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Cosmopolitan Archaeologies asks pointed questions about the politics of 
contemporary archaeological practice. Specifically, it reveals a new suite 
of roles and responsibilities for archaeology and its practitioners and it 
suggests that these newly forged relationships are inherently cosmo-
politan in nature and ethos. Cosmopolitanism describes a wide variety 
of important positions in moral and sociopolitical philosophy brought 
together by the belief that we are all citizens of the world who have 
responsibilities to others, regardless of political affiliation. This ethical 
commitment is the thread that connects cosmopolitan thought from 
the classical tradition to contemporary philosophy. Similarly, it is this 
ethical concern that has energized the debate in anthropology (e.g., 
Breckenridge et al. 2002; Kahn 2003; Rapport and Stade 2007; Werbner 
2008) and has prompted archaeology to rethink the scope of its com-
mitments at home and abroad. The subject of this volume, archaeo-
logical heritage and practice, is increasingly entwined within global 
networks, prompting scholars gradually to accept that our research and 
fieldwork carries ethical responsibilities to the living communities with 
whom we work. But more than simply adhering to ethical codes devel-
oped for our own discipline (Meskell and Pels 2005), a cosmopolitan 
approach both extends our obligations to these communities and steps 
up to acknowledge our role as participants in national and international 
organizations and developments. Honoring these obligations might 
take many forms and is dependent upon context, which means that 
we cannot expect to formulate a set of prescribed solutions that can be 
applied internationally. As the following chapters illustrate, our obliga-
tions may entail addressing the political and economic depredations 
of past regimes, enhancing local livelihoods, publicizing the effects 
of war, or tackling head on the incursions of transnational companies 
and institutions. Archaeologists are increasingly being called upon to 
straddle these multiple scales, in large part because of the nature of our 
fieldwork but also, more importantly, because heritage now occupies a 
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new position in the global movements of development, conservation, 
post-conflict restoration, and indigenous rights.
Cosmopolitanism may not provide a stock set of solutions, but I 
would argue that it offers a useful lens through which archaeologists 
might consider this new set of multi-scalar engagements. On the one 
hand, it encompasses the overarching framework of global politics and, 
on the other, it directs our attention to the concerns of the individual 
and the community. In this introduction I attempt to chart some of 
the propositions put forward in recent cosmopolitan writing that are 
particularly relevant to heritage ethics. While there are different in-
flections to cosmopolitan thought in contemporary philosophy, eco-
nomics, and politics—and in historic cosmopolitanisms from Greek, 
Roman, and Enlightenment writings—I focus here on what is often 
described as “rooted cosmopolitanism” and draw largely from discus-
sions in anthropology and philosophy. A brief historical outline then 
follows, charting archaeology’s development of a political and ethical 
awareness. Here I also consider new developments such as the grow-
ing interconnections between archaeology and anthropology, specifi-
cally in the heritage sphere, as well as the blending of ethnographic 
and archaeological methodologies in a new generation’s field projects. 
Finally, cosmopolitan heritage ethics are outlined for the individual 
chapters in the volume, particularly as they connect to local specificities 
and international processes. As we will see, many heritage practitioners 
are now willing to go beyond merely describing our negotiations and 
are attempting to redress historic injustice, social inequality, and the 
legacies of colonialism, exploitation, and violence.
Cosmopolitan Propositions
One of the key figures of contemporary cosmopolitan theory, Anthony 
Appiah, observes that cosmopolitans “take seriously the value not just 
of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking an 
interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance. People 
are different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from 
our differences. Because there are so many human possibilities worth 
exploring, we neither expect nor desire that every person or every so-
ciety should converge on a single model of life. Whatever our obliga-
tions are to others (or theirs to us) they often have the right to go their 
own way” (2006a: xv). In terms of managing the past, this means that 
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our archaeological responsibilities cannot be limited to beneficence 
or salvage; they must include respect for cultural difference—even if 
that sometimes means relinquishing our own research imperatives. Ar-
chaeologists no longer have the license to “tell” people their pasts or 
adjudicate upon the “correct” ways of protecting or using heritage. As 
Appiah rightly reminds us, “there will be times when these two ide-
als—universal concern and respect for legitimate difference—clash” 
(2006a: xv). Appiah has been at the center of just such a clash himself, 
caught between his universal concerns for access to heritage versus re-
spect for indigenous heritage practices (see Engmann 2008; chapter 
by González-Ruibal, this volume). Specifically, he maintains an elitist 
stance on cultural heritage in his native Ghana by suggesting that claims 
to global patrimony might trump local community control. As in the 
Ghanaian case, the chapters that follow underline the complexities ar-
chaeologists now face as they are being subject to the force of world 
conventions, international codes, sponsors, and other global projects, 
while respecting and often protecting local, communal, or indigenous 
understandings of the past, of heritage practices, and ways of being.
Certainly, the ideals of cosmopolitanism are not new. They stretch 
back to the Cynics and Stoics, and forward to Kant, Mill, Habermas, 
Gilroy, Žižek, and Appiah. Yet there has been a strong resurgence in 
cosmopolitan theory and ethics since the 1990s. Reasons for this new 
recasting of cosmopolitanism are manifold and must surely include 
recent military adventures in the Middle East, proliferating sites of 
genocide, and crises in humanitarian intervention, as well as global 
indigenous movements, environmental concerns, desires for world 
heritage, and the subsequent calls for return of cultural properties to 
source nations. Thus anthropologists have argued that the late twenti-
eth century forces of nationalism, multiculturalism, and globalization 
have fostered a historical context for reconsidering concepts of cosmo-
politanism (Pollock et al. 2002: 7). Given the effects of resurgent na-
tionalism on the one hand and the ever increasing claims of culture on 
the other, many scholars advocate a cosmopolitanism that is very much 
rooted in place. While synonymous with Appiah’s writing, “rooted 
cosmopolitanism” was first coined by Cohen (1992: 480, 483), when 
he called for “the fashioning of a dialectical concept of rooted cosmo-
politanism, which accepts a multiplicity of roots and branches and that 
rests on the legitimacy of plural loyalties, of standing in many circles, 
but with common ground.” Rooted cosmopolitanism acknowledges 
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attachments to place and the particular social networks, resources, and 
cultural experiences that inhabit that space. As various authors in the 
book illustrate, archaeologists are increasingly wary of strong national-
isms that may in fact mask the rights of disempowered minorities, of-
ten unacknowledged within the confines of nation. This is particularly 
salient in the realm of heritage, where individual and community at-
tachments to place are often sacrificed in the abstract framing of world 
heritage, transacted solely by and among nation states.
Cosmopolitans take cultural difference seriously, because they take 
the choices individual people make seriously. What John Stuart Mill 
said more than a century ago in On Liberty about difference within a so-
ciety serves just as well today: “If it were only that people have diversi-
ties of taste, that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all 
after one model. But different persons also require different conditions 
for their spiritual development; and can no more exist healthily in the 
same moral, than all the variety of plants can exist in the same physical, 
atmosphere and climate. The same things which are helps to one person 
towards the cultivation of his higher nature, are hindrances to another” 
(Mill 1985: 133). Cosmopolitans, by Appiah’s account (2006a), want to 
preserve a wide range of human conditions because such a range allows 
free people the best chance to constitute their own lives, yet this does not 
entail enforcing diversity by trapping people within differences they long 
to escape. This means that a cosmopolitan archaeology will not always be 
preservationist in ethos, nor would it attempt to congeal people within 
some preserved ancient authenticity. This is why many have called for 
a rooted cosmopolitanism that emanates from, and pays heed to, local 
settings and practices (see chapters by Lydon and Lilley, this volume).
Cosmopolitanism might look suspiciously like another version of 
multiculturalism. However, in this book we suggest that theories of 
multiculturalism differ from cosmopolitanism since multiculturalism 
seeks to extend equitable status or treatment to different cultural or 
religious groups within the bounds of a unified society (see Benhabib 
2002, 2004). While the ideals of multiculturalism are admirable, many 
cosmopolitans find this position problematic since it can deprivilege 
certain forms of cultural difference and subsequently disempower in-
digenous and minority communities who already have less visibility 
and representation under the state (Ivison 2006a). Many of the authors 
here speak to, if not explicitly name, the inherent problems of multicul-
tural states such as Australia or the United States, which have diverse 
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populations and manifold tensions over the claims of culture, economic 
opportunity, and indigenous rights. Charles Taylor (1994: 61–64) ar-
gues that multiculturalism results in the imposition of some cultures 
upon others with a tacit assumption of superiority. Western liberal so-
cieties are supremely guilty in this regard. In relating this to heritage, 
archaeology is increasingly employed in land claims and other forms 
of restitution for indigenous groups. A multiculturalist position might 
challenge indigenous privilege in the management and control of sacred 
places or objects for the democratic ideals of free and equal access for all. 
Conversely, a cosmopolitan stance might go beyond this recognition 
of equal value and access by considering whether cultural survival and 
indigenous practice should be considered legitimate legal goals within 
a specific society. Today, many archaeologists would consider the claims 
of connected communities primary and, in many contexts, give them 
greater weight than other stakeholders. But archaeologists must also be 
aware that while some groups may opt for cultural “preservation” and 
distinctiveness, other groups may prefer cultural integration and some-
times even “destruction” of the material past (see chapters by Lydon, 
González-Ruibal, and Colwell-Chanthaphonh, this volume). These de-
velopments represent a marked departure from the archaeology prac-
ticed in previous decades, which was satisfied with an ethos of minimum 
intervention or aspired to a “do no harm” model of coexistence.
The political ramifications of heritage have been an object of ar-
chaeological research and writing for some time. However, the scale 
and interconnectedness of archaeology’s materials, research, and field 
practices within larger global interventions and organizations repre-
sent a much newer arena for reflection. From this perspective we find 
ourselves closest to the discussions raised in anthropology around 
the ethics of cultural cosmopolitanism, yet the large-scale and collab-
orative nature of archaeological field practices provides an additional, 
complementary dimension. Cosmopolitan approaches to an archaeo-
logical past, such as those in this volume, posit a new challenge to the 
impositions of Euro-American heritage discourse by destabilizing the 
presumed cultural “goods” of world heritage, global patrimony, and 
other universalisms. These studies, with their particular materialities 
and histories, also demonstrate that “cosmopolitanism is not a circle 
created by culture diffused from a center, but instead, that centers are 
everywhere and circumferences nowhere. This ultimately suggests that 
we already are and have always been cosmopolitan, though we may not 
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always have known it” (Pollock et al. 2002: 12). Not surprisingly, the 
anthropological academy has been charged with being much less cos-
mopolitan than some of the seemingly “remote” communities within 
which we work (see essays in Werbner 2008).
In the forgoing I have suggested that the ethical responsibilities sur-
rounding heritage sites and practices now inhabit ever wider cosmo-
politan circuits. In addition, the basis of archaeology is itself inherently 
cosmopolitan through its disciplinary tactics and spatiotemporal prac-
tices. At every level our work is both multi-scalar and contextual, mak-
ing archaeology rather different from her sister disciplines of history 
and anthropology. Cosmopolitanism is thus inescapable for archaeolo-
gists who deal with uncovering human histories that transcend mod-
ern national borders and Western understandings of cultural affiliation, 
and when the results of our research have serious ramifications for liv-
ing peoples, many of whom live in non-urban contexts, depend on 
local livelihoods, and have emotive connections to place (see chapters 
by Breglia and Benavides, this volume). Cosmopolitan archaeology 
acknowledges its responsibilities to the wider world yet embraces the 
cultural differences that are premised upon particular histories, places, 
practices, and sentiments. In the heritage domain we must wrestle with 
the tensions of universalism and particularism and constantly negoti-
ate some middle ground. But as discussions of human rights demon-
strate, according to Chakrabarty (2002: 82), universalistic assumptions 
are not easily given up, and the tension between universalism and his-
torical difference is not easily dismissed. In his view cosmopolitanism 
is a particular strategy formulated in the course of this very struggle. 
Access to one’s own cultural heritage as a fundamental human right 
represents a new challenge that is fast appearing on our disciplinary 
horizon. Rights to heritage and heritage rights are gradually emerging 
within archaeological discourse (O’Keefe 2000; Prott 2002; see also 
chapters by Lydon and Hodder, this volume) whereas researchers were 
previously ill-prepared to enter debates that traversed international, 
national, and indigenous platforms.
How might cosmopolitan heritage discourse prepare us for these 
emergent struggles in which archaeological pasts are drawn into con-
temporary struggles for recognition and self-determination? Cos-
mopolitans tend to be strong proponents for the survival of cultural 
diversity. They value the inherent differences between societies and 
support the maintenance of those differences. But as a cautionary note, 
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we cannot assume that striving for cultural diversity is a necessary good 
for everyone in the arena of heritage and identity politics. Surely it is 
problematic to privilege diversity for its own sake, and rather more im-
portant to recognize the situations in which individuals and groups 
actually choose to retain their distinctive traditions and relationships 
to the material past. There is a danger that we might force indigenous 
and minority groups to succumb to oppressive legal frameworks in or-
der to gain recognition or to even claim their heritage through the 
language of international rights. We should not presume that the main-
tenance of cultural diversity is an a priori desire for all people in all 
places. Moreover, the tenets underpinning diversity, biodiversity, and 
natural heritage cannot easily be sutured to a model of cultural heritage 
(see chapter 4 by Meskell, this volume). As these struggles emerge, 
we might instead consider another cosmopolitan commitment, namely 
the equal worth and dignity of different cultures, instead of falling back 
upon the trope of diversity. Such perspectives find wide resonance 
with the concerns of political and postcolonial liberalism (Ivison 2002, 
2006b; Rawls 1993), specifically as they pertain to issues of indigenous 
heritage, recognition ethics, and social justice.
As archaeologists and ethnographers writing together and support-
ing a strong contextualism, we trace outward the relational webs that 
result from our engagements both in the field and beyond. As many of 
us have already noted, researchers will have to partake in wider social 
and political conversations, with the caveat that archaeologists are not 
the primary stakeholders or arbiters of culture and that we cannot al-
ways mandate mutually reconcilable outcomes around heritage issues. 
Cosmopolitans suppose, however, that all cultures have enough over-
lap in their vocabulary of values to begin a conversation. Yet counter to 
some universalists, they do not presume that they can craft a consen-
sus (Appiah 2006a: 57). As many of the chapters imply, archaeologists 
should expect to spend more of our time in conversation and negotia-
tion with various constituencies and be prepared to increasingly relin-
quish some of our archaeological goals.
Developing Cosmopolitan Heritages
Cosmopolitan theory is being redefined differently by scholars across 
disciplines as diverse as geography, anthropology, political and social 
theory, law, international relations, and even business management 
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(Beck and Sznaider 2006: 1). As stated above, our closest dialogue un-
derstandably remains with our colleagues in anthropology, specifically 
in regard to issues of internationalism, migration, identity politics, 
indigenous movements, postcolonialism, and ethics. Archaeology has 
been a relative latecomer to the discussion and our current contribu-
tion stems from the discipline’s gradual acknowledgment that the past 
is always present and that we are indeed responsible for the sociopoliti-
cal interventions and repercussions of the archaeological project.
Archaeology’s engagement with politics and its larger framing within 
global developments are direct outgrowths of a specific disciplinary 
trajectory that has only recently incorporated social theory, politics, 
philosophy, feminism, and indigenous scholarship. During the 1980s 
and 1990s many archaeologists deepened their awareness and applica-
tion of social theory, whereas the 1990s and the decade 2000–2009 
were marked by our recognition of the field’s sociopolitical embed-
ding. This volume is also a product of that acknowledgment. In recent 
years practitioners have become increasingly concerned with the ethi-
cal implications of their research and, more importantly, the politics 
of fieldwork, and with collaborations with local people, descendants, 
indigenous groups, and other communities of connection (e.g., Hall 
2005; Hodder 1998; Joyce 2005; Lilley and Williams 2005; Meskell 
2005a, 2005b; Smith 2004; Watkins 2004; Zimmerman et al. 2003). 
Ethics has become the subject of numerous volumes (e.g., Lynott 
and Wylie 2000; Meskell and Pels 2005; Messenger 1999; Vitelli and 
Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2006), as had politics and nationalism before 
that. Importantly, these were not simply Euro-American trends but 
were more often driven by archaeologists from Latin America, Aus-
tralasia, Africa, and the Middle East (see Abdi 2001; Funari 2004; 
Ndoro 2001; Politis 2001; Scham and Yahya 2003; Shepherd 2002). 
Indigenous issues and potential collaborations are slowly becoming 
mainstream in archaeological discussions and, while there is much that 
still needs redressing, I would argue that the language of restitution, 
repatriation, and reconciliation has gradually gained ground. Organi-
zations like the World Archaeology Congress acknowledge the disci-
pline’s colonial history and present, and they have a public mandate 
of social justice that seeks not only to instantiate a model of best prac-
tice but to go beyond in terms of reparations and enhanced livelihoods, 
to make a positive, felt impact for the communities within which ar-
chaeologists work (Meskell 2007b). These are all vital disciplinary 
introduction  9
developments that have irrevocably changed how we undertake our 
research.
It is not simply our situated contexts that have been exposed and 
challenged: our methodologies have also recently been expanded and 
reimagined. Given the current climate of research briefly outlined here, 
and the types of transnational ethical and political work undertaken, 
a new generation of archaeologists has pursued a broader suite of 
techniques and multi-sited field methods. Blurring the conventional 
disciplinary divides, archaeologists have increasingly conducted eth-
nographic work around the construction of heritage, excavated the 
archives, investigated media-based productions of knowledge, and 
worked creatively in conjunction with living communities. Sometimes 
this work is focused on the materiality of the past, but more commonly 
such research enjoys a strong contemporary emphasis and is concerned 
with deciphering the micro-politics of archaeological practice, the ef-
fects of heritage on an international scale, and the entwined global 
networks of tourism, development, and heritage agencies, nongovern-
mental organizations, and so on. Additionally, there is a burgeoning 
literature by anthropologists on archaeological and heritage projects 
(Abu el-Haj 2001; Benavides and Breglia chapters in this volume; 
Castañeda 1996; Clifford 2004; Fontein 2005; Handler 2003). Cross-
over or hybrid projects such as archaeological ethnography (Meskell 
2007a) bring a new set of connections and conversations to the fore, 
as well as disciplinary alliances, as we hope this volume demonstrates. 
Yet where this work diverges from mainstream ethnography is with 
the foregrounding of the past’s materiality, specifically those traces 
of the past that have residual afterlives in living communities, traces 
that are often considered spiritually significant, and that often invite a 
kind of governmental monitoring and control that many indigenous 
communities and archaeologists increasingly find problematic. More-
over, archaeological ethnography often entails collaborating with, 
rather than studying, the people with whom we work in the heritage 
sphere, as the following chapters demonstrate.
I would argue that the new millennium also brought with it a new 
set of concerns for archaeologists and heritage practitioners. It was no 
longer possible to take refuge in the past or in the comfort that the 
subjects of our research were dead and buried. Rather than operating 
within a circumscribed set of practices, archaeologists now find them-
selves ever broadening out to embrace the discourses and effects of 
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environmentalism, protectionism, and international law, or to con-
front the modalities of war and conflict. This expansion underlines a 
cosmopolitan commitment that follows from the discipline’s first for-
ays into sociopolitics during the 1980s and stretches ever more widely 
into the larger, international political arenas in which we are all en-
meshed. It is timely and appropriate that the first volume in this se-
ries, Material Worlds, should address these interdisciplinary concerns, 
which have become the hallmark of an engaged archaeology. As argued 
above, archaeology has always been cosmopolitan by the very nature of 
its subject matter and field practices. However, these chapters go much 
further by examining the changing nature of multi-sited fieldwork, 
exploring hybrid modes of research, and tackling the implications of 
transnational or global heritage. In the main this is not a collection 
devoted to traditional accounts of ancient societies, but rather to our 
contemporary commitments, heritage ethics, and sociopolitical link-
ages between residual pasts and projected futures.
Contributors in this volume focus largely on the “past in the present,” 
rather than the traditional “past in the past” analyses that tend to be syn-
onymous with the discipline of archaeology. The past matters a great 
deal in the present and its material residues are increasingly crucial for 
imagining possible futures, particularly for developing beneficial trajec-
tories based on the economic, political, and social potentials embedded 
within valued archaeological sites and objects. The chapters deal with 
forms of “heritage ethics”—the fusing of contemporary concerns for 
ethical collaborations, the politics of recognition, and redress around 
sites and objects in the heritage landscape. Much of this work connects 
to indigenous communities and their rights to culture, but not in ev-
ery case, since there are other minorities, descendants, diasporic com-
munities, and communities of connection with whom archaeologists 
and ethnographers collectively work. However, the chapters extend out 
even further from these networked relationships, to the worldwide or-
ganizations and entanglements with which we are inexorably bound: 
these too form critical loci for engagement with heritage ethics.
Cosmopolitan Heritage Ethics in Practice
To illustrate the complex cosmopolitan arrangements in which archae-
ologists and their objects of study are increasingly embroiled, the con-
tributors to this volume describe various forms of cosmopolitanism 
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and take different paths to documenting or reconciling social differences 
and understandings across local, national, and multinational scales.
One salient thread running through many chapters is the politics of 
something I call heritage protectionism, and by this I mean the desire 
and means to preserve certain valued sites for the global benefit of hu-
manity. Traditionally such moves have been mobilized from a Euro-
American platform based on the presumed universalism of something 
called “world heritage”—the logic of which has widespread effects in 
both international and localized settings. It has been argued that the 
ideal of universal salvage often betrays a “hypocritical neutrality, be-
hind which the domination by another conception of the good (pre-
cisely the secular ethos of equality) is merely taking refuge” (Habermas 
2003b: 24). The construction of world heritage, a supposed cosmo-
politan good, is often used to culturally demonize certain polities with 
which the West has irreconcilable differences. Recently we have seen 
the language of sanctions being used to combat the scale of looting in 
Iraq, although we know that the largest market for illegal antiquities 
remains the United States (Eck and Gerstenblith 2003). The impera-
tives for heritage protectionism are tightly wed to the familiar global 
processes of development, neoliberalism, and governmentality, with 
their attendant array of concerns. Though often filled with promise, 
many of these internationally deployed strategies also produce heritage 
victims, as Alfredo González-Ruibal documents in his chapter in this 
volume.
Instigated in the name of humanitarianism and development, the 
forced relocations of communities in Ethiopia and Brazil rely on deci-
sions underwritten by narratives of underdevelopment bolstered by the 
work of archaeologists, who have placed people such as the Awá and 
Gumuz at the far end of modernity’s spectrum. Framing such events 
in terms of an archaeology of failure, González-Ruibal goes further by 
suggesting that even some seemingly charitable community-based proj-
ects, based on the neoliberal rhetoric of development, only instantiate 
the inequities they purport to alleviate. Those who ultimately benefit 
are generally state authorities that can showcase pristine archaeology, 
the transnational companies whose business is tourism, and those who 
might gain employment in the process. Many more have something to 
lose in these new reconfigurations of heritage and tourism, namely the 
immediate residents and stakeholders who happen to live amid the ru-
ins. Using archaeology and ethnography in tandem, González-Ruibal’s 
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cosmopolitan project takes him from Spain to Brazil and Ethiopia, 
tracking the effects of development, globalization, and universalistic 
policies. This project includes uncovering the interventions of usaid, 
the World Bank, the European Union, and Italian, Dutch, and former 
Soviet organizations. His work is an example of the move toward an 
“archaeology of the present” or an archaeological ethnography, work-
ing with living peoples, their object worlds, and the remains of their 
contemporary past.
Generally, González-Ruibal is suspicious of archaeological lip service 
to multiculturalism and multivocality that draws attention to “local 
communities” but constructs their concerns and agendas as secondary 
to academic research ambitions. Heritage humanitarianism has become 
its own fetish, immersed in philanthropy and aid that generally serves 
to buttress paternalism and cultural superiority. He rightly asserts 
that archaeologists have willingly accepted funding and participated 
in heritage development projects, following the path of international 
agencies, sometimes without the consent of those most affected. In do-
ing so they are simply papering over the cracks of global disorder. He 
argues for a vernacular or marginal cosmopolitanism that aligns itself 
with the victims of progress and does not presuppose a transcendent 
human universal. Finally, he calls for an archaeology that excavates the 
devastation of modernism, which is accompanied by the betrayal, and 
often annihilation, of the communities within which we work.
Jane Lydon’s chapter guides us through the pitfalls of multicultural 
discourse in Australia today and critiques the kinds of elision and at-
tenuation of diverse cultures through globalized heritage discourses. 
In the Australian case, indigenous accounts are most vulnerable to the 
hollow multiculturalism that would purvey a singular narrative of na-
tion. Multiculturalist, not cosmopolitan, discourse underlies many of 
the claims of powerful nations to appropriate, house, and manage the 
cultural riches of others, whether on their own territory or on foreign 
soil. Multiculturalism is mobilized within nations both to embrace and 
curtail certain diverse groups that challenge the dominant fabric of na-
tion. John Howard (2006), the former Australian prime minister, used 
the rhetoric of multiculturalism to flatten diversity, particularly Aborig-
inal claims for primacy, and celebrate the “great and enduring heritage 
of Western civilisation, those nations that became the major tributar-
ies of European settlement and in turn a sense of the original ways 
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in which Australians from diverse backgrounds have created our own 
distinct history” in his call for “One People, One Destiny.” We might 
well ask whose pasts and properties are privileged or marginalized in 
those claims for multiculturalism? The seemingly positive equation of 
democratic inclusion and equality effectively trumps the preservation 
of cultural distinctiveness (Benhabib 2002: x), yet it assumes that le-
gal democracy was already forged with cultural diversity in mind—a 
situation we know is historically untrue. Furthermore, “reparations for 
past injustices by the state, law and morality can become entangled 
in contradictions, even if both are governed by the principle of equal 
respect for all. This is because law is a recursively closed medium that 
can only reflectively react to its own past decisions, but it is insensi-
tive to episodes that pre-date the legal system” (Habermas 2003b: 24). 
Proponents of strong multiculturalism would be willing to sideline the 
cultural and political understandings of law for nations with minori-
ties or indigenous groups, for example, disavowing the possibilities 
for states within states. Lydon’s chapter explains that even the Austra-
lian referendum of 1967, while ushering in significant changes, did not 
entail full citizenship rights for Aboriginal people. Thus it cannot be 
presumed that they have an inherent allegiance to a nationalist frame-
work, nor can it be assumed, conversely, that the dominant white cul-
ture necessarily embraces indigenous places and objects as sacred or 
even meaningful. International heritage discourse exacerbates the dual 
tension between valuing diversity and difference and propounding uni-
versalism. Lydon underscores the specific link between heritage dis-
courses and those of human rights, using unesco’s program of world 
heritage as the linchpin and organizational node for a global cultural 
commons. On the one hand, unesco’s documents purport to sup-
port group rights, minorities, and traditional lifestyles; on the other 
hand, its expressed allegiance to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights accords those rights to individuals, not groups (see the chapter 
by Hodder, this volume).
In Australia, Lydon contends that a cosmopolitan ethos of openness 
to cultural difference is effectively countered by the commitment to 
universal heritage values, themselves bolstered by transnational heri-
tage practices and organizations, and other sets of professional and dis-
ciplinary alliances. Archaeologists and heritage workers are situated in 
this uncomfortable impasse. Increasingly, indigenous peoples seek to 
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forge international connections, often in preference to national ones, 
constituting yet another site of emergent cosmopolitanism (see the 
chapters by Breglia and Benavides, this volume). In 1998 Aboriginal 
people petitioned unesco to stave off the incursions of the Jabiluka 
uranium mine, which threatened the Mirarr Aboriginal community 
and its lifeways. At a unesco bureau meeting in Paris, compelling 
presentations by Aboriginal leaders led to a situation where the site was 
placed on the world heritage “in danger” list without the permission 
of the host country. Juxtaposing the fractious internal heritage politics 
of Australia and its indigenous past, Lydon then documents the recent 
movement to project the nation’s heritage beyond the boundaries of 
the nation-state with the historic site of Gallipoli, Turkey. Now famed 
as a pilgrimage site, the Gallipoli Peninsula Peace Park marks the con-
flict of 1915 during which thousands of young men from Australia and 
New Zealand lost their lives to the Turks over eight months of bitter 
fighting. Claiming heritage in a foreign conflict zone has clearly proven 
more palatable to the Australian government than addressing its own 
internal repressions and seeking equitable restitution for segments of 
its citizenry. As this chapter evinces, debates over multiculturalism, in-
digenous rights, and the possibilities of transnational or cosmopolitan 
justice bring to the fore twofold tensions, namely between states and 
their minorities (or majorities), as well as states and the international 
community as defined by particular ruling bodies. The thorny relation-
ships between national sovereignty and international intervention, 
surrounding heritage and social justice, are thus bound to resurface 
continually.
Although echoing Lydon’s assertion of Australia’s shameful history 
with its indigenous minority, Ian Lilley resists the pessimism of schol-
ars such as Peter Thorley who express skepticism about successfully 
translating indigenous archaeology into practice. Within Australian 
heritage debates Thorley has claimed that indigenous and Western val-
ues cannot be bridged since even the notion of “indigenous archaeol-
ogy ” is the product of an external and powerful settler society. Taking 
a more positive stance, Lilley imputes that Australian archaeology has 
developed closer relations with indigenous peoples than that of other 
nations such as the United States (see also Lilley 2000b). Using the 
example of the influential Burra Charter, he argues that Australia has 
effectively led the way in bringing indigenous and archaeological in-
terests together as a matter of conventional professional practice at a 
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national scale. Moreover, the charter has been inspirational for a host 
of other countries from China to South Africa. One reason for this 
positive move within Australian archaeology, Lilley posits, was the 
profession’s recognition in the early 1980s that decolonization raised 
profound questions about archaeology’s relationships and responsibili-
ties to descendent communities. A second was the pragmatism of the 
discipline’s response and its development of creative solutions to these 
newfound working collaborations.
Lilley’s other fieldwork in New Caledonia provides an alternative 
national context and a site of potential conflict where Kanak inter-
pretations and those of traditional archaeology are fundamentally op-
positional. Understandably, Kanaks remain unconvinced of the virtue 
of archaeological accounts and find themselves glossed in disciplinary 
discourse as simply one group in a long series of “migrants” and “in-
vaders.” Such tensions are played out in many heritage locales and find 
resonance in the following chapters on South Africa, Turkey, and Bra-
zil. From the communities’ vantage, archaeologists should pay less 
attention to historicizing the past and more to historically bolstering 
indigenous rights. Negotiating different disciplinary and political aims 
is crucial and, as Lilley rightly recognizes, takes time, trust, and trans-
parency. His chapter recalls that archaeologists have long performed 
the role of dangerous interloper, and despite long-term intense cross-
cultural interaction researchers frequently find themselves entangled 
in encounters of profound difference. He suggests that a crucial way 
to lessen the divide is through language, specifically by practitioners 
adopting local languages and lingua francas, which he suggests are 
themselves forms of hybridized or vernacular cosmopolitanism.
A further contribution Lilley makes is methodological. He and an Ab-
original colleague have begun a collaborative project that attempts to see 
and experience the Australian landscape from indigenous perspectives. 
Linked to the new moves in collaborative archaeologies, the project takes 
seriously the animate spiritual quality that inheres in certain features and 
places and combines these with ancestral knowledge and storytelling. 
The work is part of a growing corpus of field practice in Australia and the 
Pacific, coupled with developments in Native American indigenous ar-
chaeology (for example, Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2003a; Colwell-Chan-
thaphonh and Ferguson 2004; Ferguson and Colwell-Chanthaphonh 
2006; Stoffle et al. 2001). As the second Daes Report, commissioned by 
the United Nations, attests (1999): “Indigenous peoples have explained 
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that, because of the profound relationship that [they] have to their lands, 
territories and resources, there is a need for a different conceptual frame-
work to understand this relationship and a need for recognition of the 
cultural differences that exist. Indigenous peoples have urged the world 
community to attach positive value to this distinct relationship.” As the 
first Daes Report made clear in 1997, each indigenous community must 
retain permanent control over its own heritage, but reserve the right to 
determine how that shared knowledge is used. This is tantamount to a 
lex loci, or the law of the place (Brown 2003: 210, 225).
The instantiation of an indigenous conceptual framework that em-
braces cultural difference is exemplified in Chip Colwell-Chantha-
phonh’s chapter addressing the North American context. Here he 
employs ethnographic archaeologies from contemporary Zuni, Hopi, 
and Navajo communities to underscore our obligations to embrace in-
digenous practices and worldviews, rather than retreating into a narrow 
view of protectionism. He concludes that there is no “universal” preser-
vation ethic, since preservation itself is a cultural construct, yet interna-
tional bodies like unesco insist that we universalize just such an ethic. 
Instead, our only recourse as practitioners is to a cosmopolitan heritage 
ethic. He calls for a “complex stewardship” modeled on rooted cosmo-
politanism that acknowledges that preservation is both locally enacted 
and universally sought. For Colwell-Chanthaphonh this translates into 
maximizing “the integrity of heritage objects for the good of the greatest 
number of people, but not absolutely.” His views have strong resonance 
with the tenets of postcolonial liberalism, which assert that “cultural 
difference is real, especially in the case of clashes between liberal institu-
tions and indigenous societies, but it does not follow from this that the 
differences are therefore radically incommensurable” (Ivison 2002: 36). 
Negotiation and discussion is key as Colwell-Chanthaphonh himself 
has demonstrated. Heritage practitioners are increasingly learning that 
process is everything and their commitment to inclusion, participation, 
and ongoing discussions with affected groups is paramount. Impor-
tantly, cosmopolitanism entails openness to divergent cultural experi-
ences (Hannerz 2006), which has inevitably become the hallmark of 
recent writing in interpretive, contextual, collaborative, and indigenous 
archaeologies (see Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2007).
Heritage negotiations, however, cannot simply be interpolated into 
blanket multiculturalism, since they pivot around the issue of indi-
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vidual versus group rights, as Ian Hodder spells out in his chapter. 
He advocates that rather than imposing a priori strictures (group or 
individual rights, for example), archaeologists should embark upon a 
process of deliberation and negotiation. Throughout such a process 
Hodder argues that it will often be necessary to empower local groups 
or individual voices through complex cosmopolitan alliances that cut 
across individual, local group, regional and national group, and global 
scales. Drawing on three contemporary examples from Turkey, Hodder 
demonstrates that complex cosmopolitan interactions highlight the 
need for wider legal framings around cultural heritage rights in relation 
to human rights. The first case he puts forward involves the silencing of 
a local Turkish woman in a public heritage display in Istanbul: Mavili 
plays an integral role in the archaeological project of Çatalhöyük, 
which Hodder directs. The elision of a local voice, literally and meta-
phorically, haunts any attempt to present an ethical or comprehensive 
picture of the project and illustrates the internal national tensions that 
would be rendered mute under any banner of multiculturalism. The 
Turkish state is strongly nationalist and republican, in the tradition of 
its founder, Kemal Atatürk, and promotes national unity over cultural 
diversity as Hodder’s next example lays bare. This second case involves 
an issue of reburial, specifically secularist-Islamist tensions over sixty-
four graves excavated at the site: in the summer of 2007 the first C14 
dates came back as thirteenth to fifteenth centuries ad, which could 
indicate early Islamic burials. The third case recounts relations with a 
local university in Konya, whose students participate on the project, 
specifically detailing how the university is caught between the state’s 
desire for secularism and individual expression of religious rights. As 
Hodder’s work demonstrates, cosmopolitanism has come to embrace 
a wider and more nuanced analytical reach than the traditional bifur-
cations of global and local. Certainly, community can be envisioned 
variously, and while several authors focus upon political institutions, 
Hodder focuses on moral norms, relationships, and forms of cultural 
expression. As he notes, the fabric of the nation-state is being eroded 
by claims to and about heritage, some operating at the international 
level, others instigated by intranational minorities. Others provoca-
tively ask why states are perceived to possess legitimate and exclusive 
sovereignty over all their territories (see Ivison 2006a). Why presume 
that state institutions and processes dealing with distributive justice 
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are legitimate? Going further, one might even question the carving up 
of the global into something called states in the first instance. These 
heuristics allow us to see the state strictures, not to mention interna-
tional mandates, that have been naturalized at the intranational level. 
Transnational governance represents a new and proliferating mode of 
global politics.
At present, a decentralized political system is operative where global 
allegiance around heritage ethics is thin and populated largely by in-
tellectuals and activists. Ultimately for transnational agencies to be 
modified, progress must occur in cooperation with and through nation- 
states, and in the nation-state’s role in those negotiations reside the 
same potentials for emancipation as for domination. The present apo-
ria recognizes that nationalism, even in its most oppressive times, 
cannot be easily transcended by cosmopolitan solidarity (Cheah 1998: 
312). The international public sphere is typically represented by nation-
states—the United Nations is the obvious case in point and exempli-
fies the uneven nature of member representation. For Hodder, it is a 
matter of negotiating or balancing these supra- and infra-politics of 
engagement at Çatalhöyük, from the international funders, including 
the U.S. State Department, Boeing, Yapı Kredi Bank, and Shell, to 
the local support and labor of villagers like Mavili and her family. He 
is candid that the whole project of local engagement in Çatalhöyük is 
borne out of his own interventionist agenda, while neoliberal market 
economies have also played their role in the shaping of a heritage 
landscape. Ultimately he steers us away from multiculturalist dis-
course to focus instead on human rights to counter inequalities and 
injustices. In doing so he describes the difficulties in some universal 
privileging of individual heritage rights as opposed to the group or 
community (see the chapter by Lydon, this volume). In the process 
he does not fetishize the “local” but insists that national and interna-
tional entities be brought into the frame to ensure full participation 
at various levels.
Other chapters deal more pointedly with the discourse of heritage 
conservation and its linkages to natural heritage and ecology move-
ments. For archaeologists, cultural heritage discourse has historically 
borrowed much from the tenets of nature conservation and increas-
ingly from the global desire for biodiversity, as the chapters by Byrne 
and Meskell respectively demonstrate. Conservation at these scales 
is already prefigured as a cosmopolitan value and legacy, yet a more 
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political cosmopolitanism lies behind our efforts to draw attention to 
those who happen to dwell in or near protected areas and whose own 
heritage is marginalized for the sake of some greater, global good. For 
Denis Byrne, these individuals join the ranks of the “conservation refu-
gees,” the victims of fortress conservation that, in his words, is clearly 
incompatible with a cosmopolitan respect for plurality. Thai practice 
provides the context from which Byrne explores popular culture and 
religion, the “magical supernatural” that imbues objects and places and 
is respected by Thais across the social spectrum. Archaeological sites 
themselves become the receptacles of empowerment, though foreign 
practitioners have difficulty in integrating indigenous religion into 
their own field practice and subsequently elide the most interesting 
contemporary dimensions of their research. Moreover, they grapple 
with the Thais’ abilities to incorporate state-sponsored, nationalistic 
accounts of their past while simultaneously venerating archaeological 
objects as supernaturally endowed, as in the case of the iconic heritage 
site of Sukhotai. Byrne sees Thai cosmopolitanism as sharply contras-
tive with the strict taxonomies that heritage practitioners and archae-
ologists regularly enforce. And as a result local people and popular 
religion are decoupled from heritage management, leaving both parties 
somewhat bereft. Paralleling the development of archaeology, the rise 
of the nation-state in Southeast Asia also encouraged the jettisoning of 
certain uses and experiences of the past that were deemed uncivilized 
or premodern. Acknowledging those felt perspectives and cultural dif-
ferences toward materiality, however, might lead to more tolerant and 
less polarized decision-making processes regarding heritage, preserva-
tion, conservation, and use. As Byrne reminds us, popular religious 
practice does not require our consent, but rather it is the students of 
heritage who stand to gain by taking a cosmopolitan approach.
Just as Byrne and González-Ruibal have shown the negative intersec-
tion of the politics of natural and cultural protectionism in Thailand, 
Brazil, and Ethiopia, my own chapter documents the dangerous nar-
ratives of terra nullius or “empty lands” in South Africa and the com-
munities that are forced to pay the price of global conservation and 
biodiversity. My own archaeological ethnography asks how different 
black communities living on the edge of a celebrated national park en-
vision the global. Like Lydon’s case of Jabiluka, the communities bor-
dering Kruger National Park draw upon the networks of indigenous 
rights, international law, and expert international researchers to craft 
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a particular identity and stake in the reclaiming of the natural com-
mons. And even so-called national parks are ipso facto transnational 
bodies composed of American funders, European aid agencies, ngos, 
government officials, impoverished park workers, and foreign research 
scientists. Identifying competing conceptions of the common good, 
and the practices by which new and emergent social realities come into 
being, is very much at issue in this chapter and others throughout this 
volume. Multicultural discourse cannot hope to explain or encompass 
these processes, since they are not confined to a notion of pluralism, 
but to cosmopolitan openness, self-constitution, and transformation. 
Philosophers such as Benhabib (2002: ix–x) adopt an academic stance 
by opposing social movements that maintain the distinctiveness of cul-
tures, finding them fundamentally irreconcilable with democratic con-
siderations. Her position finds little purchase with those individuals 
and communities around Kruger and elsewhere who currently struggle 
for recognition and restitution from the state. What is troubling with 
bourgeois theories of justice is the propensity to detemporalize or 
decontextualize, presenting themselves as fixed and unchanging stan-
dards (Ruiters 2002: 120). Such abstractions fail to account for real 
institutions and relations in practice. How would such a theoretical 
position account for the situation in South Africa, where the majority 
is not synonymous with colonizer and the minority with indigenous 
community per se, where indigeneity is multiply claimed across many 
ethnic categories, and where ethnicity and religion are complexly cross-
cutting and even fractious?
Discourses of biodiversity form the backdrop to this chapter, spe-
cifically its global success and ability to outstrip cultural heritage on 
national and international agendas. These discourses privilege nature 
over culture and typically sacrifice historic recognition and restitution 
for the “greater good” of conservation. Irrespective of leadership or 
regime change in South African national parks, state power continues 
to devalue the archaeological past and its human histories. Narratives 
of terra nullius have resurfaced in dangerous and familiar ways. The 
now discredited discourse erases indigenous histories and is perilously 
hitched to the celebratory discourses of conservation and biodiversity, 
since both espouse global desires for pristine wilderness, minimal hu-
man intensification, the erasure of anthropogenic landscapes, the pri-
macy of non-human species, sustainability, and so on. There is a denial 
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of indigenous presence, irrespective of the documented rock art, pre-
historic sites, and Iron Age remains that number well over one thou-
sand within Kruger’s borders. Without recognition of the complex and 
continued human history in Kruger’s landscapes there is little chance 
of historical justice and restitution for indigenous South Africans in 
these regions. Archaeologists have played no small part in this erasure, 
certainly during the apartheid years, and their racialized narratives, and 
even their silences, have had tremendous residual force to this day for 
black South Africans. Cultural heritage is seen as divisive and particu-
lar, whereas natural heritage is global and encompassing, entreating us 
all to subscribe to its world-making project.
A consistent concern throughout the chapters is the fallout for local 
communities and other stakeholders who inhabit heritage landscapes 
and inadvertently bear the brunt of our archaeological fieldwork and 
findings. Sandra Arnold Scham’s chapter reveals that even our current 
crises in the Middle East are not free from archaeology’s disciplinary 
misadventures. She asserts that archaeologists have narrativized the 
East as more religious, irrational, ritualistic, and oppressive. And the 
premises and practices we enjoy are often directly fed back into popu-
lar conceptions of the Middle East, or perhaps worse, U.S. foreign 
policy discussions. Archaeologists working in the region, in Scham’s 
view, continually stress sacred or ritualized material culture, thereby 
capitulating to an image of the East as being more religious and less 
secular by the very nature of our research. Our taxonomies are mutu-
ally exclusive rather than permeable, she imputes, and the resultant pic-
ture constructs religion in a wholly Western guise that is all pervasive, 
extremist, and impractical, existing as a force external to culture and 
society.
Taking this squarely into the realm of heritage ethics, Scham inter-
rogates the Archaeological Institute of America’s Open Declaration on 
Cultural Heritage at Risk, which was circulated to the U.S. govern-
ment before the invasion of Iraq. Surely, she muses, human life is not 
secondary to cultural property? But scholars of the Middle East have 
inevitably couched their preoccupations with invasion and conflict “in 
terms of preserving things rather than people.” Instead of focusing on 
these preoccupations she extends the cosmopolitan idea of hospitality, 
inspired by Derrida and Habermas, and tempered by her own excava-
tion experiences, as a set of obligations on the part of hosts and guests, 
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which is becoming so crucial for our continued fieldwork in the ar-
chaeological present. Critical of those who fail to honor obligations 
to those with whom we work, she suggests that these decisions are 
sometimes premised upon derogatory views of Middle Eastern cul-
ture, and that even our oft-critiqued “Orientalist” forebears assessed 
the situation with greater savvy by employing local workers rather 
than wealthy Western students. Her work poignantly demonstrates 
who wins and loses in our disciplinary and personal refusals to engage, 
whether at the local or international scale. While the Middle East is 
always positioned as the most extreme or volatile heritage scape, the 
attitudes and fallouts she exposes occur globally, as other chapters in 
this volume detail.
Lisa Breglia’s chapter critically examines the consequences of achiev-
ing world heritage status for those who live and work in the shadows 
of global patrimony. Her ethnographic study reveals how a celebrated 
Mayan heritage has ultimately failed its immediate stakeholders and 
what remains is a shrinking horizon of possibility for social, economic, 
and cultural uplift. Despite Chichén Itzá’s cosmopolitan underpin-
nings and the promise of neoliberal development, the inequities of 
labor regimes, land use, tenure, and ownership remain intransigent. 
Moreover, she draws a distinction between the attitudes and experi-
ences of Yucatec Maya and other Mexican citizens around the site as 
they are polarized within a disjointed nationalism, itself a reminder of 
the fractious nature of the local. In the context of Mexican heritage, 
nationalism is an artifice that is exposed and effaced through an ar-
chaeological past and thus the nation-state falls short. Ethnographic 
interviews with Chichén Itzá’s heritage workers reveal that their at-
titudes extend beyond indigenous appeals toward a cosmopolitan 
discourse on global culture, internationalism, and supranational con-
structions of rights and duties connected to citizenship (see the chapter 
by Lydon, this volume). Tensions between Mexicans and indigenous 
Maya site custodians abound: the former flagrantly resist site rules and 
restrictions, damage the monuments, and litter the site, according to 
the latter. Breglia asserts that site workers are implementing their own 
“cosmopolitan, postnational politics of location that highlights the 
tenuousness of the modern apparatus that grafts together archaeology, 
heritage, tourism, and nationalism, hiding the diverse interests of each 
in order to create the illusion of a supposedly transparent site of Mexi-
canness.” As with Hodder’s contribution, archaeologists cannot sim-
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ply tack between community and state entities, as the nation-state so 
often fails its minorities, sometimes silencing or erasing their pasts and 
presents. Breglia further argues that while heritage scapes are tacitly 
cosmopolitan due to their global connectedness and tourist markets, 
the social relations between workers, local residents, landowners, man-
agers, archaeologists, bureaucrats, and tourists reflect an even greater 
quotidian cosmopolitanism.
In such heritage settings, cosmopolitans would consider that though 
indigenous individuals and connected communities have certain rights 
and claims to culture, they are not trapped by ancient identities and 
necessarily expected to perform them in the present. However, identity 
politics may be a necessary avenue to pursue in order to gain adequate 
restitution for the past in the present. Hugo Benavides’s ethnographic 
work in Ecuador lays bare the fiction of cultural authenticity within a 
nationalizing project, as the latter abuts the “progressive” neoliberal 
entities of sustainable development, eco-tourism, and indigenous hu-
man rights that are invested in reproducing global difference. He asks 
how the archaeological remains of a pre-Hispanic past become a tool 
for hegemonic reproduction against a backdrop of transnational cul-
tural diversity. In his account, Indian and black diasporic communities 
are reified as the national “other ” despite claims to a grounded national 
identity based on geographical legitimization that is equal to or greater 
than the white elite. Referencing three archaeological sites, Benavides 
describes the contemporary fashioning of a politically expedient “Indi-
anness” through heritage, the narratives of continuity, and the fallbacks 
to hardened categories of race and pristine culture, all of which are in-
fluenced by the machinations of global capital and struggles for politi-
cal recognition. However, with the palpable disinterest in excavating 
black maroon sites, an Afro-Ecuadorian archaeological research legacy 
is left languishing. Those of us working in the interstices of cultures 
and histories have held deep expectations on how indigenous groups 
are meant to behave or supposed to perform their historical connec-
tions. Archaeologists must be more embracing of cultural difference in 
the present, in our own contact zones and our own clashes of cultures. 
There are myriad ways in which past inheritance can be embodied, felt, 
narrated, mobilized, and experienced: there is no single path to cultural 
legitimacy.
Like those of many other authors in this book, Benavides’s findings 
impel practitioners to consider the interventions of multinational bodies, 
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international legal framings, and rights movements that go beyond 
cultural heritage imperatives, because they are frequently interpolated 
into broader development schemes, the involvement of ngos, corpo-
rations, and the workings of global capital. In his words, “Ecuador 
as a whole cannot be a competitive player in today’s global market 
without a coherent story of a pre-Hispanic historical narrative.” And 
archaeologists proffer the means of legitimating political struggles and 
thus enable hegemonic entry into the contested domain of transna-
tional market imperatives. This is by no means a celebratory cosmo-
politanism, but rather a fraught cosmopolitics, emphasizing the “need 
to introduce order and accountability into this newly dynamic space of 
gushingly unrestrained sentiments, pieties and urgencies for which no 
adequately discriminating lexicon has had time to develop” (Robbins 
1998: 9). As the chapters in this volume elucidate, an attention to cos-
mopolitanism is a recognition of our obligations and responsibilities, 
historically and presently: it is neither a theoretical gloss nor a political 
trend scholars could hope to bypass or one day overcome. It is the 
position we as archaeologists find ourselves in today, much as social an-
thropologists and others have previously acknowledged (Breckenridge 
et al. 2002; Cheah and Robbins 1998; Hannerz 2006; Latour 2004; 
Mignolo 2002). Stimulated by the discipline’s political and ethical en-
gagements and bolstered by a new incursion into ethnographic and 
hybrid field practices, archaeologists and heritage workers are already 
caught up in cosmopolitics. With such a legacy from the past and set of 
responsibilities for the present and future, archaeologists should accept 
that there will be troubling terrain ahead. The challenge may require 
us to relinquish some of our own goals and set those within a wider 
international arena, as well as redress the hierarchical relationships of 
power in which we are all enmeshed.
Implications for the Archaeological Present
The subject of our research, the archaeological past and present, is situ-
ated firmly within a suite of cosmopolitan dispositions and practices: 
extensive mobility and travel; consuming places and environments; cu-
riosity about people, places, and cultures; experiencing risks in encoun-
tering others; mapping various cultures and societies; semiotic skills 
in interpreting others; openness to different languages and cultures 
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(Szerszynski and Urry 2006: 114–15). Cosmopolitan Archaeologies rec-
ognizes that particular “locals,” “communities,” and “national” bod-
ies have complex interactions with various international sponsors and 
universities, conservation agencies, development organizations, and 
ngos, thus challenging simplistic notions of globalization or homog-
enization. The shorthand of local and global, caricatured by imputed 
cultural designations of traditional versus capitalist, falls short of the 
current complexities we all necessarily face on the ground. The util-
ity of the term globalization, once descriptive of the macroeconomic 
turn, is further restricted by the fact that it now stands for everything 
and nothing simultaneously. What is appealing about cosmopolitan-
ism is that while the processes of globalization lay claim to an over-
arching homogeneity of the planet in economic, political, and cultural 
spheres, the term cosmopolitanism might be employed as a counter to 
globalization from below. It also effectively overturns any notion that 
the local, situated contexts in which we work as archaeologists or eth-
nographers are isolated, traditional, disengaged, or disconnected from 
larger processes, institutions, organizations, consumer networks, and 
knowledges. While globalization is seen as something happening “out 
there,” cosmopolitanism happens from within (Beck and Sznaider 
2006: 9). As archaeologists and anthropologists, we are primed to be 
attentive to specific local contexts and histories that plan and project 
global designs and understandings in particular modalities (Mignolo 
2002: 157). Studies of the archaeological present have lately evinced this 
local dimension, placing local communities and understandings at the 
forefront of our research agendas.
The chapters in this book are testament to a range of diverse cosmo-
politanisms around the broad topic of heritage ethics. Through sus-
tained case studies we examine the ways in which local and national 
heritage politics are made and unmade through international dis-
courses and regulations; how transnational bodies and organizations 
such as unesco, the World Bank, and conservation and funding agen-
cies are curiously brought into play in local arenas. Balancing appeals 
to universalism with that of cultural difference remains a critical ten-
sion that underlines much of the existing literature on heritage and our 
engagements as practitioners. These strange proximities and multiplic-
ities are experienced in particular regions and locales in distinct ways, 
even though the organizational directives might aspire to a presumed 
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universality and neutrality. We have also explored the politics of sal-
vage, with its incentives of the common good that are based on prom-
ises, driven by the future, and depend upon networks of participation, 
discipline, and sacrifice that discursively create desirable heritage citi-
zens (see Hayden 2003). In an Orwellian tone, interventionist policies 
that control the past also serve to predict future outcomes, promis-
ing sustainable development, betterment, and socioeconomic uplift. 
What must be sublated in the present will be recouped in the future by 
coming generations, while international elites and the adequately re-
sourced will be able to enjoy the spoils of heritage and conservation in 
the present in the form of cultural and ecological tourism and research. 
Such promissory strategies tend to deprivilege indigenous and minor-
ity communities, often disempowered constituencies whose land, live-
lihoods, and legacies are threatened.
Collectively we take seriously the intellectual foundations and politi-
cal economies of heritage—the legal, political, and ethical strata that 
underlie implicit tensions over access, preservation, and control of the 
material past in an unstable present. We question the translatability of 
heritage terms and practices across a wide array of sites and locations. 
Through the lens of cosmopolitanism we consider the discursive pro-
duction, consumption, and governing of other people’s pasts through 
examination of the participants, organizations, stakeholders, beneficia-
ries, and victims. In the future, a cosmopolitan archaeology is likely 
to fuel lines of inquiry into emergent experiences, commitments, and 
relationships, as well as critique its opposites and adversaries in de-
bate (Hannerz 2006: 84). Taken with our obligation to reflexivity and 
alongside further theoretical and methodological developments, those 
of us working within heritage ethics will continue to reexamine and 
recast our own commitments and identifications in true cosmopolitan 
spirit.
Note 
Versions of this chapter were given at the Cultures of Contact Conference at 
Stanford University, the plenary panel of the Thirty-ninth Annual Chacmool 
Conference held in Calgary entitled “Decolonizing Archaeology: Archaeol-
ogy and the Post-Colonial Critique,” and the “Identités, Mémoires et Culture: 
Une Vision Transnationale du Patrimonie” workshop at the Collège de France, 
Paris. I am grateful for comments and suggestions by those participating. 
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Emma Blake, Denis Byrne, Ian Hodder, and Carolyn Nakamura read and com-
mented on earlier drafts. Lindsay Weiss has also offered intellectual directions 
and key references for this work over the years that have proven invaluable. 
Finally, I want to thank Ken Wissoker, who patiently offered his invaluable 
direction and insight throughout the writing process.
Jane Lydon
1  i young and free 
The Australian Past in a Global Future
Australians all let us rejoice
For we are young and free
We’ve golden soil and wealth for toil,
Our home is girt by sea:
Our land abounds in nature’s gifts
Of beauty rich and rare,
In history’s page let every stage
Advance Australia fair,
In joyful strains then let us sing
Advance Australia fair.
—“Advance Australia Fair ” 
The Australian national anthem continues to resonate with a popular 
sense of the country’s relatively recent origin, unfettered by a grim Eu-
ropean past—Australians feel “young and free,” with a history still to 
write, no choice but to advance. This identity is of course defined in 
relation to an international community, as indeed it has always been—
but in an age of increasing global interconnectedness, the importance 
of the nation as a framework for understanding the Australian past (and 
therefore its present and future), has in some respects only strength-
ened. However, against this powerful narrative, a well-established cri-
tique of Australian heritage has identified problems with this national 
framework, and especially the suppression of indigenous experience 
entailed in creating a solid national foundation. Calls for transnational 
histories that re-site the nation within more global accounts of migra-
tion and exchange (for example, Curthoys and Lake 2005) potentially 
de-emphasize the state and reaffirm the status of “first ” peoples within 
longer-term trajectories of human endeavor. Heritage is now a global 
discourse and can also be seen as a discourse of globalization that en-
folds diverse cultures and attitudes toward the past into a single nar-
rative. Internal tension between an openness to cultural difference and 
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simultaneously a commitment to universal values remains unresolved, 
yet new forms of significance that are emerging within international 
heritage praxis, as people become enmeshed within transnational al-
liances, reveal new modes of political community. Processes such as 
the participation of indigenous peoples in international institutions in 
preference to national ones do not merely challenge the legitimacy of 
the states’ claim to exclusive jurisdiction over territory, but in fact con-
stitute an “emergent cosmopolitanism” (Ivison 2006a) that is compat-
ible with universal notions of justice and yet is also rooted in particular, 
local ways of life.
Cosmopolitanism and Heritage
Many theories of global interconnectedness focus on the tension be-
tween different conceptions of human subjectivity and difference, 
often expressed as an opposition between universalism and relativ-
ism, and linked to notions of individual versus collective rights, and 
concomitant conceptions of culture as either fluid and contingent, 
or as bounded and local. International heritage discourse is similarly 
structured by this dual commitment—to global peace and prosperity 
grounded in universal human rights, but also to cultural diversity.
As formative analyses of the complexity and flux of globalization sug-
gested (for example, Hannerz 1992; Featherstone 1990), diffusionist 
models (sometimes caricatured as coca colonization) are inadequate to 
explain processes of global interconnectedness, which are characterized 
not merely by homogenization and integration but also by the prolif-
eration of diversity. The dissolution of some boundaries—most clearly, 
through mediatization and capital flow, travel and migration—has si-
multaneously acted to strengthen others and, most notably, a sense of 
local distinctiveness. Despite the persistence or even intensification of 
some normative orders within global processes, a sense of difference is 
constructed in relation to others in an enhanced awareness of plurality. 
Although cultural forms may be global, their interpretation and use are 
shaped by local values.
Visions of the ethical, emancipatory potential of an interconnected 
world, such as Kantian conceptions of cosmopolitanism, are character-
ized by a commitment to the equal worth and dignity of all human be-
ings, linked to standards of justice that are intended to be applicable to 
all while at the same time retaining an openness to local different ways 
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of life (Appiah 2006a). As an intellectual ethos this stance transcends 
the particularistic and contingent ties of kin and country, constituting 
“an institutionally grounded global political consciousness” (Cheah 
2006: 491). The tension between the principles of universalism and 
local difference is central to current analysis of global networks, linked 
to concepts of universal human rights and local values. As I explore 
further, this apparent conceptual paradox is identified as a dilemma 
within both human rights and heritage discourse as well as theories 
of political community such as cosmopolitanism; it is a problem not 
merely of articulation between different orders of practice, but of how 
to conceive human subjectivity and difference.
It is often argued that the proliferation of international human rights 
law over recent decades has rendered it “one of the most globalized 
political values of our times” (Wilson 1997: 1), giving rise to “feasible 
global forms of political consciousness” that may regulate the excesses 
of capitalist globalization (Cheah 2006: 491). One of the central issues 
in this area has often been expressed as a contradiction between univer-
sal human rights with their emphasis on individual equality, and local 
culture and group rights—sometimes termed the “universalism versus 
relativism” debate. Relativist critique of universalism identifies the 
socially and historically contingent nature of human rights discourse, 
which emerged in its current form in Europe in the aftermath of World 
War II (with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948) 
within a Western ideology of liberalism and the bourgeois categories 
of possessive individualism. Such critique points to the global diversity 
of legal systems and especially indigenous peoples’ claims to communal 
rights to land ownership or self-determination. The relativist critique 
relies upon a conception of culture as an entity—static, internally uni-
form, and historically bounded, rather than a contested and emergent 
process. In practical terms, the concept of “unity in diversity” becomes 
problematic when “culture” violates “universal rights”—or conversely, 
when minority cultures are objectified and penalized for changing.
The tension between universalism and cultural relativism is also ap-
parent within international heritage discourse. Like human rights, her-
itage now constitutes a world network of organizations, policies, and 
practices, represented at a global level by the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (unesco), which aims “to 
build peace in the minds of men” and to promote prosperity around 
the globe. Many have noted that in its promotion of Western notions 
australian past in a global future 31
of heritage—as material and authentic, for example—heritage can also 
be seen as a discourse of globalization (Ireland and Lydon 2005: 20). 
One of its key programs is the preservation of “culture,” deployed 
largely through the framework of “world heritage” and the “world 
heritage list,” conceived as universally owned. As unesco’s website 
declares, “What makes the concept of World Heritage exceptional is 
its universal application. World Heritage sites belong to all the peoples 
of the world, irrespective of the territory on which they are located,” 
in a vision of a global cultural commons. To be listed, places must be 
“considered to be of outstanding value to humanity” (unesco 1972), 
yet this notion of universal value is predicated upon an understanding 
of humankind as irreducibly diverse.
It is also linked to a commitment to a universal right to culture, as 
human rights discourse is increasingly drawn upon by the international 
heritage movement. First articulated by unesco during the 1960s, in 
a climate of postwar decolonization, demands by the indigenous in-
cluded the right to “enjoy their own culture.”1 By the 1990s the per-
ceived effects of globalization in homogenizing local cultures prompted 
the protection of diversity as a major theme of unesco’s activity. The 
World Commission on Culture and Development’s statement of 1995 
regarding culture in the contemporary world—Our Creative Diver-
sity—articulated a new ethic of diversity that reached its fullest expres-
sion in the Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity 2001: here for the 
first time cultural diversity was termed “the common heritage of hu-
manity,” the defense of which was deemed to be an ethical and practi-
cal imperative, “inseparable from respect for human dignity” (unesco 
2001: 20). But as Thomas Eriksen’s discussion (2001) of Our Creative 
Diversity points out, unesco’s insistence upon cultural difference con-
tradicts its promotion of a universalist view of ethics. Placing an exoti-
cist emphasis on culture as difference—focusing on those symbolic acts 
that demarcate boundaries between groups, and the traditions associ-
ated with a single set of people and their heritage or “roots”—is linked 
to the anthropological paradigms of cultural relativism and structural-
ism. Yet the report simultaneously deploys a more fluid conception of 
culture as globalization, creolization, and “impulses”—a view linked 
to poststructuralist deconstructionist approaches. Hence the report 
simultaneously defends “group rights,” “the protection of minori-
ties,” and the identification of claimants as living “traditional lifestyles” 
while also expressing a commitment to the Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights, which accords rights to individuals, not groups. As I 
have noted, the dilemma in this dual position is the inevitable conflict 
between collective minority rights and individual rights.
Too often, the reification of culture has trapped minority groups be-
tween the identification of claimants (as leading “traditional lifestyles”) 
and their own need to change and engage with global processes to sur-
vive. By detaching heritage from the local context that gave it meaning, 
heritage may disenfranchise communities. For example, Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett (2006: 2, original emphasis) argues that through its metacul-
tural application of museological methods to living people and culture, 
an asymmetry is produced between “the diversity of those who produce 
cultural assets in the first place and the humanity to which those assets 
come to belong as world heritage.” Others suggest that in practice local 
concepts of value may be incorporated into Western heritage meth-
odology, for example through heritage tools such as Australia’s Burra 
Charter (Sullivan 2005).
Recent moves toward broadening the concept of culture to include 
intangible cultural heritage make these problems more explicit. As 
practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, and skills “embod-
ied in people rather than in inanimate objects,” such heritage high-
lights its vulnerability to repressive cultural practices that contravene 
human rights—such as in Myanmar, where the use of forced labor for 
monumental restoration is argued to fall within the traditional Bud-
dhist practice of merit-making. William Logan (2008; and see the 
chapter by Hodder, this volume) argues for the use of human rights 
instruments to regulate heritage practice and the development of a hi-
erarchy of human rights forms, with rights to cultural heritage giving 
precedence to rights to freedom from slavery or torture.
Notwithstanding the recurrent framing of the relationship between 
universalism and cultural relativism as a dilemma, it seems more pro-
ductive to avoid opposing these tendencies in any absolute fashion. 
Dichotomization of universal and local values overlooks the effects of 
globalization and transnational juridical processes: many indigenous 
peoples, for example, are adopting human rights doctrine, and refer-
ring to themselves as “indigenous”—that is, choosing to identify with 
a pan-global category. Such phenomena undermine bounded, static 
conceptions of culture as “values,” expressing rather a dynamic, fluid 
conception of culture that is not necessarily at odds with human rights 
(for example, Merry 2003). To understand the “social life of rights” we 
australian past in a global future 33
need to attend to the actions and intentions of social actors, within 
the wider constraints of institutional power; ethnography of a network 
considers “the way people are drawn into a more globalised existence 
and become enmeshed in transnational linkages” (Wilson 1997: 13). 
Universality becomes a matter of context. Such analysis reveals the 
sets of conjunctural relationships that constitute local meanings and 
identities (e.g., Breckenridge et al. 2002), at the same time as transna-
tional practices and categories are resisted and appropriated according 
to context; meaning does not reside within culturally bounded and set 
values but flows through global interconnections at local, national, and 
global levels.
Universal or Elite Value? Reinscribing the Nation
Recent critique of the notion of “outstanding universal value,” a key 
concept for the World Heritage Convention, has pointed out that de-
spite the centrality of liberal values and particularly participatory de-
mocracy to international heritage discourse, in practice such discourse 
reproduces elitist Western methodologies and ideals; through imple-
mentation at the level of the state, national myths continue to feature 
the heroic male, excluding other groups and notably women (Labadi 
2005, 2006). Heritage management frameworks have overemphasized 
a bounded national past and underplayed the nation’s involvement in 
transnational histories—for example of migration and empire.
Certainly, the nation has not lost its salience as the dominant frame-
work for understanding the Australian past—it seems that an enhanced 
awareness of a global context has only increased this sense of distinc-
tiveness, as nationalist legends are retold as a way of asserting mem-
bership in an international community. As the website of the federal 
Department of the Environment and Heritage (2007a) declares under 
the banner of “Australian Heritage,” “By knowing our heritage—our 
past, our places and the source of our values—we can better under-
stand our special place in the world.”
A substantial body of critique has demonstrated (e.g., Byrne 1996; 
L. Smith 2000; Ireland 2002) that from its inception during the 1960s 
Australian heritage was used to tell a unique national story that masked 
internal complexity while marginalizing the nation’s broader entangle-
ment within transnational historical processes such as the spread of 
humans across the Pacific, indigenous settlement, and migration. As a 
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form of historical consciousness, a focus of social memory and shared 
narratives, heritage has become the primary way in which the past is 
invoked by cultural institutions such as museums, enfolding conflict 
within a consensual national past (Ireland and Lydon 2005; Young 
1999: 12–13). Heritage representations, grounded in archaeological and 
historical narratives, continue to reinscribe the national stories of co-
lonial discovery and settlement, “pioneer” achievement, and freedom 
won through heroism at war. Such stories are linked to the values of 
“mateship,” decency, courage, and egalitarianism that continue to 
structure current political arguments about issues such as immigration 
restriction, border defense, and the treatment of Aboriginal people. 
Postcolonial critique of the celebratory version of white settlement 
over the last two decades has shifted mainstream perceptions of the na-
tion’s origins, as indigenous experience and injustice have challenged 
or been integrated into public memory. Yet while such reappraisal is 
hotly contested (e.g., Macintyre and Clark 2003), the centrality of the 
nation endures.
Changes to the Australian national heritage regime in 2005 marked 
a tension between new modes of practice that acknowledge shifting 
public interests in the past—such as “intangible cultural heritage” and 
an emphasis on social value—and the heritage inventory as a tool for 
producing a seemingly apolitical and unambiguous national story. The 
new National Heritage List, where places are protected by stronger 
commonwealth powers, has further reified the concept of “national 
significance” within legislation, heightening the existing tendency for 
a national “high culture” to be promoted and policed by the state’s 
normative cultural institutions. One issue here is that this method of 
assessing places according to their degree of national importance—
whether they reach a particular “threshold” of significance—is clearly 
at odds with the way that Aboriginal people have valued their places, 
which has been inclusive rather than comparative. For Aboriginal 
people, representing hundreds of small linguistic and cultural entities 
across the continent, and excluded from citizenship until 1967, no al-
legiance to a national framework can be assumed. By the same token, 
the places held dear to these groups may not be considered important 
enough to qualify for listing at this level, omitting what many would 
consider to be a key aspect of Australian culture (Lydon and Ireland 
2005).
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Gallipoli: Hills, Ridges, and Gullies
Within an expanded international context, key national stories have 
been reanimated, as an enhanced global interconnectedness has simul-
taneously acted to strengthen a sense of distinctive Australian identity. 
The site of Gallipoli, in Turkey, has long held a sacred dimension for 
many Australians as the “birthplace of the nation” and as a symbol of 
shared core values. It marks the landing on April 25, 1915 of the seven-
teen thousand troops of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps 
(anzacs) in support of the British in a campaign that aimed to capture 
Constantinople and remove Turkey from the war. After a protracted 
and ruinous eight-month siege, the allies were forced to withdraw with 
heavy losses. But the “anzac spirit”—courage, endurance, initiative, 
discipline, and the mateship born of egalitarianism and hardship—con-
tinues to be invoked by Australians. In popular parlance, the anzac 
“digger” “rejected unnecessary restrictions, possessed a sardonic sense 
of humour, was contemptuous of danger, and proved himself the equal 
of anyone on the battlefield” (Australian War Memorial 2007).
Over recent years there has been an astonishing rise in the popular-
ity of the anzac legend, evident in growing attendance at anzac Day 
ceremonies around Australia, in an explosion of books, films, and mu-
seums on the subject, and especially in the emergence of a well-trodden 
tourist pilgrimage to “the Peninsula,” made possible by mass global 
travel. In 1998, two hundred people attended the Dawn Service at An-
zac Cove on April 25, and this increased to ten thousand in 2000, and 
eighteen thousand in 2004, while organizers anticipate at least twenty 
thousand visitors for the one hundredth anniversary in 2015 (Parlia-
ment of Australia 2005: 27). On one level, this intensification of senti-
ment is testament to the privileged role of war in the national psyche. 
The surge in Gallipoli commemoration also coincides with the passing 
of the last “diggers,” suggesting that we are witnessing a process of 
valorization as the campaign slips out of lived experience, and bereave-
ment turns to nostalgia. This process also seems to have changed popu-
lar assessments of the campaign’s military impact, for example, with 
one observer claiming: “I think it’s important that we’re now no longer 
saying . . . that in the First World War Australians fought other peo-
ple’s wars and died in vain, which I think was historically wrong, but 
also a dreadful commentary on the suffering of the fallen. I think what 
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political leaders . . . are now saying is that the men and women who 
went there did a noble thing, and essentially the cause for which they 
fought was a noble cause” (Kirk 2000). Hence the anzac Day address 
of John Howard, the former prime minister of Australia, expressed the 
prevalent attitude in declaring that “today’s generations thank you for 
making this a free society. We thank you for the way of life that we all 
enjoy” (Howard 2005).
Celebration of the legend reached a climax of sorts in late 2003 when 
Howard pledged that “the Anzac site at Gallipoli should represent the 
first nomination for inclusion on the [new] National Heritage List.” 
But one year later it was revealed that the Turkish government had 
rejected this suggestion because it had concerns that the listing would 
compromise its sovereignty; instead the governments agreed to seek 
“some symbolic recognition” (Griffiths 2005). This rebuff followed a 
long history of commemoration and protection of the anzac terri-
tory: in 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne had provided for granting the land 
“in which are situated the graves, cemeteries, ossuaries or memorials 
of their soldiers and sailors” to host governments; in 1973 the Galli-
poli Peninsula National Historic Park was listed in the un’s List of 
National Parks and Protected Areas; in 1996 the Gallipoli Peninsula 
Peace Park was established, expanding the area’s extent to thirty-three 
thousand hectares (Cameron and Donlon 2005: 133). The Australian 
government’s attempt to list the peninsula reveals the enduring link 
between identity and bounded territory; its decision—astonishing to 
some—to inaugurate a category of national icons by recognizing a 
place on the other side of the world expresses an impossible impulse 
to transcend time and space by incorporating this sacred site into the 
national body.
The physical terrain and bodily experience of visiting the penin-
sula has also become an increasingly important part of the legend, as 
pilgrimage to the site, especially by young backpackers, combines a 
spiritual quest, a search for family, a post-Vietnam revival of patriotic 
fervor, and a desire to witness a defining moment in the national past 
(Scates 2002, 2003, 2006). Crucially, the expatriate’s need to reassert a 
unique national identity has led to the incorporation of the site into an 
international tourist itinerary, commemorating the importance of home 
for those so far away from it, and providing a sense of shared history: 
as one young visitor explained, the experience “gives you something 
to tie yourself to while you are travelling overseas” (quoted in Scates 
australian past in a global future 37
2002: 12). For the global traveler, the Gallipoli pilgrimage provides the 
juxtaposition of a key moment in recent Australian history with the an-
cient, exotic world of the guidebook, enfolding them into a coherent, 
satisfying journey into the past.
Commemorative ceremonies such as the prime minister’s anzac 
Day speeches also celebrate the harsh terrain, a dramatic landscape that 
evokes the hardship and futility of the campaign. Howard (2005) said, 
“Ninety years ago, as dawn began to break, the first sons of a young 
nation assailed these shores. These young Australians, with their New 
Zealand comrades, had come to do their bit in a maelstrom not of their 
making. Over eight impossible months, they forged a legend whose 
grip on us grows tighter with each passing year. In the hills, ridges and 
gullies above us the Anzacs fought, died, dug in and hung on. Here 
they won a compelling place in the Australian story.” For this reason 
tremendous controversy surrounded roadworks carried out in 2005 in 
preparation for the ninetieth anniversary, causing damage to the land-
scape and exposing the remains of soldiers killed without burial in the 
conflict (Cameron and Donlon 2005). Following this scandal, further 
archaeological assessment of the landscape has been commissioned by 
the Australian government, but the scope of this proposal has been 
broadened to encompass the ancient archaeological remains of the 
peninsula, distancing the government from the recent controversy 
by downplaying the most recent episode of the place’s significance in 
heritage terms, and contextualizing it within a much longer history of 
conflict and reconstruction.
Gallipoli: “Victories for Our Common Humanity ”
The shifting significance of Gallipoli in the Australian imagination re-
veals how the configurations of meaning, memory, and identity that 
define national heritage are reinscribed on an international stage. The 
legend’s importance has been enhanced by an increased popular aware-
ness of its international context. One important aspect of this devel-
opment is the perception of places such as Anzac Cove as symbols 
of reconciliation and international fraternity in the present (Howard 
2005). These sentiments echo those of the diggers themselves, such 
as Harold Edwards, who in 2000 thanked the Turkish people for the 
friendship shown to those who invaded their land and stated, “We feel 
there’s a collaboration of spirit which is going to be helpful to mankind, 
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and if only we could all be friendly to each other, live and let live, free 
to do anything we like, provided it doesn’t limit or interfere with other 
people’s freedom or rights” (Kirk 2000).
The Turkish people also view the naval battle of Canakkale and the 
land battle of Gallipoli as founding national events, albeit for differ-
ent reasons. The conflict at Gallipoli was Turkey’s sole victory in five 
campaigns of the First World War, and it is seen as the last great victory 
of the Ottoman Empire. More particularly, it flagged the military capa-
bility of the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the beginning 
of his role in Turkey’s transition to a secular republic. Atatürk still wel-
comes Australians who visit Turkey and invites them to remember their 
lost soldiers through a monument at Anzac Cove that reads:
Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives . . . 
You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country . . . 
You, the mothers,
Who sent their sons from faraway countries,
wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom  
and are in peace.
After having lost their lives on this land they have become  
our sons as well.
Atatürk, 1934
The Turkish government ’s announcement in 1997 of a proposal to 
nominate the military landscape to the World Heritage List received an 
enthusiastic Australian response, with one legislative body seeing these 
moves as “victories for our common humanity. . . . As a result of what 
happened, the Turkish community and the Australian community now 
feel a close affinity with one another ” (N.S.W. Legislative Assembly 
2003).
Today the Gallipoli legend reinscribes a core national myth, drawing 
upon collective values that resonate with a domestic audience while as-
serting the Australian nation’s global parity within a league of nations; 
in some forms, the legend also promotes a vision of world peace and 
unity. The narrative’s evolution exemplifies the process of selection and 
valorization involved in the national deployment of the international 
heritage system. However, despite the centrality of concepts of cultural 
diversity to the heritage system, and despite the integral importance of 
indigenous values and traditions to Australia’s national story, the imple-
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mentation of heritage by the state denies unwelcome claims grounded 
in culture and history—such as the Aboriginal demand for acknowl-
edgment and restitution for the damage inflicted by colonialism. As 
the cartoonist Cathy Wilcox has succinctly shown, the former Austra-
lian government’s endorsement of Gallipoli as the story of a nation 
forged in battle contrasts with its concurrent refusal to acknowledge 
more unpalatable aspects of colonial dispossession (see figure 1.1).
“Leave It in the Ground!”: 
Indigenous Participation in Transnational Processes
The refusal to acknowledge the negative consequences of colonialism 
has also characterized the development of Australian heritage in pro-
moting a vision of indigenous culture as static, bounded, and shared, 
and in constructing a celebratory national story centering on progress 
and consensus. Yet indigenous peoples have also begun to draw upon 
international heritage discourse to assert their identities, protect their 
interests, and oppose injustice on the world stage. Some attribute this 
process to globalization, which has dissolved some boundaries only to 
strengthen others, namely the assertion of distinctive collective identi-
ties and claims to rights. Today minority societies do not simply choose 
1 “Our heritage.” Courtesy of Cathy Wilcox.
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between isolation or assimilation; rather, they seek self-determination 
“by choosing among various ideas, institutional models, and strate-
gies, originating from dominant societies and global institutions, 
which hold out possibilities of protecting a distinct community ’s abil-
ity to make such choices in the future” (Niezen 2004: 2–3). Indigenous 
peoples may now choose to participate in international institutions in 
preference to national ones.
Such demands do not merely challenge the legitimacy of a state’s 
claim to exclusive jurisdiction over territory, but in fact point toward 
new transnational modes of political community—what Duncan Ivison 
(2006a) terms an “emergent cosmopolitanism” that is compatible with 
universal notions of justice and yet is also rooted in particular, local 
ways of life. Such demands show how historical injustice can struc-
ture our moral concepts, presenting deep challenges to liberal theories 
of global justice. Appeals to international norms, together with their 
indigenous revaluation, also reveal a relationship between different 
levels (local, state, global), “ which is pluralist but not state-centric, im-
manent but also universalist ” (Ivison 2006a: 121). Indigenous scholars 
are showing that conceptions of local culture are changing, shaped 
by an international context and incorporating a universal notion of 
human rights without abandoning a sense of local meaning or distinc-
tiveness. For example, the indigenous lawyer Larissa Behrendt (2002, 
2003) argues that indigenous people have used the concept of rights 
to describe their political aspirations, advancing the concept of “inter-
nal self-determination” in a vision of increased indigenous autonomy 
within the structures of the Australian state. Some have also discerned 
possibilities in new categories of global identity—organizations such 
as the World Archaeological Congress for example, or the attempts 
of some indigenous groups to have their traditional countries or sites 
included on the World Heritage List.
The international campaign led by the Mirarr people of the Kakadu 
region in northern Australia exemplifies this process, to date suc-
cessfully preventing uranium mining on the Jabiluka mineral lease. 
Uranium was widely discovered in the Northern Territory during 
the 1950s, and in the mid-1970s the Australian government commis-
sioned an inquiry into the issues facing mining in the region. At the 
same time, legislation was passed that allowed Aboriginal people in 
the Northern Territory to gain legal title to their traditional land (the 
Aboriginal Land Rights Act [Cth], 1976). The inquiry ’s Second Report 
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recorded the opposition of the Mirarr people to uranium mining on 
their land, noting that “some Aboriginals had at an earlier stage ap-
proved, or at least not disapproved, the proposed development, but it 
seems likely that they were not then as fully informed about it as they 
later became. Traditional consultations had not then taken place, and 
there was a general conviction that opposition was futile” (Australia 
Parliament 1977: 9). Nonetheless, the government proceeded against 
Aboriginal wishes, exempting the Ranger uranium mine at Jabiru from 
the traditional owner “mining veto” provisions of the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (NT) Act of 1976. The Mirarr continued to express their op-
position to mining, despite the agreement it was pressured to sign in 
1978. (For various accounts of these events, see Mirarr 2007; Katona 
1998, 2001; O’Brien 2003.)
The Jabiluka Mineral Lease is 230 kilometers east of Darwin, covers 
73 square kilometers, and is owned by Energy Resources of Austra-
lia Ltd. (era). It abuts the northern boundary of the Ranger Mineral 
Lease, which has been mined since 1980. Both leases predate and are 
excised from Kakadu National Park, which was inscribed on the World 
Heritage List in three stages between 1981 and 1992. Kakadu is one of 
the few sites included on the list for outstanding cultural and natural 
universal values—including as an outstanding example of significant 
ongoing ecological and biological processes, of superlative natural 
phenomena, and for containing important and significant habitats for 
in situ conservation of biological diversity. Its cultural values include its 
status as a unique artistic achievement and its direct association with liv-
ing traditions of outstanding universal significance (Department of the 
Environment and Heritage 2007b). The predominantly Gundjehmi- 
speaking Mirarr (a group of twenty-seven people) have been tradi-
tional owners of this area “since time immemorial” and have always 
opposed mining on their land. As Jacqui Katona (2002: 29), the execu-
tive officer of the Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation, explains, “Most 
important to the Mirarr in defining themselves is their status as tradi-
tional owners. This status, authority and power is derived from their 
land, their relationship to land and each other and has developed over 
thousands of years.” For Aboriginal people, their land is a “humanised 
landscape which is indivisible and immutable, and every natural fea-
ture has a name and meaningful mythological association. Place and 
person are inseparable, while past and present form a unity of ongoing 
creation” (John Mulvaney, quoted in Katona 2001: 196). In part, the 
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park derives its preeminent status from its immense archaeological sig-
nificance (e.g., R. Jones 1985), containing sites such as Malakunanja II 
(or Madjedbebe as it is called by the Mirarr), where one of the oldest 
human occupation dates has been recorded (Roberts et al. 1990), and 
this scientific evidence has powerfully substantiated indigenous claims 
of cultural longevity.
Despite Aboriginal opposition the Australian government gave ap-
proval in May 1978 for Pancontinental to drill at the proposed mine site 
so as to complete an environmental impact statement (eis). In 1980 
the Mirarr and other Aboriginal people in the region lodged a claim 
for their land under the Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act of 1976. In 
1981, Pancontinental agreed with the Northern Land Council not to 
oppose the land claim if negotiations on Jabiluka proceeded. Under 
pressure, the Mirarr “consented” to the Jabiluka Mining Agreement 
entered into by the Northern Land Council and Pancontinental in July 
1982. However, in 1983 the Hawke Labor government was elected to 
office with a policy of halting expansion of the uranium mining indus-
try. The Jabiluka project was caught by this policy, which remained in 
place for the next thirteen years. In 1991 Pancontinental sold its interest 
in the Jabiluka mine to era, the owner of the Ranger mine. One con-
dition attached to the deed of transfer was that the consent of “tradi-
tional owners” would be required before Jabiluka ore could be milled 
at Ranger. It is generally agreed that unless the ore is milled at the 
existing Ranger facilities, mining at Jabiluka would be economically 
unviable. In 1997 the Mirarr formally announced their opposition to 
this milling.
After the conservative Howard government was elected in 1996, it 
decided to develop uranium mining by recognizing the fourteen-year-
old Jabiluka Mining Agreement. Represented by Yvonne Margarula, 
the senior traditional owner, and by Jacqui Katona, the Mirarr em-
barked upon a public campaign to prevent this, involving a speaking 
tour, public forums, alliances with other Aboriginal groups, and inter-
national lobbying, including a submission to the World Heritage Bu-
reau that prompted tremendous media attention. The Mirarr deployed 
the heritage concept of “living tradition” in their campaign, represent-
ing their culture as an ancient survival within the modern world and 
explicitly contrasting the purity of living indigenous tradition with the 
vices of modernity. They argued that “the Mirarr communities have 
had a presence in the Kakadu region for up to 65,000 years. If the 
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mine proceeds, our survival is at risk. . . . Culturally, surviving clans are 
struggling to hold on to their cultural traditions and pass them on to 
new generations in the face of the establishment of mines in sensitive 
and culturally important areas . . . and in the face of alcohol and other 
substance abuse and the blandishments of the mass consumer culture” 
(Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation 1998: 34–35). In their view, the 
World Heritage Convention protects “one of the few remaining islands 
of traditional culture from the relentless forces of development [and 
constitutes] a legal bulwark defending the integrity of Mirarr society ” 
(Katona 2002: 36). They pointed out that the benefits of modernity as 
measured in the “quality and length of life of the Aboriginal residents” 
have not transpired as the result of mining on their land (Gundjehmi 
Aboriginal Corporation 1998: 36; and see Katona 1998).
In August 1997 the government approved the mine pursuant to an 
eis that had been prepared by Energy Resources of Australia, despite 
widespread public and expert opposition, including serious concerns 
of the government’s own conservation division, Environment Austra-
lia, about long-term damage to the environment, Aboriginal people, 
and World Heritage values.
Jabiluka’s “Detour Via Europe”
In mid-1998 the seemingly inexorable pressure toward mining was eased 
by two key events. First, because the Mirarr continued to withhold 
their consent for Jabiluka ore to be milled at the era’s Ranger uranium 
mine, the government announced approval of the Jabiluka Milling 
Alternative, whereby uranium would be milled at Jabiluka. Second, 
Margarula and Katona attended a meeting of the unesco World 
Heritage Bureau in Paris and convinced the bureau to send a mission 
to investigate the dangers to the Mirarr living tradition and the envi-
ronment associated with the Jabiluka uranium mine. In October 1998 
the unesco World Heritage Committee Mission visited Kakadu and 
Canberra, and the following month handed down its finding that the 
Jabiluka mine posed serious threats to the cultural and natural values 
of the Kakadu World Heritage Area (unesco 1998). This decision, 
and the unprecedented threat of placing a site on the World Heri-
tage “in danger” list without permission by the host country, caused 
huge embarrassment to the Australian government, which refused to 
comply with unesco’s resolution. In December the World Heritage 
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Committee accepted the mission’s report and resolved that construc-
tion at Jabiluka should cease until the Australian government could 
prove that the identified threats to Mirarr culture and country were 
being avoided. It was widely perceived that the Howard government 
had been ambushed by the globalization of environmental political 
power, which over the preceding decade had moved from “alternative” 
to mainstream within European governments. Bob Brown, a Green 
member of the Australian Parliament, and his colleagues, who were 
often ignored in national debates, were able to command “enormous 
entrée” among the coalition Green governments of Germany, France, 
and Italy, successfully securing the adoption of a Green anti-Jabiluka 
motion by the European Parliament in Brussels. The federal govern-
ment had been outflanked by a coalition of international indigenous, 
social activist, and environmental groups: as one observer noted, “It 
didn’t even see him [Brown] coming, mainly because he detoured via 
Europe” (Milne 1998).
Nonetheless, following an expensive lobbying campaign mounted 
by the federal government, in July 1999 member nations of the World 
Heritage Committee voted overwhelmingly against imposing an en-
dangered listing on Kakadu (Department of Environment and Heritage 
2007b). Environmentalists were bitterly angry, but Katona’s (1999) re-
sponse was measured, noting that “the World Heritage Committee 
has recognised very strongly that there are culture impacts to the living 
tradition of the Mirarr people. . . . The Australian Government has 
bound itself to . . . reporting back to the committee and ensuring that 
there is progressive opportunity back in Australia, to deal with issues 
of living tradition. . . . It ’s been an interesting opportunity, because it ’s 
one that we haven’t had domestically.”
The World Heritage Committee emphasized the fact that “whilst 
fully respecting the sovereignty of States on whose territory the cul-
tural and natural heritage is situated . . . States Parties . . . recognise 
that such heritage constitutes a world heritage for whose protection it 
is the duty of the international community as a whole to co-operate.” 
The committee was also of the opinion that “confidence and trust 
building through dialogue are crucial for there to be any resolution of 
issues relating to the proposal to mine and mill uranium at Jabiluka. . . . 
In particular, a more substantial and continuous dialogue needs to be 
established between the Australian government and the traditional 
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owners of the Jabiluka Mineral Lease, the Mirarr Aboriginal people” 
(unesco 1999).
Throughout 2000 both sides of the dispute lobbied the World Heri-
tage Bureau—the anti-mine coalition to strengthen its hand against the 
mine, and the Howard government to prevent properties being listed 
as “in danger” without the government’s agreement. In early 2002, 
Rio Tinto (which had acquired the deposits through its takeover of 
North Ltd. in 2000) announced that it would “mothball” the project, 
subsequently filling in the excavation and giving the traditional owners 
the right to veto future development at the site—perhaps for financial 
reasons as well as because of criticism for failing to act on discussions 
concerning sustainability and community relations (Bachelard 2003). 
No doubt its other, less controversial global mining interests absorbed 
its attention from this time onward (Heathcote 2003). Although pe-
riodic review points remain scheduled for renegotiation between the 
company and the traditional owners, the Mirarr remain opposed to the 
mine being developed.
In 2006 the Howard government took steps to increase Australia’s 
stake in the global nuclear energy market, reopening the issue of nuclear 
energy as a domestic power source, in abeyance since the 1980s. With a 
change of government in late 2007, it remains to be seen whether this 
direction will be pursued, in a context of worsening drought and hotly 
contested debate about a national response to climate change.
Conclusion
Gallipoli and Jabiluka demonstrate the limits, as well as the potentiali-
ties, of heritage conceived as a cosmopolitan network of ideas, practices, 
and policies. As I have described, world heritage discourse acknowl-
edges diverse ways of valuing the past, such as “intangible cultural heri-
tage,” while retaining elitist Western values, such as the application of 
“universal outstanding value” as a threshold of assessment. Conceptu-
ally tensioned between a commitment both to universal values and to 
local cultural meanings, the logical disjunction between universalism 
and cultural relativism is often framed as an inevitable clash between 
collective cultural rights and individual rights. Further, emancipatory 
conceptions of an interconnected world are undermined by the persis-
tent reinscription of narratives that deny indigenous perspectives in the 
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pursuit of national politics. However, in its complex implementation, 
and the concrete ways that people are drawn into heritage networks, 
new alliances and practices may transcend the ambiguous dualisms of 
national and international or local and global. Indigenous participa-
tion in the international sphere undermines simple dichotomies of 
scale, showing that local indigenous culture and identities are inter-
penetrated by the global community and notions of universal human 
rights, producing new ways of seeing the past.
As demonstrated by the privileged status of the anzac legend in the 
Australian imagination, national narratives may be given fresh power 
within a global context. The legend’s valorization of a particular vision 
of the Australian past has been promoted by the federal government, 
which has even attempted to lay claim to a site on the other side of the 
world, while at the same time refusing to address internal, Aboriginal 
experience. In this incarnation Australian heritage has emphasized the 
nation’s collective youth and innocence; the national anthem reminds 
us that “our home is girt by sea,” a geographic boundary that natu-
ralizes this imagined entity, rather than seeing it as a “set of relations 
that are constantly being made and re-made, contested and re-figured” 
(Burton 2003: 6–7). But rather than being “ young and free,” indig-
enous people are not free to choose; rather, they remain constrained by 
neocolonial myths and processes enshrined in national structures.
By contrast, in mounting their international campaign, the Mirarr as-
serted their rights as custodians of traditional land and culture through 
a new pan-global alliance with environmental groups and national 
and international ngo networks. They created and exploited new in-
ternational sources of leverage, connecting with the assertion of local 
commons, expressed through indigenous land rights and conservation 
values. This multi-scaled form of resistance drew a local place and its 
concrete resources into a global space of social action, “both inside and 
outside the imperial core” (Goodman 2006: 165). Key to their cam-
paign was their representation of their culture as ancient and pure, in 
a narrative of the survival of a living tradition threatened by the ills of 
modernity. The discourse of world heritage underpinned by a rich ar-
chaeological resource fueled demands for the protection of local rights 
to culture and country; the Mirarr identified themselves as members of 
a new category comprising “all indigenous people around the world” 
(Katona 2002: 29), articulating a fluid understanding of culture that 
accords with notions of universal rights. Despite the problems entailed 
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in balancing the protection of individual rights against collective val-
ues, transnational juridical and heritage processes work to undermine 
relativist notions of difference even as they reemphasize boundaries 
and strengthen a sense of local identity. In practice, the Mirarr peo-
ple’s participation in transnational linkages and networks, resisting and 
appropriating according to their need, produced new identities and 
meanings that nevertheless remain Aboriginal. The Jabiluka campaign 
shows how the dichotomization of universalism and cultural relativism 
within transnational networks such as heritage fails to account for the 
complexity of this cosmopolitan process.
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Ian Lilley
2  i  strangers and brothers? 
Heritage, Human Rights, and Cosmopolitan  
Archaeology in Oceania
Archaeologists are archetypal strangers in most if not all of the locali­
ties in which they work. This is certainly the case in Australia and Mela­
nesia, where this chapter is set. Can they truly hope also to be brothers, 
part of the family, in such places, to the point where the universalizing 
scientific tenets of archaeology and heritage management can be rec­
onciled with local perspectives on the past and its material reflection? I 
see such reconciliation as a straightforward matter of human rights. It 
would be a major step forward if the profession were to treat all those 
among whom it works justly, as equals, and in a way that does not sim­
ply do them no harm, but also delivers them some good as they define 
it. I have no doubt that a cosmopolitan perspective is critical to any 
such endeavor. Yet as Kahn (2003: 404) reminds us, cosmopolitanism 
as generally conceived in Kantian terms has its problems, most resting 
on its embeddedness in the Western intellectual tradition. This posi­
tion greatly diminishes the claims of universality to which such cosmo­
politanism aspires, because “all forms of cosmopolitan thought—those 
that following Kant aspire to treat a diverse humanity for ‘what they 
have in common’—will inevitably begin with culturally­inflected pre­
suppositions about what it is that constitutes that common humanity 
(a human essence, whether defined biologically or otherwise)” (Kahn 
2003: 411). 
Kahn recognizes that the solution is not just for archaeologists to 
listen more to “the Other,” or help make more “recognition space” for 
other voices to be heard alongside ours, vital though such actions might 
be. Rather, we should aim to produce truly cosmopolitan knowledge 
“out of the encounter between representatives of different cultures,” 
that is, new knowledge that could not “conceivably have pre­existed 
the . . . encounter” (Kahn 2003: 411). To do otherwise is to remain 
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stuck in the unproductive essentialist oppositions of “us and them,” 
“Self and Other.” The trick, of course, is to produce this new knowl­
edge in a manner that reduces and, ideally, ultimately eliminates the 
enormous gulf between the power wielded by Western scholars and 
that of their interlocutors in local communities (Kahn 2003: 411). The 
only real means of doing this is to go beyond inviting local people or 
descendent communities to participate in work in the field and the lab­
oratory, attend conferences, or perform ceremonies on site to ensure 
spiritual safety and the like. As the succinct overview by Conkey (2005, 
esp. 15–18) makes clear, it has long been understood that relinquishing 
power in a politically effective fashion means bringing local conceptu­
alizations into archaeological practice in ways that guide interpretation 
at a theoretical level as well as field and laboratory studies at the level 
of technical execution.
The New Frontier
This is where things get disturbing and even intolerable for many in the 
profession. It is one thing to ask that colleagues consult local descen­
dent communities, but are significant numbers of them really ready to 
make the conceptual and practical adjustments that are necessary to 
take the process of power sharing to its logical conclusion? As is appro­
priate in a discussion of cosmopolitanism, this question can be recast 
in Kantian terms to ask whether most archaeologists, as outsiders, can 
make the leap from being visiting strangers to being resident guests in 
accepting the hospitality of their hosts. As is clear from Scham’s con­
tribution to the present volume, making such a move reconfigures the 
social distances among the parties and so changes how outsiders and 
hosts alike are recognized and expected to behave. When an archaeolo­
gist ceases to be a visiting stranger, the latitude usually allowed owing 
to the stranger’s naïveté is dramatically restricted if it does not evapo­
rate altogether, and he or she is expected to conform much more closely 
with vernacular custom and practice. If a visitor takes up residence like 
a guest but refuses to conform in this manner, he or she will be received 
as neither stranger nor guest, but rather as a difficult and potentially 
dangerous interloper (Dikeç 2002; Rundell 2004). 
Archaeology has long been in this latter position, but global currents 
of decolonization will inevitably force archaeologists to become guests 
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in the societies in which they work, despite the readily apparent diffi­
culties that this entails. The alternative would see the profession denied 
access to archaeological resources to a far greater extent than happens 
now. This struggle for the hearts and minds of archaeologists as well 
as local communities is not fundamentally different from the upheav­
als being experienced in a great many other fields of scholarly enquiry, 
and indeed at the highest levels of international affairs, as the process 
of decolonization plays out (Lilley 2008). It is worth noting in this 
context (and in relation to the chapter by Scham, this volume) that 
Kant thought outsiders should not attempt to switch from being 
strangers to being guests because of the claims that this makes on both 
the host and the outsider. Moreover, he explicitly excluded nonstate 
societies from those among which his “universal” rules of hospitality 
should apply, because they were too different from states to be in­
cluded (Dikeç 2002; Harvey 2000). Such questions of difference are 
still the crux of the matter, insofar as dealing with state­level actors 
generally entails dealing with institutions that despite inevitable cul­
tural differences share basic characteristics that reduce the uncertainties 
of cross­cultural communication (as attendance at—indeed, the very 
possibility of—any successful international conference instantly makes 
clear). Dealing with nonstate or substate actors, though, and especially 
indigenous minorities, frequently entails encounters with profound 
difference for all parties, despite the long­term and ever more intense 
cross­cultural interaction of the post­Columbian period. 
When we focus on indigenous societies as an exemplar of such dif­
ference, we see that the difficulty for archaeologists who try to “go na­
tive” (or the reverse for Native scholars) is that there is a strong chance 
they will fall between the two stools they aim to straddle—the indig­
enous one and the Western scientific one. This is because they could 
give up the intellectual and technical positives of science to attain a 
goal they might be unable ever to reach owing to the “blood and soil” 
factor well known to scholars of identity: their lives lack some experi­
ential dimension or, in even more essentialist terms, the “single drop 
of blood” that is critical to an authentic indigenous perspective (Con­
key 2005: 26–29). For Native scholars the matter would be to achieve 
a truly Western standpoint (e.g., Atalay 2006; Cachois 2006; Dugay­
Grist 2006). Archaeologists making the attempt thus risk becoming 
marginalized as neither fish nor fowl, like Naipaul’s (1964) unfortu­
nate Mr. Biswas. If they pull it off, though, they should gain the sort 
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of mongrel cosmopolitanism paraded so provocatively in exactly such 
terms by the likes of Salman Rushdie (e.g., 1989). This hybridity is both 
founded upon and most effectively able to produce truly cosmopoli­
tan new knowledge of the sort envisaged by Kahn (2003). It should 
also provide an appropriate vantage point from which to deploy such 
knowledge ethically to the benefit of all parties involved (Lilley and 
Williams 2005).
Looking Up from Down Under
The latter prospect has led inter alia to the idea that archaeologists 
should become “discrepant” (Clifford 1992), “rooted” (Appiah 2006a), 
or “vernacular” (Bhabha 1996) cosmopolitans. As the other contribu­
tions to this volume all discuss, this means archaeologists should ac­
knowledge their inevitably Western roots and decolonize their practice 
to make it meaningful in the varied local settings into which they insert 
themselves (see also L. T. Smith 1999). This process has gained a lot of 
momentum over the last decade and now reaches well beyond the set­
tler societies in North America and Oceania where most headway has 
been made (e.g., Atalay 2006; Bedford 1996; Bernardini 2005a; Byrne 
2003, 2004; Colwell­Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2006; Conkey 2005; 
David and McNiven 2004; Lilley 2000a; Lilley and Williams 2005; 
McGuire 2004; Nicholas and Andrews 1997; Sand 2000a; Sand et al. 
2006; Watkins 2000). It now encompasses places as diverse as the more 
isolated parts of Great Britain (e.g., S. Jones 2003) and at least some 
Asian countries, such as Japan (Mizoguchi 2004) and Taiwan (e.g., D. 
Blundell 2000). Australia, though, seems to be at the cutting edge. This 
is not simply self­serving chauvinism on my part, as the words of my 
North American colleagues such as Atalay (2006) and Silliman (2005) 
make clear. As I have described elsewhere (Lilley 2006a), pictures like 
those painted by Atalay and Silliman are reinforced by concrete evi­
dence from the world of international cultural heritage management. 
The World Bank leans heavily on the Burra Charter of Australia icomos 
(http://www.icomos.org) for guidance on the “world’s best practice” 
in its management of “physical cultural resources” (http://www.lema 
.ulg.ac.be), as did the Chinese government in its recently promulgated 
“China Principles” (http://www.icomos.org/australia). Much the same 
is happening in Iraq, where “world­class site management plans based 
on the Burra Charter” are being developed (http:// hnn.us). 
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The Burra Charter was originally designed to deal with historical 
non­indigenous built heritage, but it has evolved along a trajectory 
that has seen its wording and applications expand to accommodate 
pre­European indigenous heritage as well as shared colonial heritage. 
The transformation of other aspects of the country’s archaeological 
practice has advanced at the same time. This is most emphatically not 
to say that Australian archaeology and cultural heritage management 
are flawless paragons of cross­cultural virtue, a question to which I 
presently return. Nor is it the case that individual colleagues elsewhere 
in the region, such as New Zealand or New Caledonia, or for that mat­
ter elsewhere in the world, such as Canada or the United States, lag 
appreciably behind Australia in any critical respect. For the moment, 
though, it seems that as an institution Australian archaeology is en­
joying unparalleled success in bringing archaeological and indigenous 
interests together as a matter of conventional professional practice at a 
national scale (Lilley 2000b).
Just why this is so remains a matter of conjecture (Lilley 2006a; Smith 
and Jackson 2006). It seems plain, though, that it hinges in significant 
part on two factors. The first is the profession’s recognition beginning 
in the early 1980s that decolonization raises profoundly important ques­
tions about archaeology’s relations with descendent communities. The 
second has been the pragmatism of the discipline’s response (i.e., calling 
a spade a spade and doing what was needed to make things work). This 
pragmatism is typically quite creative and at times even radical by global 
standards, as Smith and Jackson’s (2006) recent contribution leaves in 
no doubt. Yet all is not as rosy it might seem, if  Thorley’s (1996, 2002) 
periodic interventions are anything to go by. On the basis of his ex­
tended experience with remote desert people, Thorley (1996: 10) points 
out that even in situations where archaeologists (as well as ethnogra­
phers, linguists, and the like) have endeavored to practice reflectively 
in a manner that is sensitive to issues of authority and representation, 
indigenous people usually have other priorities. If they value research 
at all it is because of the social and economic opportunities it offers 
and in fact the value to them of such opportunities can make it hard 
for them to challenge researchers or their findings. Thorley (1996: 10) 
observes that “interest in the relationship could be misinterpreted as 
approval of the researcher’s findings while from an Aboriginal point of 
view the content of the research may be seen as unimportant. Different 
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values are assigned by each side. As a society without a Western tradi­
tion of impersonal academic debate there is little incentive to argue 
with the researcher and risk the relationship; in fact there may be a 
tendency to defend the researcher in order to preserve the relationship, 
no matter how misguided the representation.”
Elsewhere Thorley (2002: 110) draws attention to a similar question 
of values in connection with notions of cultural heritage management 
in remote settlements. He is specifically concerned with the idea that 
the value of material items often lies in their intangible qualities, which 
might require them to decay physically to be preserved, what Colwell­
Chanthaphonh calls the “preservation paradox” in his contribution 
to this volume. Thorley (2002: 110) notes that while indigenous Aus­
tralians use archaeology and heritage management for their own pur­
poses, this does not mean that they invest in Western archaeological or 
heritage management values. For Thorley (2002: 110), “This raises the 
question of whether the transmission of new cultural forms and prac­
tices must include a corresponding transfer of meaning. It could be ar­
gued that rather than the internalisation of Western values, adoption of 
contemporary heritage practices by Indigenous groups reflects a con­
scious manipulation of terms of their own priorities and interests.” 
There is significant variation in the wider indigenous Australian 
community, which means that issues like those Thorley raises apply 
to greater or lesser degrees in different places. Nonetheless there is 
a very high level of physical (and virtual) mobility within that wider 
community, and so a great deal of communication about values and 
the like, both from the remote areas to more settled regions and vice 
versa (e.g., Lilley and Williams 2005: 237–38). This means that attitudes 
such as those Thorley describes exhibit a strong underlying continu­
ity across the continent despite the above­mentioned variation. Thorley 
does not think the gap between indigenous and Western approaches 
can be bridged. “While there has been growing support for Indigenous 
perspectives,” he writes (2002: 123), “it is doubtful whether wider rec­
ognition will be sufficient to resolve underlying conflicts of value.” In 
his earlier article (Thorley 1996: 11) he pointed out that “both Byrne . . . 
and Hodder . . . have put forward arguments for ‘indigenous ar­
chaeologies’ in Australia, but neither have described how these might 
translate into practice. Despite the best of intentions, the notion of 
indigenous archaeology is itself the product of an external and more 
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powerful society. This is particularly ironic, since it would seem that 
the basis of such approaches would draw from Aboriginal forms of 
identification, rather than a framework not of their making.”
Talking the Talk
Thorley (1996: 11) believes the way forward is to accept that the fore­
going intellectual differences are too great to span and to get on with 
things using approaches that respect the reasons for the differences. I 
understand perfectly well what he means, having worked in remote 
parts of Australia and the Pacific for many years. I am not yet con­
vinced, however, that all is lost. Language is a large part of the issue for 
Thorley. He (1996: 9) points out that English is not the first or even 
second language of choice in much of remote indigenous Australia. I 
would add that Standard English is not even the language of choice 
among indigenous Australians in most rural and many urban areas, 
where either some local form of  “Aboriginal English” or the Kriol of 
northern Australian and the Torres Strait is commonly used in every­
day contexts. The barriers to effective communication created by such 
linguistic variation should be apparent, especially as they reflect often 
profound differences in worldview. 
One obvious way such barriers might be breached, though, is for 
more archaeologists not only to take care with the academic language 
that they use so that they can avoid neocolonial overtones (e.g., Smith 
and Jackson 2006; Watkins 2006), but also to learn to speak local lan­
guages or lingua francas, and indeed to produce appropriate written 
material in local languages, too. This idea goes a long way beyond 
simply being able to translate for basic comprehension: in my experi­
ence it can have crucial social and political implications in cross­cultural 
encounters. Clendon (2006: 50) underscores how important the mat­
ter is in much of northern Australia, for instance, where a “religious 
mandate linking land and language” underpins “a positive social ex­
pectation that visitors . . . should speak the language of their hosts if 
they can.”
Numbers of archaeologists around the world do this now, of course. 
I do not speak any of the myriad local indigenous languages of Ocea­
nia, but I do speak Papua New Guinea’s lingua franca, tok pisin. So do 
most of my colleagues who work in the region. This gives us reasonable 
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linguistic access in other parts of Melanesia, where related but slightly 
different creoles and pidgins are spoken. It helps in Torres Strait and 
Aboriginal northern Australia, as well, where the related Kriol is used. 
The same obviously applies in reverse for colleagues working in these 
varied areas. I have not yet produced an academic or even a popular 
publication in any of these languages, though I have presented infor­
mal written reports to community authorities in tok pisin. Others are in 
the process of producing school texts, primers for heritage rangers, and 
the like (e.g., Kaltal et al. 2004). Just as Anglophone colleagues work­
ing in Latin America or Francophone Africa frequently learn Spanish, 
Portuguese, or French, I have also learned (still rudimentary) French to 
help with research I am developing with local and expatriate colleagues 
in the Francophone Pacific. I will endeavor to learn at least enough of 
the language of the island on which we work to allow me to follow 
conversations among community members and my multilingual local 
colleagues as the project advances. The issue of language is crucial to 
this particular study, a matter to which I will return.
Being conversant with the vernacular of their research areas would 
help archaeologists get their message across, but there is much more to 
it than using a bit of  “restaurant French” to get by. The latter is necessary 
but obviously far from sufficient. Whatever language they use (though 
the more locally specific the better), the heart of the problem is that 
archaeologists need to frame their research in terms that makes sense 
to the communities with which they pursue their research. In Thorley’s 
terms, they must appeal to the sorts of values and perspectives local 
people are likely to bring to the matter. As described elsewhere (Lilley 
2006b; Sheehan and Lilley 2008), my current approach to this ques­
tion takes off from Merry’s (2006) discussion of the vernacularization 
of transnational ideas concerning human rights and violence against 
women. Like these ideas, archaeology has been resisted to varying de­
grees by indigenous people around the world as “an alien, Western 
import not suited to local normative systems” (Merry 2006: 38). If ar­
chaeologists are to engage local people with the discipline in their local 
context, the discipline’s universalizing scientific conceptual apparatus 
needs to be “framed and presented in terms of existing cultural norms, 
values and practices” (Merry 2006: 39). Merry (2006: 39) calls this pro­
cess “indigenization,” which she defines as the “symbolic dimension of 
vernacularization.” The term applies regardless of whether the recipient 
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population is indigenous in the sense commonly used to refer to colo­
nized native minorities. 
One problem with orthodox approaches to vernacularization and in­
digenization can be that they seek “resonance” on the seemingly sensi­
ble grounds that a “frame needs to be resonant with cultural traditions 
and narratives to be appealing” (Merry 2006: 39). Research summa­
rized by Merry (2006: 41) shows, though, that “resonant discourses 
are less radical than nonresonant ones . . . [so] resonance is a costly 
choice because it may limit the possibility for long­term change.” This 
is because “frames” can restrict who may and may not speak and what 
can and cannot be said, and thus they can flatten variability and down­
play dynamism and contestation (Merry 2006: 41). On these grounds, 
Merry (2006: 41–42) advocates “a more dialogic analysis” that recog­
nizes variation and competition between views. This fits closely with 
my experience of the interactions between archaeology and local and 
especially indigenous communities over the last few decades. If we rec­
ognize rather than avoid this reality we will be better equipped to ben­
efit from the conceptual and technical opportunities a dialogic—or, in 
Appiah’s (2006a) terms, conversational—process has to offer.
To gain maximum leverage from these insights, vernacularization 
and indigenization must proceed from one specific end of a range of 
variation in the degree to which “local cultural forms and practices are 
incorporated into imported institutions” (Merry 2006: 44). This end 
is that of hybridization, an interactive form of cross­fertilization “that 
merges imported institutions and symbols with local ones, sometimes 
uneasily” (44). Merry (2006: 48) describes the novel phenomena that 
result as being “thickly shaped by local institutions and structures.” 
At the other end of the range, where many past and some contempo­
rary attempts at collaboration by archaeologists are still lodged, there 
is “replication,” which is only “thinly adapted to local circumstances” 
(Merry 2006: 48). Although she makes no mention of vernacular (or 
any other form of ) cosmopolitanism, the link between Merry’s line of 
thought and Bhabha’s is obvious and compelling.
Creating functional and mutually rewarding hybrids will not be easy. 
To paraphrase Merry’s comments about international funding for hu­
man rights ngos, the funding and permitting agencies that facilitate 
archaeology are still strongly oriented toward hard science and are thus 
likely to react skeptically to thickly indigenized research proposals. By 
the same token, the local (and especially the indigenous) communities 
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with which archaeologists work are likely to remain skeptical about the 
discipline owing to continuing historical grievances or the imperatives 
of contemporary identity politics. We must try, though, if we believe 
that vital matters of mutual interest are in the balance (Lilley and Wil­
liams 2005). Though this issue cuts in both directions, archaeologists 
should make the greatest effort at this stage, given that they still have 
by far the most institutional power (despite the passage of nagpra and 
so on). The first steps are to show our colleagues that there are other 
ways of seeing the world and on that basis train them to think outside 
the square. 
I know some archaeologists will react badly to this suggestion, but 
there is nothing “fringe” or “New Age” about such thinking. It is just 
good anthropology. As Geertz (1983: 70) taught us a generation ago, 
“Accounts of other people’s subjectivities can be built up without re­
course to pretensions to more­than­normal capacities for ego efface­
ment and fellow feeling.” As he went on to say, though, “Normal 
capacities in these respects are, of course, essential, as is their cultiva­
tion, if we expect people to tolerate our intrusions into their lives at 
all and accept us as persons worth talking to.” Applied anthropolo­
gists have been putting precisely these sorts of ideas into practice in 
this fashion for at least a decade (e.g., Sillitoe 1998a, b). Furthermore, 
as Strathern (2006) recently pointed out, approaches like the one I 
am advocating are ontologically not appreciably different from the 
“ideas trade” entailed in the interdisciplinary approaches to research 
that everyone is being encouraged to pursue these days and, we might 
add, with which archaeologists have long been acquainted (cf. Warren 
1998). To quote Strathern (2006: 192) quoting Galison (1996: 14), the 
idea in all of these varied areas of endeavor is to “work out an interme­
diate language, a pidgin, that serves a local, mediating capacity” (also 
see Osborne 2004). 
The following examples from Australia and New Caledonia discuss 
how my colleagues and I are trying to develop such mediating inter­
mediate languages of this sort. Both projects are in their infancy and so 
may appear somewhat underdeveloped here. My descriptions should 
be read as “dispatches from the front” rather than reports on mature 
case studies. Moreover, the two projects involve very different research­
ers and descendent communities in very different historical, linguistic, 
and current sociopolitical contexts. This means that what we are trying 
to achieve, the way we are going about it, and the language and tone 
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I use here to describe the projects all differ markedly between the two 
cases. In particular, the Australian example can be described in Merry’s 
language as seeking to frame archaeological approaches in terms that 
are resonant with Aboriginal perspectives, whereas the New Caledo­
nian project takes a more radical, nonresonant tack to bring archaeo­
logical and local views together. 
Aboriginal Ways of Seeing
I have previously described some of the efforts in which I have been 
involved to take such matters forward in Australia (Lilley and Williams 
2005). These projects place indigenous concerns uppermost, but oth­
erwise they entail relatively straightforward collaboration between Ab­
original and archaeological interests. More recently I have tentatively 
headed off at more of a tangent with an indigenous nonarchaeologi­
cal colleague to explore the deployment in archaeology of contempo­
rary indigenous visualization of landscape (Sheehan and Lilley 2008). 
I stress that it is still very much work in progress that remains largely at 
the experimental conceptual level. We hope it will ultimately build on 
the advances of landscape archaeologists such as Bender (1993), Bradley 
(2000), Thomas (2001), and Tilley (1994). Their approaches incorpo­
rate ethnographic information about hunter­gatherer perspectives on 
landscape, but they do not, themselves, apply it to the landscape ar­
chaeology of hunter­gatherers rather than of agriculturalists. Our focus 
on landscape is intended to complement the attention to matters of 
history that has characterized much of the effort to indigenize the dis­
cipline so far (e.g., Bernardini 2005a).
We advance the general proposition that the way that the physical 
landscape appears to Aboriginal people—its visual organization or 
structure—contains spiritual information concerning the organization 
or structure of the landscape that constrains people’s behavior. This 
means, to give a simplified example, that if the landscape in a particular 
place looks like a snake, it actually is, in its spiritual guise, that snake 
and must be approached as such. Different sorts of sites will occur in 
particular places along the snake’s body in accordance with the spiritual 
information inhering in this or that locality. Moreover, the investiga­
tion of those sites requires them to be treated as part of that specific 
sort of living organism (in this case a snake), which will be related as 
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kin to at least some of the local indigenous community. Digging, in 
particular, but also other forms of study such as mapping and photog­
raphy need to be undertaken with this fact in mind. 
In some parts of Aboriginal country, whole landscapes form images 
representing the meaning embedded in those localities. Faces might be 
discernable in vegetation patterns or rock exposures, for instance, be­
cause that country contains stories concerning the people whose faces 
can be seen. This sort of imagery is usually considered of profound 
significance to Aboriginal people because ontologically it is a mani­
festation of the ancestral knowledge of all the relationships between 
people and their environment that is held within the land (see also 
Godwin and Weiner 2006: 128–32). The nature and distribution of sites 
in such locations, and the archaeological work that can be done there, 
will depend on what the stories are about and whom they concern. 
The challenge for archaeologists is to learn to see what is there, just as 
they all once had to learn to see with “an archaeological eye” when they 
were students, so they could distinguish stone artifacts from natural 
rocks, or agricultural terraces from natural rotational slumping. Bender 
(2006: 313, original emphasis) describes learning to see in the Aborigi­
nal way as coming  “to recognise the animate nature of the . . . world” 
(cf. Bradley 2003). 
Intellectual property negotiations prevent us from discussing specific 
landscape images at this stage, but opportunities are arising to develop 
a visual archaeology that can reveal what my co­researcher calls “these 
edifices of Aboriginal culture” to a wider audience. Furthermore, we 
have not yet developed our position to the point where we can carry 
out field trials. We have, however, described initial visualization experi­
ments undertaken as classroom exercises in undergraduate courses for 
mainly non­indigenous university students in Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander studies. Though lack of space prevents detailed discus­
sion here, the results are very encouraging (see Sheehan and Lilley 
2008, for initial findings). Other Australian archaeologists are doing 
broadly similar sorts of research. Some of the most innovative work is 
that led by David and McNiven in the western islands of Torres Strait, 
between mainland Australia and New Guinea. These researchers and 
their indigenous and non­indigenous collaborators have sought to 
“historicize the spiritual” by archaeologically examining various sorts 
of sacred sites, including ritual mollusk­shell arrangements (David et al. 
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2005), dugong (“sea cow”) bone mounds (McNiven and Feldman 
2003), intertidal stone alignments (McNiven 2003), and caches of turtle­ 
shell masks (David et al. 2004). Building upon contemporary Torres 
Strait Islander knowledge and belief, they are beginning to show how 
“chronological changes in the use of these sites inform us about histori­
cal developments in Islander ontology and their ritual orchestration 
of seascapes and spiritual connections to the sea” (McNiven and Feld­
man 2003: 169). David (e.g., 2006) has done similar work elsewhere 
in Australia.
Godwin and Weiner (2006) also provide some excellent case stud­
ies of how such opportunities are changing the way archaeology is 
being done in Australia, in this instance in cultural heritage manage­
ment. They remind us how Aboriginal people read their country and 
the distribution of sites upon it in terms of past and present actions 
of ancestors and Dreamtime entities. This contrasts with the atten­
tion archaeologists would normally pay instead to the distribution of 
resources, though the latter is directly linked to Dreamtime activity 
and so is encompassed by Aboriginal perspectives in any event. Un­
derstanding this as a general principle means that archaeologists can 
develop appropriate analogical models that can guide research even if 
the specifics of the Dreamtime stories relayed by contemporary Ab­
original people differ from those in the past. The idea is not simply 
to replace conventional models based on past environmental patterns 
and the like, but rather to add a dimension to such models so they can 
better account for more of the complexities of past human behavior in 
modes that make sense to local indigenous people. 
Godwin and Weiner also underline techniques by which meaning 
is negotiated through dialogue and conversation rather than imposed 
in such readings, highlighting the difference between Aboriginal and 
Western approaches to the creation and management of knowledge. 
If Aboriginal people working on a project were uncertain about the 
meaning of a particular site, landscape feature, or occurrence during 
fieldwork (such as the unusual activity of a swarm of native bees, in 
one instance), they took their questions to more knowledgeable people 
(Godwin and Weiner 2006: 132–35). The sites in question were usually 
unexceptional archaeologically, but their indigenous meanings had to 
be fathomed if their occurrence was previously unknown to the Ab­
original field crew or if they exhibited some noteworthy feature, such 
as a particular richness of worked stone.
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Mission: Tiga 
As mentioned earlier, I am also involved in indigenizing research in 
the French Pacific, specifically the Loyalty Islands in New Caledonia 
some 1,200 kilometers off the northeast coast of Australia. The project 
includes local archaeologists of Kanak and European descent as well 
as colleagues from metropolitan France. It focuses on Tiga, the small­
est of the inhabited islands in the Loyalties. Pilot studies concluded 
in 2006, laying the foundation for more intensive studies in years to 
come. To avoid continual highly repetitious citation, I note that the 
following is abstracted from our recent successful proposal for further 
work, which drew heavily on the extended treatment of the issues in 
question by Sand et al. (2006).
The project is motivated primarily by the fact that New Caledonia 
is unique in Pacific prehistory. The founding Lapita occupation some 
three thousand years ago differed in several critical respects from that 
elsewhere in the distribution of the Lapita cultural complex, while the 
ensuing trajectories of change produced levels of cultural diversifica­
tion unparalleled anywhere in Remote Oceania, the region beyond 
the main Solomon Islands chain, uninhabited prior to the Lapita 
dispersal (Kirch 2000: 148; see Lilley 2004 for general discussion of 
Lapita; and Sand 1998, 2000b for overviews of New Caledonian pre­
history). The problem for archaeologists is that their interpretations 
of New Caledonia’s dynamic human history conflict with local Kanak 
views. The latter are largely either based on or a reaction to Eurocentric 
historical and ethnographic pictures developed before modern archae­
ology began in the region. These scenarios portray “traditional” Kanak 
society as small­scale and semi­nomadic, and governed as petty chief­
doms. Such descriptions have been completely undermined by the ar­
chaeological demonstration that the last millennium before European 
contact was actually characterized by a densely inhabited landscape 
based on labor­intensive horticulture organized by strong chiefdoms 
that collapsed as a result of massive demographic and cultural disrup­
tion between initial European contact in 1770 and the French takeover 
in the 1850s. 
This dramatically nonresonant archaeological reappraisal of “tradi­
tional Kanak culture” as it has been understood for generations does 
not sit well with politicized indigenous New Caledonians, the bulk 
of whom receive their higher education in metropolitan France, or 
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indeed with the expatriate scholars who have promoted it. Nor do 
scientific archaeological explanations of the often dramatic cultural 
changes that occurred over the preceding three millennia of hu­
man settlement in the archipelago. As much of the work of the New 
Caledonian Department of Archaeology makes clear (e.g., Sand 2000a; 
Sand et al. 2006), just what archaeology is “for” in New Caledonia 
remains as unclear to most Kanaks as it does to many indigenous peo­
ple in other settler societies. The nub of the matter is that like those 
in other colonial societies, pre­archaeological settler interpretations 
in New Caledonia ascribed all evidence for pre­European change to 
successive waves of invasion much like the one represented by Euro­
pean colonization. The political effect of this approach is to diminish 
indigenous people by characterizing them as just another group of 
migrants who have no more claim to special land and cultural rights 
than any other group in the modern population. In reaction, Kanak 
activists and their European sympathizers have attacked the entire 
concept of history and long­term cultural change as an oppressive 
neocolonial device. As in other settler societies, the offending pre­ 
archaeological interpretations have been replaced with a simplistic two­ 
step model in which a static indigenous past where everything was 
peaceful and well organized was suddenly destroyed by Western colo­
nization. In this scenario, the population of New Caledonia is polar­
ized as “indigenous” or “invaders.” This division emerged in the late 
1970s. It led to a major political emergency, including periods of unde­
clared civil war in the 1980s, the aftereffects of which have not entirely 
dissipated.
The finality with which this stark and highly politicized model was as­
serted almost completely stifled Kanak interest in history, as witnessed 
by the almost complete absence of historically oriented research con­
ducted by Kanaks, except the handful working in the New Caledonian 
Department of Archaeology. This reveals how difficult the indigenous 
community still finds it to replace the recent ideologically motivated 
two­part account with a more complex archaeologically informed con­
ception. The principal criticism of archaeologists in this context is that 
they place too much emphasis on historicizing the past and not enough 
on validating models of stasis that in the view of indigenous activists 
provide the basis for historical rights. Although rooted in profoundly 
different approaches to history, this divergence in perspectives has been 
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exaggerated by synchronic ethnographic models that left Kanaks and 
other native peoples “outside the realm of world historical experience” 
(Peterson 2000: 27). 
Ironically, because archaeology underwrites a diachronic view of 
indigenous societies, some indigenous people are adamant that their 
past—as described ethnographically—and the authenticity of identities 
built upon such pre­archaeological descriptions will be completely un­
dermined by the historicization that archaeology entails. Contempo­
rary political considerations are thus pivotal to the debate, because all 
nonliterate societies have oral traditions that clearly illustrate the dyna­
mism of their pasts. A significant part of the problem is that the mate­
riality of archaeological evidence is much harder to dismiss on political 
grounds than oral­historical testimony, which is often disputed within 
and among local communities, not to mention by settlers. Archaeolo­
gy’s “solid” data thus fuel the fires of contemporary competition over 
land and other resources and archaeologists are inevitably drawn into 
current political maneuverings.
These internecine struggles belie the claims of those Kanak activists 
who contend that there is a unified “Kanak people.” Contestation of this 
sort also generates practical and intellectual difficulties for archaeolo­
gists and friction between them and sections of the Kanak community. 
Coping with such complications will be a small price for archaeolo­
gists to pay if the melding of a vibrant, archaeologically informed his­
tory with contemporary perspectives can produce cosmopolitan new 
knowledge that helps modern indigenous communities show that they 
have never been “people without history” at the same time that it ren­
ders archaeological interpretation more nuanced at the human level. 
In addition to any direct positive impact it may have on local concep­
tions of history and long­term change or on archaeological approaches 
to analysis and explanation, new knowledge that situates indigenous 
people well and truly within “world historical experience” should also 
improve the light in which they are perceived by non­indigenous peo­
ple in multicultural settler societies such as New Caledonia. Western 
and other cultures that place a high value on “progress” and material 
acquisition still generally portray the alterity of indigenous peoples as 
a marker of moral and intellectual deficiency. By demonstrating that 
archaeologists have as much to learn from indigenous people as the 
reverse, the successful production of hybrid new knowledge should 
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provide local people with additional ammunition in their fight for so­
cial and political justice.  
To the foregoing ends, our project on Tiga aims to produce cos­
mopolitan new knowledge by integrating archaeological field and 
laboratory research with an understanding of how local people concep­
tualize and mark culturally important sites and landscapes today, in­
cluding the sites under archaeological investigation. A still embryonic 
methodology is being developed in collaboration with the Tiga com­
munity to integrate the results of the two parts of the study in this man­
ner. At its most basic level, archaeological results and contemporary 
Kanak histories and conceptualizations of cultural landscapes will be 
brought together as the project proceeds, through constant dialogue 
between the local community and the professional archaeologists and 
oral historians (who include Kanaks from the Loyalties and elsewhere 
in New Caledonia). The extent to which a single, new, hybridized 
cultural history is feasible can only be determined through continual 
conversation as the results from the two different facets of the project 
become known and can be compared, contrasted, and where possible 
reconciled. 
An exploratory project of this sort would be unnecessary if it were al­
ready known just how this process would advance. As is the case in the 
Australian work discussed earlier, though, we aim eventually to go well 
beyond the use of oral history or tradition to augment archaeological 
interpretation along the lines advocated by Whiteley (2002). There is 
certainly no cookbook to follow, but we envisage a procedure simi­
lar to the constant negotiation described earlier among the Aborigi­
nal people working with Godwin and Weiner (2006). In accordance 
with the principles outlined by Merry (2006), the idea is to foster con­
ceptual hybridization that is “thickly shaped by local institutions and 
structures,” rather than replication that is only “thinly adapted to lo­
cal circumstances.” Language will be a critical factor in this process. 
We work not only in French, New Caledonia’s lingua franca in the 
absence of pidgins like those used elsewhere in Melanesia, but also in 
the local Kanak language(s), as made possible by working with local 
Kanak archaeologists and oral historians. This last should allow us to 
get much closer than we otherwise would to native conceptualizations 
of the past and the role(s) played in the present by archaeological ma­
terials as well as other tangible and intangible facets of local cultural 
landscapes.
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A Concluding Note of Cautious Optimism
The projects I have outlined above all pivot on the proposition that 
archaeologists cannot remain as visiting strangers rather than resident 
guests if they want to reduce the distance between their interpreta­
tions and those of the local and especially indigenous communities in 
which they work. In this the projects I have sketched here share a great 
deal with the post­processual approaches of Bender, Thomas, Tilley, 
and others. Recent appraisals of their work, such as Brück’s (2005) 
assessment of the rise of phenomenology in British archaeology and 
Fleming’s (2006) critique of post­processual landscape archaeology, 
therefore raise issues that are also of relevance to the sorts of research 
with which I am involved. The issue of most concern in both cases is 
“whether contemporary encounters with landscape . . . can ever ap­
proximate the actual experience of people in the past” (Brück 2005: 54). 
To my mind, this question subsumes or is at least closely related to 
many of those Whiteley (2002) raises regarding the evidential reliabil­
ity of oral tradition. As archaeologists should know better than anyone 
else, people and their values change, as do physical landscapes. It should 
therefore be clear to us that “describing our own [or contemporary in­
digenous people’s own] embodied encounters with landscapes tells us 
more about contemporary perceptions and preoccupations [and the 
modern environment] than it does about the past” (Brück 2005: 57). 
Despite this reservation, Brück (2005: 65) applauds the fact that the 
approaches of  Tilley, Thomas, Bender, and others have forced archaeol­
ogists to “reconsider the social significance of landscape and to explore 
concepts of the person that are very different to modern Western mod­
els of the individual.” The studies I have described are intended to take 
this process further by according non­Western models a centrality that 
is absent from the sorts of post­processual approaches that Brück can­
vasses. Intriguingly, Fleming’s (2006) altogether more pointed review 
takes an unexpected turn to argue much the same thing as Brück in this 
regard. After lambasting Tilley and others for visiting a postmodernist 
methodological nightmare upon the discipline, Fleming concedes that 
“it is good that landscape historians who work in prehistoric periods 
are exploring the potential of cognitive approaches, experimenting 
with new ways of writing, and have been reminded of the ever­present 
issues of ‘the dearth of people.’ ” Even more fascinatingly, though, 
he argues that conventional landscape archaeology has done this sort 
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of thing all along. In his estimation (Fleming 2006: 271–72, original 
emphasis), this is because it is about doing “work in the field . . . in 
the open air. An outsider at first, the landscape archaeologist has no 
choice but to become engaged in the landscape, to become an insider 
as a consequence of acquired knowledge. . . . Landscape archaeologists 
are not obsessed with the attainment of hard­edged objectivity always 
and everywhere, and our field discourse always and necessarily involves 
thinking about the intentionality and mindsets of people in the past.” 
As Fleming (2006: 272) himself recognizes, this contention is a far cry 
indeed from “Binfordian scientism,” despite what would seem to be 
their shared intention to debunk post­processualism and, by extension, 
the sort of approaches with which my colleagues and I are experiment­
ing. In this connection, it is salutary to return to Wylie’s (1992: 16–17) 
discussion of the manner in which the “conceptual and methodological 
commitments of scientific archaeology . . . have tended to direct atten­
tion away from what Binford . . . has vilified, in his most uncompro­
mising defenses of processual approaches, as ‘ethnographic,’ internal 
variables . . . he considers explanatorily irrelevant and scientifically in­
accessible, such as gender . . . [and] other symbolic, ideational, social, 
and broadly ‘ethnographic’ dimensions of the cultural past.” 
Conkey’s (2005) recent consideration of the “intersections” of femi­
nist and indigenous archaeologies updates us on many of the ques­
tions Wylie took up in that landmark essay. I would expect scholars of 
Wylie’s and Conkey’s reputations as theoretical innovators and activists 
to have left processualism far behind in recognizing that greater atten­
tion to “relational dialogues” and other issues of language should make 
it “an easier step to engage with oral traditions and oral accounts as a 
viable line of evidence in the interpretation of archaeological materials 
and the cultural past” (Conkey 2005: 29–30). I am still somewhat dis­
believing of the possibility that we have come so far that an “anti­post­
processualist” as red in tooth and claw as Fleming not only explicitly 
distances his position from Binford’s but also asserts that the orthodox 
approaches he esteems have “always and necessarily” involved ostensi­
bly post­processual perspectives. It gives me great hope, though, that 
far more of my colleagues than I imagined might be prepared to take 
the leap from outsider to insider, or, to return to Kant, from visiting 
stranger to resident guest in their relations with local communities. 
They might say they are comfortable with the sorts of approaches I 
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have sketched out here because they have always done such things, if 
under other names. I am certainly not going to split terminological 
hairs if it helps archaeology take local conceptualizations of history se­
riously. Ultimately this is the only way the discipline can live up to its 
obligations to advance the human rights of the people among whom 
it seeks to work.
Note
First thanks go to the descendent communities I have worked with in Australia 
and Melanesia, especially the Aboriginal and Kanak communities with which 
I am currently involved. I am grateful to Lynn Meskell for asking me to con­
tribute to this volume and to my director, Michael Williams, for supporting 
my work through thick and thin. I also greatly appreciate the friendship and 
collegial support of the co­researchers on the projects discussed here, particu­
larly Norm Sheehan in Australia and Christophe Sand, Jacques Bole, and John 
Ouetcho in New Caledonia. The research I have described has been funded 
by the University of Queensland Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies 
Unit, the New Caledonian Department of Archaeology, the Centre National 
de la Recherche Scientifique, the Embassy of France in Australia, the Acad­
emy of the Social Sciences in Australia, and the Australian Research Council. 
Versions of this chapter have been presented in Brisbane and Stanford and it 
benefited from discussion in those venues as well as from the insights of this 
volume’s peer reviewers.
Denis Byrne
3  i   archaeology and  
the fortress of rationality
If environmental conservation conjures its own global spatial universe 
out of a deliberate focus on the needs of biodiversity rather than the 
needs of people living in or near protected areas (Hughes 2005: 157; 
Tsing 2000), archaeological heritage conservation might be said to 
conjure a global spatial universe of its own. This latter is an order 
of space defined by the discourses of archaeology and heritage. It 
exists in the imaginary of national and international archaeology and 
heritage practice and is largely unknown to local people despite the 
fact that they dwell in it. It is unknown to them insofar as the old 
objects and places that populate this space—the equivalent of nature 
conservation’s biodiversity—are known to them in other terms.
Practitioners of archaeology and heritage conservation who are 
committed to a cosmopolitan view seek to accommodate these local 
realities via a “ values approach” that endeavors to canvass, document, 
and assess the multiple meanings that old objects and places can have 
(e.g., Avrami et al. 2000; Byrne 2008) using such value categories as 
the scientific, the social, the aesthetic, and the historical. A parallel 
values approach is employed by many nature conservationists who 
reject the “fortress conservation” approach (Borrini-Feyerabend et 
al. 2004; Brockington 2002, 2004; Colchester 2004: 94; Harmon 
and Putney 2003). As the name implies, fortress conservation seeks 
to protect national parks from local people, who frequently become 
the subject of expulsion and forced resettlement (see chapter 4 by 
Meskell, this volume; Phillips 2003: 12).1 They join the ranks of the 
world’s “conservation refugees.”2
My geographic focus here is Southeast Asia, a region where forced 
resettlement of people from archaeological conservation zones is by 
no means unknown today. There is, however, another dimension to 
fortress conservation in the Southeast Asian heritage field that, though 
less traumatic for those on its receiving end, is far more pervasive. I 
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refer to a discursive barrier, erected by archaeologists and heritage 
practitioners, that excludes serious consideration of popular religion 
as a means by which old objects and places are contextualized within 
the world of everyday life. Citing the case of Thailand, I describe the 
ways in which people attribute magical supernatural qualities to the 
material past. I argue that we are prevented from acknowledging, let 
alone accepting, this situation because of the way our discourses are 
constituted in a secular-rationalist Western worldview that grew out of 
the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment. This worldview 
not merely rejects the magical supernatural; to a significant extent it 
was founded upon this rejection.
For the most part we do not find practitioners of archaeology or 
heritage conservation actively blocking people from interacting with 
the material past via the magical supernatural. What we find instead is 
an effacement of that whole contextual frame. This effacement is clearly 
incompatible with a cosmopolitan respect for plurality; but how do 
you respect a plurality that you cannot see? I propose that a thick cos-
mopolitanism requires history: we need to be willing to excavate our 
own practice in order to know how it is constituted.
The Local, the Popular, and the Magical
Before embarking on a history of the effacement of the magical super-
natural in the specific case of Thailand it seems advisable to make some 
general observations about popular culture and popular religion. As a 
belief system and field of practice, the magical supernatural in Thailand 
is spread across all segments of the population, albeit not evenly. The 
belief in the supernatural empowerment of certain objects and places 
appears to be shared by farmers, construction workers, upcountry Bud-
dhist monks, politicians in Bangkok, waiters in the tourist hotels of 
Phuket, pop singers, noodle stall owners, and taxi drivers, among others. 
It transcends the rural-urban divide and the class divide, as well as the 
divisions of gender and age. And yet it is absent from the school curric-
ulum, will not be found in modern orthodox institutional Buddhism, 
and tends not to be mentioned in heritage impact assessments, heritage 
inventories, government museums (except as a relict phenomenon), or 
at those other sites that have their origin in the formation of the mod-
ern Thai nation-state (beginning in the mid-nineteenth century).
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Thai popular religion includes the often overlapping practices of ani-
mism, non-canonical Theravada Buddhism, Hinduism, and elements 
of Chinese popular religion. Animism in Thailand is centered on the 
phi, those territorial spirits associated with particular trees, fields, for-
ests, swamps, and other natural landscape elements. Described as “na-
ture spirits” by Tambiah (1970: 316), they inhabit road intersections, 
bridges, and mountain passes. Turton (1978: 124) shows how “non-
specific forest spirits” become specific when forest areas are cleared for 
houses or cultivation. Phi commonly occupy archaeological sites and 
ruins (e.g., Wijeyewardene 1986: 147–48). When the ruins of temples 
are discovered in the jungle it is assumed they are occupied by phi and 
mediums may be brought in to attempt to channel the spirit and thus 
identify it. The many millions of spirit shrines that continue to be 
erected in Thailand map the tangible presence of the supernatural but 
so do the tens of thousands of Buddhist stupas, the physical fabric of 
which is frequently considered to be empowered and miraculously ef-
ficacious. At a popular, non-canonical level, the realms of animism and 
Buddhism overlap and entangle.
In addition to the localized cults of territorial spirits there are those 
cults that have a virtually unlimited spatial spread. The emergence in 
the 1980s of the cult of the former Thai king, Chulalongkorn (Rama V, 
reigned 1868–1910), exemplifies this phenomenon. At the spatial epi-
center of the Rama V cult is the equestrian statue erected to honor him 
in the Dusit area of Bangkok. While amulets and images of Rama V 
appear not to have originally been associated with rituals seeking su-
pernatural assistance (for example, in providing invulnerability), the 
cult’s more recent popularity among rural and urban laborers has led 
to the incorporation of these ritual objects within established patterns 
of Thai supernaturalism (Jackson 1999a: 168). Cult objects of Rama V 
have jumped the national borders of Thailand and are now to be found, 
for instance, on the hing bucha (worship shelf) of Thai restaurants all 
over the world.
Almost any object that is old is likely to be considered saksit (super-
naturally empowered). The historian Lorraine Gesick (1995: 62) cites a 
case from southern Thailand where the remains of an old dugout canoe 
were excavated by villagers who placed them in the local temple. But, 
“gradually,” she tells us, “as villagers took away slivers as talismans, 
[the canoe] almost entirely disappeared.” It was said that some of the 
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people who took the wood died because they could not withstand its 
supernatural power.
A key principle in Thai popular religion is that of contagion, the be-
lief that supernatural power transmits via physical contact. This is seen 
in the way caves once occupied by famously empowered forest monks 
become empowered places and in the way powerful monks transmit 
efficacious power to amulets and statues of the Buddha by praying over 
them while linked to them via sacred cotton threads. Similarly, the effi-
cacious potential of an ancient stone adze is transmitted to the water in 
the earthenware jar in which it is kept and protects those who drink the 
water against illness and lightning strikes (Sorensen 1988: 4). To think 
of such objects as having agency is not to imply they have intentionality 
(Gell 1998; Meskell 2004: 77); it is we human agents who initiate the 
“causal sequences” that give objects the power to act on us (Gell 1998: 
16). Within these limits, however, the magical agency possessed by a 
great array of objects and places in Thailand means that they are not 
available to be “managed” by us in the conventional mode of heritage 
management. The agency they have means that they have the capacity 
to act upon us as much as we have the capacity to act upon them. We 
might usefully think of local people being in dialogue with old objects 
and places; we might consider the appropriate relationship of conser-
vators to these objects and places as also one of dialogue (Byrne 2005: 
59–60).
The magical supernatural is better thought of as a geographically un-
bounded discourse than a localized practice. Particular cults may be 
quite localized, but the magical supernatural, as a way of giving mean-
ing to the material past, constitutes a kind a lingua franca that exists 
across the whole of Southeast Asia and beyond and arguably brings 
into being a transnational community. I would guess that the cosmo-
politan urge, to the degree that it currently exists in archaeology, takes 
the form of an openness to the particular meanings that different cul-
tures give to old objects and places. It is cosmopolitan at the level of 
culture. The magical supernatural, however, is a discourse in the sense 
that archaeology is a discourse. It is global in its reach and it character-
izes the relationship that the greater proportion of humanity has with 
the material past. The sheer prevalence of the magical supernatural in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America alone, as against the very restricted 
penetration of archaeology and heritage discourse into the realm of 
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everyday life in these areas, urges us toward a cosmopolitanism that is 
comfortable with magic.
Western Disenchantment in Southeast Asia
By the time it achieved a significant presence and influence in South-
east Asia, the West had rejected the existence of the magical supernatu-
ral. Yet even in the case of those Southeast Asian lands that, unlike 
Thailand, were acquired as colonies, the West never enjoyed sufficient 
influence to significantly influence the practices and beliefs of popular 
religion. What it did achieve was a significant influence on elite society 
in these lands and on the path these elites took to modernity. It pro-
foundly influenced the discourses of archaeology and heritage as and 
when they developed in Southeast Asia. In this section I offer a brief 
overview of the West ’s experience of “disenchantment ” and its influ-
ence on Thailand’s modernity.
In European medieval Christianity God was a living presence in the 
landscape, manifest in the miraculous efficacy flowing from saintly 
people, sacred relics, and sacred places (Bender 1993: 253–55). In part 
this was a reflection of the way early European Christianity had as-
similated elements of preexisting religions. Many of the sacred sites of 
paganism were physically overlain with churches, altars, and shrines. 
Wells and springs were named for Christian saints and martyrs and 
their water became “holy water” used in Christian rituals (Strang 
2004: 88; K. Thomas 1971: 48). Christianity’s scheme of the supernatu-
ral consisted of the ordered realms of the diabolical, the natural, and 
the divine supernatural, the first governed by Satan, the second two 
governed by God (Le Goff 1988: 12). The character of the divine super-
natural came to be heavily informed by the cults that formed around 
saints and their relics (Geary 1986; Meskell 2004: 45–46). The sites of 
saints’ graves and the relics themselves were believed to be animated 
by miraculous efficacy and were a target of appeal by the faithful for 
favors in this life as well as in the next. There are a great many par-
allels between medieval Christianity and contemporary Thai popular 
Buddhism. These include the latter’s syncretic overlap with animist 
belief and ritual, the superimposition of stupas and monasteries onto 
animist sites such as hilltops and rock outcrops, the cults that form 
around saint-like “magic” monks (Jackson 1999a), and the ascription 
archaeology and fortress of rationality  73
of miraculous power to Buddha images, consecrated amulets, and the 
physical fabric of religious structures, including stupas (Byrne 1995). 
The key characteristics of the world of Thai popular religion should 
thus be familiar to us, in the West, as they are so much a part of our own 
past. The Protestant Reformation, beginning in the sixteenth century, 
had the effect, however, of distancing us from our medieval selves. I 
suggest that it is the Reformation in us that makes it so hard for us to 
accept the validity of the magical supernatural as a way of making sense 
of the material past in today ’s world.
In the Protestant view, particularly the Calvinist view, religion was to 
be a matter between one’s soul and a God who dwelt in heaven (Eire 
1986: 312). This is Latour’s (1993: 32–35) “crossed-out God,” the God 
of modernity, relegated to the sidelines. In repudiating belief in the 
presence of magical and sacramental forces in the landscape, the Refor-
mation effectively removed God from nature as an active, causal force, 
opening the natural world up to understanding through learned in-
quiry via discourses such as natural history and archaeology. Counter- 
Reformation Catholicism, for its part, validated the worship of holy 
images but warned against regarding them as possessing power in 
their own right. It did not exactly resile from the miraculous—this was 
hardly possible, given the central place in Catholicism of the sacramen-
tal act of transubstantiation, in which the bread and wine are magically 
transformed into the body and blood of Christ. Instead, it sought to 
carefully manage popular engagement with the miraculous. We see this 
at Lourdes, where pilgrims are discouraged from treating the spring 
water as magically efficacious (Eade 1991: 55–68). The revolution in Eu-
ropean scientific thought that took place in the seventeenth century 
complemented key tenets of the Reformation: “ The notion that the 
universe was subject to immutable natural laws killed the concept of 
miracles” (K. Thomas 1971: 643).
One thus speaks of the “disenchantment ” (Weber 1946: 155) of the 
post-Reformation world. One problem with this proposition is that 
for many of Europe’s Christians, God continues to be immanent in 
nature—for them, the relics of the saints continue to be miraculous. 
Nor have other manifestations of the supernatural entirely faded 
from modern life experience, as Jay Winter (1995: 54–77) shows in re-
lation to the First World War. Another problem is the common as-
sumption that post-Reformation disenchantment encompasses the 
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non-European world, Asia for instance. While, as described in the next 
section, most Asian countries have experienced state-driven campaigns 
against “superstition,” nothing similar to the Protestant Reformation 
ever actually occurred there. Contrary to the Weberian “rationalisa-
tion thesis,” in Asia capitalism and modernity have not been accom-
panied by disenchantment. On the contrary, Asia’s rapid economic 
development in the last decades of the twentieth century has been ac-
companied by a surge in popular religion (Keyes et al. 1994; Jackson 
1999b).
The first Europeans to arrive in Siam, toward the end of the seven-
teenth century, set foot there nearly two hundred years after Martin 
Luther (1483–1546) formulated his ninety-five theses in 1517. The first to 
reach Siam were Portuguese explorers and traders in 1511; Portuguese 
Dominican missionaries followed in 1567. The Dutch opened factories 
at Patani in the south of Siam in 1602 and six years later at the capital, 
Ayuthaya, where Japanese traders, many of them Christians who had 
fled persecution in their homeland, were already established (D. Hall 
1981: 380). The British East India Company followed in 1612. In 1664, 
during the reign of King Narai (reigned 1657–88), French missionary 
priests were allowed to build a church and a seminary at Ayuthaya 
and they were soon carrying out missionary work elsewhere in Siam. 
The other Christian missionary project of the most influence in Siam 
was that of the American Protestants beginning in the mid-nineteenth 
century.
The Protestant missionaries were particularly concerned to attack 
what they saw as the idolatry of popular Thai Buddhism and they used 
every opportunity to try to demonstrate to Thais that images of the Bud-
dha and other deities were not imbued with divine power. On occasion 
this involved destroying the images in order to demonstrate their pow-
erlessness (e.g., Perkins 1884: 452), a strategy in the iconoclastic tradi-
tion of Calvinism. At around the same time that Western missionaries 
were attacking “idols,” Western art historians were appropriating them 
to the discourse of aesthetics. While the outcome was the reverse—the 
physical fabric of the idols was privileged and preserved for aesthetic 
edification—the discursive shift was in other ways the same. That is to 
say, it moved away from the idea of religious objects as divinely em-
powered and toward the idea of them as cultural property or cultural 
heritage. Being perhaps the most obvious “collectible” in Thai material 
culture, statues of the Buddha began to be acquired by Western traders, 
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travelers, and missionaries as early as the seventeenth century though 
it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that the 
European discourse of art history began to inform this collecting. In 
1917 George Coedès, formerly director of the Ecole Française d’Extrème 
Orient in Hanoi, was appointed to the National Library in Bangkok 
and it was only then that art history and archaeology began to be prac-
ticed on a professional basis in Siam. Unlike most missionaries, the 
art historians and archaeologists would treat the images of Buddha re-
spectfully or at least “neutrally ” though still via a discourse that focused 
purely on their formal materiality. It was a discourse that was immune, 
so to speak, to the divine power and efficacy of the objects.
This discursive shift would be manifest spatially as thousands and 
then, by the twenty-first century, hundreds of thousands of images of 
Buddha began their migration out of Asia toward the museums, the 
mantelpieces, and the glass coffee tables of the West. Some of these 
images are ancient, some are modern sacralized images, and many are 
unsacralized images produced specifically for the Western market. Not 
all of these images, however, have moved into the purely secular realm 
of art history; many have been acquired and displayed by westerners 
who, though not Buddhists, do appear to invest them with some de-
gree of spirituality. Interesting here is Meskell’s (2004: 177–94) view 
that the modern collecting of ancient Egyptian religious objects (and 
reproductions of them) does not entail a leaving behind of their origi-
nal spiritual, magical properties. She observes the “quasi-ritual piety ” 
with which many modern consumers “revere” them (2004: 178) and 
she notes that while “consumption may to some degree cheapen the 
grandeur of religion . . . commodities can also democratise the spiri-
tual” (2004: 182). In the case of Thai images of Buddha, an added per-
mutation of their migration westward has been that this transfer has 
been accompanied by a movement in the same direction of Buddhism 
itself. Beginning in the nineteenth century, many in the West have been 
attracted to a certain construction of Buddhism emphasizing holistic 
thought (Bruce 2002) and meditative, transcendental practice. But the 
Buddhism championed in the West tends to be “a religion without 
gods, a type of spiritual self-effort totally dependent upon the will of a 
determined practitioner” (J. Holt 2003: 112). This could hardly be fur-
ther removed from the kind of popular religious practice in Thailand 
that mediates local relations with the material past. As Jackson (1999a: 
251–52) observes:
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In popular religiosity—whether practised within an animist, Brahmanical, 
or even a Buddhist symbolic frame—neither the clerical bureaucracy of the 
Buddhist sangha nor notions of non-self (anatta) or transcendent salva-
tion (nibbana) play a significant role. In Thai popular religion it is the ‘self ’ 
of the spiritually powerful personality that is of paramount importance, 
and spiritual practice centres on establishing a strong personal relation-
ship between the devotee and that personality. This is the case whether the 
spiritual personality is a Buddhist monk, a Hindu god, a former king of 
Siam, a Chinese deity, or a locality spirit believed to inhabit an old tree, a 
cave, a mountain top, or other natural feature.
Returning to the nineteenth-century missionaries, we observe that 
they brought more than religious faith with them to Asia; they also trav-
eled with the science of medicine, the technology of the printing press, 
and an enthusiasm for modern education. Apart from their undoubted 
altruistic, humanitarian aspect, the medical services provided by mis-
sionaries were intended to help undermine superstitious beliefs (e.g., 
Cort 1886: 318). On the whole, Thais accepted the efficacy of modern 
medicine, but it seems unlikely that they saw it as canceling out the ef-
ficacy of the magical supernatural as recourse against illness and injury. 
In present day Thailand, where modern medicine is almost universally 
employed, invulnerability tattooing and recourse to the spirits and dei-
ties, channeled by mediums, are both extremely common in the rem-
edy and prevention of bodily harm as well as spiritual assault (Kitiarsa 
1999). Even more prevalent in contemporary Thai society is the wear-
ing of invulnerability charms, many of which are small stamped clay 
amulets (Chirapravati 1997; Turton 1991). They are ritually sacralized 
by powerful monks and are frequently “archaeological” in the sense of 
having been dug up from archaeological sites or “released” from stupas 
that have been broken open (Byrne 1999: 276; Tambiah 1984: 204).
What the above discussion  indicates is that in Thailand, as in many 
other parts of the non-Western world, the discourses of science and 
the supernatural can be practiced simultaneously, and by millions of 
people they are so practiced. The practice of one does not necessarily 
lead to the collapse of the other; the idea that they are antithetical is 
one of the conceits of Western modernity. I would argue that in a simi-
lar way and in the course of everyday life Thais participate in and prac-
tice the public discourse of heritage while simultaneously practicing 
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supernatural Buddhism. For example, people visiting the iconic heri-
tage site of Sukhothai in Central Thailand participate willingly in the 
state-sponsored narrative of this ancient religious center as the first cap-
ital of the Thai nation (Peleggi 1996) while at the same time venerating 
and propitiating individual structures and objects within the complex 
as supernaturally empowered entities. This display of cosmopolitan-
ism on the part of ordinary Thai folk stands in contrast to the man-
ner in which archaeologists and heritage practitioners tend to police a 
1 An amulet stall-holder in central Bangkok is reading  
an amulet collectors’ magazine. He is wearing one of  
the currently popular Jatukam Ramathep amulets.  
Photograph courtesy of the author.
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strict taxonomy aimed at preventing the archaeological meaning of the 
material past from being contaminated by supernatural meaning. Like 
the nineteenth-century missionaries, we archaeologists put our faith 
in the incompatibility of science and the supernatural. One effect of 
this is that it prevents local practice from having a say in heritage man-
agement, but another is that it denies heritage practice the richness of 
discourse plurality and contributes to the experiential and intellectual 
aridity and blandness that characterize heritage practice.
The interest taken in the natural history of Siam by Western travel-
ers and sojourners from around the middle of the nineteenth century 
was similar to the advent of modern medicine in that natural history 
constituted a self-contained, explanatory system with no interest in 
integrating existing indigenous forms of knowledge to itself. Its self- 
consciousness as a modern science insulated it from traditional knowl-
edge. Natural history embodied a classificatory approach based on ob-
servable physical attributes (Foucault 1973). It detached observed objects 
such as plants, animals, trees, soils, and rock formations from their lo-
cal social and religious settings, moving them into the new global set-
ting represented by geological tables and biological taxonomic systems. 
“Natural” objects might be acknowledged to have quaint meanings as-
signed to them in local custom and folklore, but this had nothing to 
do with their essential meaning as “natural” phenomena. Taxonomic 
systems such as Linnaeus’s could accommodate the biological species 
and other natural phenomena of Asia as easily as those of Europe. As 
Mary Louise Pratt (1992: 30) observes, circumnavigation of the globe 
by Europeans brought into being not just a “planetary consciousness” 
but a “European global or planetary subject ”: “One by one the planet ’s 
life forms were to be drawn out of the tangled threads of their life 
surroundings and rewoven into European-based patterns of global 
unity and order. The (lettered, male, European) eye that held the sys-
tem could familiarize (“naturalize”) new sites/sights immediately upon 
contact, by incorporating them into the language of the system” (Pratt 
1992: 31).
The Western sojourners who made up most of the membership of 
the Siam Society, founded in Bangkok in 1904, traveled widely in Siam, 
sometimes resided in the provinces, and were in a position to make 
just the kind of firsthand observations valued by natural history. The 
indefatigable Colonel Gerini (1904), in his exhortation to his fellow 
members of the Siam Society, suggested 217 topics that warranted their 
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interest. Under the letter “a” were to be found Aboriginal, agriculture, 
alchemy, alimentation, amulets, ancient cities, animals, Annamese, an-
thropology, archaeology, architecture, arms, arts, and astrology. “Every 
casual observer,” he urged, “even if not interested in the subject, can 
help by merely noting down such facts as fall under his knowledge” 
(1904: 1). The Siam Society, under royal patronage, functioned some-
what like its sibling learned societies in the surrounding European 
colonies, including the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 
and the Ecole Française d’Extrême Orient. It served to gather and cen-
tralize knowledge that was made available to various branches of the 
sciences and humanities in the metropolitan centers. These forms of 
knowledge—for example, archaeology, botany, ethnology, geology, 
zoology—had no precedent in the indigenous cultures of the region, 
which they marginalized by creating authorized bodies of knowledge 
whose center of gravity was situated in Western centers of learning. 
In relation to these centers, places such as Siam, Malaya, and Burma 
constituted the “field.”
Much more was involved, though, than the simple collection of 
knowledge and the channeling of it into Western repositories. As 
Foucault (1967, 1973) was at pains to point out, the great classifiers of 
eighteenth-century Europe strove to transform the disorder of pre-
classical knowledge into a new type of order. The “disorders of illness,” 
for instance, were transformed “into something akin to the order of 
plants” (Elden 2001: 127). It is tempting, by analogy, to see the clas-
sificatory schemes of art history and archaeology, which arranged Bud-
dhist stupas and other structures into types and subtypes, as an effort to 
remedy and displace a similar disorder. This disorder was the perceived 
madness of a system of popular knowledge that ordered these monu-
ments according to their record of miraculous efficacy or according to 
the spirits and deities known to reside at or in them, information that 
was recorded in shrine chronicles as well as being the subject of a vastly 
detailed and continually updated body of oral local knowledge.
Art historical and archaeological taxonomy is based on visual ob-
servation of material fabric and form. Popular religious knowledge is 
not indifferent to materiality but is interested primarily in materiality ’s 
effects. It finds evidence of these effects in dreams and apparitions 
and messages channeled by mediums. It carefully observes the flow 
of good fortune emanating from places and objects actively venerated 
or propitiated; equally, it registers the flow of ill fortune consequent 
80 Denis Byrne
upon the neglect or mistreatment of the same objects and places. These 
two knowledges coexist, but while the former is legitimated as proper 
knowledge by national and international institutions, the latter, though 
it flourishes at a popular culture, is denied this legitimacy.
Western knowledge systems operating in Siam rendered local popu-
lar religion as quaint rather than real. As noted at the beginning of this 
section, this discrediting has had little or no impact on the belief in and 
practice of local religion and the way it contextualizes the material past. 
What it has done is move it to the periphery of our view. But at least as 
important in the way the popular has become largely invisible has been 
the emergence, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, in Siam- 
Thailand3 of the nation-state. This highly centralized form of govern-
ment necessitated the crafting of a new national history (Reynolds 
1991), one that spelled the “nationalization” of archaeological heritage 
sites and the emergence of a discourse of heritage that—somewhat 
incidentally, somewhat tactically—was disarticulated from popular 
culture.
Marginalization of the Popular by the Centralized State
There are strong parallels between the development of the nation-state 
in Southeast Asia and the development in that region of archaeology 
and archaeological heritage management. This is not happenstance. As 
numerous archaeologists themselves have noticed, the nation-state, 
particularly in its project of national identity building, has profoundly 
shaped the form that modern archaeology has assumed in most parts of 
the world (e.g., B. Anderson 1991; Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996; 
L. Jones 1997). There was no precedent in Southeast Asia for the type 
of space the nation-state would require for its existence, and archaeol-
ogy, along with historiography, cartography, demography, education, 
museums, and transport infrastructure, would be among the programs 
or technologies that would help make this space available (B. Anderson 
1991).
The centralization of knowledge that has occurred in the course of 
the formation of nation-states in Asia is well illustrated by the produc-
tion of Thailand’s new national history, beginning in the late nineteenth 
century. The production of this history does not imply the absence of 
prior historiography. Premodern “traditional” historiography, known 
as tamnan (Wyatt 1976), was a localized form of history, each locality 
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having its own body of tamnan, oral or written, closely associated in 
an explanatory way with local sites (built and natural) and local land-
scapes. Royal capitals had their own tamnan, which, like those of 
outlying places, blended mythology and history, and the premodern 
state also maintained archives of royal edits that were themselves sa-
cred objects. Then there were Buddhist cosmological texts such as the 
Traiphum, which was compiled as early as 1345 bce from the Pali canon 
and commentaries and was preserved and kept current by the kings 
of Siam, who periodically commissioned recensions of it (Reynolds 
1976). The nature of premodern Siamese historiography was thus con-
tinuous from the local to the state, from the village to the center.
The move to the creation of national history is documented at a lo-
cal level in a case study by Gesick (1995). She describes the situation in 
the Songkla area of peninsula Thailand where, traditionally, tamnan 
manuscripts written on palm leaf were regarded as sacred objects in 
their own right (Gesick 1995: 20). Curated in local temples, they were 
charged with power in a way that made them dangerous to read. In 
1902 Prince Naris toured the Siamese provinces of the Malay Peninsula 
in his capacity as the minister of post and telegraph in the government 
of King Chulalongkorn. While visiting a famous old monastery in the 
Songkla area, he was shown a set of old manuscripts that had been in 
the care of a local woman (Gesick 1995: 5–6). Gesick interviewed two 
elderly sisters who were descendants of the curator of the manuscripts 
during Naris’s time and who related the story of how the manuscripts 
had been removed to Bangkok.
Reading the manuscripts, they say, was extremely dangerous and was 
rarely if ever done, and then only with ceremonial precautions. The manu-
scripts, they agreed, could only be read—the clear implication is “read 
aloud”—from the back of a white elephant. Otherwise, whoever attempted 
to read the manuscripts would cough blood from the larynx and die. 
Upon questioning, they explained that the “ white elephant ” was a sym-
bolic white elephant constructed out of cloth over a bamboo frame. They 
also said the “royal servants” (kha ratchakan) who took away the manu-
scripts took them on a white elephant. Without the white elephant, the 
manuscripts “refused to go.” (Gesick 1995: 20)
The removal of the manuscripts to Bangkok “signals” the ascendancy 
of scientific “national history ” over sacred local history (Gesick 1995: 
15).
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The collection of local source material to build national history had 
its counterpart in archaeology. What Prince Damrong Rajanuphab 
(1862–1943) accomplished for the government as the minister of the 
interior under Chulalongkorn, establishing and administering the new 
provincial bureaucratic infrastructure, he also did for the past of the 
new nation: he centralized it (Craig Reynolds, personal communica-
tion). Damrong personally recorded numerous ancient sites, mainly 
religious monuments, during his frequent travels across the country. 
Provincial governors and other officials were requested to put out feel-
ers and to report finds to Bangkok and they were instructed to col-
lect and conserve antiquities. The resulting inventory served to give 
these sites a new coherence as the physical imprint in the landscape of 
the emergent national narrative. Unlike the case of the tamnan, this 
project of mapping, which helped to bring into being a national space, 
had no interest in the supernatural attributes of the sites. It might in-
deed be argued that these places could only play their nation-building 
role once they were freed from the web of magical supernatural power 
relations that contextualized them within popular culture. Similarly, in 
the master plot of the new national history, the old narratives of kings 
that explained their rise and fall in terms of their religious merit were 
replaced by ones in which the kings were nation builders (Thongchai 
2000: 544).
The interrelatedness of the various components of the nation- 
building program is seen in the relationship between archaeology, his-
tory, and transportation. By 1907 some 550 miles of railway track were 
in operation in Siam (B. Anderson 1978: 225). Railways, new roads 
(replacing buffalo and elephant tracks), and telegraph lines allowed 
the center to be present at the periphery, permitting the centralized 
national government to be a tangible reality in all parts of the country 
and to control minutely life across the country in a way that had never 
been possible previously. If the railway and then the highway system 
made even the far-flung reaches of the nation governable it also made 
the physically dispersed heritage sites visitable. Successive Thai gov-
ernments have developed iconic monumental sites such as Ayuthaya, 
Sukhothai, Pimai, and Phanom Rung as historical parks for visitation 
by both Thai and foreign tourists. As Ivy (1995) has shown in the case 
of Japan, the railway helped introduce the public to the idea of na-
tional space as well as promoting the idea that national culture was 
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a visitable, consumable entity. In Siam, as in India, China, and else-
where, the building of the railways required huge volumes of “ballast” 
for use in constructing the bed of the line and this was often acquired 
in the vicinity of the line by demolishing the ruins of old stupas and 
other monuments. Among other places, this occurred in the area of the 
old capital, Ayuthaya (Vella 1978: 203–4). One author even claims that 
railway contractors were actively encouraged to use temple ruins as a 
source of “ballast ” (Graham 1924: 178). There is a sense then in which 
those sites that nationalism raised to iconic status became visitable by 
the new national community in a process that consumed non-iconic 
sites of purely local-popular significance.
In Benedict Anderson’s words (1991: 173), across Southeast Asia in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, the surveyors were “on the 
march to put space under the same surveillance which the census-makers 
were trying to impose on persons.” Whereas previously the power of 
the king only extended as far out from his capital as he was able to 
project military force, now the writ of government extended across 
the whole country to its very borders. But the borders themselves had 
to be created for the purpose. Previously there had been no need to 
know precisely where the kingdom began or ended geographically—at 
their peripheries, the kingdoms of Siam, Burma, and Cambodia gradu-
ally merged into each other. The modern topographic survey map of 
Siam, first produced at the end of the nineteenth century by Western 
surveyors employed by King Chulalongkorn, displaced a preexisting 
notion of a sacred landscape that consisted of sacred centers, such as 
princely capitals, surrounded by unmeasured space (Thongchai 1994). 
This space was depicted in the murals painted on temple walls in which 
“the universal land of the Buddha” (Thongchai 1994: 22), consisting 
of stories from the Buddha’s life, was shown as being set in the local 
landscape surrounding the temple. It was a spatial order in which the 
cosmological and the terrestrial tied together. Henceforth, however, 
it was only the confines of the Buddhist temples across the country 
that were recognized by the center as constituting sacred space, not 
the landscape surrounding them, which was subsumed into the new 
“geobody ” (Thongchai 1994) of the nation.
Prince Damrong’s nationalization of ancient monuments, alluded to 
earlier, was part of a larger move to invent a whole new notion of Thai 
“culture,” which became particularly marked in the 1930s and 1940s. 
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The thinker, writer, and politician Luang Wichit Wathakan (1898–1962) 
played a key role in this invention, convinced as he was that the new 
nation must be “a tangible entity which individuals could identify with 
and love” (Barmé 1993: 87). This tangibility included new ritual be-
havior in relation to national symbols (for example, the flag and the 
national anthem), a whole new raft of performing arts (sponsored 
by the Fine Arts Department, founded in 1933), a new style of dress 
and deportment, and the promotion of Thai language at the expense 
of Chinese languages (Barmé 1993: 144–63). Popular religion had no 
place in this new cultural domain.
The construction of the Thai nation-state thus affected popular re-
ligious practice in a variety of ways. An attempt was made to confine 
religious belief to a segment of life that was defined by institutional 
Buddhism. The supernatural was taken out of history (by the new na-
tional historical narrative), taken out of nature (as an explanation of 
natural phenomena), taken out of the landscape (displaced by modern 
cartography), taken out of the very notion of “culture,” and taken out 
of the material past, where it would be displaced (at an official level) 
by the discourses of archaeology and heritage. At least this was the 
program: it would be more accurate to say that popular religion was 
taken out of visibility.
It is impossible to separate the creation of archaeological or heritage 
space in Thailand from either the influence of Western secular-rational 
modernity or the internal nation-building project. One might say that 
the magical supernatural context of the Thai material past has been 
stratified below these developments and obscured from view. I mean 
specifically the view from “above,” the perspective one has of Thai so-
ciety when one’s view is mediated by official institutions and discourse. 
Archaeology has benefited from the disenfranchisement of popular re-
ligion as a form of legitimate knowledge and practice insofar as it has 
allowed us to promote the illusion that ordinary Thais see the material 
past the way we do. A space has been opened up for us to occupy, but 
our occupation of it is always at the expense of a disengagement from 
the world of our fellow citizens in places like Thailand. To dwell in this 
space is to live an illusion.
Finally, in this section, I turn to briefly consider the role that reli-
gious reform in Thailand has played in the disenfranchisement of the 
popular. King Mongkut (Rama IV, reigned 1851–68) came to the throne 
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after living twenty-seven years as a Buddhist monk, during which time 
he learned English and read extensively about Western religions and 
Western science, himself becoming a knowledgeable astronomer. But 
he also studied the Pali canon of Buddhism and turned his energies to 
promoting an orthodox practice of Buddhism that eschewed belief in 
magic and the supernatural. In 1829 he founded the Thammayut order 
of Buddhist monks, who aimed “to purify the religion by restoring 
to it the outstanding qualities of rationality and objectivity that had 
characterized early Buddhism but had been lost with its popular accep-
tance” (Ishii 1986: 156). Before and after his ascension Mongkut was a 
vocal defender of Thai Buddhism against those Westerners, particularly 
Protestant missionaries, who denigrated it as a primitive, superstition-
ridden religion. In doing this he stressed the rationality of orthodox 
Buddhism: “His discussions with the missionaries made him realize 
that it was the folk beliefs appended to Buddhism that underlay their 
contempt for his religion. He became firmly convinced that in order to 
defend Buddhism from the pressures of Western civilization, he must 
strip it of those heterodox accretions” (Ishii 1986: 159).
Monastic reform and the “modernization” of religion continued 
throughout Mongkut’s eighteen-year reign and during that of his son, 
Chulalongkorn. Several Brahmanistic and animistic court rituals, such 
as the Giant Swing ceremony, were discontinued and a radical reform 
of the Buddhist sangha (the monkhood) was instituted. The highly dis-
persed nature of the monastic structure was reinvented as a centralized 
system, controlled by the Sangha Council in Bangkok, that was not 
unlike the new civil service and that paralleled the newly centralized 
Thai state. Tamnan were removed from local monastic education but 
the Sangha reforms also involved a very direct intervention in monastic 
ritual and the way that monks lived their religion. The modern state 
has always had a problem with mobile populations of pastoralists and 
hunter-gatherers and it is significant that one of the key measures of the 
reform package was a concerted campaign to stop the wandering exis-
tence led by many of Siam’s monks, an existence that saw them roam 
from one forest monastery, pilgrimage site, ancient ruin, or meditation 
cave to another. Under the terms of the 1902 Sangha Act monks were 
required to register at a particular monastery (J. Taylor 1993: 71).
The spiritual power possessed by monks meant that it was natural 
for local people to rely upon them in their various dealings with the phi 
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and other non-canonical spirits and forces (Tiyavanich 1993). To coun-
ter this, a program of surveillance on the part of the Sangha Council 
aimed to curtail the extent to which village monks were enmeshed in 
non-canonical religious practices centered on the local cults.
It is questionable how much effect any of this has had in the long 
term on the practice of popular religion in Thailand. The emergence 
in the 1980s of “prosperity cults” headed by “magic monks” (Jackson 
1999a, 1999b) suggests that non-canonical Buddhism is enjoying a re-
surgence. Jackson notes that “from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the 
Thai state withdrew from its historical role of controlling expressions 
of Buddhist religiosity and that its place was increasingly taken by the 
market ” (Jackson 1999a: 258). The orthodox-conservative leadership 
of the sangha has also suffered a loss of prestige. A run of financial 
and sexual scandals in recent decades has eroded the position of the 
monkhood in general, and the supreme patriarch’s alignment with the 
conservative military side during the democracy massacre in 1992 was 
also damaging (J. Taylor 1993: 74). At the same time the state has to 
some extent relaxed its highly centralized power structure and has im-
plemented the policies of decentralization that are now common to 
governments in most parts of the world. This has been concurrent with 
a resurgence of interest in local history, which, in places, even includes 
a relegitimization of tamnan (Thongchai 1995: 111).
Cosmopolitanism and Conservation
I would stress the point that popular religious culture does not require 
our consent in order to flourish in its relationship with the material 
past. It is principally we who stand to gain by taking a cosmopolitan 
approach. Our choice is over whether we want to live and work in the 
world of actual social practice or in the imaginary world our discourse 
has furnished us with.
It seems wishful thinking, however, that the Western conservation 
movement will bring down the walls and engage with local practice 
anytime soon. To date, the real gains made by socially inclusive con-
servation management, both in the natural and cultural domains, are 
almost entirely confined to the developed world. In places such as 
Australia, New Zealand, and North America, indigenous people have 
gained a real degree of control over their heritage, resulting sometimes 
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in embargoes on archaeological research and sometimes in collabora-
tive research. In the developing world the gains have mainly been at 
the level of the case study. In Thailand, for instance, iccrom has a proj-
ect to promote the engagement of heritage professionals with local 
communities and their value systems.4 The regional intergovernment 
heritage body, spafa, also promotes community engagement, but 
this usually turns out to be focused on educating local communities 
to adopt state-endorsed heritage values, ignoring the local systems of 
value that already exist. In the cultural heritage field, as in nature con-
servation (Brockington 2004: 414; Igoe 2006: 73, 76), a combination 
of the desire of proponents of the community conservation approach 
to want to believe it works and the “loudness” of the positive spin put 
on the approach by international conservationists obscures the shal-
lowness of its penetration.
We need to go beyond the sort of community engagement programs 
that aim to give locals a better appreciation of their heritage. They al-
ready appreciate it. The problem for us is that their appreciation often 
does not amount to “conservation” in the restricted sense in which we 
use that term, a sense in which “things trump people at every turn” (see 
Meskell’s introduction to this volume). Our restricted understanding 
of what a thing can be blinds us to alternative forms of conservation. 
For example, historically and in the present day, Thais often “restore” 
the crumbling ruins of old or ancient stupas by completely encasing 
them within the form of a new stupa constructed on top of and around 
them. What they achieve in this way, at considerable financial cost to 
themselves, is the conservation of the meaning of the stupa as a divine 
object (Byrne 1995). The divine nature of the stupa is by no means com-
promised by such an intervention; it can only be enhanced.
And yet there is hope to be had from the pressure that continues to 
build within the fields of archaeology and heritage conservation for the 
implementation of the “values approach” mentioned at the opening of 
this chapter. There is particular pressure to give adequate weighting 
to the contemporary social value of the material past. The social turn 
in heritage management consists at least as much of rhetoric as action, 
but this simply underlines the problem for cultural heritage: one can 
only foreground social value at the level of principle for so long before 
people begin to notice the way it is effaced at the level of professional 
practice. My guess is that this will eventually lead archaeologists and 
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heritage practitioners to an engagement with popular religion: the re-
ligious simply cannot be extricated from the social and the social, it 
would seem, is here to stay.
Cosmopolitanism draws heavily on the mind-expanding benefit of 
cross-cultural conversations. A cosmopolitan archaeology is one whose 
“researchers will have to engage in wider social and political conver-
sations,” the outcomes of which we cannot control (see Meskell’s 
introduction to this volume). According to the philosopher Kwame 
Anthony Appiah (2006a: 57), while value judgments may differ, “Cos-
mopolitans suppose that all cultures have enough overlap in their vo-
cabulary of values to begin a conversation.” However, when it comes 
to the possibility of dialogue between local practitioners of popular 
religion and professional practitioners of archaeology and heritage, we 
have to question whether such overlap presently exists. Can it exist in 
the face of our rejection, as rational modernists, of the existence of the 
magical supernatural?
In pondering this we might note that the type of conversation Appiah 
refers to would be based on the principle of tolerance and that this 
principle does not necessarily require us to accept the truth of the magi-
cal supernatural. Indeed, as Habermas (2003a: 3) observes, “ Toleration 
first becomes necessary when one rejects the convictions of others: we 
do not need to be tolerant if we are indifferent toward other beliefs and 
attitudes.” It is not belief we need, then; it is tolerance, tolerance as a 
deliberate position that we take up and tolerance that proceeds from 
our disbelief.
Notes
1  Environmental conservation projects funded by the World Bank alone, 
in the decade between 1986 and 1996, entailed the forcible relocation of an 
estimated three million people (Colchester 2004: 30).
2  http://www.conservationrefugees.org (accessed November 2006).
3  Following the coup of 1932, which ended the absolute monarchy, the mil-
itary government changed the country’s name from Siam to Thailand in 1938. 
4  See http://www.iccrom.org.
Lynn Meskell
4  i   the nature of culture  
in kruger national park
South Africa was subject to colonial occupation and more recently 
apartheid repression until the 1990s, leaving a legacy of decimated 
indigenous archaeological heritage. Archaeologists played crucial, 
albeit detrimental, roles in the fabrication of archaeological narratives 
and subsequent history making that remain inescapable today, and 
they have had the particular effect of diminishing the importance 
of an archaeological past for the majority of the nation’s populace. 
Focusing on Kruger National Park—the flagship of South Africa’s 
conservation, biodiversity, and wilderness heritage—I underscore the 
current tensions surrounding the privileging of nature over culture 
and the continuing sacrifice of historic recognition and restitution for 
the “greater good” of conservation. An archaeological ethnography 
based around heritage sites and projects across the park exemplifies the 
displacement of an archaeological past and exposes the implications 
for black descendant communities today. I argue that, irrespective of 
leadership or regime change, the mobilization of state power continues 
to devalue the archaeological past and its indigenous histories. What 
subsequently emerges as a dominant concern in the new South Africa 
is a distinctive articulation of nature in the cosmopolitan discourse of 
biodiversity.
Globally, biodiversity is positively viewed as an ecological workhorse, 
essential raw material for evolution, a sustainable economic resource, 
a font of aesthetic and ecological value, a global heritage, genetic 
capital, and the key to the survival of life itself (Hayden 2003: 52). 
Given this enormous potential and the future-geared, promise-based 
rhetorics of rescue, is it surprising that archaeological pasts seem weary 
and moribund ruins that are not living up to their earning potential? 
Perhaps as a result of this disinterest, and given the recent volatile 
struggles over land claims in Kruger and elsewhere, narratives of terra 
nullius or “empty lands” have resurfaced in dangerous and familiar 
ways (see also the chapter by González-Ruibal, this volume). The now 
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discredited discourse has become sutured to the celebratory discourses 
of conservation and biodiversity: both pertain to global desires for pris-
tine wilderness, minimal human intensification, the erasure of anthro-
pogenic landscapes, the primacy of non-human species, sustainability, 
and so on. Without recognition of the complex and continued human 
history in Kruger’s landscapes there is little chance of historical justice 
and restitution for indigenous South Africans.
Narratives of terra nullius hitch to the imaginings of powerful inter-
national bodies and regulations, including the World Wildlife Fund 
(wwf), the United Nations (un), the World Conservation Union 
(iucn), and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (cites), that want to privilege and 
preserve flora and fauna over and above people (or even the evidence of 
people) in the name of a common humanity and the global commons. 
Biodiversity and conservation may today be global constructs, but they 
are imagined in South Africa in very specific, historically charged ways. 
They are distinct yet related discourses and both are enshrined in a 
“protected areas” strategy developed largely on a U.S. model of na-
tional parks and wilderness reserves that historically bifurcated humans 
and nature, nature and culture (W. Adams 2005; Adams and Mulli-
gan 2003b: 10). While synonymous with nature in the form of dra-
matic wilderness and exotic game, South Africa is also renowned for 
its natural degradation, environmental troubles, pollution, and toxic 
landscapes (McDonald 2002). Human occupation and intensification 
are thus negatively inflected from the outset, whether in precolonial, 
colonial, or postcolonial contexts, and are similarly positioned with 
poaching, mining, deforestation, resource depletion, and so on.
The case of Kruger reveals the cosmopolitan frictions among trans-
national organizations, funding agencies, state projects, heritage bod-
ies, and indigenous communities in and around the place of culture 
in a nature reserve. Both natural and cultural heritage are imagined in 
particular local and national ways, and each is influenced and effected 
by global organizations and mandates. Funding for the running and 
research of Kruger National Park and its outreach is supplied by North 
American government agencies, private foundations, international or-
ganizations, universities, research grants, ngos, and state and private 
revenues (McKinsey Report 2002). Nongovernmental organizations 
ultimately do much of the work of the South African state. Many assert 
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that they float the nation, the danger being that they become de facto 
agencies for service delivery and devolved responsibility for govern-
ment (Cheah 1998: 322). Notions of local, state, global, and indigenous 
are all pieced together from this complex mosaic of sources, resources, 
inspirations, and agendas. The research I present here is based on sev-
eral years of work in Kruger National Park, and my research has been 
both archaeological and ethnographic (Meskell 2005a, 2006a, 2007a). 
Based at Skukuza, Kruger’s research station, I have had sustained in-
teractions and interviews with park managers, research scientists and 
technicians, ecologists, service workers, rangers, heritage officers, and 
those forcibly removed from the park during previous regimes. What 
began as a project of tracking the progress of archaeology after ten 
years of democracy has necessarily come to embrace the fraught re-
lationship between cultural and natural heritage, and to ask why it is 
that nature trumps culture. In fact, it would be impossible to conduct 
either archaeological or ethnographic fieldwork outside the confines 
of the parastatal pressures that prioritize the flora and fauna of Kruger 
National Park, as they are taken up in global imaginings of salvage, 
development, empowerment, and the good.
Parastatal Relations
In scores of interviews around the park borders, dislocated residents of 
the park see Kruger as the state, irrespective of its former management 
by the apartheid-era white National Party or its current management 
by the black anc. Kruger is a parastatal organization; it operates as an 
arm of government, is answerable to the minister for Environment Af-
fairs and Tourism, and yet is primarily financially self-sustaining. But 
more than its programmatics, Kruger operates likes a state and has al-
ways exercised a significant degree of juridical and disciplinary power. 
Its central administrative node and main tourist hub is Skukuza. The 
name Skukuza is telling. It means “to sweep clean” or “to strip bare” in 
Tsonga, and it was the name conferred upon the first warden of the park, 
Stevenson-Hamilton, in the early 1900s, by the local Shangaan people 
(Carruthers 1995, 2001). His measures to rid the park of its indigenous 
inhabitants became synonymous with the structure and identity of the 
park, particularly with systematic histories of erasure. Elders whom 
I interviewed from the northernmost park border at Pafuri south to 
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regions around Orpen and Lilydale, who once lived inside the confines 
of the park and were evicted between the 1920s and the 1960s, still refer 
bitterly to the organization of Kruger National Park as “Skukuza.” The 
name Skukuza, the action of stripping away all that existed before, has 
come to represent the politics of the park to this day. Skukuza, as both 
noun and verb, continues to have a strong resonance.
The complex relationship between people and nature that developed 
through colonial and apartheid regimes continues to haunt South Af-
rica, specifically concerning what sorts of people serve nature versus 
those who are afforded its bounty. Historically, these have always been 
lines of tension, of circumscription and discrimination—and they con-
tinue to be a potent social and spatial determinant. The “fences and 
fines” approach, also known in its stricter guise as fortress conservation 
(Brockington 2004a), has always been in operation in South Africa, 
although prior to 1994 it was manned, quite literally, by the white elite 
and their soldiers. Kruger National Park was always considered a mili-
tary buffer zone, a wilderness corridor that shielded the state from po-
litical resistance and insurgency during apartheid and now safeguards 
it from illegal immigration. As one might imagine, social transforma-
tion has still a vast way to go in the traditionally white, racially seg-
regated preserve of national parks. Moreover, there has still been no 
recognition of the thousands of black workers whose labor created the 
park and whose forced sacrifice of land, livestock, and cultural lifeways 
made it possible for the fortunate to enjoy the spoils of biodiversity and 
conservation today.
Kruger comprises some two million hectares of fenced land and is 
bordered by Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Together the three coun-
tries have allowed the creation of a transfrontier or transboundary park 
(Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park), sponsored by the Peace Parks 
Foundation—a conglomerate of international development agencies, 
private donations, and corporate involvement. The whole notion of 
an international park that traverses three countries experiencing in 
their own particular ways dire poverty, the hiv-aids pandemic, unem-
ployment, violence around immigration and displacement, and so on 
seems to test the limits of possibility. Some of my work has been con-
ducted in Limpopo province where the three countries intersect. That 
intersection ominously known as Crooks Corner is testament to the 
histories of exploitation, both human and animal, that southern Africa 
has suffered through European colonialism, in the brutal regimes of 
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apartheid South Africa and the former Rhodesia, through war-torn 
Mozambique, and in the forced relocations and displacements of 
people more recently (Connor 2003). This point of triangulation, a 
no-man’s land of sorts, also witnessed some of the most aggressive 
poaching and illegal trading of animals, gunrunning, movements of 
military and insurgents, and untold numbers of refugees. For over a 
century this has been a stain on the map—a lawless area that has defied 
containment. It should not then be surprising that it was from this 
region, to the extreme north of Kruger National Park, that apartheid 
forces launched chemical weapons assaults into Mozambique against 
the resistance forces, the frelimo (Cock and Fig 2002), using perhaps 
the nation’s most positive emblem of heritage as a staging ground for 
crushing the resistance across national borders. Kruger’s origins and 
history have been deeply implicated in the consolidation of Afrikaner 
nationalism and later apartheid, bolstered by extensive military force. 
Army and air force bases were dotted across the landscape, on its frag-
ile borders with the rest of South Africa and, more importantly, with 
Mozambique. Some of these remain operative today while others have 
been reappropriated, such as the military barracks on land currently 
leased by the luxury five-star resort of Singita (Meskell 2006a) that 
now houses its black service workers.
The Nature of Biodiversity and Bad Citizens
As a result of ongoing fieldwork, I have become increasingly concerned 
with the current understandings of and ambition regarding the concept 
of biodiversity in South Africa. The global Convention on Biological 
Diversity (cbd) defines biodiversity as “the variability among living 
organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and 
other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexities of which they 
are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and 
of ecosystems” (Orlove and Brush 1996: 329–30). “Biodiversity” as a 
construction entered the stage of science and development in the late 
1980s, while its textual origins can be traced to the cbd in 1992, the 
Global Diversity Strategy (fostered by the World Conservation Union, 
the United Nations Environment Program, and the World Resources 
Institute) in 1992, and the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 (Escobar 
1998: 54). For South Africa, the end of apartheid and the shift to a 
democratic neoliberal state came at the very moment that the mandate 
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of biodiversity achieved global recognition, and this synchronicity is 
particularly salient. One senior scientist in Kruger explained it in an 
interview as “an intersection between a political opportunity or a win-
dow of policy change that we’ve seen right through just about all the 
legislation in South Africa, and these changes in ecological thinking.” 
While biodiversity has “concrete biophysical referents, it must be seen 
as a discursive invention of recent origin. This discourse fosters a com-
plex network of actors, from international organizations and north-
ern ngos to scientists, prospectors, and local communities and social 
movements’ ”(Escobar 1998: 54). And this ties neatly into developments 
in South Africa from the mid-1990s onward, when the new democratic 
nation first became enmeshed in this series of international networks.
In South Africa biodiversity is packaged as modern and forward-
looking. It is entrepreneurial, economically indexical, and global, 
whereas cultural heritage is backward-looking, politically fraught, and 
signifies potential loss to the nation under the specter of land claims. 
Yet conversely, material heritage cannot always be sutured easily to liv-
ing communities today given apartheid’s victory of historical erasure. 
Biodiversity is conceived as cosmopolitan and neutral, belonging to no 
single person, group, nation-state, or corporation (Litzinger 2006: 69) 
but instead to a common humanity, coercing us all to participate in 
its mandate. In reality its immediate beneficiaries are often few and oc-
cluded. I should point out that Kruger itself is not a biodiversity hot-
spot and the park was proclaimed for very different historic reasons, 
including aesthetic value and the prevalence of game for hunting. 
Embarrassingly, scientists and researchers agree that there is more ac-
tual biodiversity in the poverty stricken rural sprawl that constitutes 
Bushbuck Ridge on Kruger’s western boundary (see also Fairhead and 
Leach 1996, 2003).
In asking why diverse nature offers a more compelling suite of con-
cerns, as opposed to cultural diversity and preservation, a number of 
differences are laid bare. Nature is neutral, supra-racial, existing and 
entreating protection beyond race: it can be embraced by the new, 
multicultural concept of South Africa as the Rainbow Nation (Meskell 
2005b, 2006b). Nature is immediately legible with real-time collective 
consequences for the planet if we fail to meet our protective agendas. 
Thus, a truly cosmopolitan engagement is required, whereas the ar-
chaeological and historical past requires decipherment, translation, and 
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education and is packaged in South Africa as peculiarly local. Cultural 
heritage is identity-specific and factional, and while seemingly impor-
tant for crafting a new national identity, archaeological remains are 
currently configured to particular communities in partial, exclusion-
ary, and politically divisive ways. Multiple stakeholder sharing of the 
past is understandably difficult given the repressive histories of colonial 
and apartheid rule. Species diversity is universally recognized and con-
sumed, irrespective of race, nation, religion, gender, ethnicity, and so 
on. It is also globally supported by an organizational and fiscal infra-
structure that further operates an index of modernity, civilization, and 
alignments to the priorities of the first world. The language and scope 
of biodiversity is inherently modernist and cosmopolitan, neoliberal in 
ethos, and positively configured as scientific, sustainable, developmen-
tal, and experimental. Here neoliberalism refers to a set of policies and 
practices marked as privileged modes of governance for addressing so-
cial, economic, and environmental problems. Nature has increasingly 
been treated by development agencies, national governments in the 
North and the South, organizations regulating global trade, and some 
conservationists as a public good in the name of one worldism. From 
the 1980s onward, development and conservation discourses reframed 
economic development and “modernization” in terms of environmen-
tal “sustainability”—commonly defined as development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising future generations’ abil-
ity to meet theirs (Hayden 2003: 48–49). Private and state-sponsored 
environmental education programs, especially those targeting school 
children, throughout and beyond the borders of Kruger exemplify 
these hallowed concerns for creating good environmental subjects 
whose primary goal is conservation for the future. Conversely, no such 
programs exist for cultural or archaeological heritage.
Understandably, the anc wants to trump the poor environmental 
record of the apartheid regime and the most expedient and globally 
recognized avenue is through high-profile nature conservation, which 
lies at the intersection of science, development, and neoliberal inter-
nationalism. Additionally, there are huge monetary incentives from 
overseas scientists and funding agencies. Archaeology and cultural 
heritage strategies cannot hope to match these resources or fiscal po-
tentials. Given that the most famed archaeological site in the park, the 
Iron Age site of Thulamela, is not generating notable tourist traffic or 
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revenues (Meskell 2006a, 2007a) despite being generously funded by 
corporate sponsors and international development funds in the 1990s 
(wwf, norad, Gold Fields Foundation), it is unlikely that other sites 
will be considered for recognition and development by sanparks in 
the near future.
Cori Hayden (2003: 33) has eloquently argued that we are in the 
midst of a powerful set of turns pertaining to international develop-
ment and conservation, biodiversity conservation, market-oriented 
sustainable development initiatives, and (endangered) cultural diver-
sity. Several of these forces are at play in and around Kruger, although 
cultural diversity remains almost invisible within the park and is only 
lightly marked outside its borders by a flourishing market in tourist-
oriented cultural villages. Since the 1990s the United Nations has a 
mandated register for biodiversity, and South Africa is a signatory to 
the international Convention of Biological Diversity, which outlines 
the need for its promotion in a range of sectors. Other international 
organizations, including the National Science Foundation and the 
Mellon Foundation, both of which are based in the United States, are 
operating in South Africa to fund research and inventory natural re-
sources. Meanwhile, the same governance has since been applied to 
cultural heritage, as the South African Heritage and Resources Agency 
has now formed its own register. There are numerous overlaps between 
the two management systems. In the specific context of cultural heri-
tage, Francisco Bandarin, the director of the unesco World Heritage 
Center in France, recently chose to stress that it was “the natural beauty 
of Africa and the remarkable biodiversity of its ecosystems [that] are 
of special importance to humankind, not only for the enjoyment of 
visitors but also for their scientific value and their critical importance 
for sustaining global biodiversity” (Russouw 2006: 15). Biodiversity 
trumps cultural heritage, particularly in the context of Africa, as op-
posed to the acclaimed cultural sites of Europe. As Bandarin makes 
clear, there is “an under-representation for Africa and the developing 
world” in the cultural realm. With biodiversity, alternatively, there are 
so many more potential economic sources for funding as well as stra-
tegic potentials for development. And it is precisely the cosmopolitan 
nature of nature’s potential that makes it ripe for such transnational 
attention and implicates us all in its ambitions.
Building on Foucault’s notion of governmentality, the notion of “en-
vironmentality” (Agrawal 2005) offers a provocative terrain for inves-
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tigation into the recasting of sanparks under the anc, particularly in 
terms of the kinds of subjects and subjectivity implied therein. Hayden 
(2003: 83) rightly asks what kind of participation and subjectivity is be-
ing recognized, impelled, forged, and articulated through the promise 
of biodiversity. Such promises tend to revolve around future-geared 
common goods that must be guaranteed by the continued participa-
tion, sacrifice, and self-monitoring by those very disadvantaged com-
munities who have ultimately paid the price for conservation. While 
good environmental subjects are strongly desired, with an emphasis 
on the indigenous populations surrounding Kruger Park, their own 
knowledges and practices cannot be interpolated into park manage-
ment strategies.
Many black South Africans, long excluded from the park on racial 
grounds (other than as service workers or guides), have understand-
ably seen Kruger as an exclusive enclave catering to the cultural and rec-
reational tastes of the white and the wealthy (Beinart and Coates 1995; 
Brockington 2004a). Numbers of black tourists visiting national parks 
have risen from 4 percent in 2002 to 19.7 percent in 2005 according to 
the director of sanparks. The reasons for these low numbers are both 
historic and economic (McKinsey Report 2002). The park system’s dis-
course of stakeholding and community involvement is aimed at creat-
ing the appropriate disciplined environmental citizens. And coincident 
with the “rhetoric of stakeholding comes a certain provisional language 
of representation and participation, expressed through the intertwined 
idioms of compensation, investment, and incentive-building” (Hayden 
2003: 8). In South Africa, as elsewhere, rural people, researchers, and 
governments are “all encouraged to buy in to the globalizing project of 
biodiversity conservation and protected areas with the promise of divi-
dends dangling in the future” (Hayden 2003: 8). Throughout many 
interviews, I have enquired whether people are proud of the park as a 
national treasure, an international icon, a beacon of biodiversity, and 
the pinnacle of conservation. Most reply that they still await an expla-
nation for their eviction, for compensation, and for the right to freely 
enter the park, to see the animals, to visit the graves and sites of their 
ancestors, and to have their children and grandchildren given employ-
ment by the park. Many more are angry that dangerous animals that 
escape the park’s confines destroy their crops, attack their cattle, and 
threaten their personal safety and that nothing is done to protect or 
compensate them. If they retaliate and kill the animal, they face possible 
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prosecution. Yet Kruger takes no responsibility for such destruction (in 
2006 Kruger was deemed legally responsible rather than the state). So 
common is the damage inflicted by the animals that researchers refer 
to their rogue escapees as dcas (Damage Causing Animals). Much of 
the “human cost” of wildlife has been elided from the preservationist 
discussion (Fortmann 2005: 202). In a similar vein, many of the poor-
est people interviewed do not understand what biodiversity entails and 
yet most representatives for South African National Parks believe that 
they do and are in essence supportive of this united venture (Meskell 
2006a). Most of the people living in the area see little or no social or 
economic benefits from having one of the world’s great conservation 
enclaves at their doorstep, but rather applaud the more tangible ben-
efits provided by private reserves such as those run by Conservation 
Corporation Africa. Moreover, people living on the edge of the park 
clearly understand that hunting in nearby private game farms by rich 
tourists is differently configured to traditional hunting practices. The 
taxonomies of “hunting” for sport or survival might seem porous to an 
outsider, but they have serious legal ramifications to those who once 
lived inside the park and are now very much on the outside. One man, 
jailed numerous times for poaching in Kruger put it well: It’s all about 
money, about who can afford to hunt and who cannot. He connected 
this immediately to the indices of race and power: being white means 
killing an animal has different significations and ramifications. How 
might such “disaffected” individuals, the bad subjects of conservation, 
and their descendents be brought into line, so to speak, with preserva-
tionist efforts? This question resides very much at the heart of Kruger’s 
didactic efforts and outreach programs.
Putting Archaeology in Its Place
Relations between the park and its forcibly relocated neighbors have 
improved since the democratic elections of 1994, however, and an en-
tire unit known as People and Conservation was established with edu-
cation, development, and employment as its mandate. Importantly, 
this is the unit that also manages cultural heritage, although sanparks 
has at present no qualified archaeologists on its staff in either its ad-
ministrative offices or across its twenty-one national parks. We might 
well ask where Kruger’s rich archaeological heritage falls in this new 
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landscape of cosmopolitan biodiversity and development. Some of 
the answers are reflected in interviews with the park’s senior manage-
ment. The tension between cultural and natural heritage is ever present 
among senior black anc government employees who chose to privilege 
nature and the conservation effort over and above the economic and 
spiritual needs of their own people. In this regard I am not suggesting 
that cultural heritage necessarily be a primary concern, but rather that 
pressing social or cultural issues tend to be considered secondary. It 
was frequently said that Kruger is not a development agency.
The new black leadership continually highlights the international 
biodiversity mandate, trading it “off against social needs such as health 
care and other welfare services,” stressing that “to achieve the 10 per 
cent iucn ideal, some 50,000km2 of additional land (2.5 times the size 
of Scotland) must be acquired” (Magome and Murombedzi 2003: 109) 
for protected, conservation areas. It should be said that land reform 
during the anc’s rule has been slow and heavily criticized for the re-
formers’ reluctance to disrupt nationally profitable white farms. In 2005 
more than seventeen thousand land claims had yet to be processed: 
most successful claims entail financial compensation rather than land 
settlement. The potential losses to Kruger—dramatized in terms of 
local black communities turning wilderness into theme parks and ca-
sinos—featured heavily in the 2005 State of the Nation Report (Walker 
2006: 68).
When interviewed, the director of Kruger National Park revealed 
that he had never visited the nationally celebrated site of Thulamela 
and, when pressed on the scale of Kruger’s cultural heritage, resorted 
to stock answers from the park’s public relations materials. With its im-
pressive stone walls and dramatic discoveries of smelted gold (Grigo-
rova et al. 1998; Küsel 1992; Steyn et al. 1998), the site has been used 
in speeches by cabinet ministers and presidents (Jordan 1996), and yet 
it has quickly fallen from public and park interest. There is a general 
feeling that safari tourism, featuring charismatic mammals (faced with 
threats and danger and extinction), offers a more reliable fiscal return. 
The success of unesco’s Ukhahlamba Drakensburg Park, with its rich 
rock art and heritage ecotourism, suggests that culture can be capital-
ized upon. If anything has been forefronted in Kruger it is the white 
history of exploration, discovery, trekking, trading, and hunting that 
have been visibly celebrated by historical markers. One need only think 
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of the proliferation of memorial sites dedicated to Jock of the Bush-
veld—Jock being the faithful dog in Sir Percy Fitzpatrick’s story of 
1907—that occupy pride of place in Kruger and still dominate park 
maps. One can easily imagine apartheid park wardens and administra-
tors privileging nature and wilderness at the expense of the historical 
cultural achievements of the black South Africans they victimized. Less 
easily envisaged is that the recent black anc management has similarly 
chosen to downplay archaeological heritage and marginalize human 
history within the park, which is palpably felt by communities along 
the park’s edge. Willingness to address the past, or better still, to ethi-
cally recount its specificities, is a necessary condition for justice and 
reconciliation in the present. But as is indicated here, people of various 
political commitments and affiliations in South Africa today disagree 
profoundly over the details and consequences of historical injustices 
for thinking about future reparation. These disagreements impinge 
upon their respective notions of justice, and those of responsibility, 
freedom, and identity (Ivison 2002: 93–94). One third of Kruger’s land 
is now “threatened” by indigenous claimants in South African courts, 
and since Kruger is the jewel in the crown of African parks, and the 
most financially viable national park across the nation, black manage-
ment is in a predicament, and future reparations are going to be in-
flected with volatile public negotiations about justice, identity politics, 
and common goods.
A complex example of the tensions between natural and cultural 
heritages and agendas can be traced through the negotiations around 
developing San rock art for the purposes of tourism and indigenous 
development. In recent years attempts have been made to publicly 
showcase the significant paintings within the park, attempts that I have 
observed as both an archaeologist and an anthropologist. Some two 
hundred rock art sites have been located and mapped, with hundreds 
more awaiting discovery within the two million hectares that constitute 
the park. There has always been great public interest in San rock art in 
South Africa, even during apartheid times, and there has been a recent 
resurgence of support with the collaborative interventions of the Rock 
Art Research Institute (rari) at the University of the Witwatersrand 
(G. Blundell 1996, 2002, 2004; Smith et al. 2000). A management 
plan was devised by rari in conjunction with the ongoing recording 
project and an intensive stakeholder survey was designed to maximize 
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collaboration, inclusion, development, and tourism. With support 
from the People and Conservation Unit, rock art specialists proposed 
several walking trails that would be led by qualified guides and rang-
ers that would ensure protection of visitors and fragile rock art and 
promote greater understanding of the long and interwoven histories 
of occupation in Kruger. Instantly this proposal was met with strong 
disapproval by section rangers who, for the most part, did not want to 
be responsible for visitors’ safety (despite the long history of walking 
trails in Kruger) or have any number of people in the southern sector 
of the park since it was considered a prime “wilderness” zone. Traffic of 
any sort was considered unwelcome due to the close proximity of Kru-
ger’s private game lodges—private fee-paying concessions that operate 
quasi-independently within Kruger but pay sanparks handsomely for 
long-term leases. Even when the team was recording rock art around 
Afsaal, members were admonished for having left a vehicle on a dirt 
road in plain sight of tourists who were paying hundreds if not thou-
sands of dollars per night to experience a “wilderness area.” Visitors to 
these luxury lodges were afforded walking tours that included visiting 
rock art with the aid of an armed escort, but such experiences were not 
open to regular visitors to the park. Rangers with rifles were necessary 
for all such visits, including our own, as we were on foot in the park 
and thus at the mercy of all manner of wild animals. During mapping 
researchers frequently encountered elephants that had no difficulty tra-
versing the steep rocky slopes and outcrops where much of the paint-
ings were located. This was given as another reason why a rock art trail 
was dismissed by rangers: they were short staffed, had to patrol great 
swathes of territory alone, monitor their black field rangers, and be on 
call for fires, animals, tourists, accidents, and other incidents. It was 
simply not going to be possible. A solution came in the form of a rock 
art specialist and tour guide who was a trained ranger himself and had 
worked extensively both inside and outside Kruger at several exclusive 
private game lodges. He could handle the rifle and the narrative about 
San history and cosmology. This option too was rejected on the basis 
of funding.
Ambivalence toward the archaeological past is palpable in Kruger 
National Park. An elderly retired ranger who spearheaded the record-
ing of the art some decades ago told me that he still refuses to pub-
licly present his materials to his colleagues at Skukuza because he fears 
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reprisals for his focus on cultural heritage. He cautiously remarked 
that he still had a son working in Kruger and he worried that speak-
ing out would negatively effect his future in the organization. In the 
next breath he lectured me that Kruger was not a cultural park, but a 
natural one, and should not be developed with its archaeological re-
sources in mind. He certainly did not want to see archaeology form the 
basis for successful land claims or have people return to living in the 
park. This same man took me to numerous archaeological sites, span-
ning Paleolithic to recent historical times, lamenting the state of their 
preservation, their lack of recording or research, and their ultimate loss 
to memory. While he had no archaeological training as such, he was 
one of the only park employees I have met to date who expressed any 
interest in the archaeological past or its public presentation.
Just as the mapping and development project foundered, so did the 
attempts by young black researchers from rari to glean information 
concerning relevant stakeholders and their concerns, ideas, and needs. 
Arrangements within Kruger were fraught, meetings with various 
sanparks representatives were cancelled, questionnaires were not dis-
tributed at gates and lodges, interviews were sometimes hostile, and 
there was little access to the communities who may have had most to 
gain. Some park workers felt threatened that the researchers were there 
to replace them and the overall impression was that of disregard for 
cultural resources and development across Kruger as a whole. At pres-
ent the project is at an impasse and no concrete steps have been taken 
to consolidate the work done or the prospects for developing rock art 
in the future.
My lasting impression of archaeology’s place in Kruger National 
Park crystallized in the Skukuza archives. There, after much sorting and 
shredding since the bad old days of apartheid, two boxes labeled “Arge-
ologie” were filed among hundreds containing meeting minutes, field 
rangers’ notebooks, reports on biophysical research, boundary issues, 
and prosecutions. And what constitutes archaeology in the park?—cer-
tificates granting mining rights, petitions for cinnabar prospecting and 
mica prospecting, and permits to dig for “buried treasure” no less. And 
there is some justice in this conceptualization; the negative inflection of 
mining, of depleting resources, of stripping, and of poaching is prob-
ably deserved given the particular history of our discipline in South 
Africa. It reminds me of another connection to biodiversity, namely 
bioprospecting, the global economic element of nature that similarly 
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conjures the specter of centuries-old images of the mining of gold, dia-
monds, and minerals (Hayden 2003: 51) from the colonies that became 
nations like South Africa.
Dreams of Terra Nullius
John Locke is largely blameworthy for the trope of res nullius, the idea 
of the globe as a common possession that effectively disregards histori-
cally existing property rights. In his teleology, private property follows 
from private appropriation, namely from the work of one’s hands, the 
labor of one’s body, and so on. European expansion deployed Locke’s 
treatise to justify colonial appropriation of lands. In the first instance 
indigenous lands were considered given to all “in common” and in the 
second they were worked by the industrious and thrifty (read Euro-
pean) for the benefit of all, so thus doubly possessed (Benhabib 2004: 
31–31). Just as native fauna in South Africa have been proclaimed res 
nullius, or belonging to no one, the eco-enclave of Kruger has been 
branded as terra nullius, an empty land before the onset of white ex-
ploration and settlement. An attendant moral absolutism attaches to 
terra nullius, as it does to the constructs of nature and wilderness, with 
humanity being oppositionally and negatively juxtaposed. Nature, in 
this binary equation, is intrinsically valued whereas people and their 
material histories are intrusive, destructive, artificial, and devalued 
(Soper 2000: 19). Deep ecology and green politics have further bol-
stered these hierarchies, divisions, and narratives of blame. Despite the 
green movement’s nods to indigenous knowledge and participation, 
the remnants of colonial conservation ideologies remain. Neutral na-
ture trumps the greed, waste, and devastation of people and societies, 
past and present.
Myths of emptiness have been vigorously dismantled in Australia and 
North America, yet have significant resilience in South Africa, whether 
due to lack of education or the association of archaeology with the 
apartheid state. Whatever the causes, Kruger’s indigenous history re-
mains a deep wound in the landscape and one that is painfully ever 
present for the indigenous communities that live on Kruger’s borders. 
These groups have the most to lose, or win, in the recognition and res-
titution that might logically follow archaeological acknowledgment. 
Without an admission of the human past, recognition premised upon 
historical and genealogical grounds cannot move forward in the present. 
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In cosmopolitan terms we need to counter South Africa’s continued 
residual racism that imputes that certain people do not matter (Appiah 
2006a: 153) and realize that particular histories do matter.
To underline the continued diminished position of the archaeologi-
cal past I draw upon its recent rendering in Kruger National Park’s 
public documents. It is puzzling that in 2007 they still claim: 
Bantu people entered about 800 years ago, gradually displacing the San. 
The available evidence suggests that humans occurred at low density and 
were mostly confined to the more permanent river-courses. It is reason-
able to assume from the continuous presence at some sites (Pafuri, for 
example) that humans and wildlife existed in harmony, with no major 
impact of humans on wildlife or the reverse. The arid nature of the en-
vironment, together with an abundance of predators and diseases (e.g., 
malaria) would have played a role in preventing large-scale human popu-
lation growth and settlement. Nevertheless, sophisticated cultures already 
existed by the 16th century.1
The first myth is that Bantu-speakers (read black Africans) arrived 
at the recent date of eight hundred years ago, which is challenged by 
archaeological evidence that suggests at least two millennia (Mitchell 
2002). The former still participates in the apartheid mythology of 
roughly joint arrival of black and white immigrants to South Africa, 
specifically when they reached the Western Cape. These deeply flawed 
constructions of history and culture have had a lasting legacy, felt to 
this day, but most palpably felt over the apartheid years since they were 
used to create racial hierarchies and structure unequal living experi-
ences for both black and white South Africans. 
Furthermore, the myth of low density is highly speculative as so little 
systematic fieldwork was done during the apartheid regime. Moreover, 
the archaeology within the park, for example the Iron Age sites of 
Thulamela, Makhahane, Shilowa, and Masorini, suggests significant 
industrial activity and occupation. These are material facts that are 
never engaged with, even by the researchers in Scientific Services or 
the foreign scientists who come to conduct research on the flora and 
fauna of the park. For the scientific community in Kruger, population 
density is determined teleologically: not by archaeological investiga-
tion but by current observations about impacts and modifications on 
the landscape. As Hayashida (2005: 45) points out, 
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because of the time lag in ecosystem response to disturbance and environ-
mental change, current ecosystem structure, function, and composition 
cannot be fully understood or explained without a historical perspective. 
The lasting effects of past human actions (termed “land-use legacies”) in-
clude changes in species composition, successional dynamics, soils, water, 
topography, and nutrient cycling. Many seemingly natural areas have a 
cultural past that is part of their ecological history; their conservation to-
day requires knowledge of that past and assessment of the value of con-
tinuing or replicating past cultural practices. 
Given the forced relocations of people who lived in the park over the 
last century, the determined efforts to reinstate something imagined 
as a pristine wilderness, and the absence of any serious systematic ar-
chaeological survey, the lack of substantive human trace is undoubtedly 
in the eye of the beholder. Yet we know that there are over a thousand 
sites across Kruger’s vast expanse: early hominid, Paleolithic, San rock 
art, Iron Age, historic, and recent. Ironically, even under the rule of 
the National Party several publications recorded early and continued 
black history in the park, by way of documenting early European ex-
plorers passing through the original area. More than 170 historic place 
names have survived to reflect indigenous settlement, industrial or sa-
cred sites (Kloppers and Bornman 2005), undoubtedly a mere fraction 
of the original. 
Finally, the old apartheid fables of aridity and predator activity are 
spuriously given as reasons for the lack of supposed landscape inten-
sification and modification. Historically, indigenous people are thus 
refused the role of “ecological agents” in their own right (Plumwood 
2003). The South African national parks system must dismantle the 
devastating myths of empty lands and late arrivals that deprivilege in-
digenous South Africans and erase their historic achievements in the 
materiality of the past and present.
There is a growing movement that recognizes that even at colonial 
contact many landscapes were as fully anthropogenic as those found in 
Europe (Clark 2002). Recognition of this point would, however, be 
troubling for the mandate and ambition of sanparks, which needs to 
preserve the more barren notion of Kruger as predominantly pristine. 
While culture is all about fluidity and movement, nature is ideally 
meant to stand still: culture is a process, nature an object. And when 
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humans enter the fray, as below, they are typically cast as destructive 
agents of change. According to recent park documents, the position-
ing of humankind in the “natural” debate has attracted as much de-
bate and usually settles out on a statement along the lines of “effects of 
pre-industrial people are considered natural” or the iucn’s comment, 
“where people have less effect than any other species.” Each of these 
have potential flaws. For instance, many pre-industrial civilizations col-
lapsed because of overexploitation of resources, and ecosystems with 
influential species (for example, elephant) leave more scope, in the 
iucn’s definition, for human impact. Conceptually, many sustainable 
use systems place humans quite explicitly in the ecosystem. In mod-
ern times, society’s decision to proclaim parks at all is testimony to an 
agreement that people living elsewhere in more altered systems will 
strive to keep parks less altered for a different (usually far less altered) 
mode of usage (South African National Parks 2005).
Why is the peopled past so repeatedly undercut or erased from the 
landscape, even after the apartheid years? During 2005 I was asked by 
scientific researchers to participate briefly in a collaborative interdisci-
plinary project about disease landscapes in Kruger, this time assuming 
my role as an archaeologist. When I presented the established evidence 
for early and continued human occupation in the region this evidence 
was greeted as both unheard of and slightly unwelcome. Eagerly I 
pointed to Kruger’s own apartheid-era Parks Board publication from 
the 1970s that assembled historical accounts of the first Europeans in 
the area and their encounters with significant black populations (see 
Punt 1975). Archaeological and historical evidence was deemed periph-
eral or speculative at best in the face of biophysical science. Years of 
sedimented disinterest within the nation; the lack of any archaeologists 
employed in South African national parks or within Kruger; the priori-
tization of the biophysical sciences; researchers, rangers, and trackers 
with other tasks and no interest in cultural resources; the residual in-
ertia of racism; and the lack of education are just some of the founda-
tional reasons why the past remains problematic. There is a long way 
to go in terms of site management, tourism development, upgrading 
museums and displays, curation, creating inventories, and even secur-
ing the return of archaeological objects. Positive steps are gradually 
being taken, but the disparity between management of nature and cul-
ture remains troubling terrain. The work of heritage in South Africa is 
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always in process; it is future perfect. Heritage agencies like the South 
African Heritage Resources Agency (sahra) or the National Heritage 
Council (nhc) are forward looking, forever making recommendations 
for the future, and workshopping future projects. They are ultimately 
caught in this double time, backward dependent while forward-looking 
(Farred 2004). This leads us into the double bind of historical injustice 
and its moral consequences in the present. Without a past, one cannot 
hope for recognition or restitution. While the passing of time changes 
facts on the ground, in the case of South Africa this is a very recent and 
remember-able history, effectively ending with the elections of 1994. 
Historical injustice goes hand in hand with reparations, of which Ivison 
(2006b) outlines three modes: restitution, compensation and recogni-
tion, or acknowledgment. These can take the practical forms of finan-
cial payment, apologies, affirmative action, constitutional provisions, 
and so on. Most importantly, recognition acknowledges the victims 
and the harm enacted against them and involves the act of restoring 
1 The Mkhabela family at the grave of Chief Nyongane, Kruger National 
Park, 2005. Photograph courtesy of the author.
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or compensating those who have suffered. Recognition can also take 
the form of public apologies and forms of collective remembrance, as 
has become commonplace in post-apartheid South Africa, which are 
themselves political acts.
Around Kruger numerous communities have petitioned for various 
kinds of reparation. For example, some like the Mkhabela family have 
suggested a change in the name of the park gate, Numbi, to Nyongane, 
the name of the mountain nearby, a symbolic change that would cost 
little in financial terms. They have asked for acknowledgment of the 
burials of their elders and of some 350 cattle situated within the new 
borders of the park (figure 1). Recently People and Conservation at 
Skukuza successfully organized an inscribed commemorative plaque, 
for which the Mkhabela paid. Financial restitution has also been sug-
gested, though it has not been forthcoming from sanparks. Part of 
this compensation would be for the death of a female relative killed 
by buffalo in 1988, previously denied by the park since she was not a 
sanparks employee. The Malatji have been more vigorous in launch-
ing a land claim that might entail a financial compensation. Elders told 
me they would be looking for a share in the Phalaborwa gate takings, 
but on a more pragmatic level they would like some decision-making 
power in the development of their ancestral site, Masorini (Meskell 
2005a). In 2005 after consultation, community members were employed 
in reconstructing some of the huts and furnaces at the archaeological 
site, although the final negotiations between the tribal authority and 
sanparks were fraught. Alternatively, park authorities can always pro-
vide alternative scenarios to dismiss notions of sustainable use, much 
less resource development. “The issue of conversion of natural capital is 
intriguing, some countries or operations depleting their natural capital 
without successfully creating manufactured capital or social capital (the 
latter meaning human capacity and trust) in its place” (South African 
National Parks 2005). Not all reparations are costly or financial. It is the 
process that is often crucial in the spaces of reconciliation and potential 
restitution. The challenge for postcolonial liberalism, as Duncan Ivison 
argues, is to orient ourselves toward the local, while similarly providing 
an account of the conditions and institutions that distinguish this effort 
from merely deferring to existing relations of power (Ivison 2002: 22). 
This seems key in an emergent nation like South Africa where regime 
change may have replaced racial oppression, yet it has not erased local 
issues of ethnic, indigenous, and political difference that remain cen-
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tral vectors of inequality, nor has it erased pressing concerns for a new 
redistributive economy. Working at the interface of indigenous justice 
in the postcolonial, settler nations of Canada and Australia, Ivison’s 
(2002: 89) modest aims are for fostering “better conditionality” and re-
maining open to the future to come. While this entails acknowledging 
the impossibility of justice, our continued attempts to navigate a just 
course are the appropriate ethical tactics for keeping viable the possibil-
ity of new modalities of politics, identity, and justice.
Skukuza: State without History
Why would an archaeologist be interested in the narratives of conser-
vation, biodiversity, sustainability, or development? Moreover does a 
heritage perspective have anything to offer scholars and practitioners in 
these other fields? Suffice to say that archaeologists need to recognize 
more fully our epistemic genealogies and the interwoven threads bind-
ing understandings of natural resources and nature conservation to cul-
tural resources, landscapes, and values. Conservation and biodiversity 
mandates are cosmopolitan concerns in South Africa, while heritage 
remains a troubled and very local affair. Yet on a wider, world stage 
the discourses of nature and culture conservation share a legacy and 
are now mobilized through cosmopolitan networks, as argued in the 
introduction to this volume. Resource use and sustainability inform 
to a great degree cultural heritage concerns about site usage, occupa-
tion, and lived traditions, often undervaluing them when it comes to 
indigenous owners and stakeholders. We tend to see the past as both 
raw material and finite resource, a “fossil fuels” template of the world 
that wants to restrict utilization and save our stocks for future genera-
tions. Conservation is seen very much as a global good for a common 
humanity, whether natural or cultural. The language of sustainability, 
so prevalent in nature conservation, is fast becoming the rallying cry for 
heritage development as an economic growth industry worldwide.
As this chapter demonstrates, however, land use legacies and human 
histories are sometimes erased in the productions of place. In the con-
servation equation human interventions are destructive, dangerous, and 
undesirable. Just as some of my colleagues in Kruger National Park are 
concerned that any sort of natural resource utilization is the beginning 
of the end and refuse to allow sustainable harvesting of flora and fauna, 
heritage agencies the world over typically struggle with the realities 
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of human occupation, encroachment, ongoing traditional practices, 
visitation, and appropriation in and around significant sites. There are 
exceptions at the local level, though these struggles have often been 
hard won such as in Australia (Lilley 2000b; Lilley chapter in this vol-
ume; Lilley and Williams 2005), or are ongoing sites of contestation 
between local and international bodies, as seen in issues of preserva-
tion and management of sites across Southeast Asia for example (Byrne 
1991, 1995, the chapter by Byrne, this volume). Just as animals, plants, 
and landscapes have been deemed part of the national estate for moral 
and scientific uplift from the Victorian era onward (see Ritvo 1987), ar-
chaeological and historic sites are often wrested from their immediate 
inheritors for the benefit of others, all in the name of the global good. 
The convergences of both natural and cultural protection and manage-
ment undoubtedly culminated in the colonial occupations of Africa, 
Asia, Australia, and so on by British and other European empires.
Many authors have pointed to the continued colonial, national, 
and governmental overtones of conservation and management (e.g., 
Adams and McShane 1996; Adams and Mulligan 2003a; Brocking-
ton 2004a; Duffy 2002; Greenenough and Tsing 2003; Honey 1999; 
Keller and Turek 1998; Moore 1998, 2005; Moore, Kosek, and Pandian 
2003; Neumann 1998; West 2006). More recently some impute that, 
discursively, biodiversity does not exist, rather it conveniently “anchors 
a discourse that articulates a new relation between nature and society in 
global contexts of science, cultures, and economies” (Escobar 1998: 55). 
Yet much of its networks of models, actors, theories, strategies, and 
objects remain hegemonic. Over the years I have come to view Kru-
ger National Park as a state within a state. One park officer explained 
her idea for a passport system with entry stamps for Kruger and, de-
spite the obvious marketing ploy, she had succinctly captured the na-
tionalist spirit of the place. Kruger is cumbersomely bureaucratic and 
juridical, with its own policing and border enforcement powers. It 
considers itself a business, but also a charitable organization and a 
national trust. It flirts with the notion of development, embarks on 
education programs for hiv-aids, and minimally entertains notions of 
sustainable resource use. Kruger is reliant on international funding 
agencies, philanthropy and donor aid, and assistance from ngos: it 
operates on American and European support. Is it any wonder that 
various researchers from very different disciplines I have interviewed 
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have used the descriptor “schizophrenic” to describe Kruger’s work-
ings? During my own fieldwork I have continually struggled to find 
coherence in the philosophies and management strategies for natural 
and cultural heritage within the park. Kruger is a lumbering beast that 
refuses to be brought into line with the nation’s other parks and the 
wider organization of sanparks. Its history of triumphal nationalist 
conservation coupled with long-term successful policies of human re-
moval and erasure has made it near impervious to development and, 
ironically, adaptation.
From a hut on the N’watshisaka River I would daily observe mon-
keys causing havoc amid our rubbish and hear elephants tramp through 
the dry riverbed nearby (threatening biodiversity in their wake), and I 
fully understand the lure and grandeur of the park that is frequently 
touted as “the size of Israel”—“Skukuza.” A visiting ecologist asked 
me recently whether I considered Stevenson-Hamilton a genius for 
founding Kruger, “for leaving us this,”  he exclaimed, looking around 
in wonder. That is one perspective I ventured; another would be of-
fered by the countless residents along the park border who saw Sku-
kuza as stripping them of their land, their livelihoods, and their history. 
His bemused look suggested he had not entertained these “other” his-
tories of the park. As outlined above, archaeological and cultural as-
sets continue to remain low profile and low priority. Capturing that 
dimension of biodiversity has been roundly overlooked, and natural 
heritage remains privileged and paramount in the hearts and minds of 
those who research, manage, and represent the park “for the benefit of 
all South Africans.”
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Alfredo González-Ruibal
5  i   vernacular  cosmopolitanism 
An Archaeological Critique of Universalistic Reason
Eïa pour ceux qui n’ont jamais rien inventé
pour ceux qui n’ont jamais rien exploré
pour ceux qui n’ont jamais rien dompté
mais ils s’abandonent, saisis, à l’essence de toute chose
—Aimé Césaire (1956 [1939]) 
Throughout this chapter I argue that our concern for others, as archae­
ologists, has been caught up in the neoliberal rhetoric of development, 
which helps to maintain and justify, in the long term, the inequalities 
it purports to alleviate. Moreover, some archaeological preconceptions 
in the past and some research strategies in the present have helped, in 
a conscious or unconscious way, to construct indigenous communities 
as dispensable or improvable. Here I propose another sort of archae­
ological engagement, drawing upon the work of Žižek and Bhabha 
among others, which is both cosmopolitan and vernacular in its scope. 
This archaeology excavates the present in order to understand from 
within the destructive effects of globalization, modernism, and devel­
opment, and it explores the genealogies of collaboration between the 
discipline and universalistic theories of progress. In so doing, it in­
tends to provide a more radical critique of the modern world than it 
is usually offered in our field of research. The work presented here is a 
mixture of archaeology and ethnography that has been carried out in 
Ethiopia and Brazil.
The Archaeological Rhetoric of International Cooperation
I am suspicious of some community­oriented, multicultural, and mul­
tivocal archaeology that is being carried out nowadays. I am totally 
convinced that many archaeologists are truly serious in their concern 
for others, but it is hard not to see something of a fashionable attitude 
behind many projects that purportedly pay attention to local commu­
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nities. We should be helping people and collaborating with them with­
out any specific interest in mind, but it seems hard for us to put our 
academic agendas aside. What I find compelling about a cosmopolitan 
practice is its statement that we have obligations and responsibilities with 
regard to others (Nussbaum 1996; Appiah 2006a). It is an ethic im­
perative of Kantian resonance, not a choice that we graciously make: 
there is nothing to boast about an obligation. Doing cosmopolitan 
archaeology ought to mean that we take for granted that others mat­
ter. However, even when we are doing humanitarian work, dialoguing 
with stakeholders, or reflecting upon the social consequences of our 
research, we have a very particular, although somewhat unconscious, 
academic interest in mind.
Slavoj Žižek is a scathing critic of the humanitarian activities that 
many scholars practice today: “Many Western academics cling to some 
humanitarian ritual . . . as the proof that, at the core of their being, 
they are not just cynical career­oriented individuals but human beings 
naively and sincerely trying to help others. However . . . what if this 
humanitarian activity is a fetish, a false distance that allows them to 
pursue their power struggles and ambitions with the clear conscience 
that they are not really ‘that,’ that their heart is ‘elsewhere’?” (Žižek 
2004: 178–79). His critique is pertinent to archaeology, too. I distrust 
much engaged archaeology because it seems to be translated in the 
condescending language of charity, which entails a sense of superiority 
and an inability to see underlying structural problems. Again, Žižek 
(2004: 179) pitilessly attacks this attitude by saying that “the developed 
countries are constantly ‘helping’ the undeveloped (with aid, credits, 
etc.), thereby avoiding the key issue, namely, their complicity in and 
coresponsibility for the miserable situation of the undeveloped.” The 
way we help the people with whom we work, as archaeologists, recalls 
too much, too often that of other well­meant private or public agencies 
devoted to the promotion of welfare in third world nations. The vo­
cabulary of many ngos and some archaeologists unwittingly resonates 
with the (neo)colonial rhetoric of development.
It seems that there is some naïveté in the way public archaeology is 
often portrayed in specialized publications. Tales of archaeology and 
development generally end with a self­praise, both of the archaeologi­
cal team and archaeology in general. It is possible to detect a certain 
unabashed heroization of the discipline in this kind of discourse. Take 
an excerpt from a typical heroic archaeology: “In conclusion, the ben­
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efits from our contributions to public archaeology in a small Andean 
community have been fruitful for both local communities and archae­
ologists. . . . Such experiences place communities in positions to re­
ceive benefits (i.e., employment) from future archaeological projects 
and open the door to the possibility of economic development through 
tourism. . . . Thus, local communities and officials now have a better 
understanding concerning the process of archaeology, the important 
archaeological sites that exist on their land, and the need to protect 
them” (Duwe 2006: 6). Similar projects, couched in a comparable lan­
guage, can be found during colonial times in different places of the 
world. A good example is that of Sir Henry Wellcome’s excavations in 
the Anglo­Egyptian Sudan (Addison 1951). Wellcome was an American 
millionaire who sponsored excavations and development projects in 
Sudan between 1910 and 1938. His excavations in the site of Jebel Moya 
gave work to hundreds of Sudanese peasants, whose training in “in­
dustrial habits” favored the transformation of their “wild spirit” into 
“more peaceful attitudes,” as Sir Henry noted (Abdel­Hamid 2000). 
He promoted a series of development projects in the area, including a 
model village, roads, new farming systems, forestation, training in di­
verse crafts, and health services. A mixture of paternalism and hard dis­
cipline characterized the whole enterprise. Wellcome was considered 
by archaeologists and politicians alike to be a true philanthropist and a 
“world benefactor.” His was a “loving and compassionate imperialism” 
(see Scham chapter in this volume) imposed on the locals without dia­
logue or consent.
The aim of bringing up this example is to reveal comparable agendas 
and rhetorics in colonial and modern (neocolonial) archaeologies: we 
find similar well­meant attitudes among archaeologists and a not much 
different self­heroization as saviors of an underdeveloped community. 
The real “thinliness” of the engagement is also very typical. I had the 
occasion to confirm that nothing is left of the development projects 
started by Wellcome in a visit to the place in January 2000. The most 
durable element is the monument that Sir Henry made to himself: the 
House of Boulders. Colonial and neocolonial archaeologists work on 
the short term, on the surface. They rarely address structural problems 
and their projects are meant to fail (cf. also Hodder 2003: 65).
It is widely accepted now that community archaeology should start 
by acknowledging indigenous perceptions of history, instead of por­
traying Western science as the only way of engaging with the past 
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(Y. Marshall 2002; Wobst 2005). This comes along with a wider aware­
ness among social scientists involved in development projects of the 
relevance of local knowledge (Escobar 1994). However, when it comes 
to cooperation, it still has to be accepted that a thorough critique of the 
situation of that community (why things are the way they are) is neces­
sary, too. Local knowledge, without an understanding of global histor­
ical processes and the overall political context, has little use. Otherwise, 
by focusing on temporary (mainly economic) remedies, we help, in the 
long run, to reinforce the image and the existence of the “other” as per­
petually dependent and undeveloped. Andre Gunder Frank (1996: 24) 
admitted that development studies such as those he used to carry out 
were not part of the solution, but rather part of the problem, because 
they helped to deny “the real problem and the real solution, which 
lay in politics.” The apolitical rhetoric of cooperation implies that the 
problem is always with them (Bauman 2004: 43–44): they have the 
problem and lack the knowledge. Nongovernmental organizations, 
international agencies, and even archaeologists drop from the sky, as 
dei ex machina, with knowledge and solutions to the local problems 
(which are rarely local). A reflection on how our own archaeological 
practice and theory may be a problem, instead of a solution, is urgently 
needed.
My point is that our critique as engaged intellectuals can be more 
useful in the long term, as Bourdieu (2001: 37–38; 2004: 44–45) im­
puted, than our stopgap solutions as (bad) ngos. Instead of interrogat­
ing the operations of international agencies and development policies, 
as anthropologists and sociologists have already done (among many 
others, J. Ferguson 1990; Escobar 1994; Chew and Denemark 1996; 
Arce and Long 2000; Edelman and Haugerud 2003), we have taken 
for granted that aid for development is the right thing to do, and we 
have uncritically followed the path of international agencies, putting 
plasters where open­heart surgery was needed. Thus, many coopera­
tion works undertaken by archaeologists (and not only archaeologists) 
are at best temporary remedies, in some cases applied without the 
consent of the victims: this is just papering over the cracks of global 
disorder. Archaeology endows us with a way of reasoning and reflect­
ing upon the problems of humanity that is original and powerful: we 
work with material culture—development, the state, and modernity 
are about material culture, too—and with the long term—conflicts 
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and problems in a given area are rarely new. It is up to us to make the 
most of our discipline to understand and criticize the world or keep be­
ing mediocre imitators of other specialists. Actually, some of the most 
thought­provoking and reflexive public archaeology has dealt seriously 
with the social and historical causes of present troubles (e.g., Leone 
2005). I do not see why we should be doing something different in 
third world contexts (cf. M. Hall 2000). This, of course, does not pre­
clude any other kind of more “practical” and direct help in heritage 
management or in any other field, but it is essential to problematize the 
figure of the archaeologist in the role of voluntary worker, the concept 
of development, and the idea of “cooperation” itself.
Vernacular Cosmopolitanism: Archaeology on the Border
Can cosmopolitanism be the answer to the colonial rhetoric of inter­
national cooperation and development? It might be, but probably 
not in the way many intellectuals have outlined cosmopolitanism. 
Wallerstein (1996: 124) thinks that the stance “citizen of the world” 
is deeply ambiguous: “It can be used just as easily to sustain privilege 
as to undermine it.” There are basically two kinds of cosmopolitans: 
the powerful and the disempowered, those who have chosen to live 
with others in different countries, and those who have been forced 
to do so (such as labor migrants and refugees) (Werbner 2006; Beck 
and Sznaider 2006: 7–8). The people in the first group, in which those 
archaeologists working in foreign countries are to be included, are 
allowed to be cosmopolitans, because they (or their states and socie­
ties) have made the kosmos into their polis, the orbs into their urbs (Pol­
lock 2000: 602). It is easy to be cosmopolitan when power is on one’s 
side.
Appiah’s theories (2006a) are a good example of the elite­centered, 
self­satisfied streak of cosmopolitanism (see other chapters in this vol­
ume for more positive readings of the author). The cosmopolitan ex­
periences that inform much of his work are those of a member of a 
privileged Westernized upper class who feels as much at ease in a royal 
palace in Kumasi as at Princeton University. Appiah states throughout 
his book that we have obligations and responsibilities to others, but 
they are “not monstrous or unreasonable. They do not require us to 
abandon our own lives. They entail . . . no heroism” (Appiah 2006a: 
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174). Not if heroism is understood in the neoliberal­individualist way 
criticized above. But when one thinks, for example, of all the activ­
ists who have lost their lives defending indigenous and peasant rights, 
Appiah’s statement cannot but sound outrageous.
To say that the world today does not require heroisms because we 
are much better off implies a sanction of global capitalism and the sta­
tus quo. That is a kind of a comfortable cosmopolitanism that allows 
Western(ized) elites to keep their lifestyles and worldviews, while at the 
same time it appeases their consciences: “What would the world look 
like if people always spent their money to alleviate diarrhea in the Third 
World and never on a ticket to the opera?,” asks Appiah (2006a: 166). 
The answer is simple: a much better world indeed. I do not only find 
his ethical standpoint wanting, to say the least, but also the theoretical 
basis of his cosmopolitanism, which leaves the question of the “other” 
largely unproblematized—the same with Nussbaum’s (1996) romantic 
vision of difference. Slavoj Žižek’s recent essay on otherness is much 
more thought provoking. Drawing on a critical reading of Judaism, 
Levinas, and other sources, Žižek (2005: 140) emphasizes the “alien, 
traumatic kernel” that forever exists in the “inert, impenetrable, enig­
matic presence” of “my Neighbor.” He goes beyond Levinas though 
by trying to grasp the “inhuman Otherness itself ” (Žižek 2005: 160). 
However, this troubling engagement with the Neighbor does not re­
strict our “infinite responsibility” to the other. Both Levinas and Žižek 
stress the unboundedness of our responsibility, in striking contrast to 
Appiah’s complacent limitations.
Furthermore, Appiah (2006a: 109–13) espouses the fashionable the­
ory among anthropologists today that globalism is not homogeneity, 
but leads to endless creativity (cf. Inda and Rosaldo 2002). This, again, 
overlooks global structural inequalities, long­term processes of op­
pression, and the real and traumatic impact that Western culture and 
politics exercise over the third world. The anthropologists of globaliza­
tion dehistoricize the phenomenon and naturalize neoliberalism (see 
critiques in Graeber 2002; Edelman and Haugeraud 2003; Žižek and 
Daly 2004: 139–66). This is the problem too with multiculturalism, 
which Appiah (2006a: 104–5) criticizes with regard to identity but re­
produces in other ways—for example, by ethically leveling discrepant 
voices: victims and tyrants, rich and poor, master and slave. Archaeol­
ogy, with its long­term historical standpoint and its focus on destruc­
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tion and ruins, may offer counternarratives to the anthropologists’ 
positive view of globalization.
Although there are some general ideas in which I agree with Appiah 
and other cosmopolitans of the same breed, I find this cosmopolitan­
ism flawed, yet not the idea of cosmopolitanism per se, which I con­
sider a way of articulating a concern for others without couching it in 
universalistic or paternalistic terms. A qualified cosmopolitanism, as 
proposed by Homi Bhabha among others, could be a starting point.
Bhabha (2001: 42–43) defines a vernacular or marginal cosmopoli­
tanism based upon three main points: 1) it is a cosmopolitanism that 
stops short of the transcendent human universal and provides an ethi­
cal entitlement to the sense of community; 2) it is conscious of the 
insufficiency of the self and the imperative of openness to the needs 
of others; and 3) it finds in the victims of progress the best promise 
for ethical regeneration. Vernacular cosmopolitanism is equivalent to 
Julia Kristeva’s (1997: 274) “cosmopolitanism of those who have been 
flayed.” Vernacular cosmopolitans, says Bhabha (Bhabha and Comaroff 
2002: 24) “are the heirs of Walter Benjamin’s view of modernity, that 
every act of civilization is also an act of barbarism.”
I believe, with Bhabha, that it is possible to be committed to the 
specificity of the (traumatic) event and yet to be “linked to a transhis­
torical memory and solidarity.” The way this cosmopolitanism works 
is illustrated by Bhabha through a poem by Adrienne Rich, in which a 
repetitive first person recounts different tragedies occurring in differ­
ent locales and times. The same procedure was used before by Aimé 
Césaire (1956: 39) when he wrote “I shall be a Jew­man / A Kaffir­man / 
a Hindu­from­Calcutta­man / a man­from­Harlem­who­hasn’t­got­
the­vote.” According to Bhabha (2001: 44), “The ‘I’ that speaks [in 
Rich’s poem]—its place of enunciation—is iteratively and interroga­
tively staged. It is poised at the point at which, in recounting histori­
cal trauma, the incommensurable ‘localities’ of experience and memory 
bear witness, side by side, but there is no easy ethical analogy or his­
torical parallelism.” Rich’s work is presented as the “atlas of a difficult 
world,” articulated in a series of traumatic juxtapositions. Vernacular 
cosmopolitanism is to be more than in dialogic relation with the na­
tive or the domestic: it is to be “on the border, in between, introducing 
the global­cosmopolitan ‘action at a distance’ into the very grounds—
now displaced—of the domestic” (Bhabha 2001: 48). It also implies a 
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critique of liberal individualism that excludes communities and indi­
viduals that do not fit liberal secularism. It might be a way of challeng­
ing universalism. Žižek notes that every universality is hegemonized 
or particularized, but there is a sort of universality (as there is a sort 
of cosmopolitanism) that can be redeeming: it is the universality of 
those who are “below us,” the neglected and outcast. It is a negative 
universality to be opposed to Western universalism (Žižek and Daly 
2004: 160).
My archaeological research in Ethiopia, Brazil, and Spain focuses 
on the effects of globalization, modernity, development, and univer­
salistic policies. That the local contexts in which I work are not iso­
lated, traditional, disengaged, or disconnected from larger processes, 
as Lynn Meskell reminds in the introduction to this book, is more than 
obvious in the communities where I work. In Ethiopia, I explore the 
archaeological remains of Cooperazione Italiana, usaid, and interven­
tionism by the Soviet Union (González­Ruibal 2006b). In Brazil, a 
railway funded by the World Bank crosses the rainforest where the Awá 
hunter­gatherers live, through which tons of bauxite are transported, 
every two hours, to the coast, and from there to Europe and the United 
States. The Awá, then, are hunter­gatherers whose life experience is 
inseparable from the World Bank, the European Union, agribusiness, 
aluminum industries, and illegal loggers. The peasants I work with in 
Galicia are connected with diasporic communities in the United States, 
Germany, and Argentina (González­Ruibal 2005). My research might 
be considered a sort of cosmopolitan archaeology from a threefold 
point of view: it explores international engagements and the applica­
tion of universalistic policies; it is triggered by a true concern for oth­
ers; and it juxtaposes three different localities shaken by international 
forces. Brazil, Ethiopia, and Spain are the poles of my own cosmo­
politan agenda of action and research—they form my own “atlas of 
a difficult world.” At the same time, my work is also a vernacular un­
dertaking, because it takes domesticity, culture, tradition, identity, and 
roots seriously into account.
The communities I work with share many points in common, but 
I make no attempt to even them out. As in the poems of Rich and 
Césaire, it is the juxtaposition of traumatic, singular experiences and 
their articulation with transhistorical memories and global troubles that 
interest me. I work on the border—the marginality of minority groups 
in third world countries, but I bring the border to my own homeland. 
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By doing that, I dissolve the concentric circles that Martha Nussbaum 
(1996: 9) imagines emanating from one’s home and subvert her cos­
mopolitan hierarchy. As a matter of fact, I do not want to make all hu­
man beings more like my “fellow city­dwellers” (Nussbaum 1996: 9); 
on the contrary, as recommended by Said (1996: 514), I prefer to “an­
nihilate my place,” which does not imply a rejection of primordial af­
fects, but an elaboration of them (Said 1996: 515; also Kristeva 1997: 
274). And, with Žižek (2005: 163), I am against the “ethical ‘gentrifica­
tion’ of the neighbor” and the ethical leveling of the other. Nussbaum’s 
(1996: 13) statement that “politics . . . will be poorly done if each thinks 
herself equally responsible for all, rather than giving the immediate sur­
roundings special attention and care” goes against the radical ethics 
proposed here, following Žižek (2005). If there is any hierarchy in our 
responsibilities toward others, it should be dictated by the urgency of 
the situation, not by national ties.
I am an archaeologist who works with living peoples, their material 
culture, and the remains of their contemporary past—a kind of research 
that may be labeled “archaeology of the present,” a term that tries to 
blend those interests in a meaningful way (González­Ruibal 2006a). In 
the rest of this chapter, I will deal with two of the areas in the atlas of 
the difficult world I have been mentioning—the most troubling ones: 
Brazil and Ethiopia. I will try to show what flawed notions of devel­
opment and evolution, in part supported by an archaeological meta­ 
narrative, have implied for the communities in which I work.
Ethiopia: Development in Terra Nullius
In my first trip to Sudan and Ethiopia, in January 2000, both countries 
were the poorest nations in the world according to the un listing and 
both of them were at war. Armed conflict and extreme poverty made 
those countries, at that time as well as today, very cosmopolitan coun­
tries—in a very particular way. International agencies and institutions, 
governmental and nongovernmental, large and small, American and 
European, populated then and populate today the tortured landscapes 
of the Horn of Africa.
The panorama is cosmopolitan too from an archaeological point 
of view. Sudan and Ethiopia host a sizeable community of Western 
researchers. Their agendas, however, are more universalistic than cos­
mopolitan. While cosmopolitanism implies a concern for others, for 
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difference and diversity, universalistic archaeology has a Western inter­
est camouflaged under the vocabulary of globalism—much like that of 
many international institutions. According to Beck and Sznaider (2006: 
19) universalism “does not involve any requirement that would arouse 
curiosity or respect for what makes others different.” Archaeological 
research in Ethiopia is polarized around human origins and the state. 
Ethiopia usually hits international news for two issues: famine and hu­
man fossils. For different reasons, they both capture Western imagina­
tions and create an image of the country as a barren land where early 
hominids once roamed and dispossessed humans die en masse today. 
For palaeoanthropologists, Ethiopia is an accident. They could well be 
doing the same work in Utah or Bavaria, if there were such wonder­
ful sites there. Admittedly, they could not show the stunning photos 
of the jeep stuck in the sand, the beautiful (black) women smiling, or 
the fierce ancestral warrior with an ak­47. The epics of palaeoanthro­
pological research in sub­Saharan Africa certainly deserve a good eth­
nography that is to be done some day. By now, we just have a romantic 
account from the point of view of those great gentlemen adventurers 
(for example, Johanson and Edey 1981; Kalb 2001). Palaeolithic spe­
cialists are barely interested in the (too parochial) history of the Horn 
of Africa because they aim higher: they want to reveal the Origins of 
(all) Humankind. The search for origins that bypass indigenous inter­
ests is certainly not something that affects Ethiopia alone (cf. Shep­
herd 2002; Wobst 2005: 25). In Ethiopia the situation is perhaps more 
poignant because the Euro­American search for origins takes place in 
one of the poorest nations in the world. The Afar pastoralists, who live 
in the area where most hominid fossils are found, kill each other for 
securing a waterhole for their herds (Gebre 2004: 252–54) and their 
nomadism is more and more restricted by development projects and 
the national park that occupies part of their traditional lands—which 
feature in the World Heritage list as the cradle of humankind. The 
state is striving to transform them into “ ‘law abiding,’ modernized and 
productive citizens” (Kassa 2004: 224). Meanwhile, archaeologists 
and physical anthropologists struggle for a new fragment of a yet older 
Australopithecus that might make it to the front page of Science or 
Nature.
The other important focus of attention by international scholars and 
institutions is Ethiopia’s history as a state. This includes the Aksumite 
civilization (early first millennium ad), the churches of the Middle 
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Ages (Lalibela), and the castles of the Abyssinian court of the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries, based at the city of Gondar (figure 1). 
International interest in Aksum (Munro­Hay 1991) has been fostered 
for two main reasons: its outstanding monumentality and its connec­
tions with other parts of the world—Egypt, Greece, Rome, Yemen, and 
India. Later, the medieval and Gondarine periods are also marked by 
an outstanding architecture and art with obvious foreign resemblances: 
Gondar has been called the “Camelot of Africa” (Ramos and Boavida 
2004). Ethiopia, then, is valued as are other third world nations for be­
ing a strategic crossroad, attractive for its hybrid nature. This vision of 
Ethiopia’s history is reflected on the World Heritage list. The Ethiopian 
sites that have been incorporated are mainly related to the origins of 
humankind (Awash and Omo valleys) or the history of the Abyssinian 
state as a unified and cosmopolitan nation (Aksum, Gondar, Lalibela). 
In incorporating such sites, the complexities and intricacies of Ethio­
pian history are lost, whether because they are bypassed wholesale (hu­
man evolution) or because only the state perspective is given. This has 
1 One of the seventeenth­century castles of Gondar, a World Heritage 
monument. Photo courtesy of the author.
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to be related to the colonialist, modernist bias of the concept of world 
heritage (Meskell 2005d: 128).
Modernity sanctions the role of the state and its works as progres­
sive, and it considers nonstate societies as backward and anarchic. Ar­
chaeology has played an important role in justifying the works of the 
state and forgetting the people at its margins (Meskell 2005d: 130–32; 
Wobst 2005: 28). With Appiah (2001: 225), I am against “Africa as a 
fancied past of shared glories—the Africa of Diop and the ‘Egyptian­
ists.’ ” I am, on the contrary, with that of Aimé Césaire (1972: 23), in 
his (admittedly idealized) defense of the societies destroyed by impe­
rialism. Instead of undermining the concepts of progress and cultural 
achievement developed by the Enlightenment, some pan­Africanists 
appropriated them and used them to strike back. The merit of these 
interpretations lay in bringing attention to the intellectual creativity of 
sub­Saharan peoples. At the same time, however, this means accepting 
the rules of the game as presented by those in power: cultural suc­
cess is based on state polities, strong inequalities, wide (and usually 
unfair) economic networks, and large monuments and infrastructures, 
all of them made possible by social exploitation (Stahl 2004: 254–55). 
Other intellectuals, such as Aimé Césaire, have resorted to a more radi­
cal weapon of resistance: changing and challenging the rules of the 
game—the roots of colonial discourse—altogether. By praising “those 
who have invented nothing,” Césaire (1956) created a new structural 
metaphor that broke with Western assumptions of historical success. 
The same occurs with Clastres’s “societies against the state,” for whom 
failing to achieve “social complexity” is not a failure but a political act 
of resistance (Clastres 1989).
The project in which I have been involved in Ethiopia since 2001 
is an alternative to prevailing universalistic approaches. It deals with 
communities at the border of the state, in an area lacking remains from 
the deepest past. I will refer here to the history of one of the groups 
that inhabit the borderland of Ethiopia, the Gumuz of Metekel. Me­
tekel is located north of the Blue Nile, near the frontier between Sudan 
and Ethiopia. The annexation to Ethiopia was only completed around 
1901 (Abdussamad 1999). Although originally conceived as an ethno­
archaeological project, our concern for the situation of the people with 
whom we worked led us to rethink our principles of engagement and 
reconsider our research under more cosmopolitan and postcolonial 
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lines. What I will try to show here is that the Gumuz’s present situation 
of disempowerment with regard to national and international develop­
ment projects is just the final step in a long history of dispossession and 
marginalization.
Since at least the middle of the first millennium ad the Gumuz have 
been considered homines sacri, in Agamben’s (1998: 71–80) apt termi­
nology, a sort of humans liable to be massacred, enslaved, and deprived 
of their lands: “If someone kills the one who is sacred according to the 
plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide,” says the Roman law. 
The killing of a homo sacer is a sort of banal death without the aura of 
a sacrifice—this is why Agamben rejects the concept of Holocaust for 
the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis. The existence of the homo 
sacer is bare life (nuda vita) at the will of sovereign power. The justifica­
tion for the inferiority of the Gumuz resonates with other colonialisms 
elsewhere: they are heathen, flat­nosed, black, nomad, and uncivilized 
(Pankhurst 1977). Their land is a terra nullius, available for more indus­
trious peasants, living in sedentary villages and worshipping the true 
god, or for capitalists involved in development projects.
It is very likely that the slave raids in this territory, along with expedi­
tions in search of gold, were carried out already in the Aksumite period 
(Pankhurst 2001: 28–30). After the thirteenth century the documenta­
tion about the slave raids grows steadily and significantly reaches a peak 
during the period of splendor of the Abyssinian Kingdom, from the 
early seventeenth century to the mid­eighteenth century. The Gumuz, 
pejoratively called Shankilla (“slave”), were captured and killed by the 
thousands during those centuries (Pankhurst 2001: 351–72). That the 
Shankilla were regarded as little better than animals is demonstrated by 
the hunting expeditions carried out in the late nineteenth century and 
the early twentieth by noble Ethiopians, in which elephants were killed 
and Gumuz were captured (Abdussamad 1988). Slavery continued un­
til the Second World War, when Fascist Italy put an end to it—and 
presented the achievement as a moral justification for the conquest of 
Ethiopia. The Italians, however, undertook most development proj­
ects in the heart of the country, leaving only military posts in lowland 
areas. Fascist rule in Ethiopia was organized on racist lines, and the Gu­
muz were too black and too primitive to be able to benefit from prog­
ress, unlike the Caucasian­looking highlanders (Amhara, Agaw). Over 
the centuries, the Gumuz were gradually expelled from their original 
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territory and banished to the margins of their homeland, the least 
healthy and fertile lowland areas (Wolde­Selassie 2004a: map 8­11). 
Many Amhara and Agaw settlers came from the highlands, giving rise 
to the complex ethnicity of the area today. As a matter of fact, the pro­
cess has not come to an end, and each year new families descend to the 
lowlands in search of new cultivable land, escaping from the wasteland 
in which the Abyssinian plateau has been transformed by the feudal 
politics of the same state that built Gondar (Girma 1992).
Even today, the land of the Gumuz is somewhat perceived as a terra 
nullius by the state, the neighboring groups, and the West: they see it 
as an underpopulated territory that deserves better exploitation. We 
may think that the relegation of the Gumuz, based on their culture 
and race, is something of the distant past, with no effect in the present 
whatsoever. Yet ancient beliefs have not withered away. The journalist 
Alan Moorehead (2000 [1961]: 6) tells that the land of the Gumuz 
“is a country of conical grass huts and oppressive heat that creates a 
sort of woolliness in the mind, and of long, slow, uneventful days that 
have stunted human ambition from prehistoric times.” This racist per­
spective is still shared by many developmental agencies, missionaries, 
and sanctimonious, well­educated Westerners. The “woolliness in the 
mind” prevented the Gumuz from building splendid palaces that may 
deserve inclusion in the World Heritage list or even attention by ar­
chaeologists. Unambitious and uncreative, they have been unable to 
make history, and their lives have been condemned to the same hollow 
nothingness since the dawn of times. The land of the Gumuz is a great 
place for an ethnoarchaeologist, where he or she can see prehistory 
alive. Unfortunately for such prehistoric relics, “There was never any 
possibility that these undeveloped people would be left alone in their 
slow dull round existence,” states Moorehead (2000 [1961]: 9). When 
the author wrote that, slavery had ended two decades before, but new 
adversities were still to come for the Gumuz, this time from beyond 
the Horn of Africa in the shape of development policies. The treatment 
of the Gumuz and their land was going to be very much the same.
In 1985, as a late response to the terrible famine and drought that 
killed one million Ethiopians, the Communist state decided to estab­
lish a development program and resettlement scheme in the land of 
the Gumuz (Wolde­Selassie 2004a, 2004b). They were spared by the 
famine, as were most inhabitants from lowland areas, because their 
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“primitive” swidden agriculture and egalitarian politics were much 
less aggressive to the environment and had not caused the large­scale 
deforestation of more “advanced” cultivation methods and political 
economies based on heavy taxation. The scheme—the so­called Tana­
Beles Project—was developed in the Beles Valley, where 250,000 hect­
ares of land were to be occupied by 48 villages and several agricultural 
projects. Over 82,000 highlanders were displaced to the area (Wolde­ 
Selassie 2004b: 76) and 73,000 hectares of tropical forest were cleared 
(Yntiso 2004: 92). The enterprise was made possible thanks to funds 
and technical assistance provided by the Italian government. Thou­
sands of indigenous peoples were uprooted from their ancestral lands 
and banished to less fertile areas. Perhaps because the locals were not 
starving, nobody thought that they should receive any benefit from the 
development project. Thus, my Gumuz informants often complained 
that they did not have access to the health and education services of­
fered to the newcomers or to free seeds and agricultural machinery. 
This embittered the relations between the Gumuz, the central state, 
and the highlanders, a situation that ended in overt ethnic conflict after 
the fall of the Communist regime in 1991.
The situation has improved with the implementation of federal poli­
cies that grant more political power to the indigenous inhabitants of 
Metekel (and disenfranchise the settlers). However, multicultural fed­
eralism has not helped the Gumuz as much as it could be expected 
to. At least in part, this is due to the terrible legacy of the Tana­Beles 
project. As we have had the occasion to see during our fieldwork, 
those Gumuz communities that are located around the premises of 
the development scheme suffer from acute social problems: violence 
within the community and between clans is widespread, with frequent 
killings and feuds; there is a high ratio of female suicide; traditional 
working parties and celebrations have given way to alcoholism; the 
authority of the elders seems undermined by youngsters whose new 
means of legitimation is the possession of automatic weapons (cf. also 
Wolde­Selassie 2004a: 111). Other problems brought by the new po­
litical situation, however, are not inherited. They are the result of the 
introduction of new modernist strategies under the sign of capitalism, 
which also considers the land a terra nullius. The new local elites are 
eager to develop their region at any price, usually to the detriment of 
their own inhabitants. Thus, agro­industries flourish, the Gumuz are 
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still being displaced from their homeland, and deforestation increases 
every year (Wolde­Selassie 2004a: 126).
In March 2006, when we were looking for a village where we could 
carry out fieldwork, we discovered a huge deforested area, extending 
for dozens of kilometers along the road. As we found out later, the 
deforestation was carried out by a Dutch multinational company that 
planned to cultivate oil palms for biodiesel in that area. It cut down 
eighty thousand hectares of tropical trees, expelled the local popula­
tion, and brought in laborers from the neighboring villages, most of 
them highlanders recently settled in the area. Once again in their long 
history of abuse, the Gumuz have been decreed disposable and their 
lands stolen or rented for nothing. However, in macro­economic fig­
ures, this agribusiness project will appear as a sign of development and 
probably contribute a bit to the rise of the federal gdp. At a global level, 
the production of biodiesel—itself a dubious alternative energy—will 
be depicted as an eco­friendly solution to the fuel crisis.
My point is that, by being only concerned with glorious monumen­
tal pasts and the history of the state (preferably a well­bounded nation­
state) as an evolutionary success (cf. the chapters by Lydon and Byrne, 
this volume), archaeologists and heritage managers are sanctioning the 
crude modernist vision of many development agencies. By studying 
the history and material culture of “those who have invented nothing,” 
another discourse, one that challenges evolutionism and concepts of 
progress, can be produced. The archaeology of Metekel is also about 
monuments, the state, and international contacts, as much as the cas­
tles of Gondar or the obelisks of Axum. The monuments of Metekel 
are not inherently different from those sanctioned by the World Heri­
tage Organization or by the interests of Western archaeologists. The 
difference has to do with time only. The archaeological remains of Me­
tekel are the ghostly ruins of the Tana­Beles project, which failed and 
was abandoned in 1991 (González­Ruibal 2006b), or the rusty carcasses 
of tanks and trucks ambushed on the road to Sudan during the last 
civil war. Archaeological sites are also the palaces built by slave traders, 
impressive brick buildings, now abandoned, boasting an incongruous 
solidity in a land of “conical grass huts and oppressive heat” (figure 2). 
The monuments of Metekel are trenches and arsenals constructed by 
fascist Italians, who dealt with this area as though it were an empty 
battlefield and protected the frontier with human waste: indigenous 
troops, askaris, because the life of an Italian soldier was too valuable 
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to be lost in a terra nullius. Metekel, too, is a crossroad of civilizations. 
But this is the dark side of all cultural crossroads. The state, develop­
ment, progress, history: from the border, things never look the same.
Brazil: Order and Progress
“The settler and pioneer have at bottom had justice on their side: 
this great continent could not have been kept as nothing but a game 
preserve for squalid savages,” said Theodore Roosevelt (quoted in 
Maybury­Lewis 2002: 45). Despite the years that have passed since that 
statement, the viewpoints and beliefs have not changed substantially: 
development projects for the progress of the nation­state trump indig­
enous communities everywhere in the world. In some cases, like Brazil, 
the means of exterminating squalid savages and getting hold of their 
lands have not changed much either. In chapter 4 of this volume, Lynn 
Meskell says that myths of emptiness have been vigorously dismantled 
in Australia and North America, but not in South Africa. Myths of 
2 The ruined palace of the slave trader Banjaw Abu Shok, built in the 
1930s in the town of Gubba. Photograph courtesy of the author.
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emptiness are still very much at work in the Brazilian cultural and po­
litical imaginary, also, with terrible consequences.
The Awá or Guajá are a small group of hunter­gatherers, numbering 
around three hundred individuals, who inhabit the Amazonian forest 
in the state of Maranhão, Brazil (Cormier 2003b) (figure 3). Officially 
contacted by white Brazilians for the first time in the early 1970s, their 
population was dramatically reduced by that contact, which included 
the invasion of their land by impoverished peasants, loggers, and land­
lords, the spreading of diseases, and the development of colossal proj­
ects cofinanced by international institutions (Treece 1987). The Awá 
were by no means the only group affected by the arrival of “order and 
progress” at the southeastern edge of Amazonia. Other communities 
were heavily damaged, including the Tenetehara, Krikati, Ka’apor, 
Gaviões, and Ramko­Kamikrá (Coelho 1987; Treece 1987: 128–38). The 
work of progress here has been a “systematic history of erasure” (see 
chapter 4 by Meskell, this volume), with the difference, with respect to 
South Africa’s natural reservations, that erasure in Brazil has not been 
dictated for the preservation of nature, but for its more thorough ex­
3 A group of Awá during a hunting expedition. Photograph by permission of 
Almudena Hernando.
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ploitation. The Awá are a clear example of homines sacri. People only 
make sense if comprised within the concept of citizenship. The Indians 
are not citizens and they are considered legally minors, forever sur­
veilled and protected by the National Indian Agency (funai). Not be­
ing Brazilians, they lay “outside the sanctioned universe of obligation” 
(Fein 1984: 11). “I have never been in Brazil,” To’o, an Awá Indian, told 
me during my first visit to his reservation, and he did not know how 
right he was. It is counter­cosmopolitanism that it is at work here.
Indians are the most disposable of all peoples. Some of the peasants 
who invaded the Awá forests in the 1970s and 1980s commented with 
astonishment, when they met with an Indian family, “They almost 
look like humans” (Elizabetha Beserra Coelho, personal communica­
tion 2005). The similarity was incomplete, sufficiently incomplete to 
unleash a genocide when the invaders gave the Indians  infected clothes 
or poisoned food or simply shot at them (O’Dwyer 2000). Local poli­
ticians who agree with Roosevelt’s words and with a liberalism that 
grants rights to individuals alone (Ivison 2002) consider that a handful 
of savages should not be occupying thousands of hectares of primeval 
forest that could be developed and benefit many more people. Devel­
opment has to come first by the slash­and­burn agriculture of miser­
able peasants, then by the large­scale cattle raising that takes hold of the 
land after the initial clearing. That is the normal evolution of things: 
savagery as represented by the indigenous hunters, barbarism in the 
shape of poor but hard­working laborers cutting down the jungle, and 
civilization brought by agribusiness, ranching, mining, and industry.
As in the case of the Gumuz presented above, we have to understand 
the disenfranchisement of the Awá in a long­term perspective. The con­
tact between the Awá and the European colonizers probably started 
in the early seventeenth century, when the Portuguese conquered the 
coasts of Maranhão, previously settled by other European colonists 
(Cormier 2003b: 3). The Portuguese invaded indigenous lands, en­
slaved Indians, and brought about the dislocation of many communi­
ties. Several pandemics during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
decimated the native population of the region and seriously damaged 
the social fabric of several indigenous communities (Cormier 2003b: 
5). It is probable that the Awá were a group of swidden agricultural­
ists who lost their knowledge of cultivation after their persecution and 
enslavement by the colonizers (Cormier 2003b: 4): the Awá would 
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have turned to hunting and gathering in isolated forests to escape from 
whites. The Cabanagem civil war (1835–41), which wiped out entire 
Indian groups in Brazil, has also been suggested as the motive for the 
“involution” of the Awá (Forline 1997: 30; also Mércio Pereira Gomes, 
quoted in O’Dwyer 2000: 34). Ironically, then, it was the white man’s 
development and progress that “underdeveloped” the Awá.
After a period in which news about the Awá come from a few ca­
sual encounters in which they were described as foragers (Nimuendajú 
1949), the Awá suffered the massive encroachment of Brazilian society 
by the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. As with the ter­
ritory of the Gumuz in Ethiopia, the Awá forests were considered “land 
without men for men without land” by the Brazilian state (Forline 1997: 
16). We find again the concept of terra nullius used to the detriment of 
indigenous communities. The personal dramas of the Awá, chased and 
killed by the hundreds, their families broken and dispersed, amounted 
to a veritable genocide. Some individuals, isolated from their fami­
lies after a confrontation with ranchers or peasants, trekked hundreds 
of kilometers alone for a decade or more. The resettlement program 
of the funai was likewise traumatic. Out of ninety­one individuals 
settled in a village by the Indian agency in 1976 only twenty­five were 
alive in 1981. Most of them died due to an ill­advised vaccination cam­
paign (O’Dwyer 2000: 69). The establishment of four funai villages 
for the Awá was carried out with disregard to family and group ties.
Nonetheless, the implementation of the Grande Carajás project was 
the single most traumatic event for the local communities. It was de­
vised to occupy an area similar to that of Britain and France combined 
and it consisted of several mining projects (iron, gold, and bauxite), 
roads, dams, and railways (figure 4). The two largest investors were the 
European Union and the World Bank. Even before the program be­
gan, contracts were signed with Italy, Japan, and Germany in order to 
provide around 30 million tons of iron for their steel industries (Treece 
1987: 9). The Grande Carajás project was going to be the miracle so­
lution to Brazil’s staggering foreign debt (Treece 1987: 13). The rail­
way cut the rainforest in two, separated indigenous communities, and 
facilitated the arrival of peasants and illegal loggers en masse, whereas 
the production of iron required the rapid clearing of the forests to 
produce coal (Cormier 2003a: 125). This left the Indians without their 
traditional resources and many were compelled to hunt horses and 
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other domesticates in the ranches that had invaded their lands—and 
the ranchers killed the Indians.
The sad history of the Awá does not end here. They are now the own­
ers of large forest reserves where nobody can enter without a permit 
issued by the funai. The reality, however, is much different. During 
August 2006 we had the occasion to go with the police and the funai 
in an operation to chase illegal loggers in one of the Awá reservations. 
The loggers had devastated the forest, besieging the Awá in less than 
one­tenth of their legal territory. Roads, bridges, and campsites criss­
cross the jungle. The rivers have been dammed up and the oldest and 
most valuable trees have been cut and sold. Many peasants have in­
vaded the reserve and a large ranch owned by an absentee landlord 
occupies part of the Indian lands and part of a biological reserve. The 
Awá complain that game—their staple food—escapes from the sound 
of the chainsaws and tractors. However,  the Companhia da Vale do 
4 The railway sponsored by the World Bank near the town of Alto Alegre. 
The town was created ex novo in the 1970s in what were primeval tropical 
forests inhabited by the Awá. Photograph courtesy of the author.
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Rio Doce, from the Grande Carajás project, has been paying royalties 
to the funai for the damage caused to the Indians. The money has 
been used in turning the Awá into agriculturalists and in giving them 
clothes and other goods that push them a little bit away from savagery 
and closer to civilization.
What has archaeology and anthropology to do with this situation? 
Since the nineteenth century, both disciplines have contributed directly 
or indirectly to the portrayal of Indians in a way that legitimized devel­
opment policies and the role of the state at the expense of the peoples 
that live in its margins.
As it has been proven, archaeology played a fundamental role in sup­
porting the enterprise of the expanding Euro­American bourgeoisie 
(Trigger 1989). By constructing a unilinear tale of order and progress, 
archaeology helped to give intellectual grounding to colonialism, rac­
ism, and Western hegemony in general. In so doing, archaeology was 
not behaving differently from other sciences (Said 2003). Lubbock’s 
work (1865), which is just the most remarkable of a series of books com­
paring savages and prehistoric peoples, justified the expropriation of 
the premoderns by situating modern “primitives” in the lowest step of 
the ladder of progress and by displacing them to another time (Fabian 
1983). In the model of universalistic reason defended by nineteenth­ 
century archaeology and anthropology, the savage was a homo sacer, 
an incomplete human, an “embryo of us” (Hernando Gonzalo 2006: 
228).
The case of Brazilian archaeology has been studied by Ferreira (2005). 
He argues that the archaeology of Brazil during the imperial period 
(1840–99), with its evolutionist criteria, was a convenient tool in the 
work of “sieving” the indigenous “races” that would feature in the na­
tional image of the country to be transmitted to the imperial elites and 
to the civilized nations of the world. Thus, with data from archaeologi­
cal excavations in shell mounds and tumuli, two different groups of In­
dians were produced by the archaeological imagination of the period: 
a civilized one and a savage one. The man­eating, indolent, and nomad 
hunter who lived amid rubbish heaps and produced no monument, 
art, or craft was ruled out, while the clean, hierarchical, and industri­
ous mound­builder and skilled potter was incorporated into the myths 
of the national project (Ferreira 2005: 144). The practical effects of this 
kind of research were noticeable at that time: military colonies were 
built in which indolent natives, “surveilled and educated by soldiers 
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and missionaries, could learn Portuguese, and the craft of the black­
smith, carpenter, shepherd and agriculturalist” (Ferreira 2005: 145). The 
nomad savage was transformed into the industrious one. These colo­
nies hosted indigenous populations that would later mix with Euro­
pean immigrants thereby whitening the national race.
As I have pointed out above, this sort of unilinear archaeological 
thought is still pervasive in many Western minds, and it is certainly not 
restricted to the less enlightened citizens. In places like Brazil, a danger­
ous universalistic reasoning—a myth of progress—is still stronger and 
its practical outcomes are quite sinister. Thus, the Serviço de Proteção 
ao Índio (spi, 1910–67) and the Fundação Nacional do Índio (funai, 
1968 to the present), the national Indian agencies, inherited the im­
perial perspectives on the indigenous groups that were informed by 
anthropologists and archaeologists during the nineteenth century. The 
state posts that were theoretically conceived to protect native popula­
tions were in practice locales for the rapid assimilation of the Other 
into Brazilian culture through improvised strategies of social engineer­
ing (cf. Oliveira 1960). These usually involved the supply of Western 
material culture in the form of technical and moral knowledge. The 
final goal was to transform the native into a citizen, even if a low­class 
one (a camponês: a peasant). Although the staff of the funai had very 
few anthropologists on the payroll, that is not the case of private com­
panies, such as the Companhia da Vale do Rio Doce, one of the most 
important ventures involved in the Grande Carajás project, which con­
tracted anthropologists during the 1980s to assist “in identifying and 
attracting isolated groups of indigenous peoples to ease the stressful 
transition of contact through settlement” (Forline 1997: 17). Thence, 
if archaeology supported evolution from a theoretical standpoint, an­
thropologists played a major practical role in reordering the wild along 
progressive lines.
This modernist way of reasoning has also been incorporated, in a 
sense, by the World Heritage Organization. Brazil has seventeen 
places included on the World Heritage list (http://whc.unesco.org/en/
statesparties/br). The distribution is as follows: seven colonial cities 
(including Brasília), two Catholic monuments, seven natural reserves, 
and only one prehistoric site: Serra da Capivara, which has evidence 
of the earliest occupation of America (ca. 25,000 years old). The other 
seventeen sites on the tentative list have a similar bias, with several for­
ests and colonial monuments. The conclusion is obvious: Brazil was a 
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terra nullius when the Portuguese arrived there in 1500. Today, there is 
nature and there are the colonizers’ monuments. What about “those 
who have invented nothing”? What about the indigenous cultures 
that were populating—and still populate—Amazonia when the Euro­
peans disembarked? Their existence is symbolically denied or they are 
romantically equated with nature. Like the indolent, nomadic hunter­ 
gatherers in the imperial imagination, the Brazilian Aborigines are 
crossed out from the cultural heritage that deserves conservation and 
global respect.
That is the case with the Awá themselves. In a coffee­table book pro­
duced by the local government of Maranhão with images by a German 
photographer, the Awá feature along with dunes, monkeys, palm­trees, 
rivers, and even a few picturesque peasants (Knepper 2002). The title of 
the book is telling: The Natural World of Maranhão. Awá history, then, 
is at best natural history. The notion is shared by development agen­
cies. Thus, for the Brazilian company Eletrobrás, “Indigenous com­
munities represent one of the most complex environmental problems 
in the planning and implementation of hydroelectric plants and trans­
mission lines” (quoted in Viveiros de Castro and Andrade 1990: 1). 
Hunter­gatherers elsewhere are regarded in a similar way—the San, for 
example, are conceived as an extension of the fauna and flora in South 
Africa (Meskell and Weiss 2006: 94–95). This view of non­modern so­
cieties, and especially foragers, is not surprising, since it is espoused, 
more or less consciously, by many ethnoarchaeologists working within 
the sociobiology paradigm.
Ethnoarchaeology, once one of the cornerstones of processual ar­
chaeology (Binford 1983), and particularly the ethnoarchaeology of 
hunter­gatherers, is now largely dominated by bioarchaeologists or 
biological anthropologists who use their knowledge to understand 
early hominid behavior and the evolution of humankind (for example, 
Hawkes et al. 1997). As a matter of fact, they compare the behavior 
of living hunters with that of pre­sapiens hominids (such as Homo 
habilis). Palaeoanthropologists talk about human ecology with disre­
gard to cultural practices, beliefs, and experiences, and although they 
assert that they are just interested in the biological side of humanity in 
general and not in culture, the reality is that when they compare the 
ecology of humans and primates or talk about adaptation and evolution 
(Brockman and van Shaik 2005), they do not study lawyers or execu­
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tives in Manhattan or Tokyo, but “primitives” living in the wild, those 
who have invented nothing and are, therefore, closer to nature than 
to culture: half­humans, half­monkeys. If we excavate the genealogy 
of this approach we will arrive at Lubbock’s works and that of many 
colonial minds of the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth: 
Among Pygmies and Gorillas, for example, is the eloquent title of a book 
published by William, the prince of Sweden, with the results of a zoo-
logical expedition to the Congo (William 1926). After the strong reflex­
ive critique of cultural anthropology (Fabian 1983), the prolongation of 
nature into the “primitive man” established in the nineteenth century 
survives uninterrupted in some modern studies of ethnoarchaeology 
and human evolution. A symmetrical approach is needed to dissolve 
the divide between nature and culture: not only for non­moderns, but 
for all nature cultures—ours included (Latour 1993, 1999).
Archaeology, therefore, in the work of some of its practitioners, fails 
to recognize the achievements of those societies that do not create 
monuments (World Heritage Organization) and keeps producing an 
image of non­modern peoples as closer to nature than to humankind 
(ethnoarchaeology), eliminating their cultural peculiarities and the so­
ciopolitical context in favor of understanding the remote origins of all 
humankind. Should we be puzzled by the treatment given by develop­
ment agencies to those same communities? Unwittingly, archaeology 
helps to reinforce counter­cosmopolitan, universalistic attitudes that 
restrict our obligations to others. Our obligations are to full human 
beings only.
Conclusion: Digging the Present
According to Appiah (2006a: 153), the real challenge for cosmopoli­
tanism today is not “the belief that other people don’t matter at all; 
it’s the belief that they don’t matter very much.” In this chapter, I have 
dealt with two “non­modern” societies, the Awá in Brazil and the 
Gumuz in Ethiopia, that do not matter very much for the counter­ 
cosmopolitans—international development agencies, multinationals, 
the state officials from the countries where they live, and some schol­
ars. Smith and Wobst (2005: 393) have pointed out that an archaeology 
guided by indigenous peoples’ agendas has to engage with the present 
as much as with the past and has to focus on issues of importance to the 
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survival of indigenous cultures (see also Meskell 2005b). This sort of 
archaeology, then, has to be vernacular cosmopolitan in spirit. This is 
why my work is less related to ethnoarchaeology or prehistoric archae­
ology than it used to be and more engaged with the archaeology of the 
present. I am not postulating the abandonment of prehistory—on the 
contrary, it is essential to the long­term understanding of situations as 
those described in this chapter. I am not for the end of ethnoarchaeol­
ogy, either, although it needs to be refashioned in a much more post­
colonial and cosmopolitan way (González­Ruibal 2006a).
Nonetheless, we must start digging the present as archaeologists 
and not just in a metaphorical way: we should excavate the devastation 
brought by a modernism that marginalizes, betrays, and in the worst 
case annihilates the communities with which we work. In doing that, 
we should frame the problems of the people whom we study in a long­
term perspective—a task for which archaeology is especially well suited. 
This does not imply any primitivist or romanticized vision of the “na­
tive.” It is a purely cosmopolitan engagement that arises from a visceral 
concern for the lives of others. By excavating literally or metaphorically 
the present, we will be acting as witnesses, bearing testimony to what 
has happened and is happening—an uncomfortable yet necessary activ­
ity. A thick cosmopolitanism, says Byrne (see the chapter by Byrne, this 
volume), requires history: archaeology can provide (deep) history to 
any cosmopolitan enterprise.
Finally, as has been advocated many times, we have to carry out a 
more reflexive practice, but in cosmopolitan not egotistic terms: what 
are the implications of our work as archaeologists for the communities 
with which we work? How does our intellectual construction of the lo­
cals—needy “little guys” (Graeber 2002) or undeveloped primitives—
help to reinforce and shape all­powerful Western identities (Hernando 
Gonzalo 2006)? How can an archaeological discourse serve to perpetu­
ate inequalities and justify neoliberal policies by portraying “locals” or 
“natives” in a certain way (Hodder 2003: 63–64; also the Benavides 
chapter in this volume)? And, on the contrary, how can archaeology 
challenge accepted visions of native communities as undeveloped, criti­
cize concepts of cooperation and progress, and counterattack ideas of 
globalizing processes as something inherently creative and positive? 
The answers will be given through the application of our archaeologi­
cal sensibilities to the problems of a troubling present.
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Data used in this chapter come from projects coordinated by Víctor M. 
Fernández (Ethiopia) and Almudena Hernando (Brazil), from the Complu­
tense University of Madrid. I am grateful for their invitation to take part in 
their projects and for the ideas that they have contributed to this work. They 
are not responsible, however, for the interpretations offered here. I also want 
to thank Lynn Meskell for inviting me to participate in this book.
Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh
6  i   the  archaeologist   
as  a   world  citizen 
On the Morals of Heritage Preservation  
and Destruction
“All We Are Breaking Are Stones” 
In March of 2001, the world’s major transnational media centers 
turned their collective gaze toward the Bamiyan Valley in Afghanistan, 
awaiting the obliteration of two giant and ancient statues of  the Buddha 
(figure 1). In the now infamous global crisis—flames fanned by protests 
in India and China, pleas from the United Nations, encouragement 
from Muslim quarters in Chechnya and Sarajevo, and vociferous 
Internet chatter—Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban elected to destroy the 
Bamiyan Buddhas, as well as many of the country’s other statuary 
relics, purportedly because the icons were an affront to their version 
of Islam. “These idols have been gods of the infidels, who worshipped 
them and these are respected even now and perhaps may be turned 
into gods again. The real God is only Allah and all other false gods 
should be removed,” the Taliban’s Mulla Mohammad Omar explained 
in a decree, supported by a fatwa and a ruling by the Afghan Supreme 
Court (Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2003b: 76). “If people say these are not 
our beliefs but only part of the history of Afghanistan, then all we are 
breaking are stones.”
Little doubt remains that the Taliban used the threat of harming the 
Bamiyan Buddhas as a political ploy—to assert their authority in the 
global public sphere, to demonstrate their commitment to the most 
austere interpretation of Islam, and to reveal the West’s hypocrisy of a 
putative humanitarianism moved more swiftly by inert objects than by 
the daily suffering of Afghanistan’s poor and hungry. The destruction 
of the giant statues, however, is not without precedent, as previous 
moments of iconoclasm can be found in Islamic history (Martin 1978). 
1 Taliban fighters destroyed this colossal statue of the Buddha in  
Afghanistan’s Bamiyan Valley in 2001. Photograph by John C. Huntington, 
courtesy of the Huntington Archive.
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These previous episodes too, undeniably, were suffused with politi-
cal machinations, and yet it is not easy to deny the consistent Islamic 
religious and moral justifications used to support such iconoclasm; 
Islam clearly does not make iconoclasm requisite, but within certain 
strands, it is reasoned. The Bamiyan Buddhas did seem to constitute a 
site of “negative heritage” for fundamentalist believers and the Taliban, 
“a site of negative memory, one that necessitated jettisoning from the 
nation’s construction of contemporary identity” (Meskell 2002: 561). 
Thus, as we reflect on the crisis of 2001, we can at least take seriously 
the Taliban’s general claim—if not for this particular event—that the 
physical destruction of godly icons may have been a religious impera-
tive, necessary for the spiritual well-being of Afghanistan’s citizens, a 
populace made up almost entirely of practicing Muslims. Suppose if it 
were true that nearly every citizen of Afghanistan genuinely believed 
that “the real God is only Allah and all other false gods should be re-
moved,” then could the destruction of these “false gods” by the nation-
state’s government be justified? Can the destruction of heritage ever 
be ethically justified? If so, by what principle, why, and under what 
conditions?
Framed in these terms, the debate over the fate of the Bamiyan Bud-
dhas is not entirely atypical from others surrounding the preservation 
of cultural heritage. The debate I am pointing to is not so much the 
one commonly argued about “right”—whether a government, de facto 
or otherwise, has the right to ownership, to decide how to care for 
the cultural property within its borders. Instead, I am pointing to a 
predicament that might be called the “preservation paradox” because 
at its core is the way in which one group’s preservation of heritage is 
another group’s destruction of heritage. The underlying argument to 
the Taliban’s iconoclasm is that the preservation of Afghanistan’s living 
Muslim heritage required the destruction of Afghanistan’s historical 
heritage, its corporeal heritage of Buddhism. The preservation paradox 
is not uncommon elsewhere, and indeed I want to argue that it may 
lie at the heart of multiple conflicts between archaeologists and Native 
Americans, and even between different Native American communities.
In this chapter, my aim is to explore the preservation paradox, espe-
cially as it has effected conflicts over heritage in Native North America. 
In particular, I highlight two case studies. The first concerns the Zuni 
Ahayu:da to illustrate how anthropological modes of preservation re-
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sult in destruction from the perspective of Zuni religious practitioners. 
The second case study addresses rock art in the American Southwest, 
which Hopis seek to protect physically as monuments to their ances-
tors, but that some Navajo medicine men physically damage during 
curing ceremonies. Following these cases, I argue that resolution to the 
preservation paradox may lie in notions of cosmopolitanism, a way to 
express global concerns for heritage while at the same time orienting 
resolutions toward local actors. Although some scholars might posit 
that cosmopolitanism is largely descriptive, my reading of it—princi-
pally following from Martha C. Nussbaum and Kwame Anthony Ap-
piah—is prescriptive, a political philosophy with profound normative 
implications. Cosmopolitanism makes claims about our moral and 
ethical lives.
The Preservation Paradox
In a world without conflict or contradiction, everyone’s notion of 
“preservation” would be identical. Native communities, museums, 
governments, and international organizations alike could then cooper-
ate in sync to ensure that heritage objects were preserved for the good 
of communities, nations, humanity. But in actuality preservation is 
neither a universal concept nor unanimously defined. From the con-
temporary Australian Aborigines who repaint over ancient images on 
stone, to the Haisla who leave sacred memorial totem poles to decay, to 
members of the Six Nations who choose not to relocate burials that are 
naturally eroding from riverbanks, numerous examples illustrate that 
the concept of preservation is itself culturally conceived (Groarke and 
Warrick 2006: 173). These differences profoundly challenge the aims 
and methods of the modern cultural heritage preservation movement, 
provoking archaeologists to articulate more clearly what preservation 
means when its meanings are contested (see the chapters by Byrne, 
Lydon, and Meskell, this volume). Such cases ultimately evoke what 
we may term the preservation paradox, because they point to how one 
group’s notion of cultural preservation can be another group’s notion 
of cultural destruction.
The Zuni Ahayu:da In recent years scholars have chronicled the co-
lonialist threads interwoven into the histories of museums around 
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the globe (for example, Barringer and Flynn 1998; D. Cole 1985). The 
modern anthropology museum began as part and parcel of colonialist 
projects of the late nineteenth century and involved a desire to collect 
and control the material manifestations of newly dominated peoples. 
Even where such culpable motives were not so evident, seemingly few 
early museum professionals paused to reflect on how the collection 
of cultural objects for museum making adversely effected local (usu-
ally indigenous) communities, already yoked by colonial rule. Most 
museum curators and collectors of the late nineteenth century and the 
early twentieth genuinely believed in opposite terms that their work 
was an ethical duty. As Amalia Rosenblum (1996: 61) has written, the 
collection of anthropological specimens from cultures on the brink of 
destruction became “a moral obligation, wholly consistent with the dis-
cipline’s concern for its subject peoples. And with the rhetorical circle 
now complete, it was supposed that future generations of Native peo-
ples themselves stood to benefit from anthropological far-sightedness.” 
And yet during this age in which colonial expansion transformed socie-
ties around the world, anthropology museums did in fact obtain count-
less cultural objects that otherwise would have been lost to time. In 
the immediate aftermath of colonialism, it very well did seem that the 
physical preservation of material heritages functioned as a surrogate for 
the preservation of vanishing cultures.
These strains of the salvaging principle were certainly at work when 
anthropologists began collecting objects from the Pueblo of Zuni in 
northwestern New Mexico in the late 1800s (Hinsley 1992: 18–19). In 
a five-year period alone, between 1879 and 1884, cultural artifacts were 
taken at a rate of five objects for every occupant of the Pueblo, many 
under the cover of dark (Parezo 1985, 1987). One object in particular 
caught the attention of collectors, the Ahayu:da or War Gods, and over 
the years scores were stolen from the Zuni (figure 2). All Ahayu:da 
in the possession of museums or collectors were stolen because these 
sacred objects are owned by the community and are inalienable: they 
cannot be bought, sold, or traded by any individual for any purpose 
(Merrill et al. 1993: 532, 536). The Ahayu:da are twin deities first “cre-
ated in time immemorial by the Sun Father, the ultimate giver of life, 
to lead the Zunis and help them overcome obstacles in their migra-
tion to the Middle Place at Zuni Pueblo” (Merrill et al. 1993: 524). The 
deities protect the Zuni people and look after their welfare, intervene 
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to bring rain and good crops, give courage during war, and cure indi-
vidual ailments and illnesses that infect the whole tribe (T. J. Ferguson 
1990: 8–9; Ferguson and Hart 1985: 57). The Ahayu:da are thus not 
only associated with war as their English name would suggest, but 
have a complex role in Zuni society. Sculptural images of the Ahayu:
da are made during the winter solstice and other ceremonies connected 
with the Bow Priesthood, which makes Uyuyemi, the elder brother 
War God, with the cooperation of the Deer Clan, and Ma’a’sewi, the 
younger brother War God, with the help of the Bear Clan; Bow Priests 
are delegated to install the two cylindrical wood sculptures in shrines 
that surround the Pueblo of Zuni (Ferguson et al. 1996: 251–52; Steven-
son 1898). When the newly fashioned Ahayu:da are placed in a shrine, 
the previous ones are “retired,” reverently laid on a nearby pile with 
other Ahayu:da. “These retired Ahayu:da retain an important role in 
2 A stylized representation of a Zuni man making offerings at a War God 
shrine, likely on Dowa Yalanne, a sacrosanct mesa and ancestral site for the  
Zuni people. Note the retired Ahayu:da to the right. Image from Reports  
of Explorations and Surveys, to Ascertain the Most Practicable and  
Economical Route for a Railroad from the Mississippi River to the  
Pacific Ocean, United States War Department, 1855.
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Zuni ritual,” Ferguson and his co-authors (1996: 252) emphasize. “All 
Ahayu:da are to remain at their shrines exposed to natural elements 
until they disintegrate and return to the earth.”
Although some early collectors certainly understood the Zuni esti-
mation of the Ahayu:da (Parezo 1985: 771)—for it was in large part 
their great value to the Zunis that made such objects of great value to 
anthropologists—it is not necessarily a contradiction to recognize that 
collectors were also troubled by witnessing these precious objects dete-
riorating from sun, wind, and rain. This is the core of the salvage ethic, 
the urge to “preserve” objects by physically protecting them. But for 
the Zunis, such acts that aspired to cultural preservation were in fact 
acts of cultural destruction. As cultural objects, the Ahayu:da are vital 
to the Zuni people’s ongoing traditions, physical health, and spiritual 
well-being. The deities are sanctified in the complex of Zuni customs 
and cultural practices; they must be left in place to serve their purposes.
During the efforts of the Zuni tribe to have stolen deities returned, 
some museum professionals were concerned that repatriated Ahayu:
da would be returned to shrines and left in the open to deteriorate 
(Ferguson et al. 1996: 264). Aside from pointing out that the museums 
illegally held the Ahayu:da, the Zunis involved emphasized that muse-
ums cannot really “preserve” these cultural objects, because for them to 
be cultural objects—for them to be Ahayu:da—they must be allowed 
to wear away naturally (Merrill et al. 1993: 546). “That is the natural 
course of things and the Zunis do not think humans should intervene 
in the process,” Ferguson and his co-authors (1996: 264) wrote. “As 
the Zunis say, ‘All things will eat themselves up.’ ” In other words, from 
the Zuni view, when Ahayu:da are put into museums, taken from their 
sacred shrines, and indefinitely protected from natural decay, they are 
in part destroyed and injure the Zuni people. It is when the Ahayu:da 
are allowed to deteriorate physically in their sacred places that they are 
preserved as meaningful heritage and as religious objects.
Ancestral Pueblo Glyphs The Diné, the Navajo people, are deeply rooted 
to the Diné Bikéyah, the country of their ancestors, in the four corners 
region of the American Southwest (Valkenburgh 1999). The towering 
mountains, spectacular rock formations, rare rivers and springs, unique 
plants and animals, and open desert sky form the cultural landscape 
of the Navajo people’s lived experience (Kelley and Francis 1994). An 
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essential feature of this sacred landscape is the many ruins that testify 
to the lives of the ancients (Kelley and Francis 1993: 155). Navajos call 
those people that made and left the fallen pueblos the anaasazi, or an-
cient enemy (H. Holt 1983: 595). The Navajo express a deep affinity for 
these places and ancient people.
Most scholars maintain that Navajos entered northern New Mexico 
around 1500 ad, generations after the major Ancestral Puebloan vil-
lages, like those in Chaco Canyon, were occupied (Towner and Dean 
1996: 8). And yet as Robert S. McPherson (1992: 81–85) has detailed in 
his singular book Sacred Land, Sacred View, Navajos believe that their 
relationship with the ancient Puebloans stretches back to when humans 
lived in the underworld. Traditional Navajo stories recount that the an-
cient pueblo world collapsed in the midst of environmental chaos and 
social anarchy. McPherson (1992: 3) has written: “The Anasazi serve as 
a good example of what happens when those roots [of connection to 
the earth] become weakened. The Anasazi culture shriveled and died 
because the people transgressed the laws of the holy beings and of na-
ture as they sought ease through power which they abused. Their ex-
ample and the visible remains left behind serve as a reminder of death 
and destruction in the midst of life.”
Of the various kinds of ancient sites that remain today, among the 
most visible are those with glyphs—pictographs and petroglyphs. Na-
vajos have long taken these images on stone to be wordless transcripts 
of the Ancestral Puebloans, descriptions of their trials and tribulations 
before they were destroyed or moved on (McPherson 1992: 76). As 
glyphs are born from human evils, they, like ruins more broadly, are 
dangerous and cause disease, blindness, and confusion. Sites where 
there has been any ceremonial activity “carry a ritual power that is en-
during and not to be violated without potentially threatening the wel-
fare of the families involved” (Doyel 1982: 637). Other Navajos believe 
that glyphs are associated with witching. Handprints on the walls are 
those of the dead searching for a person to haunt and placing one’s 
hand in the imprints of like images can cause sickness, pain, and aches 
in the jaw, head, and arm. Some Navajo believe “a painting left in a 
ruin was made for a reason, a thought behind it continues to permeate 
its existence”—the ghost carried by the wind can haunt the living 
(McPherson 1992: 121). To heal those inflicted, curing ceremonies must 
be held.
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Ruins and glyphs are powerful and consequently dangerous, but 
power does not always result in evil. The power imbued in ancient 
places can be harnessed for healing (H. Holt 1983: 596). The Navajo 
cosmology holds the universe to be ordered by natural laws—this or-
der in part comes from the animation of everything, even fixed objects, 
which may be appealed to for aid. When a Navajo is ill, it is presumed 
that “the natural order of things has been disrupted, in some cases by 
patients’ improper conduct or contact with impure things” (Schneider 
and DeHaven 2003: 422). In this view, evil and good are indivisible: 
“A site or prayer that is used for positive effect can also be used for 
negative results by just reversing that which is good” (McPherson 
1992: 73). The power in ancient sites can thus be used for healing when 
shrines are placed in ruins, ceremonies conducted there, or artifacts 
collected for ritual use.
Although most of these uses would seem to have little impact on 
archaeological sites, one ceremony does not leave the ancient detritus 
unscathed. The ceremony is little reported in the anthropological lit-
erature, but McPherson (1992: 118) briefly describes the ritual, which 
requires the intentional defacement of ancient glyphs. In some cases, 
it is believed that glyphs inflict harm and thus must be ritually “killed” 
by destroying the image, a scattering of the evil contained within it and 
that is causing some impairment. Thus, at times glyphs are intention-
ally destroyed, but to ensure the physical and spiritual well-being of 
those who have fallen ill. But the ritual destruction of rock art is not 
done for the sake of destruction. For Navajos preserving the material 
past is not a foreign concept (Begay 2001; Spain 1982). These ceremo-
nies, it would seem, are performed in the genuine belief that they will 
exorcise evil, and thus “allow for the restoration of harmony on both 
an individual and a community-wide level” (Schneider and DeHaven 
2003: 420).
The Navajo ritual destruction of glyphs is thus no simple case of 
iconoclasm. Yet, as troubling as this case might be for archaeologists, 
it remains even more so for the contemporary ancestors of the people 
who made these ancient images in stone. The Hopi in particular be-
lieve that ancient ruins survive into our modern age not by chance but 
through the designs of their ancestors. Hopi traditions recount that 
the people of long ago, the Hisatsinom, emerged onto this world and 
made a covenant with the spirit-being Màasaw to act as stewards of 
the land. Seeking the Earth Center, the Hopi Mesas, the Hisatsinom 
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sojourned across the land for generations, establishing one village and 
then another—a migration over centuries that is well attested to in 
the archaeological record (Bernardini 2005a). Along their migration 
routes, Màasaw instructed the clans to leave kuktota, their “footprints” 
on the earth, by setting down ritual springs, trails, shrines, and glyphs 
(Kuwanwisiwma and Ferguson 2004).
Traditional Hopi knowledge holds that petroglyphs were etched 
to record myriad events, social practices, and topographic features, in-
cluding plants, animals, migration routes, clan membership, religious 
societies, ceremonies, astronomic observances, and landforms (Col-
well-Chanthaphonh 2005). But Hopis believe that underlying all of 
these representations is the fact that glyphs made by the Hisatsinom 
are monuments to Hopi history, proof of ancestral homelands and clan 
migrations. The importance and sacredness of tutuveni, as rock art is 
known to the Hopi, is signified by glyphs being etched directly onto 
the bedrock of the Hopi Mesas (Fewkes 1892). Hopis use glyphs adja-
cent to shrines, and petroglyphs in part demarcate boundaries of Hopi 
lands (Eggan 1994: 15; Fewkes 1906: 362–64). The creation of glyphs 
is not long past: into the twentieth century Hopis have been recorded 
leaving clan symbols on cliffs during pilgrimages (figure 3) (Bernardini 
2007; Michaelis 1981).
For the Hopis, then, glyphs not only chronicle Hopi history but 
also buttress Hopi identity; glyphs confirm the traditions related by 
Hopi elders and affirm their enduring commitment to land steward-
ship. Sites with glyphs, as is the case with all ancestral sites, are living 
monuments that connect Hopis today to their ancestors of long ago 
(Dongoske et al. 1993; Ferguson et al. 2001). Glyphs are unquestion-
ably sacred for the Hopi. They believe the physical integrity of glyphs 
is vital to remembering the past and ensuring the survival of the Hopi 
people into the future.
Thus, the Navajo practice of ritually destroying some glyphs to en-
sure the well-being of ailing Navajos threatens the well-being of the 
Hopi people. Navajos may see the ritual destruction as a form of pres-
ervation—preserving the health of the Navajo people, Navajo medi-
cine, and traditional ties to the land. But from the Hopi viewpoint, 
such ritual destruction, as thoughtless vandalism, is not only a physical 
destruction but a cultural one as well because it is their history that is 
being erased. With each clan symbol that is wiped out, another Hopi 
monument is gone.
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Heritage and the Kosmou Politês
How ought these conflicts be resolved? The preservation paradox il-
luminates a core contradiction for archaeologists who are rightly con-
cerned for the objects that constitute the focus of their labors, but who 
are also rightly concerned about the well-being of communities who 
give these objects their cultural meanings. In the cases of the Bamiyan 
Buddhas and Zuni Ahayu:da, the conflict is between broader “uni-
versal” norms of the physical preservation of heritage objects and the 
more localized norms of communities that declare that the physical 
destruction of heritage objects is needed for preserving the vitality of 
the community itself. In the case of the Ancestral Pueblo glyphs, the 
basic conflict is not between putative international and national norms, 
3 This panel of clan symbols is one of scores Hopis have etched during 
ritual pilgrimages to the Tutuveni Petroglyph Site, which is today located 
on the Navajo Nation’s reservation. In recent years, unknown parties have 
inflicted heavy damage to the iconography Hopis believe to be sacred and 
monuments to their past. Drawing by Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh.
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or between the nation and a local community, but between two local 
communities that differentially interpret the history, social value, and 
spiritual function of ancient glyphs.
Undeniably, concrete resolution to such conflicts will entail legal and 
political considerations that may supercede moral ones. Because any 
Ahayu:da collectors hold are unavoidably stolen property, they should 
be returned to the Zuni tribe on these grounds alone, irrespective of 
how the Zunis care for the deities. Navajos, if caught destroying ar-
chaeological sites on federal land, may very well face the consequences 
of prosecution under the Archaeological Resources Protection Act. The 
Taliban may not have comprised the legitimate government of Afghan-
istan. However, while political and legal solutions are needed to fully 
address these conflicts, ethical questions remain. Setting aside whether 
museums possess stolen property, or Navajos are violating arpa, or 
the Taliban was a legal government, I am trying to clarify the archaeo-
logical position on such conflicts. Quite simply, I am asking, from the 
perspective of archaeological ethics: what is the right thing to do?
More than twenty years ago, John H. Merryman (1986) argued that 
there are two ways of thinking about cultural property, that objects 
of cultural patrimony rightfully belong to nations or that they exist 
independently of national borders and so belong to humanity. More 
recently, Joe Watkins (2005) has emphasized how enclaves within na-
tions, particularly indigenous communities, provide a third pole, that 
of the intranationalists. Although these positions are indispensable 
to clarify legal and political arguments of right and ownership, they 
contribute far less to discussions about cultural property in terms of 
lived experiences and moral obligations. Consider: the ancient ruins of 
Chaco Canyon in New Mexico are at once a Hopi ancestral site, a locus 
of Navajo spiritual power, a ritual space for New Agers, an archaeo-
logical and scientific resource, a National Historical Park of the United 
States, and a unesco World Heritage Site (Finn 1997; Noble 2004). 
Clearly, in anthropological as much as ethical terms, such a complex 
convergence of people, communities, and institutions cannot be re-
duced to just intra-nationalist, nationalist, or internationalist claims. 
The key ethical problem, then, is not so much categorizing rights but 
trying to illuminate their interrelationships.
This in essence will mean finding equitable solutions to conflicts over 
heritage that do not unjustly encumber one group to the advantage 
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of another. But how can stewardship be realized when one place is 
valued in such different ways? As shown above, there is no “universal” 
preservation ethic, because preservation is itself a cultural construct. 
(International organizations and treaties that aver to preserve heritage 
for the “good of humankind” do not claim that this is a universal ethic, 
but that this ethic should be universalized.) Nevertheless, this is not to 
say that preservation is nonsensical, injurious, or necessarily imperial-
ist, but that instead we must develop a sophisticated understanding 
of how heritage works from the individual level, to the community, 
to the nation, and beyond it. Because this is the social reality we find 
ourselves in, a just solution cannot simply pick out the rights of one 
group but must instead interweave these multiple values. It is this need 
for a more complex approach to heritage stewardship that leads us to 
cosmopolitanism.
The Argument of Proximity When thinking about possible resolutions 
to these problems, we may intuitively think about various claims to 
heritage objects as a set of nested relationships. This framework would 
situate, for example, a range of individuals and communities in rela-
tion to each other and the object in question. Following Amartya Sen 
(2002: 115), broadly stated, we can think of these nested relationships 
consisting of four sets of identity: kinship, locality, nationality, and hu-
manity. Such a nested, multi-scale structure is akin to what has been 
codified in the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation 
Act (nagpra), which orders priority of ownership along a key align-
ment of affiliation, beginning with lineal descendants and then moving 
outward to tribal cultural affiliations (Echo-Hawk 2000: 268). The is-
sues of affiliation in nagpra are heated not only because the law can 
turn on how it is determined (T. J. Ferguson 2004), but also because in 
a moral sense we feel claims of right are proportional to the degree of 
cultural affinity.
This ordering of right can be termed the “argument of proximity” 
because it is based on the notion that those individuals and communi-
ties most socially or culturally proximate to the cultural object and its 
creator(s) have the greatest rights to it. Indeed, ample anecdotal and 
sociological evidence makes clear that often people do have more in-
tense emotional experiences with heritage objects that are perceived to 
be culturally proximate. A Zuni elder seeing an Ahayu:da on display in 
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a museum feels great sadness and senses the deity’s own sentiments—
clearly a different experience from, say, an Anglo museum visitor who 
is encountering the Zuni Indians for the first time (T. J. Ferguson 
1990: 10). But that same Anglo, say, whose great-grandfather died 
fighting for the Union Army, will likely have a more evocative experi-
ence than the Zuni elder at Gettysburg National Park (Gatewood and 
Cameron 2004). The argument of proximity is compelling because 
it captures the essence of cultural heritage—the things we feel deeply 
connected to, that give us a sense of history, our future, and ourselves. 
This argument is powerful because it is not abstract and it respects the 
autonomy of individuals. It recognizes that those who feel closest to 
heritage objects are perhaps in the best position to determine how the 
integrity of those objects can be maintained and honored.
However, a generalizable principle of stewardship derived from the 
argument of proximity—roughly stated, preservation should be de-
cided by those closest to the heritage object in question—is not with-
out problems. One shortcoming with the argument of proximity is that 
it confuses an is with an ought. A hierarchy of relations may accurately 
describe how individuals feel—assuredly based on social structures or 
cultural worldview—more connected to cultural objects, but this social 
reality does not necessarily imply that they ought to have more rights to 
it. The bare fact of social proximity does not make a moral imperative, 
in other words.
We can think of many cases in which someone may feel particularly 
proximate to an object but not have particular claims to it based only 
on these feelings of affinity. I would argue that descendants of Betsy 
Ross could not legitimately claim ownership of the first American flag 
only because of these descendants’ social proximity. The descendants 
may feel closer to the object—perhaps more pride and adoration for 
the flag than the average American, recognizing as they might that one 
of their very kin made it—but that fact alone does not give them more 
right to it. In not dissimilar terms, Zunis would say that the carver 
who made an Ahayu:da does not own it by virtue of his proximity; 
no one individual can alienate the wooden image because the entire 
community owns it as an inalienable cultural object. The carver and the 
carver’s family might feel honored that one of their own made the idol, 
but these feelings alone do not bestow upon them any special rights 
of control.
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The Argument of Inclusivity Another problem with using a set of nested 
identities to order a set of moral rights is that the lines between each 
category can be strangely arbitrary. Few, if any, anthropologists today 
think of “culture” as a neatly bounded bundle of customs and prac-
tices, but instead they emphasize the ways in which culture and the 
social identities born from it are fluid and flexible phenomena (see the 
chapter by Hodder, this volume). A Zuni tribal member, after all, not 
only has kin and religious affiliations but is also a citizen of the United 
States. So, can cultural identities be so easily parsed and ordered? Can 
we presume that one identity takes moral precedence over another, 
particularly if we admit that myriad identities are constituted in the in-
dividual? Given that each person has multiple—intersecting and over-
lapping—identities why begin with the most particular identity before 
proceeding outward (if concentric circles) or upward (if a hierarchy)?
Indeed, some political philosophers recommend that we must begin 
such deliberations not at the most particular and local, but at the most 
general and universal. Martha C. Nussbaum (2002a), in a forum with 
twenty-nine scholars, argued for just this view as a critique of unfet-
tered patriotism. Rather than a first loyalty to the nation, Nussbaum 
argued that our first duty should be to humanity. “Whatever else we 
are bound by and pursue,” Nussbaum (2002b: 133) asserts, “we should 
recognize, at whatever personal or social cost, that each human being 
is human and counts as the moral equal of every other.” The Stoics of 
ancient Greece were perhaps the first in Western philosophy to suggest 
that every individual is a kosmou politês, a world citizen who “dwells, 
in effect in two communities—the local community of the birth and the 
community of human argument and aspiration” (Nussbaum 2002a: 7). 
As Marcus Aurelius, a firm Stoic, wrote, “My city and country, so far as 
I am Antonius, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world” (Rus-
sell 1979: 272). The Stoics, it is clear then, were not arguing to merely 
espy humans beyond our horizons or to abolish state governments. 
“Their point was even more radical,” Nussbaum (2002a: 7) writes, 
“that we should give our first allegiance to no mere form of govern-
ment, no temporal power, but to the moral community made up by the 
humanity of all human beings.”
The kosmou politês is committed to a moral sphere that begins with 
humanity rather than ends with it for three basic reasons, according to 
Nussbaum. The first is egocentric in that the more one understands 
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of the world the more one understands oneself: the study of human-
ity is thus not only a mirror but also a lens for self-contemplation. 
The second is that with a genuinely cosmopolitan view, communities 
can better solve their problems. Factionalism and partisan politics are 
avoidable if one’s commitments are wholly inclusive. The third is that 
this view is inherently gainful because it “recognizes in people what 
is especially fundamental about them, most worthy of respect and ac-
knowledgment: their aspirations to justice and goodness and their ca-
pacities for reasoning in this connection” (Nussbaum 2002a: 8).
This philosophy of cosmopolitanism is not far from the view of “in-
ternationalism,” codified in multiple charters and laws, which define 
cultural property as “components of a common human culture, what-
ever their places of origin or present location, independent of property 
rights or national jurisdiction” (Merryman 1986: 831). Excepting the 
common gendered language in these charters of mankind, this view 
is compelling precisely because it aspires to be so inclusive and non-
discriminatory. A cosmopolitan perspective affirms that some cultural 
objects transcend state boundaries and national imaginings. It ad-
dresses the realities of contemporary and historical globalization, that 
people today as for centuries are fundamentally connected—traveling, 
exchanging, communicating. The kosmou politês seeks to recognize 
our common humanity, even as the differences that render possible 
unique contributions to world heritage are honored.
A cosmopolitan principle of stewardship would therefore state that 
we should maximize the preservation of cultural heritage objects for 
the good of the greatest number of people. Here “preservation” would 
entail the physical conservation of objects so far as possible because if 
objects were physically destroyed then they could not be appreciated 
by all of humanity—or at least the portion of humanity that could visit 
or view the objects in question. The physical preservation of cherished 
heritage objects might infract the creed of a few, but is justified by their 
wider appreciation.
However, a principle so formulated is problematical chiefly because it 
disregards the very reasons that we value heritage objects in such broad 
terms. We value heritage objects not for their abstract qualities per se, 
but for the particular experiences they evoke. The cosmopolitan cher-
ishes an Uyuyemi sculptural image not merely because it was made by 
humans, but because it was made by members of the Bow Priesthood 
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and Deer Clan living at the Pueblo of Zuni in the belief that the de-
ity secures their community’s physical and spiritual well-being. Thus, 
while the principle of preservation from the argument of proximity fails 
because it is not universal enough, the principle of preservation from 
the argument of inclusivity fails because it is not particular enough. 
What is needed is an approach that locates the middle ground where 
the local and the global meet.
An Argument for Rooted Cosmopolitanism Some critics have disparaged 
Nussbaum for missing what is right in front of her when looking so far 
beyond the horizon—the social connections and ethical duties humans 
feel toward their family, friends, and intimates. “Above all,” Gertrude 
Himmelfarb (2002: 77) has passionately written, “what cosmopolitan-
ism obscures, even denies, are the givens of life: parents, ancestors, 
family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, commu-
nity—and nationality. These are not ‘accidental’ attributes of the indi-
vidual. They are essential attributes.” Sissela Bok (2002: 39) similarly 
believes that cosmopolitanism unreasonably requires us to ignore our 
social ties. Suppose, she writes, two people are drowning and one is 
your intimate while the other is a stranger. Does it really make no dif-
ference to you which person is saved first?
But even the Stoics emphasized that the obligations of world citizen-
ship should not replace local affinities, which are distinguished as “a 
source of great richness in life” (Nussbaum 2002a: 9). As Sen (2002: 
112) has written in Nussbaum’s defense, “The demands of fundamental 
allegiance need not be identical to those of exclusive allegiance.” A cos-
mopolitan ethic hardly requires that we surrender our identities of fam-
ily, religion, or community, but in fact can easily accommodate special 
attention to those in our most immediate social circle. Nussbaum be-
lieves that this is the most practical way of ensuring human flourishing. 
As an example, Nussbaum explains that she gives her own daughter 
exceptional attention because it is better to give one child her full 
care than only a little care to the world’s children. “But,” Nussbaum 
(2002b: 136) ends, “that should not mean that we believe our own 
country or family is really worth more than the children or families of 
other people—all are still equally human, of equal moral worth.”
The political philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah (2005, 2006a) 
has led a spirited defense of cosmopolitanism, but has argued that our 
the archaeologist as a world citizen  157
commitments to our intimates and kin are not merely practical, but also 
deeply ethical. Firmly grounded in the tradition of liberalism, Appiah 
claims that we need to cultivate ethical systems that are simultaneously 
cosmopolitan and rooted. Appiah’s justification for this view is extended 
and complex, and so cannot be related in toto. Nonetheless, as Appiah’s 
reasoning ultimately buttresses my own, it is important here to ex-
amine at length some of Appiah’s central arguments for a rooted cos-
mopolitanism, most persuasively articulated in his book The Ethics of 
Identity (2005).
Appiah begins his story with his own father, Joseph Appiah. He is 
described as a cosmopolitan patriot, a man who deeply loved his family 
and his Asante roots, was willing to die for his nation of Ghana, and 
yet admonished his children, “Remember that you are citizens of the 
world” (Appiah 2005: 213). Joseph loved Ghana. He risked his life for it 
and was imprisoned for it because he opposed the country’s tyrannical 
government. To explain Joseph’s outlook, it is important to consider 
that while he was born and reared in the Asante region of Ghana, 
Joseph was also a subject of the British Empire, married a British woman, 
and had children who came to live in America, Namibia, Nigeria, and 
Ghana. Indeed, Appiah reminds us that throughout human history, 
throughout the world—from Alexander the Great’s reach in India, to 
the spread of Bantu ironworks over Africa, to Islam connecting Mecca 
to Jakarta, to Chinese silk shaping European fashions, and on and on—
human communities have journeyed and interacted.
Even as the nature, form, and frequency of our interconnectedness 
may be shifting in the twenty-first century, Appiah argues that the world 
has never been nor will ever be a “global village.” A village implies 
a close relationship, but it is impossible to be intimate with the billions 
of people that populate the earth. But this is a limitation not only of a 
global outlook. Can a citizen of the United States really know 300 mil-
lion fellow Americans? Whether speaking of humanity, the nation, or 
the ethnie, we are therefore often speaking of “political strangers.” Cos-
mopolitanism nonetheless acknowledges that not everyone is a stranger; 
it is not a philosophy that advocates, in Susan Wolf ’s (1992: 244) term, 
an “extreme impartialism” in which one is morally required to treat a 
stranger exactly as one treats a friend. “A tenable cosmopolitanism,” 
Appiah (2005: 223) consequently argues, “in the first instance, must 
take seriously the value of human life, and the value of particular human 
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lives, the lives people have made for themselves, with the communities 
that help lend significance to those lives. This prescription captures the 
challenge. A cosmopolitanism with prospects must reconcile a kind of 
universalism with the legitimacy of at least some forms of partiality.”
A cosmopolitan philosophy must justify the nature and limits of 
ethical partiality. The concern with “special obligations” is that they 
seem to undermine three core liberal values, which cosmopolitanism 
also seeks to uphold: “those of autonomy (that is, some core concern 
for liberty), loyalty (that is, associational life, in all its richness and re-
sponsibility), and moral equality (that is, the notion that persons are 
of equal worth, or anyway, due equal respect)” (Appiah 2005: 224). 
Appiah’s response is twofold. He first argues that obligations can be 
both special and universal. The general idea here is that ethical partial-
ity involves “particularist goods.” Consider for example, friends and 
wealth, which can both be intrinsically good, but goods of different 
kinds: “You may not mind whether you have this million dollars or 
that million dollars; but you value your friend not as a token of the 
type friend but as this particular person with whom you have a highly 
particularized relationship” (Appiah 2005: 227). His second argument 
comes down to the point that we do not demand the same sense of 
equality from states and individuals. Although we want state govern-
ments to be impartial when selecting their policies and running their 
programs (so as not to unfairly disadvantage, say, women or African 
Americans or the poor) we deem that partiality at the individual level 
is not only fair but also often expected. In this way, Appiah (2005: 230) 
asserts, “Impartiality is a strictly position-dependent obligation. What 
is a virtue in a referee is not a virtue in a prize-fighter’s wife.”
Appiah goes on to say that our sense of ethics unfolds from the per-
sonal paths each of us seeks in our lives, our “ground projects.” These 
pursuits are shaped by two kinds of relationships, “thick relations” (in-
teractions among those with a shared worldview and a rich collective 
history) and “thin relations” (the associations we have with political 
strangers). These relations in turn correspond with two kinds of obli-
gations. The first are “ethical obligations,” which involve leading a life 
that is good or bad, while the second, “moral obligations,” are nar-
rower and concern the principles of how to treat others. Thus, thick 
relations involve ethical obligations and thin relations involve moral 
obligations. “Ethical concerns and constraints arise from my indi-
viduality; moral ones arise from my personhood,” Appiah (2005: 232) 
the archaeologist as a world citizen  159
writes. From this framework, we can begin to see how Appiah’s rooted 
cosmopolitanism uniquely negotiates between the tasks of partiality 
and impartiality. We are bound by both thick and thin relations, by 
both ethical and moral obligations.
And so, unlike Nussbaum, Appiah (2005: 241) is arguing that the 
cosmopolitan’s commitment to the local should not just be instrumen-
tal, not just “a coolly cerebral decision, an impartial calculation as to 
how one would best make the world a better place.” Indeed, the imag-
inings of a nation are real to those who imagine them. The happen-
stance of one’s sex does not somehow make one’s gender inauthentic. 
In the end, nationalities matter ethically “for the same reason that foot-
ball and opera matter: as things cared about by autonomous agents, 
whose autonomous desires we ought to acknowledge and take account 
of even if we cannot always accede to them” (Appiah 2005: 245). Thus, 
rooted cosmopolitanism is not a contradiction in terms, but instead 
goes to the heart of a life committed to one’s kin and community as 
much as the dignity of every human being.
Appiah presents a kind of universalism that appreciates that human 
practices and behaviors are historically and socially contingent. But we 
do not need to obtain perfect theoretical harmony to discover shared 
practices. Appiah argues that we can and often do agree on moments 
of moral and ethical judgment. We cannot always agree on the uni-
versal, but we can often agree on the particular. The missionary nurse 
and mother who come to the aid of a sick child come for different 
reasons, but both come to help this ailing child. Appiah suggests that 
such shared moments are clearly realized when we hear stories in which 
we come to see the world through the eyes of another (see the chap-
ters by Lilley and Scham, this volume). The anti-universalist, Appiah 
(2005: 257) concludes, “supposes that the rationalist is bound to think 
that ‘we’ are right and ‘they’ are wrong: but if there is one world only, 
then it is also possible that they might be right. We can learn from each 
other’s stories only if we share both human capacity and a single world: 
relativism about either is a reason not to converse but to fall silent.”
The Principle of Complex Stewardship
The principles of stewardship derived from proximity or inclusivity are 
what we might consider to be notions of “simple stewardship” because 
they see preservation as either infinitely variable (depending exclusively 
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on local definitions) or wholly fixed (depending exclusively on a single, 
universal definition). A perspective of rooted cosmopolitanism leads 
us, in turn, to “complex stewardship” because it stipulates that archae-
ologists must comprehend the ways in which preservation can be both 
locally enacted and universally sought. This tenet is offered not as a 
universal principle, but as a means to universalize a stewardship ethic 
derived from rooted cosmopolitanism. In other words, it is a way for 
archaeologists to frame predicaments of stewardship—as so clearly 
raised in the preservation paradox. This principle could thus be stated: 
We should maximize the integrity of heritage objects for the good of 
the greatest number of people, but not absolutely.
Maximize the integrity of heritage objects. In this principle, “integrity” 
is conceived as the soundness of a cultural object that includes but is 
not limited to physical welfare. As we saw in the case of the Ahayu:da, 
a wooden deity’s integrity is derived primarily not from its perpetual 
physical conservation, but rather from its active participation in the life 
of Zuni community members, which includes the physical deteriora-
tion of the object. Concepts of integrity should not be imposed ex-
ternally, but ought to be derived from the viewpoints of stakeholders. 
The scientific archaeologist, as one stakeholder, can make the argument 
for the physical preservation of an object, but this is just one view that 
must be negotiated given the local context. This concept of integrity 
provides the archaeologist with a firm foundation to explain why—
from a scientific view—ancient Ancestral Pueblo glyphs should not 
be destroyed, but that other archaeological artifacts can be destroyed 
(e.g., carbon samples, sherds for petrographic analyses, and so forth). 
That is, the argument from the archaeological viewpoint is that the 
scientific integrity of some objects entails their physical destruction while 
in other cases their physical conservation.
For the good. As a notion of integrity, “the good” is not a ready-made 
object that can be imposed from above. I think that archaeologists need 
a minimum concept of the good, which can be found in the notion 
of universal human dignity. From this flow basic values that archae-
ologists can reasonably defend: equality, justice, liberty. Archaeologists 
ought to be committed to human flourishing, but this does not give 
them license to enjoin their own ideas of “the good” upon others, par-
ticularly on impoverished or politically weak communities. Indeed, the 
basic recognition of human dignity would demand that archaeologists 
respect how individuals and communities conceive of the good, so 
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long as those individuals and communities do not themselves contra-
vene the basic human dignity of others.
Of the greatest number. Following from a view of rooted cosmopoli-
tanism, our first (but not only) allegiance is to humanity. Beginning at 
the outermost ring of our nested relationships means a first recogni-
tion of our shared identity as human beings, of our entwined histories 
and collective experiences. Specifically in terms of “heritage,” it seems 
empirically true that most communities deeply value the objects that 
contribute to their identities, and many communities deeply value the 
objects of other communities. Since cultural heritage (although vari-
ously defined and expressed) seems to be prized across a spectrum of 
communities, it is not only right but also a practical matter to err to-
ward humanity. In other words, if multiple communities are likely to 
esteem the Rosetta Stone, why start discussions of value with Greeks 
or Egyptians or archaeologists? Does it not make the most sense, as a 
beginning point, to imagine the values it holds for humanity?
But not absolutely. But since we know that cultural objects are val-
ued precisely because they come from particular human communi-
ties—and not humanity in general—we must take into account not 
just the “greatest number” but also individuals who made objects or 
experience profound affinities because the objects come from their an-
cestors or community. Archaeologists could also argue that the scien-
tific merits of some particularly special object outweigh the benefits of 
sharing an object with other stakeholders. This stipulation, then, seeks 
to be sensitive to the local contexts in which heritage objects are cre-
ated, used, conveyed, and retired. In Appiah’s terms, the phrase “not 
absolutely” sanctions our thick relations and ethical obligations while 
“maximiz[ing] the integrity” concerns our thin relations and moral 
obligations.
It should be clear from this discussion that I am not promoting an 
absolute rule, but rather a frame archaeologists can use to begin de-
liberations on ethical predicaments. Although I am using the term 
“stewardship,” this discussion moves away from how “stewardship” 
is typically conceived by archaeologists and their professional socie-
ties (e.g., Groarke and Warrick 2006). Even as ethical archaeologists 
should seek to engage in dialogues with stakeholders, this principle 
does not require archaeologists to be arbitrators; however, it does re-
quire archaeologists to be anthropologists because they must be aware 
of how different stakeholders conceive of and enact such key concepts 
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as heritage, preservation, integrity, and the good. They must be aware 
of how and why heritage objects persist in particular communities, in-
cluding their own archaeological one. While I have sought to clarify a 
justifiable and reasonable moral stance for archaeologists, this principle 
by itself does not provide a clear mechanism for negotiation or reso-
lution of conflicts. Real negotiations must involve legal and political 
considerations, and not just ethical principles.
The principle of complex stewardship can nonetheless clarify how ar-
chaeologists qua archaeologists can approach the preservation paradox. 
In the case of the Zuni Ahayu:da, it is clear that these wooden images 
are exceedingly rare, even priceless contributions to the record of hu-
manity. However, a general contribution to humanity is not enough. 
In this case, the key issue revolves around integrity. Museum profes-
sionals and Zuni tribal members approach the images in fundamentally 
different ways, but it is the Zuni perspective that is most compelling 
since it is from this community that the objects were made and are still 
used. The museum world after all marvels at these objects because of 
how the Zunis conceptualize the War Gods. Thus, even the museums 
should acquiesce to the deep particular meanings the images hold for 
Zunis.
With the case of the Ancestral Pueblo glyphs we again see conflicting 
ideas of integrity: for Hopis, the integrity of the objects entails their 
physical conservation as monuments to Hopi history; for Navajos, the 
integrity of glyphs depends on their use in the healing of ill Navajos 
and the maintenance of the Navajo cultural landscape. Although most 
evidence suggests that Navajos did not arrive in the Southwest until af-
ter many of these ancient glyphs were made, this consideration must be 
balanced by the fact that the Navajos do have some traditions that re-
late connections with the anaasazi (Begay 2003). The most persuasive 
argument of integrity from the Navajo perspective might be if it could 
be demonstrated that it was ancient Navajos who made the glyphs 
that were being damaged in Navajo ceremonies. But unless the issue 
of integrity between the two primary stakeholders can be clarified, we 
need to consider the broader values of other Pueblo groups, archaeolo-
gists, tourists, and residents of the Southwest and the United States. 
When these glyphs are destroyed, the absent objects potentially affect 
the well-being of all these communities as well. For these reasons, and 
unless additional claims are made or information is offered, archaeolo-
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gists should have serious ethical reservations about the Navajo practice 
of damaging ancient Ancestral Pueblo glyphs.
Although the Taliban ostensibly destroyed the Bamiyan Buddhas 
because of political machinations (Meskell 2002: 563), if their claims 
of destruction for religious preservation were taken seriously, could ar-
chaeologists accept (on ethical grounds) the destruction of the statues? 
The far-reaching estimation of the Bamiyan Buddhas as a record of 
humanity is indicated by the archaeological expeditions that Italian, 
French, Indian, Japanese, and Afghan scholars have undertaken since 
the 1920s, the substantial investments made by unesco since 2001, and 
the inscription of the Bamiyan Buddhas as a World Heritage Site in 
2003 (icomos 2003). Nearly two millennia old, and among the largest 
standing Buddhist sculptures, the Bamiyan Buddhas were rare cultural 
objects to be sure. At the same time, a close look at the issue shows 
that the Bamiyan Buddhas had been threatened many times before and 
the world had hardly taken notice; indeed, the discourses surround-
ing the crisis suggest that for many people throughout the world, the 
prestige of the Bamiyan Buddhas as objects of world heritage actually 
came after—not before—their destruction (Colwell-Chanthaphonh 
2003b: 76, 93). An argument based exclusively on notions of inclusiv-
ity may not be entirely convincing. The integrity of the Bamiyan Bud-
dhas is twofold. First, although few if any practicing Buddhists live in 
Afghanistan, when the crisis began, protests in Sri Lanka and China 
would indicate that Buddhists in those places continue to revere the 
statues for their religious meanings. Second, the Bamiyan Buddhas’ 
integrity involves their status as heritage objects for Afghans, a status 
upheld by previous Afghan governments and even initially the Taliban 
in 1999 (Harding 2001). Because the integrity of the Bamiyan Bud-
dhas—as religious objects beyond Afghanistan, and as heritage objects 
within Afghanistan—would be fundamentally undermined by their 
destruction, the strongest ethical redoubt for the Taliban would be a 
convincing argument about “the good.” This argument would have to 
entail a compelling explanation about how people in the Bamiyan Val-
ley, or in Afghanistan, as adherents of one strain of Islamic fundamen-
talism, needed to remove these sacrilegious objects in order for society 
to flourish. In addition to the difficulties of making such a case, defend-
ers of the Taliban would have to explain how such destruction would 
not contravene a baseline standard of human dignity, as it seems that 
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such naked desolation (dynamiting the statues) menaces contemporary 
Buddhist adherents. It is difficult to see how archaeologists could be 
ethically neutral or more in this instance of heritage destruction.
Cosmopolitan Education
When children enter this world, do they begin learning of it first from 
the particular or the general? Sissela Bok (2002) offers the intuitive 
argument that humans build their identities from “part to whole,” 
naturally assembling their world from one’s kin to one’s community to 
one’s nation to our world.
Martha C. Nussbaum’s provocative response to this question is that 
these rings of association do shape how we see the world—and that 
children do naturally move from these rings of identity—but they be-
gin with humanity. Nussbaum (2002b: 142) writes of how all babies 
begin their lives first as human beings: “Infants respond, innately, to 
the sight of a human face. A smile from a human being elicits a reactive 
smile, and there is reason to think this is an innate capacity of recogni-
tion.” It is only as the child grows that she begins to learn of particu-
larities, that this person is her mother, that this land is her country, that 
this lexicon is her language. “All circles develop simultaneously, in a 
complex and interlacing movement,” Nussbaum (2002b: 143) posits. 
“But surely the outer circle is not the last to form. Long before children 
have any acquaintance with the idea of nation, or even of one specific 
religion, they know hunger and loneliness. Long before they encounter 
patriotism, they have probably encountered death. Long before ideol-
ogy interferes, they know something of humanity.”
If it is true that humans know of humanity from their earliest ex-
periences, then the field of archaeology has the potential to expand 
and deepen these understandings. As David Hansen (2007) suggests, a 
“cosmopolitan education” is one that inspires people to learn from ev-
ery human contact they make and to not withdraw from what is merely 
different. This approach to pedagogy can lead to human solidarity and 
the understanding of how we are all each other’s relations. Critical ex-
plorations in human history and the explication of the relationship 
between material culture and humans in all times and places are ideal 
means of learning about similarities and difference among human so-
cieties. This realization should encourage cosmopolitan educators and 
philosophers to incorporate archaeological inquiry more fully into 
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their projects. And in turn, it should compel archaeologists to engage 
with their local communities as well as far beyond them. Archaeolo-
gists ought to remember that they are not only members of a profes-
sion and inhabitants of cities and countries; they are also citizens of the 
world.
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7  i   “time’s  wheel  runs  back” 
Conversations with the Middle Eastern Past
For a several decades now, those of us who have done our archaeo-
logical service in the Middle East have sought to disabuse ourselves of 
the idea that we were working at the center of it all. As the erstwhile 
“cradles of civilization” have failed to appeal to new generations of ar-
chaeologists, the biblical and ancient Near Eastern pasts are developing 
a distinct quaint colonialist aura (Steele 2005). Despite this, our per-
sistent, if inflated, sense of our central place in the discipline remains a 
constant. Thus, many of us have discovered that our feelings over the 
return of popular attention to our region, while accompanied by the 
sobering realization that the events that precipitated it are tragic ones, 
are not entirely unalloyed with satisfaction.
It is a surprising development for an archaeological subspecialty not 
exactly known for its timely debates that happenings in our field are 
engaging the interests of journalists and television reporters. Neverthe-
less, whether it is seen as a thorn in the imperialist side, a cauldron of 
extremism, or a last stand of tradition in the face of a commodifying 
modernity, the region now exerts a profound effect on many aspects of 
our culture. In analyses focusing on the role of religion (Ahmed 2003; 
Halliday 2000; Jan 2003; Antoun 2001), economic underdevelopment 
(Silverstein and Makdisi 2006), victimization and the struggle for 
subaltern status (Lindholm 2002), popular culture and its discontents 
(Stein and Swedenburg 2005), colonialism and violence (Dawisha 
2003; J. Cole 1992), and the internet and globalization (Hill 2002), 
our colleagues in the social sciences have sought understanding of this 
effect with admirable zeal.
The notion that Middle Eastern cultures and values are fixed and 
immutable is a theme in many of these explorations with some schol-
ars who willingly confront the fallacies of this concept (Massad 2001) 
and others who suggest that a primary concern in the region is the 
maintenance or invention of traditions that can be embalmed for fu-
ture generations (Lewis 2001, 2004; Huntingdon 1998). Most of these 
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tomes, having been spawned in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, 
have a subtext, whether acknowledged or not, of either decrying (Little 
2004; Lockman 2004) or supporting (Lewis 2004) the current policy 
of the United States in the Middle East even though political analysts 
of all stripes have begun to detect a certain lack of precision on what 
that policy now is.
What our government excels at, however, is not transparency in its 
political or strategic aims but clarity in the realm of values. As President 
Bush famously admonished: “We must never forget that this is a long 
struggle, that there are evil people in the world who hate America. 
And we won’t relent. The folks who conducted to act on our country 
on September 11th made a big mistake. They underestimated America. 
They underestimated our resolve, our determination, our love for free-
dom. They misunderestimated the fact that we love a neighbor in need. 
They misunderestimated the compassion of our country.”1 In this fa-
mous foray into neologism, the president articulated what he believed 
to be American objectives for the Middle East. On the one side is a 
“loving and compassionate” imperialism influenced by Western reli-
gious teachings and imperfectly realized as an antidote to Eastern re-
ligious extremism (Lockman 2004; Little 2004). On the other side, it 
is posited, is a violent dismissal of our values as a corrupting zeitgeist 
aimed at erasing religion and morality from all public life (Jan 2003; 
Ahmed 2003).
As a major contributor to perceptions formed both there and abroad, 
the archaeology of the Middle East has clear subtexts relating to almost 
every aspect of practice in the region (Pollock and Bernbeck 2005) and 
it is these subtexts that determine what is conveyed about its narra-
tive. In what follows, I will make some exploratory movements toward 
fashioning a cosmopolitan adaptation of the Middle Eastern archaeo-
logical story based upon concepts that have been articulated by Appiah 
in Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (2006a). Based upon 
Appiah’s cosmopolitan philosophy and, additionally, that of Haber-
mas (2003), Derrida (1997), and Nussbaum (1994, 2006), I will exam-
ine values that are at the heart of Middle Eastern cultures, both ancient 
and modern, and what they should mean for Western archaeologists 
practicing in the region today. From there, the sections below move 
backward in time from typical approaches to knowledge dissemination 
about the archaeology of the Middle East today to nationalist percep-
tions that represent a slightly earlier era to, finally, telling our story 
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as archaeologists of the ancient Near East through the eyes of those 
Victorian cosmopolitans and anti-cosmopolitans (Appiah 2006a: 1) 
known to some as Orientalists.
The story will, thus, be presented in stratigraphic terms. While I am 
not as enslaved to chronologies as many of my colleagues, I find the 
activity of uncovering the conceptual layers that have formulated our 
discipline, as one would a site, to be as good an approach as any toward 
revealing how we came to be where we are. As the quote in the title 
of this article, from Robert Browning’s poem Rabbi Ben Ezra, sug-
gests, “Time’s wheel” does indeed “run back” both in the ways that we 
continue to conduct archaeology in the Middle East and in the rever-
berations of “our” past in concert with all of the other pasts that have 
shaped the region.
Hospitality and the Cosmopolitan Archaeological Project
After having fairly dismissed the idea of “timelessness” in relation to 
the Middle East it may seem disingenuous to begin our reverse chro-
nology with a discussion of hospitality—one of those presumably un-
changing traits of Middle Eastern life. Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
find a value that has been more misunderstood, taken advantage of, 
and mischaracterized by Westerners in the Middle East than hospital-
ity. Biblical scholars still see among the Bedouin of the modern Middle 
East the very model of what they view as Abraham’s welcoming de-
meanor (Vos 1999; Feiler 2001), hardly recognizing that this conflation 
of millennia and cultures does no more to elucidate the Bible than it 
does to convey an accurate sense of the modern culture.
Recently, in expressing a hope that Christians who live in Muslim 
countries “find welcome and respect” there, Pope Benedict sparked a 
discussion on the topic of hospitality and its attendant concept, reci-
procity. Aside from the observation that “reciprocity,” in either its 
positive or negative form, is not a Christian value, quoting a medieval 
emperor on the inherent evil of Islam, as the pope did in this same 
speech, did little to assure that his hopes would be fulfilled. By con-
juring up one of the worst periods in the history of relations between 
Christians and Muslims, the pope reduced what ideally should have 
been a conversation, which Appiah defines as being neither didactic 
nor consensus seeking (2006a: 58), between religious practitioners to 
an implied threat. Under the circumstances, this use of the language 
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of hospitality seems remarkably obtuse and his comments appear to 
ridicule both the cultural and religious values of the Muslim and Arab 
worlds.
In contrast, cosmopolitanists posit a role for global moral behav-
ior that, it is argued, should be dependent upon an understanding, 
through conversation, of the values of others as well as co-extensive 
with global economic influences (Appiah 2006a). The prospect of one 
world with many perspectives applies to the phenomenon of cosmo-
politanism itself—which has numerous adherents with as many differ-
ent views as to what constitutes universal values. Both Derrida (1997) 
and Habermas (2003a) support this philosophical project although 
Habermas’s approach is distinctly more rational than Derrida’s. He in-
vites his audience to consider a world in which citizens share equally 
in a sense of freedom to have lives of dignity but, as Derrida (1997) has 
noted, such a world is founded upon the notion of universal access 
to the form of reason Habermas espouses. Tolerance is at the heart of 
Habermas’s vision of a cosmopolitan world and certainly tolerance is 
most clearly the value that Appiah’s system is based upon. Derrida adds 
another dimension to the debate by suggesting that tolerance is more 
protective of the power of the person and the state expressing it than it 
is supportive of true equality.
It is hospitality, according to Derrida, that most closely approxi-
mates a true cosmopolitan worldview. “Pure and unconditional hos-
pitality, hospitality itself,” he writes, “opens or is, in advance, open to 
someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as 
an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, non-identifiable and un-
foreseeable, in short, wholly other” (Derrida 1997: 128–29). Offered to 
the foreign other from the very heart of the familiar self, the place of 
dwelling, true hospitality subsumes the language of tolerance, which, 
for Derrida, is no more than a parsimonious “scrutinized hospitality” 
(Derrida 1997: 128). On balance, Derrida’s perspective, of the two, 
seems more “right” for a cosmopolitan understanding of the Middle 
East where hospitality is neither a quaint religious tradition nor an ob-
ligation that is undertaken only with an end in view. It is, instead, an 
entire network of dependent and overlapping factors—reciprocal rela-
tions that allow for a smoothly functioning social order.
In practicing our own version of hospitality and reciprocity, the con-
sideration of adding to the economic welfare of the communities we 
work among should not be a secondary one. Discussing this topic on 
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several occasions with archaeologists whom I knew to be working in 
the same region as I was, I asked if they had ever employed anyone 
locally to work on their projects. The answers ranged from doubts as 
to whether their government licenses would permit them to do so to 
implications that the people in the area were unreliable, untrained, and 
untrustworthy. Apparently those who held the latter view had not re-
flected that sites are entrusted to the people living near them whether 
archaeologists are there or not. In this instance, the hospitable solution 
is also the practical one.
This not too startling revelation came to me while I was working in 
the Dead Sea region in Jordan. During the winter months, in prepara-
tion for a project, I arrived to find that the local small complex of mud 
brick houses, which were uninhabited the previous summer, now had 
people living in them. From the beginning of my work there, young 
people from those houses would attempt to converse with me, bring 
tea to me while I was working in the field, and even send me back to 
Amman with produce and cheese—all of which I attempted to refuse 
with no success. I had become a regular, but still reluctant, luncheon 
guest by the time I was joined on the project by Mohammed Balowneh, 
an archaeological inspector from the Jordanian Antiquities Authority.
The dimension of understanding that the latter’s presence began 
to add to the proceedings was one for which I remain grateful. With 
limited Arabic skills on my side and little to no English skills on the 
other, I had found my seemingly pleasant encounters with the local 
people uncomfortable and burdened with guilt, as I had determined 
that these were not people who could afford to entertain me on a daily 
basis. My colleague said to me one day as we were eating, “You know 
these people are very poor?” I said that I did and had tried very hard to 
refuse their generous invitations. Dismissing that as the reason for his 
comment he continued by saying that it would be good to hire people 
from among my hosts for my project. As far as the hospitality was con-
cerned, he told me later, “It’s important—it has to be done,” indicating 
that the obligation falls on both the host and the guest.
The idea that, in choosing people to work with, one might do so 
on a personal basis is not entirely foreign to our culture. The element 
of the relationship added by hospitality is intended to operate as an 
affirmation that one’s host is correct in fulfilling social obligations as, 
hopefully, one’s guests will be correct in fulfilling theirs. We may recog-
nize this necessity yet, all too often, we will continually take advantage 
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of the obligation on one side, as I did, without attempting to assume 
it on the other. Archaeologists working in these countries are no less 
guests there than tourists—and, one might well argue, they should 
be more aware of their obligations in that respect by virtue of having 
spent much more time in the country.
A colleague of mine, a Palestinian archaeologist working in the West 
Bank, maintains that the employment of local people on archaeologi-
cal sites can demonstrably reduce the amount of looting that goes on 
there (Yahya 2005: 75–76). There are model archaeological excavations, 
some of them mentioned elsewhere in this volume, that integrate a 
system of sharing, both in economic and in educational terms, with 
surrounding communities. Çatalhöyük (Hodder 2000), the Kruger 
National Park Project (Meskell 2005a), and the Rahmatabad Project 
in Iran (Bernbeck et al. 2005) are good examples. Most archaeology in 
Israel and Jordan has not incorporated these ideas and research remains 
firmly under the control of “professionals” and their students. In this 
sense, we might say that the “Orientalist” scholars of the past assessed 
this situation more correctly than we—dependent as they were upon 
a local work force, rather than a host of wealthy Western students. It 
seems that, in evaluating the theoretical harm done by their views on 
Middle Eastern culture and society, some of us have elected to counter 
it by eliminating any economic relationship between ourselves and the 
local people entirely. To deconstruct the Middle Eastern past in terms 
of the perspectives that have sustained us for so long may require an 
acknowledgment that the lineage of our discipline is not a noble one. 
This does not, however, preclude salvaging something of validity from 
the idealistic fabrications of our forebears.
Misunderestimating the Middle Eastern Past
Rejecting our past history piecemeal, rather than as a whole, is a se-
riously complex proposition. It requires a consideration of all of the 
legacies of the discipline, including a perennial favorite that few wish 
to disregard—the idea that enlightened and scientific concepts can be 
subsumed into archaeological practice without doing damage to post-
modern concerns about serving the public. Science, so Appiah (2006a: 
39) tells us, runs interference with attempts to understand through 
true conversation. How many archaeologists working in non-Western 
countries have heard their colleagues expound upon the “unscientific” 
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methods of locally trained scholars? I would venture to say that most 
of us, at one time or another, have had this experience. Science is still 
the last bastion of the colonialist defense.
Misunderestimate, everyone’s favorite presidential blog word as 
expressed in the speech concerning the attacks of September 11 cited 
above, seems to be a particularly apt term for these kinds of mistakes 
in judgment. It might be defined (if it existed) as “to misunderstand 
and underestimate simultaneously.” The context in which the president 
uses this word also should have some resonance for us. Even though 
it is clear that he does, in fact, know the word “underestimate,” as he 
uses it in conjunction with “resolve,” “determination,” and “freedom,” 
“misunderestimate” is, peculiarly, reserved for “love,” “compassion,” 
and, on numerous other occasions, his own abilities. One has to as-
sume that Bush is well aware that whatever love or compassion is dis-
played by citizens of the United States toward each other is of virtually 
no concern to its enemies. The suggestion is, rather, that these are “hid-
den” qualities—ones that are not readily discernible. It is this gnostic 
aspect of our Middle East policy that has been assiduously relied upon 
in numerous follow-up discussions as to the direction of our interven-
tions in Middle Eastern political processes (R. Marshall 2005).
Just as the president has no problem conveying meaning through 
nonexistent words, we attempt to paint our pictures of the Middle 
Eastern past through the medium of the nonexistent, but nonetheless 
meaningful, “collective memories” of our listeners. The “biblical” ver-
sus “Near Eastern” versus “Middle Eastern” past are radically different 
versions of the same archaeological record adjusted for different audi-
ences. In exploring how far some of our notions about the past in the 
Middle East may have moved us toward the untenable present, one 
need only look at the ways in which the archaeology of this region is 
taught and its artifacts interpreted. The idea that “important” material 
culture is that which reflects religious rather than secular ideology is 
axiomatic for archaeologists who traditionally assign “ritual” functions 
to enigmatic objects. This both continually re-creates and reinforces 
the view that the East is more religious (read “irrational”) than the 
West (Said 1978; JanMohamed 1985). In this light, it is understandable 
why seals are given major significance among archaeological finds in 
the region. In fact, the meaning invested in them has inspired many 
famous forgeries of these items (Vaughn and Rollston 2005) and the 
discovery of different forms of seals generates archaeological excite-
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ment far in excess of their value in providing information about an-
cient cultures. The “loaded symbolism” of these objects can be directly 
traced to religious perspectives (that is, seals or bullae with biblical 
names on them) or indirectly, in terms of the sense of both the finality 
and the approbation they represent. For example, on the holiest day of 
the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur, religious Jews express the wish to be 
happily sealed in the Book of Life while for Christians the breaking of 
seven seals heralds the end of the world and for Muslims Mohammed 
is the “Seal of the Prophets.”
A long-range perspective that incorporates outdated origins of the 
state models (Service 1964; Carneiro 1977; Wittfogel 1967) is still popu-
lar both in and out of the classroom. A preoccupation with towers and 
walls in Middle Eastern archaeology, as symbols of boundaries, bor-
ders, and landscapes of control, of nationalism and militarism, suggests 
more than a mere superimposition of the present on the past. Such 
preoccupation reflects a continuing classificatory mindset that requires 
either a hierarchical or unconnected relationship between cultures and 
societies. Most archaeological data suggest that this is likely to be a com-
plete mischaracterization of past realities. Nonetheless, when it comes 
to the ancient Near East, the choice of relationships between sites tradi-
tionally comes down to conquered, conqueror, or disaffected.
To the extent that the region’s archaeological record demonstrates a 
secular ideology it is always assumed to be as a result of that mysterious 
force in the ancient world known as “hellenization” (Mazar 2000). This 
is not to say that an interest in establishing a synthesis between East-
ern and Western civilizations is not, also, an obsession. A theory that 
has long fascinated scholars of the ancient Near East—“The Axial Age” 
(Jaspers 1953)—juxtaposes the so-called universalizing philosophies of 
Europe and Asia. This simplistic construct can literally be placed into 
the service of any view on religion and politics. The familiar unctuous 
rhetoric of politicians who speak of values shared by all of the world’s 
great religions, values that curiously sound quite particularistic, im-
plies that the appeal of this concept lives on.
In recent decades, critical historical perceptions of the consequences 
of religious intolerance, from martyred Christians to the Holocaust, 
have become a common thread in our education, so much so that it has 
created a distrust of religion in public life that fundamentalists are now 
finding so deplorable (Antoun 2001). While we are wont to abrogate 
the role of religion in politics, education in the Middle East focuses on 
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economic and political factors as the most insidious historical forces 
(Zubaida 1999; Ahmed 2003). While our historical education repre-
sents the Crusades as a period of religious activism, heroic to some but 
alarming to many others (Scham 2002), Arab education emphasizes 
that Crusaders were impelled by a feudal system that economically dis-
enfranchised younger sons (Maalouf 1984).
These kinds of differences, though they seem only to extend to in-
terpretations of certain historical episodes, can result in some bizarrely 
mismatched perspectives in the field between archaeologists and the 
communities in which they work. Our concern with delineating space 
and material culture as either sacred or secular, ritual or functional can 
suggest to others that we are bent upon viewing religion as a force 
apart from all other aspects of society and culture (Zedeno 2000). Our 
categories tend to be mutually exclusive rather than overlapping. Thus, 
in a sense, Western scholars might be considered as extreme in our 
thought as we have deemed others to be in their deeds (Appiah 2005: 
138–41). We can excuse this tendency as a “reasoned approach,” but is a 
dedication to reason inherently superior to a zeal for god and country? 
We assume so, yet in the end there is little incontrovertible evidence 
that we can summon to support this proposition.
Nationalism and Patrimonial Archaeology
One might expect that cosmopolitanism and nationalism are mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, given the kind of damage that is possible, cosmopol-
itan perceptions of both religion and patriotism might be assumed to 
be fraught with misgivings. Curiously, neither Appiah nor Nussbaum 
(1994, 2006), who has written extensively on this subject, are dismissive 
of these as emotional attachments. Suggesting that cosmopolitanism, 
rather than being an alternative to these feelings, might be viewed 
as the imagined community writ large, Appiah seems to declare that 
his own brand of “rooted” cosmopolitanism encompasses the soul of 
patriotism and religious feeling if not all of their outward expressions 
(2005: 155–210).
The cosmopolitan patriot can in fact maintain local attachments 
alongside of an appreciation of difference not only through tourism 
but also as a result of migration, nomadism, and diaspora. “In the past, 
these processes have too often been the result of forces we should de-
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plore; the old migrants were often refugees, and older diasporas often 
began in an involuntary exile,” Appiah writes. “But what can be hate-
ful, if coerced can be celebrated when it flows from the free decisions 
of individuals or of groups” (Appiah 1997a: 618). The conundrum of 
cosmopolitan patriotism arises with the realization that the “roots” of 
cosmopolitanism are firmly planted in this coercive past. Appiah’s own 
family history might be said to have resulted from multiple migrations, 
forced as well as chosen.
To be a cosmopolitan patriot is to be unique in one’s understanding 
of the relationship of individuals to places and from a contemplation 
of what makes us different rather than like our nationalist neighbors. 
“Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business,” Nuss-
baum (1994: 6) tells us. “It is, in effect, as Diogenes said, a kind of 
exile—from the comfort of local truths, from the warm nestling feeling 
of patriotism, from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one’s 
own.” Nussbaum’s argument that “cosmopolitanism seems to have 
a hard time gripping the imagination” in comparison to a patriotism 
“full of color and intensity and passion” (Nussbaum 1994: 5) reminds 
us, as archaeologists, of the difficulty in getting people to care about 
places that they don’t view as their patrimony.
The postmodern dilemma is how much of a dichotomy between 
cultures one can embrace fully while, at the same time, attempting to 
comprehend the cosmopolitan society. The unspoken assumption of 
many postmodernists, that there is a “bad” nationalism that has in-
cited nations to seize power and a “good” nationalism that empowers 
formerly colonized people to control their own past, needs to be ex-
amined carefully. This problem might best be approached by a further 
examination of whether there might be a distinction between national-
ism and patriotism. Nationalist archaeology, which we have all come 
to condemn, may be distinct from patrimonial archaeology, although 
the latter concept is not one that should make us entirely comfortable. 
Nevertheless, just as there are a host of factors beyond simple intellec-
tual curiosity that motivate scholars, both as individuals and as mem-
bers of groups, what other people make of places is neither predictable 
nor controllable.
Rather than an argument for universalism, multiculturalism, or glo-
balization, Appiah’s cosmopolitanism (2005: 222) has, at its heart, a 
message for anthropologists and archaeologists (see also the chapter by 
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Breglia, this volume). People, that is, individuals, in all of their unregu-
lated glory and resplendent with a sense of choice, trump cultures. Take 
heed any one of us who would preserve aspects of cultures that their 
practitioners are no longer interested in, for in a cosmopolitan world 
there is a right to select those affiliations that one would remember—
and those that one would rather forget (see the Benavides chapter in 
this volume). In the Middle East, it is unfortunately the most politi-
cally and socially engaged archaeologists who have discovered this hard 
lesson. Several of my colleagues in Palestine and Jordan have become 
involved in movements toward reviving original crafts—looking upon 
it as an authentic way in which to stimulate the interests of communi-
ties in their pasts. These activists are not people who lack understand-
ing about the region—many of them, in fact, were born there. They 
were, however, educated in the West and, as Appiah notes, therefore 
are wont to seek an uncontaminated and pristine version of their own 
cultures (Appiah 2005: 136). All of these endeavors, well intentioned as 
they are, have had virtually no impact, economically or otherwise.
What this means for archaeologists elsewhere is also a rather daunt-
ing prospect. Our visions of pickling the past must fall aside in the face 
of such a perspective. What is left is a sense that the past was formed 
not so much by those anonymous automatons that constituted past 
“cultures” but by individuals. We have known this for some time, elect-
ing to couch this realization in the term “agency” in order to maintain a 
safe distance from it (Dobres and Robb 2000; Dobres 2000; Pauketat 
2001). Coming back to seeking the “Indian behind the artifact,” in real-
ity rather than just symbolically, we find that our views about preserva-
tion and authenticity are based upon a concept of cultural difference 
that is bounded and that fails to admit difference on its own terms.
There is no real prescription for making either heritage or archaeol-
ogy value neutral, and such a project would eventually be destructive 
of the entire enterprise of understanding past cultures (see the chap-
ter by Colwell-Chanthaphonh, this volume). We cannot simply leave 
the question at that, however, because to do so would reinforce the 
kinds of categorizations that we have been so comfortable in making 
in the past. In Near Eastern archaeology in particular, we find it diffi-
cult to resist the typological temptation. The traditional “pottery read-
ing” that takes place at most sites in the Near East, ostensibly done in 
order to educate students, is really a performance intended to gratify 
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archaeologists. This is perhaps where the expression “non-diagnostic” 
entered our vocabulary as a substitute for “I don’t know.” This kind of 
thinking is not conducive to the conduct of real conversations with the 
people we work among.
Naturally, the resurgence of religious nationalism in the Middle East 
has further complicated all of these questions because of our propen-
sity to want to work at or near “sacred” sites. Jerusalem, which most 
of us know to be a frustrating and virtually impossible archaeological 
venue, still draws scores of volunteers to work on dull salvage digs in 
advance of construction projects. Notably, archaeologists of Muslim 
heritage favor survey work over excavation projects in places like Jeru-
salem while archaeologists of Jewish heritage want to dig up the city 
(Scham 2001). The religious nationalist constituencies of both support 
these views although the archaeologists themselves are not religious. 
Contested sites like Jerusalem engage their proponents in an essential 
war of wills over control and access to them and each side realizes that, 
ultimately, the fate of such places will be decided more by perseverance 
than by power (Scham 2003b).
While I was conducting a survey near a Chalcolithic (ca. 6500 bp) site 
in Jordan, a local man asked me, “What Arab peoples are you studying 
here?” He was with his young son and had asked the question presum-
ably for the child’s benefit. In response to his ready classification, which 
I didn’t like, I was on the verge of countering with my own when it 
occurred to me that, since I had only the most imprecise idea of what 
constituted an Arab past identity, I was not in a position to comment 
on the question. Such an identity could easily encompass any trace of 
past or present cultures found on Arab soil. Just as religious Jews view 
all skeletal remains found in the land of Israel from the Paleolithic era 
forward as Jewish it would not be unusual for a Muslim in Jordan, 
which this man seemed to be, to make the same case about archaeo-
logical remains there.
That this was in fact the beginning of a real conversation that I failed 
to pursue now occurs to me. As products of our education, we ar-
chaeologists strive for certainty in determining the categories to which 
our data belong and we don’t invite questions that take us outside 
of our study boundaries. As products of a discipline that incorpo-
rates theological foundations of the nineteenth century and philoso-
phy of the post-Enlightenment (Silberman 1998; Ostigard 2001), we 
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archaeologists working in the Near East in particular remain as con-
fused as anyone else about the ways in which religious and secular ide-
ology operate within our own culture and that of both the ancient and 
modern Middle East.
The Ancient Near East and the West: 
A Fallibilist Love Story 
Spurred by a national identity developing from a fragmented base, re-
quiring the desperate sacrifice of thousands and lasting, by some ac-
counts, over fifty years, the Risorgimento eventually resulted in the 
extrication of Italy from the twin grip of imperial Austria and the pa-
pacy. It is difficult not to see in this historical episode comparisons to 
the situation in the Middle East today even to the extent of finding 
modern echoes of the redoubtable Metternich, whose famous pro-
nouncements include “Error has never approached my spirit” and 
“Italy is only a geographical expression” (Reinerman 1971). Robert 
Browning was a cynical observer of the Italian resurgence as he was 
of most of the nationalist enterprises of his day (Poston 1973). He was 
not, like his wife Elizabeth Barrett Browning, an engaged and emo-
tional observer of the Italian revolution, even though he spent much of 
his adult life in Italy in self-imposed exile and many of his most famous 
monologues were composed there (Ryals 1996). His detachment and 
seeming alienation from his surroundings have caused some critics to 
accuse him of manifesting an “Italianism” in his perspectives on Italy 
that differs little, in their view, from Orientalism (Russo 1994). 
Browning’s natural candor and political skepticism distinguishes him 
from the more impetuous poets of a previous generation. As a willing 
exile, he stood, perhaps, as a force between the jingoistic imperialism 
of his age and the fraught foreign emotional attachments of the Ro-
mantic poets. Upon his return to England a few years after his wife of 
almost twenty years died, he wrote “Rabbi Ben Ezra.” Like many of his 
dramatic poems, this one reads like an internal cosmopolitan conversa-
tion between the poet and his protagonist:
For thence—a paradox,
Which comforts while it mocks—
Shall life succeed in that it seems to fail?
What I aspired to be,
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And was not, comforts me:
A brute I might have been,
but would not sink i’ the scale.
His conversations typically disclose without resolving and often pre-
sent startling revelations. “Rabbi Ben Ezra” is a would-be lament of the 
aging philosopher. A lesser poet might have written a litany of regrets 
in such a work for thoughts and feelings not acted upon. This poem 
rather presents the paradox that the protagonist’s failure to achieve his 
aspirations was, in fact, his salvation. To subordinate all emotion to 
reason, it suggests, is to not live life. To do the reverse is to submit to 
brutality.
A cosmopolitan understanding of conflict and its devastating effects 
necessitates a similar stand between the claims of reason and emotion 
(Appiah 2006a). To converse in an atmosphere of contention it is nec-
essary to approach the project with a belief in paradox. In a subse-
quent stanza of Browning’s poem, Rabbi Ben Ezra asks, “Was I, the 
world arraigned, were they, my soul disdained, Right?” An admission 
of uncertainty is not, as much of our Western education has taught 
us, a poor basis upon which to begin a discussion nor is it necessary 
to make each exchange a negotiation. This is rather the process of ac-
knowledging fallibilism (Appiah 2005: 188; 2006: 144)—the imperfec-
tions in knowledge that we have persisted in protecting and passing on 
to future generations. 
In a remarkably concise summation of all of the attendant prejudices 
that have accompanied the exploration of the ancient Near East, the 
archaeologist William Dever has said that the Bible is “not ‘history,’ but 
‘His’ story—the dramatic account of God’s miraculous dealings with a 
particular people designated to become his chosen” (Dever 1997: 20). 
Less traditional practitioners would be reluctant to buy into this par-
ticular view as the basis for the discipline but, even with its essentialist 
faults, today’s biblical and Near Eastern archaeologists still believe in 
“our” story. Our story is uniquely our own, distinct from other archae-
ologists’ stories and, more significantly, distinct from the stories of the 
people we encounter. It is the conversation we have with ourselves and 
it admits of no distractions or diversions.
Near Eastern archaeologists are fond of beginning our story with 
Nabonidus, the last Babylonian emperor, who supposedly conducted 
the first archaeological excavation (Bahn 1999: 1–2). Most of us see 
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symmetry in this, rather than the irony that it actually represents, rea-
soning that even if Nabonidus appeared inept, or worse, deranged, to 
his own countrymen, at least he had the redeeming trait of intellectual 
curiosity. Perhaps it is well that we begin with Nabonidus as he may 
have established a precedent for the ways in which we have regarded 
the contributions of Orientalists to our discipline. No better illustra-
tion can be found for this than the reverence that both specialists in 
the Bible and in the Near East have for Flinders Petrie, the pioneering 
excavator of sites in Egypt and the Levant during the early part of the 
twentieth century.
Archaeological raconteurs make much of the peculiar, if not apoc-
ryphal, stories of Petrie having climbed the Great Pyramid in a tutu as 
well as his having willed his head to University College London so that 
his estimable intellectual capabilities might one day be fully explored 
by scientists (http://www.pobonline.com). The leading textbook used 
for the teaching of biblical archaeology to undergraduates informs us 
that it was Petrie’s methodology for excavating tells and subsequent 
pottery typology that constituted “a major breakthrough” (Mazar 
2000: 7) for Near Eastern archaeology. General archaeological text-
books (Fagan 2005: 108; 2001: 236; Bahn 1999: 148–49; Price and Fein-
man 2001: 226) are no less laudatory concerning Petrie’s achievements 
with the exception of Wenke’s (1999: 469–470), which refers to Petrie’s 
“dynastic race” theories in a polite and noncommittal discussion of 
Afro-centric views on Egyptology.
While the standard narrative on Petrie’s contributions appear to 
suggest that, once again, an inquisitive spirit cancels out a seemingly 
harmless derangement, the correlation between Petrie’s classification 
theories and his overbearing racism are obvious to many in the field. 
University College London, perhaps feeling a particular sense of re-
sponsibility on this issue given its association with Petrie, has under-
taken to ameliorate this situation on its “digitalegypt” website, which 
tells us that, “[Petrie’s] classification rests on assumptions concerning 
the evolution of human societies over time. . . . Such assumptions may 
be symptomatic of the social Darwinism and associated racism of late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Western science” (http://www 
.digitalegypt.ucl.ac.uk).
The question of connections between “our story” as archaeologists 
and “the story” that now seems to be informing most of the developing 
views and policies on the Middle Eastern past can be understood more 
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easily by examining the rhetoric of all of these purveyors of the East in 
the West. The problem with dismissing such views as merely racist or 
colonialist returns us again to the old enemy of understanding—clas-
sification. On reading the letters of the early explorers of the Pales-
tine Exploration Fund (Moscrop 2000) and the pronouncements of 
Flinders Petrie (Drower 1996) it is impossible to imagine that even 
the most insensitive encounters between these individuals and the “na-
tives” whose aid they so attentively sought in their endeavors were bur-
dened with an ongoing racist rhetoric. The overt racism of Western 
archaeologists was more likely reserved for communications with their 
perceived peers. Mortimer Wheeler is, therefore, famously touted for 
both his good relations with his Indian co-workers and his blanket dis-
missals of the intellectual capabilities of his Indian students (Hawkes 
1982).
It is more likely that methodology was the ground upon which most 
of the clashes between East and West were fought. Any attempt to in-
troduce cosmopolitanism into archaeology will likely fail in the realm 
of practice as much post-processual theory has before. Positivism is a 
privileged form of communication, no less so in the social sciences, and 
science remains our model for all modes of discourse (Appiah 2005: 
57–58; 2006a: 13–15). No doubt our forbears in the field were posi-
tivists as well as racists—both of them traits that caused them to express 
frustration and hostility toward the slovenly habits of their workers.
If science and reason cannot be appealed to as a basis for achiev-
ing a cosmopolitan understanding of the Middle Eastern past, what 
is left? Though the danger of suggesting such a possibility is apparent, 
I believe that sentiment holds more promise. The emotional ties that 
early explorers and archaeologists genuinely seem to have felt toward 
the region are understandably dismissed by many of us as the “Law-
rence of Arabia” phenomenon—an anomalous product of imperialist 
intervention. Said, in his typically pragmatic way, views these ties as an 
idealization of the East based upon fantasies and miscalculations (Said 
1978). This is true to the extent that it describes the effects of such emo-
tions on the objectified “beloved Orient,” but the question of whether 
this emotion in any way transforms those who have it may be more 
complex than we have supposed.
William Foxwell Albright, the putative originator of biblical archae-
ology, wrote to his mother in 1921 that “there is not a spot in the whole 
world which suits me like Jerusalem, not only for its associations, but 
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also because of the opportunities for research at the fountain head, 
and because of the cultivated cosmopolitan atmosphere which I love” 
(Long 1996). This admiration of the East may be at the heart of the 
problem, but it might also prefigure the resolution. There is no doubt 
that Petrie, Wheeler, and Albright cherished deep feelings for the East. 
Emotion, particularly emotion that informs the entire adult life of an 
individual, is not something that I am wont to dismiss lightly. Cer-
tainly, it is not to be trusted and, in the case of the Middle East, it has 
seldom conveyed to the benefit of real people living there. Yet, it may 
contain within it an uncultivated seed of understanding for difference 
(Appiah 2005; Nussbaum 1994).
Conclusion
The depiction of the “cosmopolitan” past is an adjustment that has yet 
to be made. Perhaps we have never truly believed that there is a market 
for this version. Cosmopolitan archaeology is not heritage studies nor 
is it the public archaeology of preservation and protection that is the 
specialty of unesco and the World Monuments Fund. Archaeological 
projects designed to incorporate notions of true conversation will ad-
dress more than a concern with the examination and preservation of 
the site for future generations. Appiah points out that “there are two 
strands that intertwine in the notion of cosmopolitanism. One is the 
idea that we have obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we 
are related by the ties of kith and kin, or even the more formal ties of 
a shared citizenship. The other is that we take seriously the value, not 
just of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking 
an interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance” 
(2006a: 19).
Appiah begins Cosmopolitanism with the story of Richard Francis 
Burton, whom he views as both exemplary and anti-exemplary of the 
mode of thought he espouses in the book. Though he was not an ar-
chaeological explorer, Burton, nonetheless, is very much a part of the 
ancient Near Eastern story. His attempts to embed himself within the 
culture of the Middle East and his linguistic abilities are looked upon 
even today with both envy and outrage. Burton, so Appiah tells us, 
was the “least Victorian of men—and the most” (2006a: 7). Where 
one might consider that Browning’s detachment made him largely 
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non-participatory (and non-critical) in the grandiose political and cul-
tural program of the Victorian Age, we must place Burton squarely in 
the middle of it. By combining the passion of the dedicated Orientalist 
with a brutality of character that seemed preternaturally suited to the 
military, Burton represents the quintessence of the Western assault on 
the Middle East. We have newly assessed Burton as an arrogant ex-
propriator of culture but, in doing so, we still fail to acknowledge that 
his views remain entrenched in Near Eastern studies. What continues 
to bring archaeologists to the Middle East is that Burtonian sense of 
confronting an exotic culture that, nevertheless, belongs to us. In our 
acceptance of this we perpetuate and support the attempts of Western 
politicians and religious leaders to affix the region and its people to 
a moment in time when we believed ourselves to be in more control 
over them.
“Time’s wheel runs back or stops: Potter and clay endure,” as Brown-
ing, in the persona of an eleventh-century Jewish philosopher, admon-
ishes in order to convey to his audience the futility of the active but 
unexamined life, of the sort that Burton might be said to personify. 
Although the poem indicates that Browning also was an expropria-
tor of Middle Eastern culture, the poet never presents his vision as 
authentic nor does he purport to have translated the works of those 
in whose guise he speaks. Representing two aspects of a complex age, 
these Victorian cosmopolitans are as much the roots of our discipline 
as theology, ideology, and imperialism. We need not, however, con-
tinue to conduct our dialogue with the Middle East from either the 
alienated stance of a Browning or the involved but destructive stance 
of a Burton. The rules of engagement of Western scholars with the 
Middle Eastern past can still be rewritten.
Note
1  “President Thanks cia: Remarks by the President to Employees of the 
Central Intelligence Agency at cia Headquarters, Langley, Virginia,” White 
House Press Release, September 26, 2001.
Ian Hodder
8  i   mavili’s   voice
In this chapter the load that I wish to give to the term “cosmopolitan” 
is the complex blending of the global and the particular in ways that do 
not replicate Western perspectives and that do not construct the local 
as a product of the global. In the same way that Appiah (2006a: xiii) 
moves away from “globalization” and “multiculturalism,” both prob-
lematic terms that have become very extended in meaning, I wish to 
use the term “cosmopolitan” as part of an attempt to move away from 
global/local dichotomies. So in this chapter I will use the term to refer 
to the complex alliances that are set up between groups and individuals 
that crosscut the global, national, and local categories.
Several writers have discussed the principles, ethical and otherwise, 
on which cosmopolitan dialogue should be based. Appiah (2006a: 
78) talks of “taking an interest in” other peoples and places, even if 
agreement cannot be reached. Benhabib (2002) describes a deliberative 
democratic process. Both Appiah and Benhabib, in different ways, are 
concerned with individual rights. Both therefore minimize the rights 
of individuals with respect to their membership of cultural groups. Ap-
piah (2006a: 131) argues that “the mere fact that something you own 
is important to the descendants of people who gave it away does not 
generally give them an entitlement to it.”
Benhabib (2002: 33) rightly makes the point that cultures are fluid 
and constructed. She notes that most people today “are members of 
more than one community, one linguistic group, one ethnos.” She thus 
promotes perspectives on public policy regarding cultural preservation 
that empower “the members of cultural groups to appropriate, enrich, 
and even subvert the terms of their own cultures as they may decide” 
(2002: 66). She prefers a deliberative democratic process based on re-
spect and egalitarian reciprocity (2002: 37), but she admits that her 
approach does not address the cultural heritages of indigenous peoples 
(2002: 185). These groups often cling to their cultural identities in the 
face of long histories of exploitation, conquest, policing, and subjuga-
tion. For such groups, an open dialogue and an egalitarian reciprocity 
that do not acknowledge preferential restitution seem inadequate and 
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disempowering. Respect for pluralism and diversity seems inadequate 
as the sole basis for ensuring group rights.
In contrast to these perspectives, the processes that led to nagpra 
in the United States, to the Burra Charter in Australia, and to the code 
of ethics of the World Archaeological Congress firmly link indigenous 
rights to the recognition of cultural affiliation. Certainly in some in-
stances cultural affiliation is the basis for claims of recognition and 
restitution. I agree that international human rights issues should not 
assume a Western tone, and in particular we should not assume a priori 
that individual rights should trump group rights. Group rights are key 
in heritage contexts and in claims to restitution by historically savaged 
groups.
But the problem with both nagpra and with writers such as Ap-
piah and Benhabib is that they assume a priori positions about whether 
rights to cultural heritage are primary. In practice, in different contexts, 
sometimes cultural heritage rights are the basis for claims to other 
rights (recognition, economic welfare, freedom of expression, and 
so forth), while in other contexts, cultural categorization may in fact 
subvert or deny individual rights (when, for example, cultural groups 
exclude those who claim membership).
It seems important, therefore, to recognize that in a cosmopolitan 
world of complex and shifting alliances, cultural heritage claims should 
be linked strategically to the specifics of the cosmopolitan mix. While 
accepting and championing group rights we should not also deny in-
dividual rights. Rather than imposing overall strictures (group or indi-
vidual rights, for example) we should trust to a process of deliberation 
and negotiation. There seems wide recognition that claims to heritage 
should as far as possible be resolved through processes of dialogue, 
respect, recognition, and restitution in an open democratic process. 
Rather than starting these processes on the basis of a priori strictures 
about whether human and cultural heritage rights should be based on 
the individual or the group, we should focus on dealing with the con-
ditions that make a democratic dialogue possible. In such a process, I 
argue, it will often be necessary to empower local groups or individual 
voices through complex cosmopolitan alliances that cut across indi-
vidual, local group, regional and national group, and global scales. In 
this chapter I wish to explore some examples that purport to show how 
individual and local group rights can be enhanced through complex 
cosmopolitan interactions, alliances, and dialogues.
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The Right to One’s Past? Introducing Three Examples 
from the Cultural Heritage of Turkey
During the summer of 2006, an exhibit about Çatalhöyük, a Neolithic 
site in central Turkey, was opened in Istanbul. It lasted for four months 
and was funded by the major Turkish bank Yapı Kredi. Held in the 
Yapı Kredi Gallery on one of the busiest streets in Istanbul—Istiklal 
Caddesi—the exhibit was prepared and mounted by a culture and arts 
section within Yapı Kredi, in close liaison with the public relations de-
partment of the bank.
The Çatalhöyük Research Project, which I direct, is multinational, 
involving teams from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Po-
land, as well as three teams from Turkey (Hodder 2000). The project 
was closely involved in the planning and implementation of the ex-
hibit, and some of the video material developed by the project was cho-
sen for use in the exhibit, including a video used in the on-site visitor 
center where people are introduced to the site. Since the project aims 
to have close links with the local communities close to the site, Mavili 
Tokyağsun, a woman from the local village,  provided the voice for the 
Turkish version of the video. Mavili has worked for the project in the 
dig house, in the kitchen, and in some collaborative research. She has 
two children and has been divorced, about which there is some stigma 
in the village, but she is now remarried. The video using her voice is 
played daily to visitors to the site, most of whom are Turkish speakers, 
and it has been received very well.
A few days before the exhibit opened I was told that the public rela-
tions department at the bank had decided to replace Mavili’s voice on 
the version of the video to be used in the exhibit in Istanbul. It was 
explained to me that her accent made understanding her words dif-
ficult, although we had not encountered this problem at the site. The 
new voice-over was made by someone from Istanbul. Despite protes-
tations from me about how this erasing of Mavili’s voice would harm 
our relationships with the village and would set back our attempts to 
build close ties and “ownership” of the site in the village, the exhibit 
went ahead with a nonlocal voice on the introductory video. While I 
was initially assured that there would be a section in the exhibit that 
described the involvement of the local community in the project, this 
too disappeared in the final version of the exhibit displays.
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In this case a regional dialect and a local contribution were silenced. 
It would be possible to read the reaction of the educated Istanbul Turks 
as being about class. Indeed, there may have been some snobbery about 
lower-class uneducated provincials in the decision to remove Mavili’s 
voice. But if there were any reasons beyond the desire to have the words 
easily understandable, a wider context is provided by the debate within 
Turkey between secularists and Islamists. In 1928, five years after the 
founding of the Turkish republic, a clause retaining Islam as the state 
religion was removed from the constitution. Secularism was a central 
strut of the republicanism envisaged by Kemal Atatürk, the founder of 
modern Turkey. Mavili’s voice came from the Konya region, that part 
of the country associated most clearly with a newly powerful Islamist 
perspective in Turkey, one feared by the urban elites that had benefited 
the most from the Kemalist position, which had been dominant since 
the early days of the republic.
The long interaction between secularists and Islamists in Turkey and 
the social context of the debate have been chronicled by many authors 
(Abu-Rabi 2006; Zubaida 1996). The Islamist movement emerged 
soon after the founding of the secular republic in 1923 (Narli 1999). It 
failed to gain wide support in the 1920s to the 1940s. From the 1950s 
onward, there was a major expansion of  Turkey’s modernization. Many 
felt excluded from the new wealth and higher levels of education, and 
it was particularly in the provincial areas and among upwardly mobile 
classes that the environment was created for the growth of Islamic par-
ties. Islamist groups provided social welfare for the new aspiring uni-
versity students, professionals, shopkeepers, merchants, or workers. 
Financial assistance was provided by a newly formed Islamist business 
elite. The newly educated and financed groups moved increasingly into 
urban contexts, including Ankara and Istanbul.
Narli (1999) argues that several types of relationships were embroiled 
in the Islamist-secularist conflict: center-periphery, class, regional cleav-
ages, and sectarian antagonism (such as Sunnis versus Alevis). Thus, 
through time, a series of socioeconomic and regional groups in the pe-
riphery have backed a succession of Islamist parties in order to voice 
their grievances: the National Order, National Salvation, Welfare, and 
Virtue parties. More recent pro-Islamist parties include Saadet or Hap-
piness Party and the present governing AK (Justice and Development) 
Party. The current AK Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is a complex 
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and ever shifting attempt to attract support from across the divide. 
While undoubtedly rooted in the Turkish Islamist tradition, it has 
sought to pursue Turkey’s membership in the Europe Union and sup-
ports some liberal reforms (for example, in 2004 the state-run tv broad-
cast the first Kurdish-language program). Konya, one of the heartlands 
of its provincial success, is a complex mix of restraints on alcohol but 
burgeoning capitalist and internationalist economic programs.
Thus, there is a lot going on when the urban elites in Istanbul say 
that it is inappropriate to air Mavili’s voice in the exhibit in Istiklal 
Caddesi. At one level, there may be simply a desire to make the words 
easily understandable. But at other levels, the use of a local Konya voice 
is tied up in the debates within Turkey that deal with tensions between 
urban and provincial, upper and lower classes, old and new money, 
center and periphery, secularists and Islamists, West and East.
My second example also refers to the secularist-Islamist tensions in 
Turkey, though more directly. In the summer of 2007, the Çatalhöyük 
project received the results of some radiocarbon determinations on 
human bone that had been excavated from graves across the site. We 
had thought the graves were late Byzantine in date, but the radiocar-
bon results in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries ad suggested that 
the burials could, after all, be early Islamic. Team members identified 
parallels in the grave construction techniques and in the layout of the 
skeletons that confirmed an Islamic attribution. During the Selcuk pe-
riod in the Konya region there was a very mixed multiculturalism, and 
many religious affiliations, but it seemed clear that around sixty-four 
of the graves that we had excavated over the previous fifteen years at 
Çatalhöyük were in fact Islamic.
We immediately consulted with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
and with local officials such as the regional governor or kaymakam. We 
also had meetings with the village head or muhtar. As a result of these 
and broader discussions in the community and among project mem-
bers, it was decided to rebury the skeletons in a designated part of the 
local village cemetery. The requisite letters for permission were written 
to the local, regional, and national authorities, including the village 
imams. As well as the request to rebury, the letters stated that the proj-
ect would try to avoid uncovering Islamic burials wherever possible 
in future excavation strategy. The letters also asked for permission to 
study the skeletal remains of any Islamic burials that were uncovered 
before the remains were reburied.
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Again, there is a lot going on in these consultations and discussions. 
The events took place in the run-up to the national elections in Tur-
key on July 22, 2007. These elections were dominated by the debates 
between secularists and Islamists in Turkey. The reburial issue at the 
site played out these larger issues in microcosm. Many of the Turks 
consulted felt that the bones should be reburied in the village cemetery. 
This was the immediate and clear view of the village muhtar and elders, 
and of the local community. But many on the project felt it was wrong 
to accede to the interests of the local community. It was felt that such a 
move would play into the hands of the Islamists.
My third example derives from the fact that the Çatalhöyük project 
is now a close institutional partner of Selcuk University in Konya, in 
central Turkey. Konya is one of the largest cities in Turkey and is usu-
ally seen as very traditional. Its university has over eighty thousand 
students. Within the highly centralized education system in Turkey, the 
administration of the university follows the Kemalist and government 
policy that none of its students should wear the “turban” head scarf, 
worn to fit closely over the hair and forehead, on campus. This pol-
icy is particularly stark in the Konya region, where religious strictures 
are followed in many areas of life (for example, alcohol is not avail-
able in most restaurants). The female students from Selcuk University 
who participate in the Çatalhöyük project are not allowed to wear the 
turban, even though most female visitors to the site, including their 
friends and families, are covered. The project is thus complicit in the 
ban on an expression of religious diversity.
Should the project allow the students from Selcuk to wear the tur-
ban? In practice local and national state officials turn a blind eye to 
the fact that the local female workers on the project do wear turbans. 
The turban is even worn in local government offices in the Çatalhöyük 
area. But what should the project do about the students from Selcuk 
University? The wider debate about wearing the turban in Turkey 
(Kilicbay and Binark 2002) should not be seen simply as an example of 
the divide between secularists and Islamists. There are many religious, 
political, social, and personal layers of meaning that are involved and 
a great diversity of perspectives and opinions (Göçek 1999). The es-
tablished meanings of veiling include adherence to the Islamic notion 
of concealing the female body from the male gaze, and the veil as a 
sign of “political Islam.” But today the articulation of Islamic faith 
into consumption culture has opened up a greater diversity of shifting 
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meanings. While many in Turkey today see the turban as Islamist, anti-
secular, and political, for many others wearing the turban is about per-
sonal choice and individual rights in a global consumer market.
Atatürk banned religious dress in public places and argued against 
veiling women, but it was left to a government in 1979 to make wear-
ing the turban illegal. For many women, the injunction against wear-
ing the turban or head scarf in universities, government offices, and 
many professions is against their values, against human rights, and an 
insult. For others, wearing the turban is a threat to secularism and free-
dom of thought and expression. In rural Konya, women may have little 
choice but to wear the turban if they are to remain within village so-
ciety and culture. And yet a young woman from the village who has 
started working on the project and who wishes to go to university and 
become an athlete is uncovered, unlike her age-mates. Should the proj-
ect actively encourage such employees, in line with university and gov-
ernment policy? Or, in its links with Selcuk University, does the project 
undermine the rights of those who wish to wear the turban, and in so 
doing does it restrain a multicultural heritage?
Global Heritage and Multiculturalism
Most discourse on heritage deriving from the United States, and in-
creasingly from the United Kingdom, takes for granted the rights of 
indigenous groups to have a say in controlling their own past, even if 
that means that those groups rebury their heritage or secrete it away 
in traditional locales (e.g., Swidler et al. 1997). “We,” as archaeologists 
and heritage managers in Western developed countries have come to 
celebrate identity difference and cultural diversity in relation to heri-
tage. There has been a massive increase in international charters for the 
management of archaeological sites over recent decades, and many of 
these have turned their attention to the processes of collaboration with 
local communities around sites and monuments. For example, in 1987, 
the General Assembly of icomos adopted the Charter for the Conser-
vation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas, which includes guidelines 
for the participation of residents. The Charter for Sustainable Tour-
ism that emerged from the World Conference on Sustainable Tourism 
in 1995 stated that tourism must be “ethically and socially equitable 
for local communities.” The Australian chapter of icomos (the Inter-
national Council on Monuments and Sites) has produced the Burra 
mavili’s voice  191
Charter, which moves away from defining sites and monuments in 
objectivist terms and toward the description of cultural landscapes as 
understood and perceived by indigenous peoples (Australia icomos 
1981). The Corinth Workshop on Archaeological Site Management in 
May 2000, organized by the Getty Conservation Institute, refers to the 
importance of collaboration with local community members. Indeed, 
the Getty Conservation Institute has modified and developed the plan-
ning framework outlined in the Burra Charter (Avrami et al. 2000; see 
also de la Torre 1997). Specific examples of collaborative work include 
that at the Nevada test site (Stoffle et al. 2001) and at the Barunga rock 
art site in Australia (Smith et al. 1995; see also Smith and Ward 2000). 
The Code of Ethics of the World Archaeological Congress (wac) seeks 
to ensure the primacy of indigenous perspectives in relation to ethical 
principles.
At times this type of focus on heritage rights suggests a multicultural-
ism in which a diversity of perspectives is celebrated and in which mul-
tiple stakeholders are identified as having a voice around the heritage 
management table. Much heritage management embraces this focus on 
multiple voices around the table. But many of the authors in this vol-
ume would decry this position as politically weak, and would in fact 
join the larger critique of multiculturalism and pluralism as a whole. 
The critique aims to replace multiculturalism with a more grounded 
concern with diversity and with historical inequalities and exploitation. 
In many contexts it argues that those who have suffered the most should 
gain the most at the heritage stakeholder table (Meskell and Pels 2005). 
It argues that complex alliances other than those centered on the West 
can be formed in the protection of individual and local heritage rights. 
Rather than a global approach centered in the West we can identify 
complex decentered global and local heritage alliances and “multiple 
cosmopolitanisms partly rooted in local cultures, partly positioned in 
global networks” (Anderson 1998: 273; see also Appiah 2006a).
This focus on cosmopolitan heritage rights reacts against the general 
assumption made worldwide that cultural heritage is the property of 
the nation-state. The rise of archaeology, antiquities management, and 
museums is closely tied to the rise of the nation-state (Kohl and Fawcett 
1995), and the ultimate rights of the nation-state in relation to heritage 
are enshrined in unesco’s documents regarding World Heritage Sites. 
It should be noted, however, that the protection of Native American 
rights under nagpra was obtained through state intervention and the 
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provision of a legal apparatus by central government (Watkins 2000). 
Within the nation-state it seems that a focus on multiculturalism and 
diversity does not of itself produce the protection of heritage rights. 
Rather, public coalitions and activism allied with state intervention are 
at times needed to create and enforce individual and local rights of 
cultural difference.
The sovereignty of the nation-state in its relation to heritage is being 
eroded by perspectives that would enforce some form of “universal” 
access over and above diverse and minority interests. In the developed 
world this view is associated with the several unesco charters that re-
fer to the universal outstanding value of World Heritage Sites and that 
see a value of heritage sites and antiquities for all humanity (Cleere 
1989). Such global prescriptions are typically the result of a Western 
sensitivity (Byrne 1991). A universalist position is also associated with 
the scientific claim for unrestricted access to knowledge. Thus many 
archaeologists and biological anthropologists in the United States and 
Europe argue that human remains should be available for all to study, 
and not reburied (for an insight into the debate, see Kane 2003; Zim-
merman 1989). A universalist position is also argued by those that seek 
a deregulated trade in licit antiquities (Merryman 2005).
International agencies, from unesco to ngos such as the Global 
Heritage Fund, increasingly work with, between, and across national 
governments in their desire to protect sites, develop tourism through 
heritage, build museums, and restore the monuments of displaced peo-
ples. Their international and global character is often accompanied by a 
Western perspective (see the chapter by Lydon, this volume). Cosmo-
politan alliances of local groups and national and international agencies 
can work to further the interests of minority groups and revive local 
economies. “What the new archives, geographies, and practices of dif-
ferent historical cosmopolitanisms might reveal is precisely a cultural 
illogic for modernity that makes perfectly good nonmodern sense. 
They might help us see that cosmopolitanism is not a circle created by 
culture diffused from a center, but instead, that centers are everywhere 
and circumferences nowhere. This ultimately suggests that we already 
are and have always been cosmopolitan, though we may not always 
have known it” (Breckenridge et al. 2002: 12). These cosmopolitan al-
liances are not just decentered open networks. In order effectively to 
champion and protect individual and local rights, there is the need to 
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create partnerships that are practical and effective. When decisions are 
made about competing claims, and when the historical rights of in-
digenous groups are decided upon, there is a need to move beyond an 
ethical multiculturalism and embrace a grounded cosmopolitanism.
It could be argued that “we were there first” or “we were always 
there” are the arguments that should underpin all heritage rights issues. 
According to this view, archaeology and cultural heritage should be 
used in origins debates to demonstrate the rights of displaced minori-
ties and indigenous groups. But archaeologists have long been critical 
of origins debates (e.g., Conkey with Williams 1991), and given the lack 
of congruence between material culture, language, genes, and aspects of 
identity it is difficult for archaeologists to adjudicate on questions of 
origins. Origins debates have typically led to claim and counterclaim in 
an escalating cycle that can lead to extreme conflict. Most local groups 
are mixed, and they are as capable as national and colonial states, or 
as any group of people, of mistreatment of those around and within 
them.
The notion that contemporary identities are complex, fluid, and hy-
brid threatens the ability of local and displaced groups to make claims 
asserting rights. In many instances national or international bodies 
need to be involved in dealing with cultural heritage and cultural dif-
ference in order to protect the rights of others. A focus on open and 
unfettered dialogue around the heritage management table, whether 
the dialogue be local, regional, national, or international, or some 
complex mixture, does not of itself protect individual or local heritage 
rights. “A metropolitan cultural politics that espouses a hands off ap-
proach to a museumized cultural other leaves the neocolonial staging 
of that other—fundamentalism, ethnicism, patriarchal nationalism—
untouched” (Cheah 1998: 290). At the level of the nation state, de-
regulation does not seem to guarantee basic rights to heritage. At the 
international level too, neither open access nor universalist strictures 
can protect individual, indigenous, or local rights to heritage in and of 
themselves.
I would like now to return to the three cases in Turkey with which 
I began to explore them more closely in relation to this general discus-
sion. Can we see here evidence of what is needed to guarantee individual 
and local rights to heritage? Are there dangers in an open deregulated 
negotiation of rights?
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Returning to the Three Cases in Turkey
In the case of whether Mavili’s voice should be retained on the video in 
Istanbul, multiculturalist intellectuals in elite academic circles in Istan-
bul argued that the project should support the retention of her voice 
and should resist the attempts by a large private bank to silence the 
local contribution to the exhibit.
In Mavili’s local village, Küçükköy, about one kilometer from Çat-
alhöyük, the villagers are suffering as a result of changes in agricul-
tural policy, which are themselves part of the attempt by Turkey to gain 
membership in the European Union and to comply with the eu’s ag-
ricultural policies. Some government subsidies have been withdrawn. 
Life in the village is also hard because large state irrigation schemes 
have made it difficult for villagers to get access to water for their homes 
and fields. Mavili’s particular life is difficult in a traditional society that 
limits the roles of women. In such a context of long-term marginaliza-
tion of women I have thought it right that the project insists on em-
ploying and paying women (initially against the wishes of some elders 
in the village). The project has also attempted to contribute to local 
economic growth, through attracting tourists to the site and through 
providing direct employment.
In this case it seemed correct to argue against the silencing of the 
local voice, but it is important to point out that here “the local” is thor-
oughly divided between an Islamist perspective and those parts of the 
village that seek change and greater choice. As we have seen, the na-
tion of Turkey too is divided between those who wish a greater Islamic 
presence in public life and those (such as in the judiciary) who adhere 
to a strong secular agenda and a Kemalist perspective. There are also 
intellectual elites calling for a form of multiculturalism and a degree of 
toleration of religious and cultural difference in public life.
So it is not a matter of supporting the local against the national or 
global. The situation is too complex and multi-stranded for that. The 
situation may quickly change, but at this particular historical moment 
the project’s support of those in the village such as Mavili, and the 
attempt to empower the villagers through identification with “their 
own” cultural heritage, with employment, and with a voice in exhibits, 
offers a concrete opportunity, in a real sense, to transcend the situa-
tion in which they find themselves. The project has been involved in 
educational schemes in the villages, and has supported the quest by the 
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villagers and local town to change their names to Çatalhöyük. It has 
provided space in the visitor center for exhibits by the local community 
and has involved them in the interpretation and publication of the site. 
The villagers are by no means passive in this process, but it has to be 
recognized that the whole project of local engagement is born out of 
an interventionist agenda. The international archaeological project has 
embedded itself close to the village, with international funding and 
with the support of the Turkish state. There is an undoubted paternal-
ist intervention in the attempts made to educate and involve and en-
gage the local community in the cultural heritage schemes. As already 
noted, the villagers are not passive in this process, but as well mean-
ing as the attempts at engagement are, this multiculturalism has been 
partly promoted by global and national processes.
As a result of James Mellaart’s excavations in the 1960s (Mellaart 
1967), for both the nation and the world Çatalhöyük means something. 
Initially it meant very little to the local community. Today the village 
and the local town vie with each other to take on the name of Çatal-
höyük. That Mavili’s voice has the potential to be heard is the result 
of the intersection of local, national, and global interests in many di-
mensions. The local senses of cultural heritage and identity have here 
been constructed through interventionist policies. Neoliberal market 
economies have played their role. It is through them that the bank is 
able to achieve economic gain through marketing sponsorship and its 
exhibit. It is through private and corporate sponsorship that the proj-
ect can function. But Mavili’s voice is weakly heard. It is all too easily 
quashed, as this example shows. Any hope of freedom or equality for 
Mavili and other villagers through heritage depends on a cosmopolitan 
fraternity—her voice in relation to “her” heritage depends on being 
promoted and pursued by international bodies and by national inter-
ests over the long term.
In fact few such interests exist to assist Mavili. There is no require-
ment by most of the numerous institutional funders and sponsors of 
Çatalhöyük for support of Mavili and other educational and empow-
erment programs. It still seems to me remarkable and unethical that 
bodies such as the National Science Foundation in the United States 
do not make consideration of local impact a requirement for funding. 
There are shifts occurring. For example, the project has been able to ap-
ply to the U.S. State Department’s Ambassadors Fund and to the Brit-
ish Academy (British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara) for outreach 
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funding. But many governmental, research, and scientific foundations 
remain uninterested in outreach issues. Most funds for such activities at 
Çatalhöyük have come from ngos and private and corporate sponsors 
wishing to make charitable donations. We have wonderful educational 
programs funded by Shell, Thames Water, Boeing, and Yapı Kredi. But 
we have seen how these interests may by themselves allow the erasure 
of regional, local, and minority interests. Neoliberal economics may 
provide a mechanism for Mavili’s voice to be heard, but some regu-
lation and intervention by the state or by global communities acting 
through or across the state seem also to be needed.
I wish to add a further example with a superficially different outcome. 
This is the case of Sadrettin’s voice. Sadrettin also lives in Küçükköy. 
He left school at the age of twelve and after a series of jobs became one 
of the guards at Çatalhöyük during the early years of the project in the 
1990s. Since as a guard his job was also to show people around the site, 
I and others on the project taught him as much as we could about the 
site and about the Neolithic in the region. One day he announced that 
he wanted to write a book about the site and the project. Because I had 
seen so many pictures of the huge “local workforces” that had exca-
vated the great archaeological sites in the Middle East and elsewhere in 
the world, and yet had never read a word written by these people who 
made archaeology possible, it seemed to me important to encourage 
and help him in his venture. Members of the project helped him in the 
translation and editing of his text (translated by Duygu Camurcuoğlu 
Cleere), and finally the book was published in English by Left Coast 
Press in the United States, thanks to the vision and support of Mitch 
Allen (Dural 2007). It talks of his social encounters, his economic deals, 
his memories of his childhood, and of his response to the archaeolo-
gists. “Once tourists came here and asked me what I thought about 
foreigners and Turks working together, and in the past I felt that they 
would not be able to work together. But now I do not feel it matters 
who does the digging” (Dural 2007: 145–46).
Sadrettin’s book is not a success story. It does not chart the success-
ful education and empowerment of one of those many who have for 
so long been overlooked at the edges, but are actually at the center, of 
archaeology. His story is tragic and unending. “I realize how tired I am. 
The tiredness has nothing to do with writing this book, but with see-
ing my life not going the way I wanted” (Dural 2007: 130). But those 
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reading his book can hardly fail to be moved by Sadrettin’s point of 
view, and archaeologists can hardly avoid the implications of his words 
and his plight, hardly remain unimpressed by the silences that we have 
created round him. There is much to learn from his book about how 
Çatalhöyük might be managed and interpreted, and about how archae-
ologists might work with local communities.
In an interview with Sadrettin published at the end of the book, I 
asked him several times how and why he felt empowered to write a 
book. I asked him why he, rather than any one of the countless number 
of site workers and guards who had remained silent on archaeologi-
cal sites, should feel able to write, and why he thought anyone would 
listen. What made him feel able to write and interpret in the face of 
so much specialism and high-level science? Given all that, and all the 
teaching he had been given, did he think he could have an independent 
voice? His answer was clear. “It is possible for me to have opinions 
independently from what I learned from the archaeologists. I still pro-
duce ideas” (Dural 2007: 147). But yet his book is a very cosmopolitan 
hybrid, infused with the education he has been given and made pos-
sible by a postcolonial sensitivity to difference and otherness that is 
more at home in a Californian publisher’s office than it is in central 
Turkey. For Sadrettin himself, as he makes clear in his book, his story 
is a sad one that has not ended well. His time as a guard at Çatalhöyük 
and in writing the book has not produced the life that he would have 
liked. He has been able to “write back,” but this privilege has been 
hard won and it has not benefited him materially or in his life’s dreams. 
Multiculturalism and diversity, even economic empowerment through 
cosmopolitan alliances, have not made life better for Sadrettin. There 
are many reasons for this, but at least part of the answer is that “finding 
a voice” does not necessarily lead to real and sustained partnerships, 
with economic and social benefit. In the West we may be fascinated by 
otherness, but it is difficult to turn such “play” into long-term change 
(see also the chapter by González-Ruibal, this volume).
A similar conclusion about multiculturalism and cosmopolitan al-
liances can be made in relation to the issue of the reburial of Islamic 
remains from Çatalhöyük in the village cemetery. Many of the local 
government officials accepted the view that the remains should be re-
buried. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, the Konya region is gener-
ally seen as a center for Islamist perspectives. The wealth in the region 
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is new, and it is built from small, medium, and large businesses. The 
region is seen as a strong base of support for the ak Party and Tayyip 
Erdoğan.
Several members of the project, especially the more educated Turks 
from Istanbul, argued against the reburial. For them, to rebury the 
remains was to play into the hands of the Islamists. A secularist posi-
tion for them involved treating the remains as scientific instruments 
of study. The skeletons should be kept in the laboratory for long-term 
analysis, for future generations of researchers. After all, they argued, 
if the Islamic skeletons were reburied, surely we should rebury all the 
Byzantine burials in a Christian cemetery, and so on. Maybe it was even 
wrong to excavate the Neolithic burials at Çatalhöyük.
There were other cross-cutting concerns. It seemed that on many 
sites in Turkey and the Middle East, scant attention had at times been 
paid to later burials. Some authorities raised the specter of possible 
“chaos” if the Çatalhöyük project raised awareness of this issue. Per-
haps excavation on many sites would become difficult. It was agreed 
that in any reburial ceremony in Küçükköy the press coverage should 
be kept at a minimum.
Indeed, the debate about the Çatalhöyük skeletal remains, while ap-
parently local, regional, and national, also seemed inflected by a wider, 
more global set of concerns. Most of the foreign members of the 
project were of the clear view that the bones should be reburied. This 
view was informed by the way that even early Christian burials have 
to be treated in Britain (informing the police and reburial in sanctified 
ground). But it was also very much inflected by the reburial debate in 
the United States and Australia (for example), where it has come to be 
accepted that the remains of indigenous people should be returned by 
museums to affiliated groups for appropriate burial.
In fact it was the project itself that raised the issue of the Islamic 
burials on the site and put forward the solution of reburial. The ini-
tial sensitivities derived from a global and postcolonial experience. 
Certainly the issue then became taken up within the domains of local, 
regional, and national politics, but the desire and decision to rebury 
were inflected by complex and very cosmopolitan intersections. At the 
core of these concerns were the villagers who felt most closely affiliated 
with the remains. In fact, in discussions with the villagers they imme-
diately referred to the belief that present-day Küçükköy had migrated 
from an earlier village located immediately by Çatalhöyük. Indeed, 
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they argued that the skeletons recovered were perhaps the remains of 
those who had lived in the old village and who had used the mound 
as a graveyard. This local concern resonated with national politics and 
the debate between secularists and Islamists, but it also resonated with 
global sensitivities about indigenous rights and the reburial of ancestral 
remains. In this strange cosmopolitan mix of alliances, the small local 
voice was made louder, and was heard, because of its intersection with 
larger scales of influence.
But the foreign members of the project remained slightly surprised 
and disappointed at the relative lack of interest shown by the various 
Turkish groups—local, regional, and national—in the whole topic. 
It did not seem to be a major area of concern after all. A global dis-
course about reburial and indigenous rights just did not seem to have 
the same impact in this context where the term “indigenous” has little 
clear meaning. So here a global discourse of rights meets a set of lo-
cal concerns (about secularism and Islam) that resonate with but do 
not duplicate the international perspective. The different perspectives 
make use of each other, but they do not coincide. The end result is a 
cosmopolitan mélange that has little ability to transform lives.
In the third case, it would perhaps be thought ethical for the Çatal-
höyük project to refuse to collaborate with a university that does not 
allow its female students to wear the turban. After all, the project does 
not seek to ban the many women wearing the turban who visit and 
work at the site. The decision to collaborate with the university is not 
here a matter of supporting the local against the global. The predomi-
nant local practice is for the turban to be worn. Rather, the project 
has to position itself in relation to the larger debate within Turkey as a 
whole regarding the secular state established by Kemal Atatürk.
As an example of this debate and how it impinges on archaeology, 
the Turkish Daily News for October 20, 2006, described the plight of a 
ninety-two-year-old Turkish archaeologist who was to go on trial for 
inciting religious hatred. She had written a paper saying that the use of 
head scarves by women dated back to pre-Islamic sexual rites. Muazzez 
Ilmiye Çig is a specialist in the Sumerians and she argued that head 
scarves had been worn by Sumerian priestesses initiating young people 
into sex, although they did not prostitute themselves. The prosecutor 
charged both her and her publisher with “inciting hatred based on re-
ligious differences.” Çig’s aim was to argue against the wearing of head 
scarves, at least in the arena of the state.
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The high-level administration at Selcuk University is very liberal. 
One of the vice rectors plays Van Morrison and Pink Floyd as we drive 
around in his chauffeur-driven bmw. The administration believes 
strongly in using international collaboration as a mechanism for rais-
ing standards. The rectors are receptive to Western ideals and values. 
Yet the administration’s leaders argue forcefully for the need to ban 
the turban, which is seen as a threat to the secular world they have in-
herited and wish to reproduce. They fear Islamic fundamentalism and 
they decry as naïve the Istanbul multiculturalist intellectuals who think 
that loosening the secular ideal does not lead to a full move to Sharia 
law.
In America and Britain there is much acceptance of a multiculturalist 
agenda and thus much criticism of the decision by the French govern-
ment to ban the head scarf in its schools. But in the Konya region it is 
understandable that the state, in however paternalistic a way, protects 
the common good of access to knowledge. The implications of a shift 
to fundamentalist religious teaching in the Konya region are clear. The 
Çatalhöyük project was the lead partner in a temper Project funded 
by the European Union that developed heritage educational schemes 
for primary and middle schools in Turkey. In preparing and produc-
ing educational books about prehistory for local schools in the Konya 
region, members of the project were told that the teachers would not 
use the books if they told of evolution rather than following the Ko-
ran. Some archaeology students from Selcuk University working on 
the Çatalhöyük project have said they were surprised to be told about 
prehistory. There is a real fear, then, that some versions of a religious 
fundamentalist agenda would restrict access to knowledge about pre-
history and might restrict the rights of people to engage in the distant 
human past. In the Konya region the common good is served by un-
derstanding and respecting the decisions by the Selcuk University rec-
tors to ban the turban. It seems that in this specific context, openness, 
transparency, and multiple engagement are best achieved by taking a 
restrictive, statist, course. It remains possible, at the same time how-
ever, to argue against the terms of the opposition between secularists 
and Islamists. It remains possible to argue that wearing the turban 
might not, of itself, imply a wholesale adoption of religious beliefs in 
all areas of life. One might wear the turban and also teach or be taught 
evolution.
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Conclusions
In 2006 Elif Shafak went on trial in Turkey, having been accused of af-
fronting Turkishness in her novel The Bastard of Istanbul. In the novel 
there is a description of the mass deaths of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 
as genocide. Her trial recalls the attempt by the nationalist lawyer Ke-
mal Kerinçsiz to prosecute Orhan Pamuk. In 2005 Turkish state pros-
ecutors dropped the charge that the Nobel Prize-winning author had 
“insulted Turkishness” by referring to the mass killings of Kurds and 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Authors such as Elif Shafak refuse 
to accept that one has to be either a Muslim fundamentalist or a secular 
European. As she says, “My ideal is cosmopolitanism, refusing to be-
long to either side in this polarized world. Ambiguity, synthesis: these 
are the things that compose Turkish society, and that is not something 
to be ashamed of ” (interview with the Guardian, September 21, 2006). 
As discussed earlier, the rights of groups in relation to heritage cannot 
be based on fixed categories and boundaries.
The various forms of multiculturalism that have increasingly held 
sway in discussions about heritage rights seem closely linked to an 
agenda that minimizes state and international regulation and interven-
tion. There are those on “the left” in global cultural heritage in the Anglo- 
American world who would go so far as to argue that local customs 
should always be accepted and not interfered with, however repugnant 
they might seem to outsiders. This view seems to me an abrogation of our 
responsibilities to each other—of fraternity. There are many problems 
with this liberal view, not least of which is the point that cultural differ-
ence is always generated within global interactions and dependencies. 
Like it or not we are co-dependent at the global scale, and our “local-
ness” is produced in relation to and within global processes. It seems 
difficult to stand by and watch injustice under the banner of “respecting 
cultural difference,” if we have been complicit in producing difference 
and inequality as a result of processes of colonialism and globalization 
(see also the discussion by González-Ruibal of the Žižek critique, this 
volume).
In practice, access by minorities and the disadvantaged to economic 
and social benefits through heritage often hinges on the membership 
of historically and culturally defined groups. It is through recognition 
of past injustices to identified groups that reconciliation and restitution 
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are often sought. Like it or not, archaeology is embroiled in claims of 
origins and can in the process contribute to an amelioration of access 
to economic and social goods. But it is inadequate to leave decisions 
about group membership, histories, reconciliation, and restitution to 
an open set of negotiations. Certainly debate around the cultural heri-
tage table should involve multiple stakeholders, but in this chapter I 
have been critical of the links between a notion of open and equal dia-
logue and a pluralistic multiculturalism.
In the three examples I have explored in relation to the cultural heri-
tage of Turkey, the rights of disadvantaged minorities can only be pro-
moted by cosmopolitan alliances between local groups and individuals 
and state or global interventions. At present, there is little in the way of 
an international legal framework that protects minority rights in rela-
tion to cultural heritage. There are many charters and ethical guidelines 
at the global scale (unesco, icomos, wac), but historically these have 
largely abrogated responsibility to the nation-state, and more recently 
increasingly to stakeholder negotiations at the local scale.
It seems that a sea change is needed at all levels—legal, financial, 
ethical—to promote a stronger global framework that protects rights 
at whatever scale they may be threatened. Pluralistic multiculturalism 
often seems to celebrate diversity, the local, and the indigenous with-
out providing a framework that can in practice protect rights. There 
is a need for an agenda that is concerned with historical inequalities 
and includes a commitment to global and interventionist principles 
that can protect the rights of individuals, minorities, and the disad-
vantaged. What is needed is careful discussion between national and 
global structures leading to a viable set of legal frameworks, even an 
international court, that protects minority rights in relation to heritage. 
A related position has been put forward by Jürgen Habermas (2000), 
who “advocates a model of cosmopolitan law which would supersede 
international law, confer actionable legal rights directly on individuals, 
and mandate the creation of supranational political agencies and in-
stitutions to ensure the implementation of human rights on a global 
scale. While nation-states would retain limited sovereignty, their citi-
zens would be able to appeal to the coercive legal authority of regional 
or global agencies, against their own governments if necessary” (Cro-
nin and De Greiff 1998: xx–xxi).
It seems to me that what is not needed is archaeologists deciding alone 
on the moral, social, and political issues surrounding cultural heritage 
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rights. It should not, for example, be for archaeologists to determine 
whether universal rights to heritage should trump local, national rights 
in general or particular. There is often a complex mix of stakeholder 
interests and multiple scales of formal and informal cosmopolitan al-
liances into which the archaeologist or heritage manager is inserted. 
“ The neologism cosmopolitics is also intended to underline the need to 
introduce intellectual order and accountability into this newly dynamic 
space of gushingly unrestrained sentiments, pieties, and urgencies for 
which no adequately discriminating lexicon has had time to develop” 
(Robbins 1998: 9). Archaeologists should certainly be part of the de-
bate and raise awareness of the complex claims and rights that are 
involved. But in the end the right to cultural heritage needs to be or-
dered intellectually, ethically, and legally. Perhaps the best way forward 
is to situate heritage rights within a larger cosmopolitan framework 
of human rights legislation. The process that leads us there needs to 
be decentered and cosmopolitan, while at the same time providing a 
structured framework of protective rights for the individual or minority 
voice.
I have tried to leave open the question of whether heritage rights 
should be conferred on individuals or groups. Rather than a universalist 
answer to this question, I would prefer to avoid absolute strictures and 
trust in the processes of heritage dialogue themselves. My focus on the 
need for a framework to protect minority rights is aimed at the process 
of heritage itself. The important point seems to be that both minority 
and individual rights need to be protected through cosmopolitan alli-
ances that recognize the historical contexts of heritage claims. These 
alliances may need to draw on structures of power and authority at na-
tional and international levels. Whether it is best to protect Mavili’s or 
Sadrettin’s rights to heritage through links to human rights concerning 
the individual, or whether it is best to refer to the heritage of the group 
depends very much on the specific historical context.
But what does seem clear from the examples given here is that minor-
ity rights to heritage depend on cosmopolitan alliances that also work 
within and between states or other institutions. It is the institutional 
frameworks that can provide the long-term commitment to change 
that is needed when voices are weakly heard. Hearing Mavili’s voice 
depends to some degree on regulation and intervention by the state or 
by global communities acting through or across the state. Sadrettin’s 
voice has been more widely heard in that he has published a book. 
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And yet this success has yet to be translated into personal betterment 
and fulfillment. We may in the West buy his book and be fascinated 
by the otherness and the empowerment that it might appear to exude. 
But we do not take long-term responsibility for his life or for those 
of his children. Our Western sensitivities too may encourage reburial 
of skeletal remains at Çatalhöyük, but “giving this heritage back” may 
do little to alleviate the social and economic problems within which 
the local communities exist. Alleviating such problems would involve 
longer and more institutionalized engagements of the type that can be 
provided by states and international agencies. In the example of the 
restriction on wearing the turban or head scarf by students at Selcuk 
University, the dissemination of knowledge about heritage seems to 
depend on taking a statist, interventionist line. It is by working with 
the university’s and the government’s secularist position that an open 
dialogue about prehistory remains possible. One might argue against 
the institutions of the state and say that a woman wearing the turban 
might also teach or be taught evolution. This is the sort of cosmopoli-
tan compromise that is sought by Elif Shafak. But the fact remains that 
for a hybrid cosmopolitanism to be a successful basis for open teaching 
about prehistory in the Konya region, some intervention and protec-
tion by state institutions seem necessary. In all these examples from 
Turkey, cosmopolitan heritage needs grounding in political, legal, eco-
nomic, and social institutions at national and global scales.
Lisa Breglia
9  i   “walking  around  like   
they  own  the  place” 
Quotidian Cosmopolitanism at a Maya and  
World Heritage Archaeological Site
Indigenous Maya guards and custodians at Chichén Itzá, a premier 
archaeological heritage site located in Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula, say 
that nacionales—Mexican nationals—are the most troublesome visi-
tors to the site. In this chapter, I examine the ideological and historical 
conditions that feed a tension between “Maya” and “Mexican” at this 
World Heritage Site, finding that neither group holds a premium on 
claiming the site as theirs, given a long history of transnational and 
private sector intervention. I suggest that the circumstance of hailing 
“Mexicans” as disruptive to the archaeological site reveals the national 
as a marked and troubled—rather than unmarked, stable, or default—
category. As nacionales “walk around like they own the place” (accord-
ing to the charges of Maya site workers), these citizen-visitors perform 
their relationship with the Mexican state, testing the boundaries of the 
constitutional guarantees that Chichén Itzá, like all of the archaeologi-
cal heritage within the national territory, is the patrimony of the na-
tion and, it would seem, of its people. At the same time, as indigenous 
Maya site workers criticize what they view as the inappropriate behav-
ior of Mexicans, they call into sharp relief the artifice of archaeology’s 
relationship with nationalism at the site. This chapter demonstrates 
that these simultaneous assertions and effacements—both of which 
bypass a firm and proper place of the national at Chichén Itzá—are 
expressions of what I call a quotidian cosmopolitanism. I find that the 
quotidian cosmopolitan sensibility at Chichén Itzá is a participatory 
collaboration between both workers and visitors to the site as they 
negotiate the meaning and significance of the site in its multiple and 
often contradictory historical and contemporary social, political, and 
economic contexts.
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Mexico-in-Chichén Itzá: A Multilayered Problematic
In recent years I have spent a great deal of time inside the archaeological 
zone of Chichén Itzá conducting ethnographic research into the social 
relations that constitute the history and everyday life of the site (Breglia 
2005, 2006). My primary interlocutors have been neither the “experts” 
on Chichén Itzá (such as archaeologists) nor the site’s most vociferous 
interpreters (for example, tour guides). Instead, I have spent many a 
steamy morning and long afternoon with guards and groundskeepers 
at Chichén Itzá, watching throngs of tourists climb up and down the 
Piramide of Kulkulkan (or Castillo), taking tickets and stamping hands 
at the entrance gates, and even pulling stubborn weeds from between 
the cracks of ancient hewn stone. The guards are federal employees of 
the National Institute of Anthropology and History (inah), the state 
agency responsible for the identification, investigation, and protection 
of the nation’s archaeological, historic, and artistic heritage. I am still 
learning about what Chichén Itzá means to them, though the depth 
and complexity of its significance is obvious as they claim that this ar-
chaeological heritage is “in [their] blood.” I have come to understand 
the bold and perhaps counterintuitive ways in which these site work-
ers define their own stakes in Chichén Itzá. These “heritage workers” 
don’t confine themselves within the parameters of indigenous identity 
politics—a discourse that requires these contemporary Maya to align 
themselves with the ancient Maya, as construed by archaeology. In-
stead, they position their attitudes, perspectives, and claims within a 
cosmopolitan discourse on global culture, internationalism, and su-
pranational constructions of rights and duties typically associated with 
citizenship. This cosmopolitan sensibility among Chichén Itzá’s guards 
and groundskeepers is—rather than newly formulated alongside the 
policies and discourse of world heritage—historicized within the ar-
chaeological development of the site as an international tourism desti-
nation, on the one hand, and a rejection of the limitations of a highly 
localized identity politics, on the other. What’s more, theirs is a cos-
mopolitan orientation to Maya, Mexican, and world heritage that pro-
foundly troubles the spatial and ideological hegemony of the Mexican 
state—the constitutionally mandated patrimonial custodian of all his-
toric, artistic, and archaeological heritage within the nation’s territory.
This latter assertion is unexpectedly crystallized in the guards’ oft-
reproduced commentary on the comportment and attitudes of certain 
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visitors to the site, especially the nacionales. Perhaps feeling a little too at 
home, Mexican tourists at Chichén Itzá have been known to purpose-
fully ignore the many restrictions on climbing delicate or crumbling 
structures. Mexicans, the guards charge, boldly enter cordoned-off ar-
eas and even engage in flagrant littering. As one frustrated guard put 
it, “They walk around like they own the place” (alternatively, “They 
make themselves right at home”). According to the guards, Mexicans 
display a high (and, it is perceived, unwarranted) degree of entitlement 
to the site, stepping around protective (however precarious) rail fenc-
ing, climbing where prohibitions are clearly posted, and, in perhaps 
the most notorious case of the past few years, attempting to slide down 
the balustrade of the pyramid of Kulkulkan. Site workers’ narratives 
of the behavior of Mexican tourists at Chichén Itzá are intriguing in 
the ironies, contradictions, and subtextual meanings they mobilize. 
Indeed, it would seem that as nacionales, as Mexican citizens, they do 
“own” the patrimonial site. However, as I’ll explore in this piece, the 
Maya workers feel or exhibit an ownership claim over the site and its 
symbols. Yet Chichén Itzá—as a site of national patrimony—simulta-
neously belongs to the whole of the nation.
Troubling the Nation
The charge of “walking around like they own the place” leveled by local 
Yucatec Maya distinguishes and marks Mexicans from outside of Yuca-
tán as Other. I find this alterizing act a provocative point of entry into 
the problematic of representing or performing “Mexico” and “Mexi-
canness” in Chichén Itzá, a site of national patrimony, international 
tourism, and global heritage. As one might expect, ownership of and 
custodianship of cultural patrimony are contentious issues not only at 
Chichén Itzá but at heritage sites across the globe. Increasingly the 
terms for struggles over the fate of monumental heritage have shifted 
to the lexicon of neoliberal globalization. Whereas the old-style wel-
fare state carefully guarded archaeological materials as inalienable na-
tional patrimony (protected by constitutional mandate in Mexico) for 
the common good of all citizens (the general assumption made about 
heritage worldwide according to Hodder’s discussion in his contri-
bution to this volume), the oft-touted decline of the nation-state un-
der conditions of neoliberalization—most significantly, privatization 
agendas—has, perhaps put cultural patrimony into peril. What’s more, 
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some evidence suggests that some archaeological heritage was never 
quite safely sequestered in the commons at all (Breglia 2006).
Thus, my interest in the charge of “walking around like they own 
the place” leveled by Maya guards against Mexican visitors to Chi-
chén Itzá is multifold. I suggest that in a supposedly unambiguous 
national space, “Mexicans” can exist as a marked category as opposed 
to an unmarked or default category among the hundreds of thousands 
of visitors to Chichén Itzá. Further, it seems that this problematic of 
Mexico-in-Chichén Itzá or Chichén Itzá-in-Mexico represents a crisis 
of  “nationality,” so to speak, at the intersection of territory and iden-
tity. Is this problem emergent with or exacerbated by the intensification 
of neoliberal agendas threatening national sovereignty over traditional 
venues of national patrimonial control, such as archaeological heritage 
sites?
I contend that as Maya workers at Chichén Itzá think and feel be-
yond the national, the points of reference upon which site meaning is 
constructed and patrimonial claims are made are neither wholly local 
nor entirely conjoined with the “internationalization” of Chichén Itzá 
through the discourse on world heritage and the flow of tourism. I 
consider that, by calling out “Mexicanness” at the site, Maya heritage 
workers are actively engaging in a cosmopolitan, postnational politics 
of location that highlights the tenuousness of the modern apparatus 
that grafts together archaeology, heritage, tourism, and nationalism, 
hiding the diverse interests of each in order to create the illusion of a 
supposedly transparent site of Mexicanness. I use “cosmopolitanism” 
here not so much to emphasize how workers at Chichén Itzá articulate 
a specific agenda aimed at an emancipatory political practice. Rather, I 
am more concerned with using cosmopolitanism to highlight a quotid-
ian sensibility that has percolated within the site and its environs over 
the course of several decades, the genealogy of which begins to coalesce 
with the presence of transnational discovery and development ideolo-
gies at the beginning of the twentieth century.
There are several ways to approach the multiply-layered problem-
atic of Mexico-in-Chichén Itzá, none more tried and true than the 
approach that takes as a given baseline unit of analysis a stable and 
coherent nation-state. Such studies, even as they propose to investi-
gate the foundations of nationalist ideologies and the complicities of 
archaeology and the scientific and governmentalistic discourse of the 
patrimonial nation, often solidify rather than destabilize the nation as 
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an unmarked, hidden in plain sight, category. In this discussion I 
work the problematic of Mexico-in-Chichén Itzá and Chichén Itzá-in- 
Mexico by drawing on two decidedly distinct literatures. On the one 
hand, I look to Yucatec historiography, which allows us to address 
empirically the issue of the multifaceted “apartness” or disjunction 
between Yucatán, the Maya, and the Mexican nation-state that social 
actors ranging from politicians to archaeologists and ethnographers to 
Maya campesinos have asserted and negotiated for decades. On the other 
hand, I bring to the problematic of Chichén Itzá a series of compelling 
(and sometimes confounding) ideas drawn from recent literature on 
cosmopolitanism. Together, these two strands creatively indicate why 
it should not be surprising that making space for Mexicans at Chichén 
Itzá is a tricky task, one that was assumed to have been handily accom-
plished in Mexico’s twentieth-century nation-building projects but 
is––in the contemporary moment—undone.
Nationalism Out-of-Joint
Chichén Itzá is Mexico’s third most heavily visited archaeological site 
and one of only a select few that holds both unesco World Heritage 
status and special status by presidential decree. Known by Europeans 
since the earliest incursions of the Spanish conquistadors into the Yuca-
tán Peninsula, it began to attract proto-archaeological amateur explor-
ers in the mid-nineteenth century, most notably the English traveler 
John Lloyd Stephens and his artist companion Frederick Catherwood. 
The appearance (especially the integrity of many architectural features) 
of the site today is largely due to the extensive reconstruction efforts 
carried out by Mexican archaeologists and the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington beginning in the late 1920s. As Wren and Schmidt (1991) 
point out, though under almost continuous investigation since the 
mid-nineteenth century, the archaeological distinctiveness of the site 
has been poorly understood and thus an issue of much debate. At the 
core of this debate for the practice of archaeology lay the problem of 
untangling the hybrid mix of Chichén Itzá’s architectural styles (clearly 
representing occupations by different cultural groups), clashing ar-
chaeological and ethnohistorical records, and what is now a bungled and 
jumbled stratigraphic record. At stake is determining the critical role 
of Chichén Itzá in the contact between Maya and others with strong 
ties to central Mexico and during the Late Classic and Early Postclassic 
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Periods (ad 968–87). Particularly crucial here became the question of 
cultural dominance: did the barbarian foreign invaders completely 
wipe out the culture of the peaceful Maya at Chichén Itzá? (L. Jones 
1997; Wren and Schmidt 1991). We’ll return to this debate shortly.
Though the archaeological narrative of Chichén Itzá is compelling, it 
is fair to say that the site is less significant today for the reliability of its 
archaeological record than for its popular attractiveness and economic 
significance for local and regional tourism. Its appeal to the touristic 
imagination lies in its multiplicity. As with many a heritage site, Chi-
chén Itzá is a space of mixed temporality—what Foucault would call a 
heterotopia. Not only is Chichén Itzá at once both ancient and mod-
ern, both of the past and of the present, but it also evokes a mixed 
sense of place. It is a dizzying amalgamation of Mexican national ter-
ritory, pre-Hispanic Maya sovereign space, a workplace, a stop on a 
whirlwind guided tour, what have you.
Even as a nation aligns (or disciplines) a heritage site into purview, 
this multiplicity cannot be tamed. For Mexico, Chichén Itzá is both a 
space of intensification and dilution of the nation, conditioned by both 
history and the contemporary everyday practices of producing the site 
for international tourism. When foreign visitors tour Chichén Itzá, it 
is a perfect, intensely packed synecdoche for “Mexico.” For Mexican 
nationals, the site extends the reach of what is nuestro patrimonio (a 
term that conveys the sense of “our heritage” in both tangible and in-
tangible aspects) from pre-Hispanic times to the age of digital photos 
on the top of the Piramide of Kulkulkan. Yet at the same time Chichén 
Itzá figures, in narratives of both its ancient and modern past, as a dis-
orderly space, a site of invasions, takeovers, simultaneous occupations, 
and multiple possible interpretations. Thus, as intensely as the site of 
Chichén Itzá indeed both signifies and stands in for “Mexico,” woven 
through are a wealth of counternarratives continuously diluting, or de-
territorializing, if you like, this seeming univocality. In other words, 
lots of the rich stuff of everyday life at Chichén Itzá, both historical and 
contemporary, happens outside of and, in some cases despite, existing 
within the auspices of “Mexico”—as national custodian, as purveyor 
of national identity, as staker of national territory, and as embracer of 
“subnational” indigenous ethnicities.
In part, the dilution of “Mexico” at Chichén Itzá sustains rather than 
tames a tension between Mexican and Maya at Chichén Itzá. This ten-
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sion, with roots traceable to pre-Conquest times, has alternately been 
exacerbated and quelled by disciplinary analyses of the site. One illus-
tration can be found in unesco’s site description for Chichén Itzá, 
inscribed on the organization’s World Heritage List in 1988.
This sacred site [Chichén Itzá] was one of the greatest Mayan centres of 
the Yucatán peninsula. Throughout its nearly 1,000-year history, different 
peoples have left their mark on the city. The Maya, Toltec and Aztec vision 
of the world and the universe is revealed in their stone monuments and 
artistic works. The fusion of Mayan construction techniques with new ele-
ments from central Mexico make Chichen-Itza one of the most important 
examples of the Mayan-Toltec civilization in Yucatán.1
Multiplicity, wrought harmonious by “fusion,” is the neutralized dis-
course presented by unesco. Academic archaeologists and histori-
ans, on the other hand, present ancient Chichén Itzá as a Maya space 
impinged upon by foreigners, or “Mexicans.” For example, Michael 
Coe, in his primer The Maya (2005), describes the Post-Classic Toltec 
occupation of Chichén Itzá as part of the “Mexican” invasion of the 
Maya lowlands.2 Coe’s (and others’) identification of a pre-Conquest, 
pre-colonization, and pre-independence (in other words pre-nation) 
“Mexican” identity works to support and consolidate the Otherness of 
Mexico at Chichén Itzá and at the same time reveals the historical rela-
tions of power in contemporary tensions between Maya and Mexican.
Translated into the popular, touristic imagination, Chichén Itzá is 
an authentic, richly resonant site of “pure” ancient Maya culture. For 
the Mexican state, in contrast, Chichén Itzá is a spectacular example of 
the ancient cultural diversity of the nation. For yet another group of 
social actors—in this case archaeologists, epigraphers, art historians, 
museologists, and other specialists—Chichén Itzá is, as unesco’s site 
description notes and quite contrary to the popular or nationalist senti-
ments, an example of “Mayan-Toltec civilization.” This third iteration 
comes to unesco’s description through an especially thick genealogy 
crafted within archaeological discourse, at the center of which we find 
the story of the Toltec conquest or invasion of Chichén Itzá—an event 
created not in the course of history, but in the course of modern inter-
pretation of Chichén Itzá’s past. This third “expert” interpretation of 
Chichén Itzá is far from a dry, scientific exposition on the pre-Hispanic 
goings-on at the site. Instead, Lindsay Jones (1997) finds within 
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archaeological narrative produced by some of the seminal figures of 
Maya archaeology (Tozzer, Morley, J. E. S. Thompson, among oth-
ers) the construction of an ancient drama pitting the civilized (Maya) 
against the savage (central Mexicans). The meeting of two kinds of In-
dians—noble savages and bloodthirsty warriors—sets into motion a 
powerful stereotype with political resonance. According to Jones, “The 
fascination with the infamous Toltec conquest of the Maya, which 
seems now not to have been an historical circumstance at all, is actually 
the manifestation of imaginative (and colonialist) processes that began 
with the initial encounters between Europeans and Indigenous Ameri-
cans” (1997: 278). Through the device of polarization, Chichén Itzá is a 
scene of arrested proto-pre-Conquest invasion. In other words, the site 
becomes a scene of ancient struggle between native Maya and foreign 
Mexican invader.
This “Mexicanization of the Maya” narrative seems to be built right 
into the twentieth-century reconstruction of Chichén Itzá. Thus, the 
Toltec conquest or invasion of Chichén Itzá and the characterization 
layered upon and folded within are supposedly neutralized through 
empirical evidence presented by the site’s architecture—a clear juxta-
position between the “pure Maya” and Mexicanized/Toltec architec-
tural styles in the modern representations of the southern and northern 
portions of the tourist site, respectively. Castañeda (2000) uses the 
occasion of reflecting on an aerial photograph of the Temple of the 
Warriors and the Castillo taken by Charles Lindbergh in 1929 to dis-
cuss the ideology of Mexican dominance over the Maya and Yucatán. 
The story of the ancient roots of Mexican hegemony at Chichén Itzá 
“no matter how weakly based on evidence, serves too well twentieth 
century nation building and nationalist ideology” (Castañeda 2000: 
47). Certainly, the Toltec “Mexicanization,” if it were to serve any mod-
ern agenda would be freely available for mobilization by the Mexican 
state as “Toltec,” is not an ethnic marker currently in play in the field 
of Mexican indigenous identity politics. As a noncontested category, it 
easily slips into “modern Mexican.”
However, the evidence for Chichén Itzá’s two heritages—one Maya 
and one Mexican—is not only physically manifest in obvious architec-
tural differences that characterize the Maya and Toltec portions of the 
archaeological site as we know it today. Rather, raced, ethnicized, and 
gendered differences are woven into the archaeological and historical 
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narratives that use Chichén Itzá to create an image of both the Maya 
and the peninsula (their geographical culture area) that feeds the no-
tion that Yucatán is a world apart from Mexico. To what extent, then, 
is this notion of Maya-Mexican polarity relevant in describing Maya-
Mexican discursive tensions performed within the contemporary con-
tours of Chichén Itzá? At the outset of my ethnographic research at 
archaeological sites and their neighboring communities in Yucatán, I 
quickly learned that both indigenous Maya and white Yucatecos use 
the term “Mexican” to distinguish non-Yucatec people or things usu-
ally associated with the central Mexican mainland.3 This distinction is 
more than a quirk of colloquial nomenclature. The distinction hints 
at the social, cultural, and geographic disjunctures between the Yuca-
tán Peninsula and (mainland) central Mexico from the time of Spanish 
conquest and colonization (beginning in 1517) and exacerbated rather 
than resolved by independence (1821). Thus, over and against the mod-
ernist drive to align identity and territory unambiguously, we find that 
“Mexican” at Chichén Itzá has become a category increasingly “out of 
joint.” Far from a very recent phenomenon, this disjuncture has taken 
shape by different causes in varying degrees of intensity over the course 
of more than a century.
While asserting that Mexican is a category out of joint at Chichén Itzá 
(and before detailing the precise reasons why), it is important to note 
that it should not be. A preponderance of laws, ideologies, boundaries, 
and representational practices should guarantee that Chichén Itzá is 
wholly and securely within “Mexico”: a constitutional guarantee pro-
tects all archaeological heritage under the custodianship of the nation. 
It follows equally that “Mexican” should be an unmarked rather than 
marked category or identity. Indeed, the contemporary and historical 
ambiguity and insecurity of these categories and identities stands con-
trary to the major thrust of the project of Mexican nationalism, which 
found particularly fertile resources in ancient ruins—not unlike the role 
of pre-Hispanic ruins in the project of founding Ecuadorian national 
modernity described by Benavides (in his chapter, this volume).
Throughout the twentieth century, the development of archaeologi-
cal sites went hand in hand with efforts to develop a national conscious-
ness that would blend and supercede ethnic or subnational difference. 
The historian Paul Eiss (2004: 125) describes the prevailing attitude 
among Yucatec officials at the time of the nascent nationalist ideology: 
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“The diminished conditions of Yucatán’s Indians derived not only from 
an imputed lack of ‘civilization,’ but also from a continuing process of 
racial ‘degeneration.’ ” But, perhaps, one hope for incorporating the 
Maya into Mexico lay in the fertile possibilities already being mobi-
lized by both foreign and Mexican archaeologists within Yucatán’s rich 
material cultural heritage. Chichén Itzá, which by the late nineteenth 
century had already aroused worldwide curiosity of amateur, pseudo-, 
and proto-scientific ilk over its magnificent ruins, was a perfect meet-
ing ground where the roots of mestizaje could cross-fertilize. Alonso 
(2004: 467) describes, on the one hand, the European element, a hold-
over of the cientifico, Enlightenment rationality that prevailed during 
the pre-revolutionary dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and, on the other 
hand, the Indian element, which “grounds the nation’s claim to terri-
tory, provides a continuity of blood, and roots the nation’s history in 
that of ancient, pre-Columbian civilizations whose art and mythology 
is integral to the ‘national soul.’ ”
During the reorganization of the Mexican state following the revolu-
tion of 1910, concerns for securing both national identity and national 
property were twin efforts. Not only did the post-revolutionary, rein-
vented nation secure its geographical territory and its natural resource 
contents, but the new, modern Mexico wished to pinion down its cul-
tural resources as well. Premier among these were archaeological and 
historical vestiges. Ruins, facades, and artifacts visible and buried were, 
along with waters, minerals, and, later, oil deposits, transformed into 
Mexican national patrimony. Meanwhile, social scientists set to the 
task of dealing with the nation’s other heritage: its new citizens. Figur-
ing prominently in this history is the anthropologist Manuel Gamio’s 
“nationalist-indigenist” (Zermeño 2002: 318) project of “Forjando Pa-
tria” (1916). Gamio sought to incorporate multiple, diverse, and, for 
the most part, disenfranchised populations into one nation, a task that 
as de la Pena (2005: 724) describes, “required careful state-sponsored 
research to distinguish ‘positive’ from ‘negative’ aspects in vernacular 
cultures and to find the best strategies for their gradual transformation.” 
Gamio specifically identified anthropology (including archaeology) as 
a tool of governance. The otherness of the Maya as an Indian race was 
particularly acute within the Mexican national landscape, evidenced by 
Gamio’s belief that the Maya world was a crucial arena for pursuing 
the ideological work of integration. Castañeda (2003: 244) speculates 
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that this led Gamio to support the work of the Carnegie Institution of 
Washington at Chichén Itzá as the ciw, in addition to archaeological 
excavation and restoration projects, used the site as a home base for 
multidisciplinary projects including ethnography, linguistics, nutri-
tion, and natural sciences. Though Mexican archaeologists carried out 
research and reconstruction in the early years at Chichén Itzá as well, all 
of the bells and whistles are attributed to the Sylvanus G. Morley, the 
director of the ciw’s Project Chichén Itzá, and his team.
By the early decades of the twentieth century, Chichén Itzá had 
been Mexicanized twice, once by archaeologists’ imaginings of a pre- 
Hispanic contaminating conquest on Maya culture seated at Chichén 
Itzá and once by the modern Mexican state, which sought to pull mate-
rial culture as well as diverse populations into the nation’s patrimonial 
fold. What would the place for the Maya be in the now doubly Mexi-
canized site? In the case of the first Mexicanization, a distinct place for 
celebrating the artistic genius of the ancient Maya is carved out. Set 
as it is wholly within the distant past, no address is made in this nar-
rative to contemporary Maya populations. This is not, however, at all 
what we see in the second case. The modern Mexican state that claimed 
Chichén Itzá for its national patrimony would eventually need to pro-
mote it by celebrating the genius of the ancient Maya while erasing the 
otherness of the contemporary Maya. In order to create and preserve 
a Mexican Chichén Itzá, the contemporary descendants of the ancient 
Maya would need to be effaced.
Yucatán as Apart from Mexico: Historical Narrative
Let us step back again to examine further yet another thread in the 
deep historical roots of the tension between Maya and Mexican at Chi-
chén Itzá—in other words, let us go back to why Maya site workers are 
calling fellow citizens “Mexicans” and accusing them of impropriety. 
Obviously, the archaeological narrative on the “Toltec conquest” by 
itself cannot explain why these tensions would play out in the everyday 
practice of operating a premier archaeological tourism destination. The 
conflict between Maya and Mexican is thus one not only construed 
by archaeological narrations of ancient invasions, occupations, and 
proto-Mexican nationality. Indeed, one could argue that pre-Hispanic 
activities at Chichén Itzá have read the past through the lens of the 
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region’s decidedly non-ancient political history—in other words, in the 
region’s modern experiences as part of the Spanish colonial empire in 
the Americas, and following this period as an ambivalent constituent 
of independent Mexico. I turn to how Yucatán imagined itself as a geo-
political entity vis-à-vis Mexico after its independence from Spanish 
colonial rule because these circumstances are critical constituents of the 
complex genealogy of the problematic of appropriateness of “Mexico” 
and “Mexicanness” at Chichén Itzá.
Gilbert Joseph (1988: 15), in his comprehensive study of relations 
between Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States during the late nine-
teenth century and the early twentieth, reads the history of the isolation 
and marginalization of Yucatán from Mexico as first and foremost a 
problem of geography: separated from central Mexico by mountains 
and swamps, and served by inadequate sea, rail, and road transporta-
tion through the middle of the twentieth century. Moseley and Terry 
(1980: 1) concur: “Cut off from the rest of Mexico by sea, great dis-
tance, and harsh terrain, the peninsula has been a virtual ‘island’ during 
most of its history. This isolation has given the people a sense of cultural 
and psychological separatism. They consider their land to be ‘un otro 
mundo’—a world apart.” Cultural differences—especially those based 
in pre-Hispanic indigenous heritage—as well as physical obstacles were 
exacerbated by political ideology from the time of  independence through 
the Mexican Revolution. According to Joseph (1988: 15), “The entire 
course of Yucatecan history suggests that rather early the federal gov-
ernment resigned itself to the inevitability of Yucatán’s geographical 
isolation and then formulated political and economic policies that fur-
ther marginalized the region within the national political structure.” 
In terms of fiscal policy, Mexico treated Yucatán as more distant, so 
to speak, than a foreign country (Joseph 1988: 16). Even today, Maya 
migrant workers are likely to mean mainland Mexico when using the 
phrase “el otro lado” (the other side)—whereas the same phrase would 
be used by central Mexicans to refer to the United States.
Given these circumstances of geography and culture, Yucatán has 
long regarded itself as distinct from the rest of Mexico. Both the region’s 
indigenous Maya population as well as its white Yucatec elite landown-
ing class have historically resisted integration into the Mexican pol-
ity. These resistances have periodically taken place since independence 
(1821), and include several declared secessions and calls for autonomy 
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from the Mexican state. That Yucatán declared independence from 
Spain separately from Mexico in 1821 was a powerful foreshadowing of 
the demonstrated “apartness” that the region demonstrated through-
out the nineteenth century and even into the twentieth.4 Though it 
is indeed true that “the rise of the modern nation-state and national-
ist movements altered the landscape of political identity” (Held 2003: 
49), the attempt to suture Yucatán and its populations of white elites 
and Maya has left an incision as yet unhealed. However, this conten-
tious history of disjuncture between Mexico and Yucatán is seemingly 
effaced within contemporary Yucatán. But if not effaced, it is carefully 
and relatively seamlessly glossed over at Chichén Itzá. That anthro-
pologists and historians have described Yucatán, the regional home to 
Chichén Itzá, as “a world apart” from Mexico is due to cultural as well 
as political and economic distinctiveness. In sum, these circumstances 
work in concert to condition the possibility for one group of Mexi-
can citizens, local Maya of Yucatán, to call a group of fellow citizens 
“Mexicans.”
Excavating a Quotidian Cosmopolitan Sensibility
Chichén Itzá and its practitioners are not cosmopolitan solely by dint 
of the high degree of transnational flows traversing the site and its his-
tory. In other words, cosmopolitan aspects of Chichén Itzá are not 
limited to the formal global connectedness of this internationally fa-
mous archaeological site to either World Heritage or tourism markets. 
Alongside these extranational conditions is a cosmopolitan sensibility 
imbued within the site and its environs, which is based not in formal 
networks (tourism) or designations (World Heritage), but rather in 
the social relations between and among site workers, local residents, 
landowners, managers, archaeologists, bureaucrats, tourists, and oth-
ers. The archaeological heritage at Chichén Itzá is a form of material 
culture highly resonant within the production and circulation of both 
local and extra-local meanings, peoples, and things.
My own understanding of the heterogeneity of the local at Chichén 
Itzá has been developed through long-term ethnographic research 
within the archaeological site itself, in surrounding communities, 
and in other regional nodes that serve as points of comparative study. 
Much of my ethnographic research at Chichén Itzá is focused on 
218 Lisa Breglia
the employees of Mexico’s National Institute of Anthropology and 
History (inah), the federal agency created to carry out the constitu-
tional mandate of protecting the nation’s cultural heritage. These thirty-
six workers, many of whom were second- and even third-generation 
presences in the archaeological zone, are as a group distinct from many 
other local residents around Chichén Itzá due in large part to their 
steady, salaried employment, their strong unionization, and their en-
trepreneurial activities inside the archaeological zone. As to the latter, 
for decades the oldest generation of inah workers at Chichén Itzá 
used their de facto presence within the federal archaeological zone as 
a means by which to garner exclusive economic benefits through the 
provision of tourist services. Chichén Itzá’s guards, those who level 
the charge of “bad behavior” at Mexicans, see the heritage rights of 
non-Yucatecos and non-Maya as illegitimate while using a particu-
larly clever argument to assert their own patrimonial claims to the 
site—which is not about cultural affiliation with the ancient Maya, or 
within a discourse of indigenous identity politics. In my book Monu-
mental Ambivalence (2006), I describe how the site’s successive genera-
tions of federally employed guards and custodians regard the site as 
inheritable family patrimony. They claim that caring for the site—liter-
ally, their employment in the maintenance and protection of the ru-
ins—as well as the right to benefit from it economically, is “in [their] 
blood” (Breglia 2005, 2006). Neither being Maya nor being Mexican, 
in their eyes, makes one a legitimate heir to the patrimony of Chichén 
Itzá.
Claiming their rights to Chichén Itzá in this fashion troubles an easy 
understanding of how these Maya cultural workers orient themselves 
to the site and how they situate themselves within the ever expanding 
horizons of region, state, nation, and even the world. The apparent 
deep sense of place that characterizes these workers’ articulations of 
their own genealogies to the ruins would suggest that the Maya root 
their identity locally. It would follow from this that any cosmopoli-
tan sensibility would be of Appiah’s (2005) rooted variety. Yet I find 
a more amenable fit here with notions of cosmopolitanism that don’t 
depend so strongly on geographical locatedness to secure identity. One 
of these alternatives is offered by Waldron (1995, 1996), who suggests 
that cosmopolitan identity is a “melange” of commitments, affiliations, 
and roles that reflects disparate and disjunctive cultural influences. 
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Certainly, this would more appropriately describe how contemporary 
mostly “Maya” employees of a modernized and Mexicanized site of 
hybrid and contested heritage fashion claims to the patrimony that 
Chichén Itzá represents.
The confidence to negotiate this “mélange” is very much a part of 
the workers’ quotidian cosmopolitan sensibility. At Chichén Itzá, the 
quotidian cosmopolitan sensibility is both local and extra-local, drawn 
into practice by the site’s Maya workers, among others (tour guides, 
administrators, and tourists), whose approach to the ruins connects 
past to present and local to global without either routing or rooting 
their identity in the national. This is especially evident in how workers 
claim rights to the site by virtue of a host of characteristics (member-
ship in the local community or inherited job positions working within 
the archaeological zone) that do not, significantly, include Mexican 
citizenship. The cosmopolitanism of the Maya heritage workers at 
Chichén Itzá is a critical stance, an intervention into the state’s attempt 
to coalesce the territory and identity of the site under the unifying em-
brace of “Mexico.”5
The cosmopolitan sensibility practiced at Chichén Itzá is at once 
both self-conscious and unwitting. I say unwitting because of the way 
in which cosmopolitanism becomes a worldview compatible with dif-
ferent styles of making identity claims, on the one hand, and forms 
of economic exploitation, on the other, both of which introduce the 
danger of rendering cosmopolitanism compatible with (neo)liberal 
multiculturalism. As the political and social agenda of multiculturalism 
has consistently failed to live up to its promises of righting social and 
economic inequalities, social injustices, and colonial legacies of racism 
and sexism, it is not so much being “Mexican” as being Maya that be-
comes the problem at Chichén Itzá that is effaced rather than addressed 
by the cosmopolitan sensibility.
In other words, not only is “Mexican” a problem at Chichén Itzá, 
as I have discussed here at length, but so too is “Maya.” Like many 
similar cases across the colonized world, the “Maya” of Yucatán did 
not use this label as a marker of self-identity at the time of the Spanish 
conquest and subsequent colonization. Restall (2004) argues that the 
imposition of the identity category represents a “Maya ethnogenesis,” 
instigating a multi-century tug of war of resistance against the imposed 
ethnic designation. Even today, workers at Chichén Itzá tend to back 
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away from a strong universal notion of asserting or identifying (with) 
an authentic Maya identity. People are historically wary of indigenist-
inflected discourse due to the legacies of the state-sponsored indigen-
ismo ideology turned policy of national racialist integration. In more 
rural parts of Yucatán such as on the outskirts of Chichén Itzá, residents 
may perceive “indigenous” as a derogatory category. Many associate the 
term with the work of the Mexican state agency,  the Instituto Nacional 
Indigenista (ini), whose rural development mission included cultural 
and educational campaigns administered from numerous coordinating 
centers across the country. The critical response from some recipients 
of the ini’s attentions was their understanding that “indigenous” ini 
workers really meant “illiterate.”
At Chichén Itzá, nearly a century of cultivating sites of valorization 
of Maya heritage recuperated a sense of “Maya” that came not necessar-
ily to be wholly tied to “indigenous.” However, in the contemporary 
arena of heritage politics, there are rather limited parameters on how 
local communities, especially relatively disempowered subjects, may ar-
ticulate claims to archaeological sites, monuments, and materials. The 
spectrum of possible positions is anchored at one end by law and at 
the other by identity politics. Indigenous identity may be constructed 
as a legal necessity (such as for Native American tribes recognized by 
the U.S. government under the repatriation procedures laid out by 
nagpra) or as a political strategy (such as for First Nations peoples 
of Canada and the Arctic, Aboriginal peoples of Australia, and many 
fourth world people across the globe). In the first instance, indigenous 
identity construction must respond explicitly to the demands of the 
state. The recognition of indigenous claims and any hopes for resti-
tution of material remains of the past is dependent upon an intricate 
demonstration of cultural affiliation—a proof, if you will, of identity. 
In Mexico, no law such as nagpra exists, and no vocal demand or 
visible movement for such a law can be discerned in the public arena 
in Yucatán. In terms of the second instance, “Maya identity” has been 
fruitfully used as a political strategy in the Maya cultural activism 
movement in Guatemala and also in the Zapatista movement within 
Chiapas, Mexico, and beyond. Indeed, to be Maya, or to be called Maya, 
in Yucatán resounds much differently than in Guatemala and even Chi-
apas, so close yet a world away from Yucatán. Maya intellectuals and 
those who stand on their side have vociferously called for increased 
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access to and recognition regarding Maya cultural heritage sites, be-
coming highly critical of the work of archaeology in the process.
Neither identity-based political activism nor state-sponsored legal 
protection find fertile ground in contemporary Chichén Itzá. Both of 
these options would require the following two conditions: (1) that “in-
digenous” and “Maya” be rejoined nagpra-style in a legal cultural af-
filiation between the contemporary population and the ancient Maya; 
and (2) that the state be welcomed as the ultimate mediator or arbiter 
of identity, conceding once and for all that Chichén Itzá had indeed 
been Mexicanized. The quotidian cosmopolitanism sensibility demon-
strated by workers at Chichén Itzá is not necessarily a politically in-
strumentalized orientation to the world that seeks to address universal 
human rights, freedom, and justice in the world. Instead, it is a meth-
odological cosmopolitanism engaged in by everyday users of the site. 
This cosmopolitan sensibility is one that allows for multiple meanings. 
Rooted in the anxiety and indeed the insecurity of Mexico, the national 
does not sit conveniently and comfortably in a safe and guaranteed 
niche between the local and the global. This notion of national cultural 
patrimony manifest most boldly in archaeological ruins seeks to trap 
Maya in a carefully prescriptive identity politics making Chichén Itzá 
“theirs” primarily by virtue of Mexican citizenship.
Cosmopolitan Territory: Toward a Postnational Space
I centered this discussion upon a deceptively simple question: Is there 
a place for Mexico at Chichén Itzá? A look at the formal apparatus 
that governs the geographical and legal terrain of Chichén Itzá (both 
the physical location along with the laws, policies, and administrative 
procedures that govern, produce, and reproduce the site) would as-
sume and dictate the unassailable “Mexicanness” of Chichén Itzá. In-
deed, all archaeological sites in Mexico are constitutionally claimed and 
protected as property of the nation. Yet ruins are sites of competing 
and often contradictory claims of ownership, custodianship, and heri-
tage (Breglia 2006). Perhaps the contestation of ruins is more obvi-
ous at Chichén Itzá, a site that has experienced the interventions of 
archaeology, tourism development, and those of the Mexican state for 
nearly a century. At the same time, it has experienced the very local pat-
rimonial claims articulated by Chichén Itzá’s neighboring indigenous 
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Maya residents based on a sort of kinship tie to the site, not in terms 
of a cultural affiliation, but based, rather, on the successive generations 
of family-based excavation and site maintenance labor carried out at 
Chichén Itzá. Compounding these other-than-national claims is the 
status of the actual ownership of land upon which the famous monu-
ments of Chichén Itzá sit: it is an astonishing fact that this site is pri-
vately owned and has been so for generations. I argue that these factors 
work in such orchestration as to render “Mexico” only a bit player, so 
to speak, in this so-called national space. The tension between the local 
and the global at Chichén Itzá effaces an appropriate space for the na-
tion, thereby promoting a crisis in grounding citizenship vis-à-vis this 
site of national patrimony.
In heterotopic space such as the Mexican, Maya, and World Heritage 
site of Chichén Itzá, “national space” is constantly and continuously 
undergoing deterritorialization. This process effects an anxiety and am-
bivalence for both Maya and Mexican as a sure ground for displaying 
and claiming citizenship within this seemingly national space, which is 
spatially and discursively undermined. The site’s long history of trans-
national interventions through foreign archaeology, on the one hand, 
and touristic development, on the other, are two continual tides in the 
ongoing territorialization of Chichén Itzá. These interventions posit 
with one hand the appropriate place for Mexico at Chichén Itzá while 
undermining its signifying power with the other.
This deterritorialization and reterritorialization sleight of hand has 
been played at Chichén Itzá since the late nineteenth century and con-
tinues in various forms through the present time. Notable signposts in 
the site’s genealogy include the purchase of the site by an American dip-
lomat in 1896 for the purpose of excavating and exploring the ruins. The 
amateur archaeologist Edward H. Thompson, backed by the U.S. gov-
ernment and with funds from the American Antiquarian Society and 
Harvard’s Peabody Museum, among others, purchased the land and ru-
ins comprising Chichén Itzá, ushering in more than a century of private 
ownership of the site and Chichén Itzá’s ruins. The site was subsequently 
sold off piece by piece to the Yucatec tourism entrepreneur Fernando 
Barbachano beginning in the 1930s. The site remains in the hands of 
Barbachano’s descendents and associates (Breglia 2005, 2006).
Another discursive and territorial intervention in Chichén Itzá is the 
granting of World Heritage status to the site. While World Heritage 
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does not make world citizens, it does mark territories in particular ways 
that gesture toward a pedagogy of global responsibility. At Chichén 
Itzá, World Heritage works subtly rather than overtly. Rather than 
protocol, World Heritage offers the subtlest of suggestions as to how 
to practice a cosmopolitan sensibility. What World Heritage status does 
is trouble the hegemony and sovereignty of the nation-state as it simul-
taneously deterritorializes and reterritorializes any given site of na-
tional heritage (Breglia 2005, 2006). Sites are deterritorialized from 
the boundaries and borders of local, regional, and national meanings 
(and, in some cases, policies) as they become discursively attached to 
unesco’s World Heritage program. Sites are reterritorialized as they 
are brought into accordance with unesco’s standard of “universal cul-
tural value,” over and above particularities of culture area and national 
boundaries. National agencies, in turn, appeal to and support abstract 
notions of “cultural good,” bolstering these with specifically nationalist 
ideologies. Living communities surrounding or, in many cases, located 
within archaeological sites negotiate these ideals and mandates accord-
ing to the dynamics of the everyday life of the archaeological heritage 
site.
While it could be argued that these stakeholders negotiate contra-
dictory state versus private interests, perhaps this does not adequately 
characterize the contemporary situation. While the neoliberal state con-
templates the relinquishment of territorial control over national prop-
erties through privatization, my ethnographic and archival evidence 
from Chichén Itzá clearly supports the claim that the state has, for at 
least a century, merely assumed—through its laws, policies, and insti-
tutional management—that sites of monumental cultural patrimony 
were within its firm grasp all along. While a certain kind of security 
of monumental heritage sites is assumed by the liberal nation-state by 
dint of the principle of territorial sovereignty (in other words Mexican 
heritage is safely bundled within Mexican national space), ethnographic 
and archival evidence strongly suggests that the stability and coherence 
of this linkage (space [Chichén Itzá] / ideology [patrimony]) is tenu-
ous at best. It is only referred to in its problematization, such as in the 
spatio-ideological problem of “Mexicans” walking around like they 
own Chichén Itzá, misbehaving, and in misreading the stability of the 
nation in this space of a disjunctive “national,” of an anxious “Mexico,” 
and of acting-out “Mexicans.”
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Conclusion
The consideration of the cosmopolitan sensibility at Chichén Itzá 
that I offer here is (lamentably, in my opinion) more backward- than 
forward-looking. It now seems that the cosmpolitanism rooted in 
Chichén Itzá’s ruins that has been emerging over the decades has a 
circumscribed (limited) political potential whose horizon  is presently 
contracting rather than expanding. In other words, the already existing 
cosmopolitanism doesn’t change the condition and indeed inequalities 
of labor regimes, land use, tenure, and ownership, and the exercise of 
local, indigenous politics at Chichén Itzá. What is more, the proto- and 
postnational space that is Chichén Itzá cannot resist ongoing waves of 
territorialization vigorously and repeatedly produced by capitalism in 
a neoliberal mode.
Given this matrix of competing interests in claiming the archaeologi-
cal heritage site, it would be impossible for us to conceive of Chichén 
Itzá as a hegemonic national space and, what is more, assert that Chi-
chén Itzá is an open ground, free and clear for the exercise of national 
identity. Using a concept borrowed from Jonathan Inda (2000: 86), 
we might understand Chichén Itzá as a “postnational zone . . . a space 
continually traversed by transnational flows of peoples and things” 
and, I might add, continually traversed by competing histories, beliefs, 
and rhetorics of belonging. The use of the “post” prefix here does not 
chronologically mark a recent decline or “death” of the nation; rather, 
“post” signifies the renewal of vigor in our analyses of how “the nation” 
operates in this geographical, discursive, and imagined site. I would 
like to suggest here that we understand Chichén Itzá as a postnational 
space in which “Mexicanness” comes to stand for a critical disjunction 
between local Maya claims to patrimony, the anxiety of national con-
trol over this cultural resource, private sector interventions, and the 
globalizing discourse of World Heritage.
The quotidian cosmopolitan sensibility at Chichén Itzá, as per-
formed by the various users of the archaeological site, informs and 
is informed by the larger challenge presenting itself at heritage sites 
across the globe. Specifically, I am speaking of the ability of the public 
sector, ranging from local communities to national governments, to 
maintain a controlling interest in heritage. As we contemplate the place 
of national patrimony in the globalizing world, we are led to ask: Is 
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Mexico “losing control,” as Saskia Sassen (1996) would put it, over its 
national cultural resources? Does the archaeological heritage field give 
us yet another example of the floundering, shrinking, or weakening 
of the sovereign nation-state, as many versions of globalization would 
have us imagine? We might use this case of the deterritorializing nation 
at Chichén Itzá as part of a broader critical inquiry at the intersection 
of local and global, taking neither as univocal or stable, to focus on 
the points of vulnerability in the supposedly stable mediating discourse 
and structure: the national. While many theories of globalization as-
sume or somehow require the stability of the nation-state as a medi-
ating “space” between the local and the global, thinking through the 
performance of quotidian cosmopolitanism throws into question not 
only the veracity but the ideology of this assumption.
One goal of this volume to which I hope this case study contributes 
is to distinguish the challenge of cosmopolitanism from the political 
largesse of multiculturalism. Especially instructive toward this end is 
the inherent refusal on the part of Chichén Itzá’s workers to situate 
themselves within the limited scope of identity politics. What I have 
also attempted here in this study of a Mexican national and World Her-
itage site is a critical intervention into what Beck and Sznaider (2006) 
call “methodological nationalism.” Translated into my own research, 
this means seeking to understand how “Mexico” signifies in practices, 
beliefs, and communities outside of the Mexican national territory. For 
me, the question has a slight (and ironic) twist: my goal is to under-
stand how “Mexico” has a fragile foothold at an archaeological heritage 
site that is, rather unambiguously, situated within Mexico’s national 
territory. More than a philosophical reflection or semiotic analysis, this 
critical stance vis-à-vis the nation is an expression of cosmopolitanism 
that can be practiced equally by visitors and the visited in a site of in-
ternational tourism.
Afterword
A recent trip to Chichén Itzá provided further pause for thought re-
garding the place of Mexico at the archaeological site. I arrived at 8:30 
am, opening time on a Sunday—the “free entrance day”—as in all of 
the state’s archaeological zones. But something was different. Already 
perspiring groups of early arrivals were crowded around the ticket 
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window that should have been closed, purchasing their entrance tickets 
before approaching the inah guards who awaited them at the bank 
of turnstiles with their stamp-pads and hole punchers in hand. Was 
Sunday no longer free, I asked myself? Then I noticed a steady trickle 
of people moving through the last turnstile, this one marked with a 
sign: Sunday is free for Mexican nationals (with proper identification). 
Mexicans passed through unencumbered, free to enjoy the heritage 
site. Perhaps there is, after all, a place for Mexico at Chichén Itzá.
Notes
1	 unesco, Pre-Hispanic City of Chichen-Itza,  http://whc.unesco.org/en/
list/483 (accessed November 1, 2006).
2	 As Lindsay Jones (1997: 288) points out, “The term Mexicanization, when 
applied to the glamorous confrontational drama between the Toltecs and the 
Maya at Chichén Itzá, is an obvious and telling misnomer since the Mexica, the 
preeminent third of the Aztec triple alliance, did not rise to prominence until 
some three centuries after the presumed Toltec conquest of Yucatán.” 
3	 Residents of Yucatán are not likely to refer to themselves as “Mexicanos” 
in cultural terms though they might in political terms. By this I refer to specific 
references to the rights and duties associated with formal citizenship (“somos 
Mexicanos” when speaking of voting rights), or when speaking of Mexican 
citizens in relation to other nations, for example, the plight faced by “us Mexi-
cans” when crossing the border into the United States.
4	 Yucatán was briefly independent in 1823 upon the fall of the emperor 
Agustin Iturbide, and the whole of the peninsula (including the present-day 
states of Yucatán, Campeche, and Quintana Roo) was declared a state within 
Mexico in 1824. Opposed to centralist authority emanating from Mexico City, 
Yucatán’s non-Maya landowners engineered the peninsula’s secession in 1839. 
The briefly independent Yucatán found its white elite-controlled government 
severely compromised by a Maya rebellion known as the Caste War. The di-
vided region was defeated by government forces in 1843. Though the Mexi-
can government promised autonomy to the region, Yucatán seceded again in 
January of 1846 when that promise was broken. During this secession, Yu-
catán contracted with the then Republic of Texas to provide naval support. 
Felipe Carillo Puerto’s short-lived Socialist Republic of Yucatán was declared 
in 1915. The political marginalization of the peninsula was complete when Yu-
catán lost the territory of Quintana Roo (the location of present-day Cancún) 
in 1902. This represented a “political defeat for the region as well as a severe 
economic loss,” and what’s more, “it demonstrated a complete subjugation 
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of potential regional growth to national interests and priorities” (Joseph 1988: 
67). 
5	 The workers’ position is aligned with what Beck and Sznaider (2006) 
describe in their use of cosmopolitanism as a critical intervention into “meth-
odological nationalism,” the use of the nation-state as a referential unit of 
territorial, societal, and cultural space, encompassing practices and processes 
therein.
O. Hugo Benavides
10  i   translating   
ecuadorian  modernities 
Pre-Hispanic Archaeology and the Reproduction  
of Global Difference
This is something. This has got to be contemporary. He’s really going to 
town. It’s very jaunty, very authoritative. His errand might prove to be 
impossible. He is challenging something—or something has challenged 
him. He’s grounded in immediate reality by the bicycle. . . . He’s appar-
ently a very proud and silent man. He’s dressed sort of polyglot. Noth-
ing looks like it fits him too well.—james baldwin, Perspectives: Angles on 
African Art
Anthony Appiah (1997b: 422) uses Baldwin’s particular description of 
a contemporary African art piece titled “Yoruba Man on a Bicycle” to 
open his discussion of the place of the modern in defining authentic 
African culture and identity. According to Appiah (1997b) unlike the 
other curators who had selected “authentic” pieces meant to emphasize 
the “primitivism” identity of the African past, Baldwin was interested 
in a broader understanding of what it meant to be African in today ’s 
world. It is this initial insight that Appiah has continued to develop in 
the last decade, serving in many ways as the central piece of his most 
recent book, Cosmopolitanism (2006a). In this contribution Appiah 
champions a much more dynamic understanding of identities and cul-
tures, one in which the past and the foreign are essential elements in 
the reproduction of contemporary and authentic cultural traditions.
As highlighted in the New York Times Sunday magazine, cosmo-
politanism was proposed as the newest philosophical trend looking to 
bridge the conservative and progressive divide. In this fashion authentic 
cultures no longer need to deny foreign elements but are rather defined 
by modern and postmodern ways of interpreting not only these same 
foreign elements but also notions of their ancient and recent pasts. This 
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is possible according to Appiah because “cultures are made of continu-
ities and changes, and the identity of society can survive through these 
changes. Societies without changes aren’t authentic; they ’re just dead” 
(Appiah 2006b: 34).
The powerful implications of seeing and defining cultures through 
change and the timing of such emphasis in the current moments of 
uneven global flows marks the backdrop for this chapter on the re-
lationship between archaeology and Ecuadorian modernities. More 
specifically I look to assess the power of a “cosmopolitan” ideology, as 
elaborated by Appiah and others (see Sahlins 1994; Žižek 2002, 2004; 
see also Baldwin 1984, 1990; and Coetzee 1996), within the context of 
Ecuadorian archaeological production, examining how the research of 
the past in the national landscape enters into, and contributes to, the 
debate of Ecuadorian and global modernities in such ways that it elu-
cidates the definition of the modern signifier itself. I will also address 
how these same archaeological enterprises contribute to contemporary 
forms of political and social identities in both subtle and explicit forms 
that are part of larger parameters and implications within the reproduc-
tion of global difference.
Reproducing Global Difference: The Specter of the Other 
Two of the most salient characteristics of a cosmopolitan ideology are 
its timeliness within the current moment of emphatic globalization 
and the fact that culture as change is an old anthropological motto. 
One must wonder about the central place of change in this contem-
porary definition of culture when modern and cyber capital are central 
forces in the reproduction of transnational economic exchanges. It is 
vital, in this fashion, to highlight the unequal manner in which global 
flows are exerted and the varying ways in which they ultimately sustain 
their ambiguous forces, precisely because they never work only in one 
direction, or in any type of moral absolute.
In J. M. Coetzee’s novel Foe is a telling commentary: “Cruso raised 
his head and cast me a look full of defiance. ‘I will leave behind my 
terraces and walls,’ he said. ‘ They will be enough. They will be more 
than enough.’ And he fell silent again. As for myself, I wondered who 
would cross the ocean to see terraces and walls, of which we surely had 
an abundance at home, but I held my peace.” As Kincaid (1997) has 
highlighted, the power to travel to see foreign “terraces and walls” is 
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both an economic and a cultural privilege with its own set of effusive 
forms of productive effects. Even the fact of who gets deigned to be a 
native, when we are all natives of sorts, is not without larger symbolic 
significations in a modern enterprise of globalization that wishes to 
hide many of the colonial specters hidden within its contemporary fig-
uration. To this degree, who visits whom, what products and services 
are exchanged, and what cultural markers are reproduced within these 
exchanges are of enormous political consequences, precisely because 
these rituals of capitalist exchanges have been singularly prescribed in 
the last two centuries, and yet there are multiple forms of identifica-
tion, signification, and reiteration that escape this homogenous form 
of political categorization (see Sahlins 1994).
As S. Hall (1997a, 1997b) elaborates, the fact that there is always some-
thing that escapes the social is a very powerful thing because it is precisely 
through that flight that new forms of political identities and agencies are 
enabled. It is in this sense that seeing culture as change has always been a 
very central ideological construct for the Western anthropological enter-
prise. Much earlier than other social scientists, anthropologists realized 
that the exotic and foreign other was far from that isolated native beg-
ging to be instructed in the rites of civilization. Perhaps this was because 
the mere presence of the anthropologists marked the long-standing 
nature of cultural interaction or even the fact that what had taken the 
anthropologists to these “supposedly ” far away places was the ideologi-
cal construct of otherness central to the Western sense of self.
The other, or more specifically the specter of the other, plays a par-
ticular form of cultural haunting within the modern forms of global-
ization and its central processes. To a certain degree it is expected that 
the old and neocolonial forms of exchanges and relationships will be 
forgotten within the new paradigm of development and globalization. 
However, the fact that the new development map could be easily fit-
ted into a nineteenth-century grid of colonizing and colonized regions 
speaks volumes to the persistent nature of exploitative global relations. 
The specter of the other is central to the imaginary of a modern and 
postmodern citizenry that continuously attempts to distance itself from 
the harrowing pictures of widespread ethnological and genocidal prac-
tices that contributed (and continue to do so) to the wealth and growth 
of capital in Europe and the United States.
It is within this double model of both postcolonial politics and also 
of Lacanian notions of the Real that Žižek understands the modern sys-
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tem of state terrorism and Islamic guerrilla mentality. It is at this partic-
ular crux that Žižek (2002) adequately refers to MacJihad, emphasizing 
the integrated nature of both the Western and Islamic claims to politi-
cal supremacy. However, it is not only that one necessarily feeds (and 
needs) the other, but that actually both forms of military intervention 
are the effects (excesses in Lacanian parlance) of much broader and 
richer cultural interactions that have determined the manner in which 
many of these social movements throughout the globe have been able 
to reify themselves as culturally authentic enterprises.
It is these multiple specters of the other that are central to the par-
anoid production of a conservative trend in the global sphere (see 
Appadurai 2006; S. Hall 1997a). These many forms of self-otherizing 
allow for new forms of cultural production that, as such, are both po-
litical and morally ambiguous, enabling multiple projects of political 
identification. In the Ecuadorian landscape, as in many other nation-
states and nationalizing projects (see Fox 1990; Dominguez 1990; and 
Williams 1990, 1996), it is not only the past but also the present that 
gets continuously otherized to re-create forms of cultural authentic-
ity that are used to redefine the national sphere in the same xenopho-
bic and racist manner that is globally prevalent. Meanwhile, multiple 
forms of progressive entities, from the launching of new forms of sus-
tainable development to eco-tourism and the reclaiming of indigenous 
human rights, are ambiguously invested in the reproduction of global 
difference. The past, particularly the pre-Hispanic and colonial past, 
plays a pivotal role in all of these different cultural enterprises, mark-
ing, in varied manners, new cultural forms of modernities within the 
Ecuadorian landscape.
It is these reifications of the other, particularly past others, that I 
wish to assess in the following analysis. Particularly I am interested 
in the manner in which these remnants of the pre-Hispanic past are 
continuously reused to define, reclaim, and legitimize new cultural 
ventures, both in terms of identification and in political negotiations. 
The archaeological enterprise becomes an invaluable tool in the hege-
monic reproduction, allowing a series of imaginary constructs to par-
ticipate continuously in the dynamic articulation of multiple forms of 
Ecuadorian modernities that get reproduced through, and against the 
backdrop of, global difference.
As a nation-state, Ecuador is continuously struggling to reproduce 
coherent narratives of self-legitimization that in many ways will cover 
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up its founding history of genocide and its unremitting racist exploita-
tion and discrimination. The Ecuadorian racial landscape is a complex 
one in which class and status markers are charged with meanings to 
create hybrid identities (i.e., cholos, montubios, mestizos, and so forth) 
and legitimize discriminatory forms of violence and rape. Mythical im-
ages of white foreigners (sometimes referred to as pishtacos, Nakaq, or 
sacaojos) accused of removing body parts, including fat, are rampant 
throughout the Andes and speak to the complex manner in which biol-
ogy, history, economics, and politics intermingle in the social produc-
tion of racial images. (See Weismantel 2001 for a thorough discussion 
of some of the main racial mythical images of the Andes.)
The initial decimation of the Native American (i.e., Indian) commu-
nities in the national territory is usually placed squarely on the coloniz-
ing shoulders of the Spanish Empire and never ascribed to the current 
Ecuadorian citizenry. However, this particular historical narrative is 
obviously one of fragile constitution, since the consistent forms of ra-
cial exploitation of indigenous peoples as indentured servants, maids, 
and other forms of exploitative labor have continued unremittingly for 
the last two centuries. Even after the defeat of the Spanish Empire in 
the early 1800s and the transition to neocolonial forms of domination 
at the hands of European entities, that is, France and Great Britain, 
and finally the United States, the racist constitution of the Ecuadorian 
nation has remained constant.
This particular racial hierarchy has proved precious to the nation’s 
reproduction of capital, allowing a white and mestizo minority to claim 
greater ownership of national public life and ultimately to define not 
only the political future of the nation but also to limit the historio-
graphical narrative production in the country. This particular racial 
legacy has also been inscribed within the country ’s three national geo-
graphical regions: the coast (including the Galapagos archipelago), the 
highlands, and the Amazon. The coast includes the most populous port 
city of Guayaquil (see below) and the province of Esmeraldas (border-
ing with Colombia at the north), which presents the highest concentra-
tion of Afro-Ecuadorians in the territory.
Meanwhile, the highlands hold the majority of the surviving Quechua- 
speaking Indian communities, with the Amazon representing a mixture 
of recent national migrants and traditional tribal communities. It is not 
a coincidence that these tribal groups have come to national and inter-
national attention through their litigation with oil companies that look 
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to literally mine their homelands (see Benavides 2004b). It is in these 
geographical landscapes that not only Indians but Afro-Ecuadorian 
communities have been continuously reified as the national other even 
though, or perhaps precisely because, their claim to a national Ecua-
dorian identity has equal or even greater geographical legitimization 
than does that of the white elite.
What is particularly telling is how these same nationally reified oth-
ers—Indians and blacks (along with Arab- and Asian-Ecuadorians who 
are pejoratively referred to as Turks and Chinese, respectively)—are also 
identities reproduced within the global landscape. Indians and black 
diasporic communities have been historically reproduced within the 
transnational and global distribution of capital, allowing both identi-
ties to achieve particular forms of global differentiations translatable in 
a wider market of symbolic signification. Therefore, it is this local re-
ification of diasporic otherness that is both indebted to and contributes 
to broader forms of global capital, which become an essential element 
of cosmopolitan articulation.
In the following three cases, I will examine the archaeological en-
terprise behind the constitution of Ecuador’s largest city, Guayaquil, 
the current pan-Indian movement, and the ambiguous place of Afro-
Ecuadorians within this same dynamic reproduction of the nation’s 
past (and present). My objective is to assess the manners in which these 
local-global articulating identities, which represent a larger member-
ship in a global market and an authentic rearticulation of vital forms of 
Ecuadorian modernities, are continuously reproduced in meaningful 
ways in the varying national landscape.
Guayaquilean Modernity: 
The Indian Past of a South American Miami 
One of the most significant traditional songs of Guayaquilean identifi-
cation contains the following verse:
Guayaquileño madera de guerrero
más fuerte y más valiente en todo el Ecuador,
no hay nadie que te iguale en fuerza y en coraje
lo digo en mi canción.
(Guayaquilean of warring stock
stronger and braver in all of Ecuador,
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nobody equals you in strength and courage
I say so in my song.)
It reflects not only the ambiguous elements of a warring Indian past, 
but also the essentially competitive patriarchal nature of the city. As 
part of their enculturation to their city, Guayaquileans are continu-
ously reminded of their brave Indian origins in the shape of the origi-
nal pre-Hispanic inhabitants of the same geographical landscape, the 
Manteños-Huancavilcas. These pre-Hispanic Indians are heralded as 
brave warriors who fought fiercely against Inca domination and were 
subdued only by the greater technology of the Spaniards and the on-
slaught of the epidemic diseases disseminated by them. Repeatedly 
the courage and bravery of this warring tribe is heralded as one of the 
primary traits inherited by Guayaquileans from the pre-Hispanic past, 
and it is one that serves to reinscribe the competitive nature of regional 
identification within the larger national landscape of the country.
The image of fierce resistance and proud heritage is similarly enshrined 
in the most popular explanation given for the origin of the city ’s name: 
Guayaquil is supposed to have come from the names of the leader of 
the Huancavilcas, Guayas, and his wife, Quil, who resisted the Span-
ish to their deaths. That is, when Guayas was killed by the Spaniards 
after he was captured, his wife preferred to jump to her death in the river 
(which carries her husband’s name) rather than “belong” to any Spanish 
men. This particular origin myth is quite similar to the racial and gender 
problematics presented in other American settings such as that with the 
Malinche in Mexico and in Peru. In this instance Quil is hailed as the true 
heroine, doing what La Malinche is blamed for not doing: dying rather 
than engaging in sexual intercourse, sleeping with the enemy, and in 
the process creating a new mestizo race (see Anzaldúa 1987; de la Cadena 
2000; Mallon 1996).
What both of these Indian references express is the ambiguously 
fragile nature of the city’s Indian past, where multiple forms of histori-
cal narratives need to be contained in hegemonic fashion to legitimize 
the current white and mestizo elite’s ideological stronghold. The Indian 
nature of the city cannot be denied: it is visible everywhere, from the 
physical elements in the bodies of Guayaquileans to the contemporary 
Indian presence at market places and construction sites to the very ori-
gins of many families whose grandparents migrated from highland 
Indian communities almost a century ago. However, this oversignifica-
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tion of an Indian past offers an impossible scenario of obsessive attach-
ments to a reified city identity that also must deny this Indian presence 
within the postcolonial mores of a whiter, that is, more “civilized” heri-
tage (see Butler 1997; Butler et al. 2002).
It is this particular schizophrenic divide that has defined the city ’s 
historiographical enterprise from its inception. This historical paranoia 
even goes to the extreme of reproducing the ideology of an “ancient 
past” (which is less than a century old), locally referred to as Guayaquil 
antiguo, as a metonymic device to rid the city of its Indian and black 
citizens. The images of Guayaquil at the end of the nineteenth century 
and the beginning of the twentieth have forever been captured in stencil 
representations and photographs. As are all reconstructions of the past, 
this one is also an artifice to reconstruct the past we thought or perhaps 
more accurately wished might have been (see Abu-el Haj 1995; Alonso 
1988; Castañeda 1996; Handler and Gable 1997; Kohl and Fawcett 1995; 
Patterson and Schmidt 1995; Trouillot 1995). 
The title Guayaquil antiguo itself offers antiquity, and through it au-
thority and authenticity to a past that is less than a century old. But 
more importantly the black and white representations of grand wooden 
houses, lumberyards, and empty central avenues depict a setting devoid 
of the class conflict, racial tension, and sexual repression that permeated 
the city at that time. These idealized representations of Guayaquil also 
provide a romantic fantasy of peace and tranquility for the largely white 
and white-mestizo, landholding elite. The lack of evidence of urban chaos 
in these pictures speaks volumes against the presence of two of the larg-
est social movements in the city (Liberal Revolution and the Worker’s 
Movement), as well as the massacre of thousands of workers that oc-
curred in Guayaquil during this period.
Archaeology, not surprisingly, has played an essential role in the dy-
namic reproduction of the city ’s official past, one in which dangerous ra-
cial and sexual specters are eliminated from the social imaginary of what 
the city might have been like, and even, more importantly, is like today. 
In its most immediate effect the image of the Indian must be simultane-
ously incorporated (since after all that is the objective of all pre-Hispanic 
archaeological excavations in the country) and sanitized to fit within the 
preordained cultural mores of appropriate behavior (buenas costumbres) 
and a troubled postcolonial identity. Most archaeological excavations 
have always taken place at a safe (geographically speaking) distance from 
the city ’s current location, particularly on the country ’s Pacific coast.
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Pre-Hispanic archaeological coastal sites such as Real Alto (Marcos 
1986, 1988), Salango (Norton 1986), and Agua Blanca (McEwan 
1990; McEwan and Hudson 2006) have provided the main reproduc-
tive sites where a modern (even postmodern) form of Indian ethnic-
ity is created. All three sites are heralded as important landmarks in 
Ecuador’s glorious Indian past, ones that are consistently denied any 
continuity of relationship or identification with any of the contempo-
rary self-identified modern Indian communities, most of which are 
strategically located in the highland (sierra) region of the country (see 
Benavides 2004a; Crain 1990). The Indian identities reproduced by the 
archaeological research in these three main sites, as well as several oth-
ers located closer to Guayaquil itself, can be incorporated into museum 
displays and contemporary debates of the city ’s (and coastal) Indian 
past without questioning the exploitative and hierarchically discrimi-
nating practices against Indians today.
What is equally telling is that all three sites have elaborated an integra-
tive approach to their archaeological research, aiming to incorporate the 
local communities into the research agenda itself. The sites have devel-
oped in situ museums that weave the archaeological data into a coher-
ent and continuous narrative with the local populations (comuna) that 
currently inhabit the towns closest to these ancient Indian communities. 
This particular form of historiographical recovery and production of 
heritage illustrates the telling racial and cultural processes that are both 
determined by and reflect the changing manner in which the Ecuadorian 
nation-state produces global difference at a local scale.
At all three sites, the archaeological data have contributed enormous 
political might to the local population’s struggle to be recognized as 
ethnic “Indians”—an identity that is no longer Indian in the traditional 
sense. Of course, the pitfall in this current political debate, as highlighted 
by Appiah’s (2006a) contribution, is that even the self-identified In-
dian communities of the highlands that make up the powerful conaie 
(Confederation of Indian Nationalities of Ecuador) are not traditional 
or authentic in some sort of past or “primitivist” conventional way. As 
Baldwin (see the opening epigraph to this chapter) so beautifully high-
lighted for the African exhibition described by Appiah (1997b), what is 
truly Indian is not some pristine form of cultural identification but rather 
a dynamic reworking of elements (and life itself ) that makes this form of 
identity sustainable in both historical and social terms.
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It is these same different types of Ecuadorian Indian identities, enabled 
and legitimized by global processes and sustained by the fluid nature of 
modern capital, that redefine what it means to be Indian and Ecuadorian, 
and even what globalization comes to mean in local terms. The identities 
reproduced in these coastal sites are no longer simply reproducing the 
“authentic” genre of the conaie (see below) but rather use archaeology 
to assert authenticity in a different fashion. All three sites reproblematize 
an ethnic identification of cholos that is normally used to refer to ex-In-
dian populations that have lost their ties with their ancestral population 
but still fail to reclaim authoritative identification within white and mes-
tizo racial discourses.
The term cholos is almost exclusively used not as a descriptive racial 
marker but as one inherently embedded with pejorative and demeaning 
connotations. Therefore it is quite a momentous endeavor to provide 
these cholo communities with an official claim to an ex-Indian identity 
while looking to offer a form of racial and cultural pride that goes against 
the very postcolonial structure of Guayaquil’s ethos as a non-Indian and 
modern city. It is these archaeological contributions that allow the comu-
nas to reclaim territorial rights to their lands based on the assertion of a 
pre-Hispanic ancestry and continuous occupation.
It is this same paradoxical identification offered by several decades of 
archeological research at these three sites that goes directly against the 
very nature of Guayaquil’s moral structure, which as the most modern 
city of Ecuador consistently thrives to dis-Indianize itself. The last decade 
has also seen an enormous investment in the city ’s infrastructure with 
the remodeling of the central promenade (el Malecón) and also the con-
struction of one of the biggest shopping malls in all of Latin America. It 
is exactly this particular sign of the Guayaquilean modern—reproducing 
itself as a South American Miami—that enters into direct conflict with its 
own Indian past. Yet at the same time it is also this Indian past that is se-
lectively used by archaeologist and coastal (cholo) communities to reclaim 
their authenticity in translatable modern and global terms.
The ultimate historical irony, and even appropriately so, is that the sup-
posed Huancavilca community that so proudly supports Guayaquilean 
patriarchal authority never seemed to have occupied the current area of 
the city ’s location at all. Furthermore, the ethno-historic accounts of the 
group depict quite explicit engagement of pervasive ritualized homo-
sexuality, which contradicts the official Guayaquilean patriarchal scripts 
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highlighted in the city’s museums and official textbooks (see Benavides 
2002).
Authentic Indian Identities: 
The conaie’s Reproduction of Global Hegemony
The conaie has garnered the most political muscle in the country 
within the last two decades in terms of projecting an authentic Indian 
identity. As the largest ethnic coalition, representing approximately 
twenty mainly highland and Amazonian Indian groups, it has been 
able to use an oppressed Indian identity as a political weapon that has 
been successfully wielded within the national and international politi-
cal scenes. Since the group’s initial explosion onto the mainstream po-
litical landscape, it has effectively stopped the country weeks at a time 
through nationally coordinated strikes, toppled two presidents, and 
formed one of the leading political parties, Pachakutik Nuevo País.
This particular explosion of the Indian into the national spotlight was 
quite slow in the coming, a direct product of decades (perhaps even cen-
turies) of long-term strategizing and painful historical lessons (conaie 
1989, 1997, 1998). It is only in this last period that an ethnic Indian iden-
tity, historically treated as a social handicap, has actually been transformed 
into a cultural asset, contributing to a surge in the actual number of self-
identified Indians in the country (a numerical increase that cannot be 
explained purely by birth ratios). However, it is precisely this ambiguous 
success of the conaie (and its political party, Pachakutik Nuevo País) 
and ultimately of a new form of Indian politics that provides an interest-
ing scenario for exploring the multiple ways in which modern signifiers 
are reproduced within contested types of global difference, and the dy-
namic manner in which the pre-Hispanic past is used to legitimize “new 
old ways” of reinstituting the sign of the local (see S. Hall 1997b).
The pre-Hispanic past plays an ambivalent role within the Indians’ 
reclaiming of territorial rights, a greater participation in the resources 
of the nation, and their ultimate goal of independent sovereignty (see 
conaie 1998). It is quite telling, and somewhat contradictory, that to 
date the conaie has never officially claimed any rights or direct control 
over an archaeological site. On the contrary, similar to Native American 
communities in the United States (see Deloria 1979 for the most explicit 
example), the Indian communities in Ecuador look at the archaeological 
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establishment as intimately tied to the xenophobic state apparatus. This 
sentiment is expressed by the group’s position that an Indian history has 
yet to be written because if it is written it will only represent the official 
lies of the government and its white and mestizo representatives (conaie 
1989).
However, even though official archaeological sites and the practice of 
archaeology itself have never been a direct object of appropriation by 
the conaie or any of its constitutive communities, the archaeological 
discourse is far from being considered a neutral enterprise. Many of the 
official publications of the conaie claim that archaeological discourses 
are strategically used to convey a new alternative version of the Ecua-
dorian past, one in which the Indian is no longer this inferior and de-
feated identity but rather is invested with intense racial pride and a reified 
cultural heritage. This alternative history offers a new narrative of the 
pre-Hispanic past in which all of the ancient Indian groups, including 
the conquering Incas, are invested with a new pan-Andean identity, and 
ultimately it forms one coherent historical entity.
The archaeological narrative serves to inscribe a new Indian identity 
that glosses over its modern configuration by representing itself as the 
authentic and traditional one. Not unlike the scenario highlighted by 
Baldwin and Appiah (1997b), it is the “primitivist” element, that is, a 
historically pristine context, that is favored in this particular variant of 
the modern Indian identity. Therefore a new modern (one could argue 
even for a postmodern) identification is derived from these contesting 
archaeological narratives to present itself as a valid Indian identity within 
the new reproduction of global capital. There is no way that Indians in 
Ecuador could have, so productively on their own, the political power to 
transform their modern identification as they have been able to do with-
out this archaeological reinforcement in the last couple of decades.
The fact that Indian communities have struggled to reclaim lands and 
resources that they feel are rightfully theirs is not a new historical reality. 
Rather, what is new is their modern identity, which is greatly indebted 
to a global form of enabling capital that allows them to translate their In-
dian difference in powerfully meaningful ways. It is no longer the Indian 
communities themselves battling against the oppressive postcolonial 
structure of the Ecuadorian nation-state. On the contrary, it is these same 
Indian communities forming coalitions with the Catholic and evangeli-
cal churches, the Ecuadorian army, the World Bank, the Inter-American 
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Development Bank, transnational ngos (nongovernmental organiza-
tions), and human rights and ecological organizations that allow Indians 
in Ecuador to negotiate their cultural identity favorably.
But it is the nature of the political context of the reproduction of an 
Indian cultural identity that speaks volumes to the manner in which the 
local and the global are mutually invested in the articulation of social dif-
ference, precisely because the Indians have been so successful in joining 
with the same forces (or at least their historical descendants) that were 
central in the genocidal destruction of Indian communities throughout 
the Americas for the last five centuries. The vital question is why is it 
that global capital seems more than ever invested in reproducing global 
differences in a way that seems to contradict the traditional economic ex-
ploitation that usually has little regard for the cultural survival of minor-
ity communities. Although the sincerity of global capital’s commitment 
to Indian (and native) identity could easily be doubted, it still begs the 
question of the place and role of global difference within the new market 
production of local identities, and their ultimate role in the postmodern 
form of globalization.
If contemporary Ecuadorian Indian communities and a global market 
are the local and global factors enabling a new definition of the native, 
the archaeological enterprise is particularly invested in this same identity 
production. The archaeological agenda carried out in Ecuador since the 
mid-nineteenth century has both explicitly and implicitly contributed to 
varying definitions of what the Indian is or means and the role that this 
racialized identity plays in the larger national imaginary, but it has never 
directly taken up the larger political implications of the discipline’s work. 
This contradictory presence of global capital has made archaeologists 
scramble for foreign and government money for their research and today 
allows the great transnational oil companies to be the most important 
source of funds for archaeological research in the country.
The fact that the salvage archaeology projects carried out in the Ama-
zon, Ecuador’s version of cultural resource management, are funded by 
these transnational oil companies speaks volumes to the modern forms 
of cultural production, particularly of the past, and in which archaeo-
logical research plays a central role. These transnational funds evidence 
how Ecuador as a whole cannot be a competitive player in today ’s global 
market without a coherent story of a pre-Hispanic historical narrative. 
Therefore, archaeologists provide in profound ways the means for le-
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gitimizing not only contemporary national political struggles but more 
importantly the way for a hegemonic entry into the contested domains 
of transnational market concerns (see Silberman 1995).
It is through questioning the greening of the past, the naturaliza-
tion of native rights, and the politics of transnational exploitation that 
funds archaeological research that a more realistic picture of the Ama-
zon region and Ecuador can be brought into focus. It is also in this 
charged environment that national imaginaries, Indian communities, 
and archaeological research in Ecuador will continue to enact the dif-
fering local and global forces at play in the region.
Therefore, this paradoxically modern Indian identity is profoundly ef-
fected by the way in which archaeology is funded and carried out in the 
country. The archaeological discourses are translated in varying manners 
to meet the political agendas of the state, Indian groups, archaeologists, 
and the general population at large. This is why constant coverage of the 
archaeological excavations, visits to in situ museums (as those discussed 
above), and continued reference to a glorious national Indian past are 
considered as central to the country ’s national imaginary.
The conaie’s strategic usage of the pre-Hispanic past belies a power-
ful hegemonic agenda that actually utilizes many of the same political 
elements it means to defeat. To a certain degree the growing influence of 
the conaie has allowed it to write its own particular version of the In-
dian past as the true one, in opposition to the one officially promulgated 
by the state. Although in this alternative version, it is the Indian and not 
the white Ecuadorian who can claim the central role in the script, it still 
fails to break free from many of the same postcolonial concerns of race, 
class, and gender that limit the playing field on which this new version 
is being defined. It is certain males from the Quechua communities with 
professional degrees that control the conaie’s agenda and in a profound 
way bring their own imaginations to what this new Indian identity is, or 
more importantly should look like.
The problem, of course, lies in assessing a manner in which truly liber-
ated forms of cultural identification are possible when the local/global 
paradox is essential to these new modern (and postmodern) forms of 
identity. At the same time the use of the pre-Hispanic past in the con-
struction of Indianness in Ecuador speaks to the central concern of 
Appiah (2006a) and all the other authors (see Baldwin 1984; Butler 
1997; Sahlins 1994) with the hybrid manner in which culture is always 
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produced. Indian identity in Ecuador today does not have the traditional, 
pristine character that is sold to tourists, activists, and the World Bank. 
Rather, the more normative hegemonic Indian identity put forward by 
the conaie is a powerful and strategic political tool with which to coun-
ter the oppression of Indian communities that has continued despite the 
supposed democratic transformation of the world market. The key of 
course is not to question the authenticity of this modern Indian identity 
but rather to question our own limited notions and assumptions about 
authenticity and cultural purity (see Malkki 1995), just as Appiah (2006a) 
has done.
The Indian movement is not a representative of some pristine cultural 
authenticity but rather a “reconversion” of previous social symbols and 
meanings in contemporary terms (García-Canclini 1992). In this complex 
reality the Indian movement is the most modern signifier of Ecuador’s 
contemporary political struggle—a struggle that is now fought beyond 
the country ’s borders. This particular global context renders the Indian 
movement’s financial support and identity very fragile. If the counter-
hegemonic demands of the conaie are met, and this could only occur 
in a global economic reordering, the movement would pretty soon find 
itself with no more first world ngos and development projects to fund 
it, and perhaps more dramatically, it would find itself without a cultural 
global understanding in which Indians could translate their identity in 
such a positive manner. After all it is instructive that it has taken Indian 
groups this long to find a cultural context that would enable their politi-
cal projects and historical legacy, since Indian uprisings are not new but 
their current transnational success is.
Making Afro-Ecuadorian Histories: 
Challenging the Multicultural Past
The most recent success of Ecuador in the World Cup (2006) high-
lighted yet another of Ecuador’s vital racial fractures, the presence of a 
significant Afro-Ecuadorian population. Most, if not all, Ecuadorians 
were delighted by the fact that Ecuador’s national soccer team was able 
to pass to the next round of the competition and represent the country 
with enormous pride and success. However, not all Ecuadorians were 
equally delighted by the fact that almost two-thirds of the team was 
made up of black men, and many voiced their worries over what kind 
of image this would give to the rest of the world. The main preoccupa-
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tion of course was that people around the globe would believe Ecuador 
to be a black nation, which for most of Ecuador’s citizens is just not 
true in any regard.
This same concern arose when a black woman was elected Miss Ec-
uador to represent the country at the Miss Universe pageant twice, in 
1995 and again in 1997. The ensuing national debate in newspapers, 
radio programs, and magazines was consistently defensive about it 
not being a racist one. On the contrary, most opinions highlighted the 
beauty and qualities of each contestant (as everybody did about the 
brilliant athletes that represented Ecuador in the World Cup) while 
questioning the authenticity of having Afro-Ecuadorians represent the 
nation as a whole. Of course the underlying racist assumption in such 
a debate was unconscious for many but served to refocus the debate on 
Ecuador’s national identity, particularly within the new global context 
of multiculturalism and participation in the democratic respect for mi-
norities and natives central to a transnational human rights agenda (see 
Benavides 2004b).
What most Ecuadorians failed to assess was the particular position of 
Afro-Ecuadorians within the Ecuadorian historical landscape, and the 
specific contradictions in envisioning a multicultural past that is more 
a present chimera than an archaeological reality. The presence of black 
communities in Ecuador is indebted to the southern extension in the 
Americas of the colonial market of African slaves, most of whom were 
brought through the Caribbean all the way down the South Ameri-
can Pacific coast. As Bryant (2005) elaborates, Quito, Ecuador’s capi-
tal, is much more instructive as a case study of colonial Afro-American 
ethonogenesis than has been traditionally accepted. Meanwhile, the 
northern province of Esmeraldas, which has the highest presence of 
Afro-Ecuadorian inhabitants, traditionally has been reified as a run-
away slave community that succeeded in maintaining its independence 
from the colonial government of the time.
True or not, the presence of black communities in Ecuador is as re-
cent as that of white and mestizo ones, but unlike them, as the Miss 
Ecuador debate suggests, Afro-Ecuadorians are seen as less Ecuadorian 
or at least not authentic representatives of the nation. This particular 
narrative structure can be understood by the fact that all pre-Hispanic 
excavations are somehow related to the current Ecuadorian (read white 
and mestizo) population even when the excavations are really assessing 
Indian communities from hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of 
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years before Ecuador even existed. This dual standard in the historical 
discourse reflects the racial conundrums of the nation and the disparate 
ways that the pre-Hispanic narrative is incorporated into the current 
racist structure of the nation-state.
The colonial past of Afro-Ecuadorians becomes a very specific (and 
absent) marker of archaeological research, while the white and mes-
tizo past is picked and chosen from the archaeological elements offered 
by pre-Hispanic and colonial excavations. It is not surprising that few 
clearly defined black sites have been the object of archaeological re-
search, with very limited exceptions in the province of Esmeraldas (see 
DeBoer 1996). This particular lack of interest in the archaeological past 
of black maroon populations expresses the truer sentiments of most 
white and mestizo Ecuadorians toward Afro-Ecuadorians; it is a par-
ticular postcolonial conundrum of Western-influenced racism that is 
now faced with shifting mores of multiculturalism and the new trans-
national concerns with embracing global difference.
However, the multicultural present put forward by transnational orga-
nizations and the global market of mtvs and show business, contradicts 
the absence of such a multicultural past not only in the archaeologi-
cal agenda, but in the imagination of the nation. How does one begin 
to constitute a past of difference when these particular diasporic black 
identities only now, in the last decades of modern capital, have been so 
invested with such high degrees of political signification? How does one 
translate the cultural resignification of a diasporic black identity that is 
maligned locally throughout the globe yet constituted as an exoticized 
precious other within the global definition of democratic ideals?
This particular dynamic immediately questions the uneven assess-
ment of the country ’s pre-Hispanic heritage as belonging more to 
some national communities than others, forcing one to extricate the 
rich cultural legacy in unequal forms. Therefore it is not only, or even 
mainly, an issue of developing concrete archaeological projects that 
would address the colonial heritage of Afro-Ecuadorian communities 
but rather of asking why these archaeological projects must be thought 
of in this fashion, when those concerning the white and mestizo elite 
are not. Yet it is this same ambiguous reification that makes an Afro-
Ecuadorian identity so pregnant with local demarcation that belies at 
the same time the large global parameters that are being imposed on all 
the national communities.
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The pre-Hispanic archaeological discourses of the country have been, 
and continue to be, used by differing national groups in a multitude 
of legitimizing fashions. However, within the hegemonic structure of 
the state, these archaeological discourses are already limited not only 
in their productive potential but equally so in their interpretive pos-
sibilities, enabling and legitimizing some national communities over 
others. It is within these inherent structural constraints that a modern 
Afro-Ecuadorian identity reflects the clear racial fracture in the con-
flicting order of the nation’s imaginary ideal. After all, it is precisely 
within this striving for the modern that the actual modernity of Afro- 
Ecuadorians reveals the contradictory origin of the discourse of a mul-
ticultural legacy.
The fact that Afro-Ecuadorians are denied an ancient past signals a 
new sign of the modern that in itself is different from the limited (and 
safe) one hoped to be achieved by the struggling Ecuadorian nation-
state. As is the case with the conaie (as discussed above) the Ecuador-
ian nation-state wants a modernity or a sign of the modern full of a 
profoundly meaningful, racialized ancient past. However, it is finding 
an undifferentiated ancient Indian past, without markers of a legacy of 
exploited Africans that is inherent in the agenda of pre-Hispanic (and 
colonial) archaeology in the country. This limited multicultural past in 
many ways is then used to negotiate and support a new multicultural 
agenda that tries to include all the different races and nationalities that 
make up the modern Ecuadorian nation-state.
This conflict between a globally infused, racialized, multicultural pres-
ent and a racist hegemonic past speaks to wider discursive constraints 
that limit the production of both. The manner in which Afro-Ecuador-
ians have been erased from the archaeological landscape has less to do, 
of course, with the archaeological evidence found at sites and through-
out the territory than with the racist underpinnings of the nation. The 
research into a black Ecuadorian past has never been an essential need 
or desire of the postcolonial structure of the country, and as such the 
lack of inquiry into these black communities’ histories belies the greater 
discriminatory practices against Afro-Ecuadorians in general.
The problem issues from the fact that in these modern times a ge-
neric Indian past and a white and mestizo present are no longer viable 
transnationally. The modern nation-states must be multicultural ones 
that reincorporate the differentiated pasts of their native and minority 
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communities. And it is at this point that the absence of an Afro- 
Ecuadorian past mirrors the limited and superficial production of a 
multicultural present. As in the United States, the archaeological re-
covery of an African legacy is yet again demanded by the changing poli-
tics within the discipline, which must explain the lack of racial diversity 
among its members and research endeavors. Yet the explicit urgency of 
recovering the African past in the Americas is only a symptom (not the 
solution) of the colonial conundrum inherent in the racist structure of 
the West’s historical legacy.
Thus, the concern is not with trying to recover an Afro-Ecuadorian 
past, but rather with assessing the contemporary motivations that make 
such an archaeological endeavor valid today throughout the Ameri-
cas (see also examples from Quilombos in Brazil). Just as the Indian 
struggle has been permanent for five centuries but only now is being 
translated in understandable Western terms, the presence of a vibrant 
Afro-Ecuadorian past is also an element of profound global mecha-
nisms inherent in the production of the local Ecuadorian landscape.
At the same time this racialized archaeological endeavor also always 
speaks to the vanishing present, questioning the fabric of a recently re-
formed Ecuadorian constitution that in the 1990s heralded the country 
as “a multicultural nation.” This particular phrasing was one political 
step shorter than the one advocated by the conaie, which demanded 
the recognition of Ecuador as “a multinational state.” Yet again, the 
modern burden of the global allowed the country to reformulate itself 
in limited modern ways, assessing the changing nature of its racialized 
present but still unwilling to thoroughly reexamine the very geno- and 
ethnocidal origins of all contemporary American nation-states.
As Ernst Renan stated over one hundred years ago, part of being 
a nation is getting its history wrong, and the lack of a vibrant legacy 
of Afro-Ecuadorian archaeological research is one more troubling 
example of the profound truth of this remark. After all it is this very 
limited facade of racial democracy that has marked Ecuador (and other 
South American nations) as opposing the supposed racist structure of 
the United States. Yet it is this actually racist structure supporting the 
new banner of a multicultural present that speaks most directly to a 
modern signifier that should allow the country membership into the 
democratic nations while it is still renegotiating colonial specters of the 
other that continuously return to repress their contemporary heirs (see 
Žižek 2004).
translating ecuadorian modernities  247
“Inconclusion”: Translating 
Archaeological Modernities in Ecuador 
Slavoj Žižek observes in Organs Without Bodies: “When G. K. Chesterton 
describes his conversion to Christianity, he claims that he ‘tried to be 
some ten minutes in advance of the truth. And I found that I was eigh-
teen years behind it.’ Does the same not hold even more for those who, 
today, desperately try to catch up with the New by way of following 
the latest “post” fashion and are thus condemned to remain forever 
eighteen years behind the truly New?” The examples of Guayaquilean, 
Indian, and Afro-Ecuadorian modernities have been used to express 
the overarching burden of the global upon the contemporary produc-
tion of identities in Ecuador today. More specifically, these same iden-
tities are highly invested in utilizing a pre-Hispanic past to be able to 
recreate their new local identification in ways that are translatable or 
legitimized in contemporary terms. All three cases show the subtle, and 
at times jarring, relationship between the past and the (vanishing) pres-
ent (see Spivak 1999), as well as between the local and global ideological 
constructs of our postmodern world. The archaeological enterprise in 
Ecuador is constrained by local/global discourses that define and struc-
ture its parameters yet fail to completely limit its cultural production.
As both Australian examples convey (see the chapters by Lydon and 
Lilley, this volume) the heritage enterprise highlights the conflict be-
tween the construction of a world defined by the local constitution 
of difference and the supposed global homogeneity of culture. This is 
what allows native populations to be hailed as central historical figures 
by a transglobal heritage discourse while these same communities are 
vilified within their own national realm. This is precisely why all other 
non-Indian identities are barely the object of archaeological inquiry in 
the Ecuadorian landscape, since none of them would be translatable 
in global terms. What constitutes Ecuador as such an example is an 
Indian past (not present) sustained by an archaeological practice that 
responds to a Western global ideal of whiteness hidden under the frag-
ile veil of local difference.
However, it is also in this conflicted production that the varying 
Ecuadorian modernities escape absolute definition (see S. Hall 1997a, 
1997b), allowing not only the present but also the pre-Hispanic past 
to be used in such varying manners by the state, city, Indians, and 
Afro-Ecuadorians. In this “minimal difference” (see Butler 1997; Žižek 
248 O. Hugo Benavides
2004) the vanishing and cosmopolitan present is produced. It is not 
in the glorious reclaiming of authentic Indian identities or in the her-
alding of an absent black past that the most cosmopolitan sign of the 
modern is reified in Ecuador, but rather the opposite; that is, it is in 
these legacies, both historically and culturally speaking, inherent in all 
of these postcolonial guises of multiculturalism, mestizo miscegenation, 
and political correctness that one must gather the terrifying and pro-
ductive void of the Real (see Baldwin 1984; Lacan 1995; Žižek 2002).
As postcolonial entities, Ecuador and Ecuadorians have continuously 
mirrored the outside other to define what it would mean to be truly hu-
man and acceptable in global terms. In the colonial process these same 
otherizing mechanisms created differentiated identities that slowly were 
internalized no longer as foreign but as national others, creating no 
longer the dilemma of “not you” but of “like you” (see Trinh T. Minh-ha 
1997). And now, under the constraints of a globalizing enterprise of 
embracing difference, in trying to incorporate the other, the Ecuador-
ian nation-state must acknowledge the paradox in its historical incon-
sistencies. Of course there is no turning back to right historical wrongs, 
but just looking at that past provides shudders of identification that 
will have structurally transforming implications, precisely because the 
past has not passed and inhabits our present being in multiple ways. As 
Baldwin (1990: 480) prefigured: “ To overhaul a history, or to attempt 
to redeem it—which effort may or may not justify it—is not at all the 
same thing as the descent one must make in order to excavate a history. 
To be forced to excavate a history is, also to repudiate the concept of 
history, and the vocabulary in which history is written; for the written 
history is, and must be, merely the vocabulary of power, and power is 
history ’s most seductively attired false witness.”
Note
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